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Executive Summary 
The Pay Equity Unit1 of the Fair Work Commission commissioned this independent report in order 
to assist parties to proceedings under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Fair Work Act), 
which HQDEOHVWKH&RPPLVVLRQWRPDNHDQµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQRUGHU¶WRHQVXUHµHTXDO
UHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQZRUNHUVIRUZRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶ for specified 
employees. It was commissioned to help parties engage in productive discussions with one 
another, and to inform them about the matters they might be required to address and the type of 
evidence that might be required in an equal remuneration proceeding. The report was required to 
build upon ± and indeed it incorporates material from ± an earlier report (Romeyn et al 2011) 
prepared for what was then Fair Work Australia (FWA). 
This report is intended to be a resource that: 
x explains the background to Part 2-7;  
x analyses both Part 2-7 and other relevant provisions in the Fair Work Act; and  
x outlines how Part 2-7 was interpreted and applied in the only test case to date, involving the 
making of an equal remuneration order for the social and community services (SACS) sector.  
As requested by the Pay Equity Unit, the report is intended to be enriched by a broader discussion 
of equal remuneration principles, materials, legislation, cases and relevant research, both 
internationally as well as at the State and national levels in Australia,WDOVRUHIHUVWRµJRRG practice¶ 
approaches for equal remuneration matters.  
Given that the new jurisdiction is at an early stage of development, these tasks have necessarily 
required us to form and express opinions as to the possible meaning and effect of the legislation. 
Both those opinions, and our assessment of what might be regarded as good practice in this area, 
are based on a careful and rigorous assessment of the legislation, its interpretation in the only 
major test case to date, and a large body of available literature on possible approaches to the issue 
of equal remuneration, both in Australia and overseas. 
We believe that the analysis we have presented will assist both applicants and respondents in 
understanding and interpreting Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act, and the types of evidence that may 
be used either in support of, or to resist, the making of an equal remuneration order. 
Preparation of this report has involved a two-stage process. A draft report was posted on the 
CommissLRQ¶VZHEVLWHRQ2FWREHU, with interested parties invited to provide written 
comments to the Pay Equity Unit by 13 November 2013. The 11 responses received can be viewed 
RQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VZHEVLWH2 
We have made various changes to the report in response to these comments. In some instances 
we have adopted suggested amendments. In others ± especially where we do not agree with a 
comment or have not fully accepted a suggestion for change ± we have noted the views of the 
                                                     
1 The Pay Equity Unit is a specialist administrative unit within the Fair Work Commission that undertakes and commissions 
independent research and provides information about pay equity matters under the Fair Work Act 2009. 
2 See http://www.fwc.gov.au/index.cfm?pagename=adminremuneration (accessed 25 November 2013). 
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commenting organisation, referencing its submission. We are grateful to those who took the trouble 
to respond. In our view their input has significantly improved the final document.  
Before going on to summarise what appears in each chapter of the report, we would like to make it 
clear that the report is the product of independent research and represents the views of its authors, 
not of the staff or members of the Fair Work Commission.  
Chapter 1 ± Introduction 
This chapter introduces the report, outlines its structure, explains our approach to the project and 
touches on some definitional matters. It also notes the feedback received from stakeholders in 
response to the draft version of the report released in October 2013 and makes some general 
comments in response to points raised in a number of the stakeholder submissions.  
Chapter 2 ± Equal remuneration: The international picture  
This chapter commences by outlining the international labour standards which provide a platform 
for both legislation and practice in Australia, notably the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Convention No 100 concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of 
Equal Value (Equal Remuneration Convention No 100). This Convention requires adherence to the 
principle of µHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQZRUNHUVIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶, which is 
defined by the Convention to PHDQµUates of remuneration established without discrimination based 
on sex¶.  
After referring to the interpretation of the Equal Remuneration Convention, Chapter 2 moves to set 
RXWVRPHEDVLFLQWHUQDWLRQDOGDWDRQWKHµgender pay gap¶*3* ± defined as a ratio that converts 
average female earnings into a proportion of average male earnings to calculate the pay gap 
between the sexes. The Chapter then describes and summarises some outcomes of a series of 
country studies that are set out in detail in Appendix C.  
In these studies, we examine legislation and practice in ten countries, all Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members, selected because of their 
comparability to Australia, and because they each demonstrate aspects of what by international 
standards would be regarded as good practice in relation to the regulation of equal remuneration. 
These countries are Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. There is also an analysis of European Union 
(EU) standards, which set out the requirements for EU countries in terms of achieving equal 
remuneration. For each country we set out the legislation and some relevant recent case law; 
provide an overview of the various processes within the country for achieving equal remuneration, 
including promotional aspects as well as complaint mechanisms; and briefly summarise specific 
features that are particular to each country. 
Chapter 2 summarises lessons learned from the country studies and also highlights aspects of 
good practice by the selected countries in their endeavours to achieve gender pay equity: 
x In relation to legislation there is discussion and analysis of the provisions in the various 
countries as to:  
 µZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶ 
 µUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶;  
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 the limitations of gender pay equity being dealt with through the lens of sex 
discrimination;  
 the exceptions which are defined in legislation to allow for differences in remuneration 
which do not breach the international standard;  
 provisions which reverse the burden of proof in cases so that the entire burden does not 
lie on the applicant; and  
 the statutory requirements for employers to provide information about remuneration.  
x Regarding national policy, reference is made to the proactive approach required by all 
member states of the ILO to develop national plans and policies to address the GPG and 
promote equal remuneration. Similarly, the European Commission as well as the European 
Parliament has called on all member states to reduce the GPG and encourage social partners 
to create more gender-equal wage structures. Country examples of such initiatives are 
described. 
x Government institutional supports which have been developed in each of the countries to 
address gender pay equity show a diversity of approaches. They include the use of 
ombudsmen, human rights commissions and pay equity commissions which endeavour to 
mediate and/or resolve complaints without the need to progress to court litigation. The 
research undertaken indicates an overall decline in the number of cases taken before courts 
and tribunals, with most cases being resolved by processes such as investigation, mediation 
and various forms of arbitration through other governmental institutions. Good practice also 
reveals the use of experts in relation to assessing work of equal value as well as equal 
remuneration to be applied, to assist the work of courts, tribunals or other government 
institutional bodies. 
x The country studies reveal an increasing trend towards either legislation which requires 
employers to undertake pay equity measures, or voluntary self-assessment by employers 
which is regularly monitored. Depending on the size of the organisation, the pay equity 
measures may take the form of pay equity plans, audits or annual reports which are regularly 
monitored and assessed externally by governmental bodies. Good practice examples are 
discussed, which include references to detailed guidelines developed by government bodies 
for use of all participants involved in equal remuneration. There is also reference to practice in 
countries in which there is highly structured centralised collective bargaining and wage setting, 
but where there is still a requirement for individual enterprises to take and report on pay equity 
measures. 
x The range of requirements on employers to provide information on remuneration present 
across the countries studied is discussed. Good practice examples are provided.  
x Drawing on examples across a number of the countries studied, a detailed discussion is 
provided about various models for assessing the value of work and in particular, 
PHWKRGRORJLHVIRUDSSUDLVLQJZRUNRIµHTXDOYDOXH¶ZKLFKDUHXVHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\7KH
discussion concerns objective appraisals of work and the method for measuring and 
comparing the relative value of different jobs. It includes a discussion about analytical and 
non-analytical schemes, recognising that most of the schemes referred to are concerned with 
single workplaces or organisations. Common analytical schemes are discussed, which include 
defining and attaching scores to four major factors: skills and qualifications, responsibility, 
effort and working conditions. Emphasis is placed upon the essential requirement for any 
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scheme to ensure that the analysis is objective and free from gender bias and, in doing so, to 
identify hidden or frequently ignored skills of women in feminised jobs. Specific good practices 
are referred to and in particular whether it is necessary to identify a comparator for the 
purpose of assessing whether work is of equal value and thereafter to ensure equal 
remuneration. The conclusion on this portion of the review is that good practice is one which 
provides the most flexible approaches to identifying and remedying gender pay inequity. Such 
approaches are not limited by requiring male dominated job comparators, or a male 
comparator, but may permit a representative comparator, a female comparator or a proxy in 
the absence of any relevant comparator, or no comparator. 
x A final section is on enforcement procedures and remedies which are used in the various 
jurisdictions. All jurisdictions appear to have a common problem of multiple avenues for 
redress, making it difficult for complainants to understand which jurisdiction to select. In 
general the options are largely dependent upon whether a complainant is a union member, 
whether the claim is for gender discrimination or whether it is a claim for gender pay inequity, 
the nature of the relief sought, and the time-limits related to the claim.  
The overall conclusion of Chapter 2 is that a review such as this provides an important opportunity 
for Australia to consider where it sits in its approach to tackling the ongoing issue of gender pay 
inequity. The examples presented in the report may suggest ways forward and inform the 
Commission and parties to applications in considering different approaches in addressing evidence 
and procedures in equal remuneration cases.  
Chapter 3 ± The Fair Work Act 
This chapter begins by summarising the historical background to the Fair Work $FW¶VSURYLVLRQV
That background is dealt with in more detail in Appendix A, concerning developments in the federal 
jurisdiction, and Appendix B, which examines approaches at State level. Reference is made, 
among other matters, to: 
x the original practice, within the federal award system, of setting lower minimum rates of pay for 
women compared to men performing the same work, on the basis that women did not need to 
support a family; 
x the gradual abandonment of that approach and the adoption by the federal industrial tribunal ± 
most notably in the Equal Pay Cases of 1969 and 1972 ± of the principle of equal pay for 
equal work; 
x the introduction in 1993 of a statutory power for the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission to make orders to ensure equal pay for work of equal value, as defined by the 
Equal Remuneration Convention ± a power which, although left largely unchanged by the 
+RZDUG*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHIRUPVRIDQGZDVQHYHUVXFFHVVIXOO\LQYRNHG 
x WKHDGRSWLRQLQWKHHDUO\VRIEURDGHUµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQSULQFLSOHV¶(53VE\WKH1HZ
South Wales and Queensland Industrial Relations Commissions, in each case in response to 
detailed pay equity inquiries; and 
x the use of those principles to secure wage adjustments in a range of feminised industries 
(including childcare and community services), until the application of the relevant State 
legislation in the non-government sector was curtailed by the progressive expansion of the 
federal system in 2005 and 2009±10. 
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Key features of the Fair Work Act are then examined. The Fair Work Act addresses the objective of 
pay equity in two distinct ways. One is through the general provisions for the setting and 
adjustment of pay rates through modern awards or national minimum wage orders. Both the 
µPRGHUQDZDUGVREMHFWLYH¶LQVHFWLRQDQGWKHµPLQLPXPZDJHVREMHFWLYH¶ in section 284 oblige 
WKH)DLU:RUN&RPPLVVLRQWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWµthe principle of equal remuneration for work of 
HTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶. Sections 156(3) and 157(2) also allow modern award minimum wages 
WREHYDULHGIRUµZRUNYDOXHUHDVRQV¶Section 156(4) defines these as µUHDVRQVMXVWLI\LQJWKH
amount that employees should be paid for doing a particular kind of work, being reasons related to 
any of the following: (a) the nature of the work; (b) the level of skill or responsibility involved in 
doLQJWKHZRUNFWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKHZRUNLVGRQH¶  
7KHUHKDVEHHQDORQJWUDGLWLRQRIµZRUNYDOXH¶DGMXVWPHQWVWRDZDUGUDWHV+LVWRULFDOO\WULEXQDOV
have demanded evidence of some change in the nature of the work, skill and responsibility 
required or the conditions under which the relevant work is performed, since the last time that the 
work in question was formally assessed. But it is as yet unclear whether the Fair Work Act 
provisions will be interpreted as importing that criterion. 
The second (and more specific) set of provisions in the Fair Work Act dealing with pay equity are 
those in Part 2-7. This permits employees, trade unions or the Sex Discrimination Commissioner to 
apply to the Commission for the making of an order to ensure that, for specified employees, there 
will be equal remuneration for work of equal or comparable value. Such an order may increase (but 
not decrease) rates of remuneration for the affected employees, if necessary in stages. A failure by 
an employer to comply with such an order, which overrides any inconsistent award or agreement, 
may result in a penalty being imposed or other remedies being awarded by a court under Part 4-1 
of the Fair Work Act. 
Our analysis of Part 2-7 in Chapter 3 highlights the following points, among others: 
x The provisions embody a broader conception of equal remuneration than under the equivalent 
provisions in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WR Act), and before that the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988. The Fair Work Act not only refers to work of equal or comparable value, 
but makes no mention of any need to establish discrimination. 
x Unlike the position under New South Wales or Queensland law, the Commission is not 
required to ensure equal remuneration. Although it cannot make an order unless it is satisfied 
that equal remuneration does not exist for the employees concerned, this is a necessary but 
not sufficient consideration for the exercise of what is framed as a discretionary power. 
x In exercising this discretion, the Commission is not constrained by either the modern awards 
objective in section 134 or the minimum wages objective in section 284, and need not 
conceive of an equal remuneration order as being part RIWKHµVDIHW\QHW¶Rf minimum terms 
and conditions under the Fair Work Act. 
x The Commission is, however, obliged by sections 302(4) and 578 to take into account: 
 any determinations made by its Expert Panel (formerly the Minimum Wage Panel) in the 
annual wage reviews mandated by Part 2-6 of the Fair Work Act; 
 the overall objects of the statute; 
 µHTXLW\JRRGFRQVFLHQFHDQGWKHPHULWVRIWKHPDWWHU¶DQG 
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 µWKHQHHGWRUHVSHFWDQGYDOXHWKHGLYHUVLW\RIWKHZRUNIRUFHE\KHOSLQJWRSUHYHQWDQG
eliminate discrimination on the basis RI>YDULRXVJURXQGVLQFOXGLQJVH[@¶ 
x There is nothing in the Fair Work Act that either requires the Commission to formulate an ERP 
to guide its determinations under Part 2-7, or forbids it from doing so. 
x An order under Part 2-7 must be directed to rates of µUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶$OWKRXJKWKLV term is not 
defined in the Fair Work Act, it arguably extends beyond wages to cover any form of reward for 
services rendered, including non-cash benefits. 
Section 721(1) of the Fair Work Act precludes the making of an equal remuneration order if the 
Commission is satisfied that the employees in question can access DQµDGHTXDWHDOWHUQDWLYH
UHPHG\¶WKDWZLOOHQVXUHHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQ, under a federal, State or Territory law (including 
another provision in the Act itself). To constitute an adequate alternative, another cause of action 
would need to be commensurate in effect to an application for an equal remuneration order. In our 
view, the capacity to seek the making of an enterprise agreement or the adjustment of award rates 
of pay for the relevant work would not satisfy that criterion. 
Section 724 also precludes the making of an order where proceedings for an µDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\¶WR
ensure equal remuneration, or against unequal remuneration, have actually been commenced 
under a federal, State or Territory law and not been discontinued or failed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Since it is merely an alternative remedy that is relevant here, as opposed to an adequate 
alternative, section 724 evidently sets a bar that is lower than that required under section 721. It is 
arguable, for instance, that an applicant could not simultaneously pursue an application for an 
equal remuneration order and a work value adjustment under sections 156(3) or 157(2). 
Chapter 4 ± The SACS case 
The SACS case was initiated by the Australian Services Union (ASU) and four other unions in 
2010, to extend the benefit of an equal pay case successfully run under Queensland law.  
In May 2011, in Re Equal Remuneration Case ,5µER Case No 1¶, a Full Bench of 
what was then FWA determined that work in the SACS sector was undervalued on a gender basis. 
But it also sought further submissions as to how this might be remedied, and in particular as to the 
extent to which the undervaluation was gender-based. In February 2012 a majority of the Bench 
accepted a joint ASU-Commonwealth submission that increases of between 19 and 41 per cent 
should be ordered to the minimum wage rates set by the Social, Community, Home Care and 
Disability Services Industry Award 2010. There was also a special 4 per cent loading, to recognise 
impediments to bargaining in the industry: see Re Equal Remuneration Case (2012) 208 IR 4465 
µER Case No 2¶. The terms of an equal remuneration order were settled in June 2012: Re Equal 
Remuneration Case (2012) 223 IR 410. The Award itself was not varied, with the order instead 
RSHUDWLQJRQDµVWDQGDORQH¶EDVLV. Both the increases and the loading are being phased in over an 
eight-year period that commenced in December 2012. 
Our analysis of the CoPPLVVLRQ¶VUXOLQJVLQWKLVFDVHKLJKOLJKWVWKHIROORZLQJNH\IHDWXUHVRILWV
reasoning: 
x The Commission declined to issue a formal statement of principles, on the basis that this 
would be premature and run the risk of limiting the discretion available under Part 2-7. 
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x There is no requirement under Part 2-7 to demonstrate discrimination as a threshold to an 
equal remuneration claim. 
x Undervaluation was adopted as a key part of the FuOO%HQFK¶VDSSURDFKLQDVVHVVLQJHTXDO
remuneration claims. 
x There is a requirement to establish that the asserted undervaluation is linked or attributable to 
gender. 
x There is no requirement for applications to reference an explicit male comparator group, 
although such references may be included. 
x 7KHµLQGLFLD¶RIXQGHUYDOXDWLRQGHYHORSHGWKURXJKWKH1HZ6RXWK:DOHVDQG Queensland 
jurisdictions provide a framework for considering whether there is undervaluation, but do not 
constitute a prescriptive formula. 
x The Full Bench recognised that impediments to bargaining can impede equal remuneration. 
x &RQVLVWHQWZLWKDSSURDFKHVXWLOLVHGLQWKHSDVWWKH)XOO%HQFKDGRSWHGDµSKDVHG¶DSSURDFKWR
wage adjustments established through the equal remuneration order. 
x Additionally, the Full Bench did not indicate that it would depart from its traditional reliance on 
work value as a means of assessing the value of work. 
Chapter 5 ± Explaining the gender pay gap: A literature review 
The µgender pay gap¶ (GPG) has been the subject of intense interest by regulators and researchers 
alike, both domestically and internationally. A number of factors prompt this interest but key among 
them is the clear evidence of ongoing gender pay inequity, and the ongoing impact of this inequity 
RQZRPHQ¶VFXUUHQWDQGOLIHORQJHDUQLQJV7KHUHDUHDQXPEHURIGLIIHUHQWPHDVXUHVRIWKH*3*
which vary according to their inclusion of part-time workers, overtime and bonuses, non-adult and 
managerial earnings, and whether they are based on weekly or hourly earnings. The available data 
for Australia identifies the current status of the GPG through a series of measures: 
x average ordinary time weekly earnings of full-time adult employees ± 17.5 per cent (ABS, May 
2013)  
x average total weekly earnings of full-time adult employees ± 21.1 per cent (ABS, May 2013)  
x average total weekly earnings for all employees ± 37.4 per cent (ABS 2013, May 2013) 
x average hourly ordinary time cash earnings for full-time non-managerial adult employees ± 9.3 
per cent (ABS 2013, May 2012), and 
x average hourly total cash earnings for full-time non-managerial adult employees ± 10.8 per 
cent (ABS 2013, May 2012). 
A central theme in labour market and gender pay equity research is understanding the factors that 
contribute to earnings differences between women and men. This is a wide-ranging area of 
research and includes consideration of factors such as differences in education and labour market 
experience, occupational segregation, and social, institutional and workplace practices. Previous 
work in this area has been considered by gender pay equity inquiries and equal remuneration 
proceedings, often with a view to assessing how work value decisions contribute to earnings 
differences, and providing information about the characteristics of undervalued work. 
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We note in Chapter 5 a consistent finding that there is a significant, persistent, µunexplained¶ wage 
gap between women and men. The findings show that only a small proportion of the GPG can be 
attributed to differences in the productivity-related characteristics of men and women, such as 
differences in education and workplace experience. Contributing factors to the GPG identified by 
the research include the undervaluation of feminised work and skills, differences in the types of 
jobs held by men and women and the method of setting pay for those jobs, and structures and 
workplace practices which restrict the employment prospects of workers with family responsibilities. 
These findings, together with the available industrial case history, indicate that the objective of 
equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal or comparable value poses a 
series of complex challenges for policy makers, industrial parties, courts and tribunals. Central to 
this challenge have been the difficulties in addressing and assessing the concept of equal or 
comparable value, in addition to understanding and accepting how gender has shaped a wide 
range of intersecting institutional and social processes, such that women are not receiving equal 
remuneration for work of equal or comparable value. 
Chapter 6 ± Proceedings under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act: Key issues 
In discussing the carriage of proceedings under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act, we take as a starting 
point the principles espoused by FWA in the SACS case, as set out above, while acknowledging 
that it is open to the Commission to reconsider its approach in future proceedings. We note in 
particular the importance of the concept of undervaluation in the application of Part 2-7. 
Historically, attempts to address issues of gender pay equity, both locally and internationally, have 
enjoyed only partial success. In relation to Australia, the 1972 principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value was not applied in full, while the impact of the 1993 equal remuneration legislation was 
limited by the requirement for applicants to demonstrate that earnings differences were a result of 
sex discrimination.  
These limitations are important to understanding the emergence of undervaluation as an approach 
utilised by industrial tribunals to hear applications for orders directed towards the objective of equal 
remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal or comparable value. As a concept, 
and in contrast to discrimination-based approaches to equal remuneration, undervaluation focuses 
on the valuation of work in female dominated industries and occupations, so as to determine 
whether that work has been inappropriately or inadequately valued. A finding of gender based 
undervaluation may be based on evidence of a failure to recognise or give proper weighting to the 
characteristics of feminised work. Additionally, other gender-associated factors, either singly or in 
combination, may have contributed to a lack of (or inadequate) work value assessments, resulting 
in rates of pay that do not reflect the value of the work. 
Key to the emergence of undervaluation, in State proceedings and the federal SACS case, has 
been the absence of a mandatory requirement for specific comparators, whether male or 
otherwise. The absence of this stipulation is linked to the concept of undervaluation, given that this 
concept does not revert routinely to a male standard. On this reasoning, validating the 
XQGHUYDOXDWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VZRUNE\UHIHUHQFHWRDFRPSDUDEOHPDOHJURXSLVLQKHUHQWO\IODZHG
EHFDXVHLWFDQQRWEHDVVXPHGWKDWµPDOH¶UDWHVRISD\ZHUHHYHUREMHFWLYHO\VHWE\UHIHUHQFHWR
work value in the first place. Male comparators might be used for illustrative purposes but are not 
an evidentiary precondition. Applicants may choose to use a range of comparisons, including other 
DUHDVRIIHPLQLVHGZRUNEXWHTXDOO\FRPSDUDWRUVPD\QRWQHFHVVDULO\DVVLVWWKHWULEXQDO¶V
assessment of the application. 
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A potential area of contest in equal remuneration proceedings concerns the parameters of gender-
based undervaluation: specifically, the evidentiary bar for gender-based undervaluation, and the 
means through which parties could demonstrate that undervaluation was gendered or had a 
gender-associated cause. In the federal SACS proceedings, the Full Bench made an initial 
determination that the work was undervalued on a gender basis, through a series of interlocking 
conclusions. These were that: 
x much of the work is caring work;  
x such a characterisation can contribute to devaluing work;  
x the work was in fact undervalued; and,  
x given that caring work has a female characterisation, the undervaluation was gender-based.  
In its direction as to the framing of any remedy, however, the Full Bench effectively imposed an 
empirical requirement on the applicants, requiring submissions as to what proportion of the 
undervaluation could be attributed to gender. 
The available research on gender pay equity identifies the complexity of separating gender from a 
UDQJHRIRWKHUUHLQIRUFLQJDQGLQWHUFRQQHFWHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQVWKDWVKDSHZRPHQ¶VHDUQLQJV
Different dimensions of undervaluation can contribute to pay inequity in an additive and cumulative 
way. The New South Wales and Queensland tribunals have taken the view that the assessment of 
equal remuneration claims involves balancing a number of considerations, and that it is not always 
possible to identify the extent of gender-based undervaluation in a forensic manner. This 
disinclination by State tribunals to mandate a proportionate identification of gender-based 
undervaluation is linked to what those tribunals have assessed as a key task, namely assessing 
the current value of the work in question and ensuring that the minimum rates of pay for it have 
been properly set.  
One of the strengths of the concept of gender-based undervaluation is that it goes to the heart of 
addressing the institutional and cultural determinants of why women have generally been under-
remunerated for their work. The ERPs which have been developed in New South Wales and 
Queensland articulate important aspects of these determinants, which are acknowledged through 
DFDGHPLFDQGRWKHUUHVHDUFKWRKDYHOHGWRZRPHQ¶VZork being undervalued and under-
remunerated. 
As to the prospect of a federal ERP (or some equivalent framework) being adopted, we believe that 
notwithstanding the disinclination of FWA to do this in the SACS case, there is no impediment to 
the Commission choosing to take this path. We note that the development of principles was an 
DSSURDFKUHOLHGRQE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSUHGHFHVVRUVPRVWQRWDEO\LQWKHDUHDRIZDJHIL[LQJEXt 
also in the area of equal pay. Appropriately formulated, we argue that an ERP could occupy the 
ground between uncertainty and prescription, guide both the Commission and potential parties, as 
well as emphasise the importance of the concept of equal remuneration. We consider a principle 
identifies for applicants and respondents the matters to be addressed in contentions and 
submissions and could facilitate the efficient conduct of proceedings. An ERP can also 
acknowledge factors that have been accepted in previous inquiries and tribunal decisions as 
shaping the undervaluation of feminised work. 
If an ERP were to be adopted by the Commission, our view is that it should provide a clear 
statement indicating that applications are to be assessed on the basis of historical and 
contemporary gender-based undervaluation, without the requirement to establish discrimination. 
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Likewise, such a principle should expressly state that an application need not be underpinned by 
reference to a male comparator. It should provide guidance on how work is to be assessed, 
including by setting out a non-exhaustive list of matters that may guide the Commission in its 
consideration of whether past assessments of the work and its remuneration have been affected by 
the gender of the workers. Put simply, the ERP should at least suggest the steps required to 
demonstrate that undervaluation was gendered or had a gender-associated cause. These matters 
could be identified as a framework rather than as a prescriptive formula and contain appropriate 
safeguards, including a direction that claims are to be assessed on a case by case basis.  
In its first decision in the federal SACS case, the Full Bench indicated its concerns about what it 
WHUPHGDQµLQGLFLD¶DSSURDFKWRGHPRQVWUDWLQJXQGHUYDOXDWLRQ It rejected an approach whereby 
applications would simply rest on demonstrating that the work featured in the application shared or 
paralleled the dimensions of undervaluation featured in the Queensland ERP. Nevertheless, what 
the Full Bench described as DµIUDPHZRUN¶IRUXQGHUYDOXDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQDµSUHVFULSWLYHIRUPXOD¶
may still be a basis for any potential principle. Indeed the Full Bench clearly relied on some of the 
dimensions outlined in the Queensland ERP to reach a view that the work in the SACS industry 
was undervalued on a gender basis. Finally the principle should contain clarity about its reliance on 
the construct of work value, in addition to other relevant work value features as a means of 
assessing the value of work. The principle should also underpin the importance of gender-neutral 
determinations of work value in ensuring that rates of pay are properly set. In Australia, work value 
has been and should continue to be the method relied upon by industrial tribunals. Work value 
determinations made by tribunals may also be informed by external and internal assessments of 
job value. The clear objective is that the assessment of work value addresses, without gender bias, 
all factors relevant to the work.  
In Chapter 6 we consider also the type of evidence that may be germane to equal remuneration 
proceedings. Evidence in these proceedings will rarely be considered in isolation but is likely to be 
considered in a cumulative way, consistent with the multiple, reinforcing and intersecting factors 
that impact on the GPG and that shape earnings.  
Compilation of an award history provides a foundation for reviewing the assessment of work value 
for the relevant areas of work and may also involve the construction of timelines on the movement 
of rates for key classifications. Ideally the history should include an account of the timing and scope 
of any work value assessments made by previous industrial tribunals. If there were work value 
assessments, it should be indicated what classifications were involved, what criteria were applied, 
what evidence was considered, and what were the key outcomes. A further consideration includes 
the use, if any, of benchmark relativities. It may be the case that there has been an absence of 
work value assessments. Equally, those assessments that were conducted may not have assessed 
the value of the work correctly, and the work may have been inadequately or incorrectly described. 
Alternatively, parties may rely on evidence which indicates that work value assessments already 
undertaken have assessed the value of the work correctly. 
It is open also to the parties to compile material that may inform the assessments of the value of 
the work, including whether it is undervalued, or alternatively, valued correctly. This evidence may 
supplement or complement the work that is prepared as part of the award history. It may include: 
x Witness statements, or material that assists to identify all the components of work that is 
required in particular positions, and within the occupation or industry concerned. This would 
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include attention to components of work value ± the skills and knowledge required to complete 
the work and the conditions under which it is performed. 
x Material to support a contention that there has been a change in work value, for example in 
the form of altered compliance or regulatory requirements, that is not presently recognised in 
classification descriptions. 
It is open also to the parties to present the results of objective assessments of indicative work that 
falls within the application. These assessments may be sourced from independent job assessment 
experts. There are newly developed resources available to the parties to assess whether previous 
job evaluations and any resultant grading that they rely upon are free from gender-bias. These 
include but are not limited to the Gender-inclusive Job Evaluation and Grading Standard developed 
by Standards Australia, and a skill recognition tool, Spotlight, which was developed by the New 
Zealand Department of Labour and has also been taken up in Australia. 
3DUWLHVPD\FRPSLOHODERXUPDUNHWSURILOHDQGHDUQLQJVGDWDWRDVVLVWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
understanding of the relevant sector or occupation. As an example, occupational and industry data 
disaggregated by gender may provide some guidance on employment patterns. This may include 
the degree to which relevant occupations are either feminised or masculinised, in addition to 
patterns of vertical and horizontal segregation by gender within the occupation or industry, and 
patterns of full-time and part-time employment. Wage patterns and methods of pay setting 
disaggregated by gender may provide some guidance on the degree of award reliance, and the 
extent of enterprise bargaining for those areas of work that fall within the application. It is open to 
the parties to bring forward additional evidence, including from labour economic studies, with a 
view to drawing conclusions about the factors that contribute to the gender wage gap, and 
submitting that the portents of undervaluation are in evidence or not evident. This material may 
also draw on material concerning wage patterns and methods of wage setting in addition to 
occupational and industry data. It should be noted, however, that these studies frequently rely on 
aggregate data sets that, in all probability, will not parallel the scope and incidence of the award or 
agreement cited in the application for equal remuneration orders. 
In applications for equal remuneration orders that are confined to a single workplace or 
organisation, it is likely that evidence similar to that outlined for award based applications will be 
presented, but localised to the particular organisation or workplace. In this instance it may be 
possible ± subject to privacy and confidentiality restrictions ± to utilise material submitted by the 
organisation to the Workforce Gender Equality Agency (WGEA) pursuant to the reporting 
requirements in the Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012. Such material may include an analysis of 
earnings that provides a level and breakdown of different components of wages (base pay, over-
award or over-agreement pay, bonuses and so on), by factors including occupation, gender and 
hours of work. 
In conclusion, we would stress that addressing and resolving matters of gender-based 
undervaluation, within the framework of the Fair Work Act, is neither automatic nor straightforward. 
We acknowledge it is entirely open to the Commission to determine an interpretation of Part 2-7 
other than the one we have advanced. But we hope that the data and analysis presented in this 
report may inform parties to future proceedings about frameworks (be they an ERP or otherwise) 
which could lay down clear markers for the task of establishing (or refuting) gender based 
undervaluation.  
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1 Introduction 
The issue of whether male and female workers should be accorded equal remuneration is one that 
has engaged the attention of Australian regulators for at least a century. It is the subject of 
international labour standards that, since 1993, have been formally enshrined in federal labour law. 
It has generated important test cases in both the federal and State industrial tribunals. It is also 
DGGUHVVHGLQYDULRXVVHFWLRQVRIZKDWLVQRZ$XVWUDOLD¶VPDLQODERXUVWDWXWHWKHFair Work Act 
2009 (Cth) (Fair Work Act), most obviously in Part 2-7. This authorises the Fair Work Commission 
(Commission) WRPDNHRUGHUVHQVXULQJµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQZRUNHUVIRUZRUN
RIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶ 
To date, this power has been exercised in one major case, involving the social and community 
services (SACS) sector.3 But it is clear from other applications lodged under Part 2-7 that the 
Commission will be called upon to address the question of equal remuneration in other industries 
and occupations, and possibly too in relation to particular workplaces. The next major test of the 
provisions is likely to come with the determination of applications lodged by various unions in 
relation to certain workers in the childcare industry.4 
1.1 Purpose and scope of the report 
In July 2013 the Commission¶V3D\(TXLW\8QLWHQJDJHGXVWRSUHSDUHDUHVHDUFKUHSRUWWKDW
would: 
x assist parties to equal remuneration proceedings under Part 2-7 to engage in productive 
discussion and work towards greater consensus in relation to the proceedings; and 
x inform potential parties about the matters they might be required to address and the type of 
evidence they might be required to bring as part of an equal remuneration proceeding. 
The terms of reference for the report also required it to include: 
x a discussion of Part 2-7;  
x an overview of matters that an application for an equal remuneration order and/or associated 
submissions might address to satisfy the requirements of Part 2-7;  
x an overview and discussion of supporting information or evidence which would be useful to 
inform equal remuneration proceedings; 
x a discussion of any equal remuneration materials, legislation, cases and relevant research 
which might be useful in relation to Part 2-7, including:  
 approaches to equal remuneration matters in other jurisdictions, including both 
internationally and at the State and national level in Australia; 
 relevant legislation; 
 decisions of courts and tribunals dealing with equal remuneration or related issues; 
                                                     
3 See Re Equal Remuneration Case (2011) 208 IR 345; Re Equal Remuneration Case (2012) 208 IR 446; Re Equal 
Remuneration Case ,57KHVHGHFLVLRQVDUHFROOHFWLYHO\UHIHUUHGWRDVµWKH SACS case¶LQWKLVUHSRUW 
4 For details of this matter, see http://www.fwc.gov.au/index.cfm?pagename=caeremuneration&page=introduction 
(accessed 16 October 2013). 
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 submissions to and reports of inquiries into equal remuneration by governments or other 
bodies;  
 data sources that could be used to inform equal remuneration proceedings; 
 published research on equal remuneration; 
 µbest practice¶ approaches for equal remuneration matters; and  
 any other relevant material. 
In meeting these objectives, we considered that it was vital to understand the international labour 
standards which provide a platform for both legislation and practice in Australia. These standards 
are set out in various international instruments, but in particular the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Convention No 100 concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women 
Workers for Work of Equal Value (1951). We have also had regard to approaches taken in other 
countries with regard to legislation and processes for achieving equal remuneration. We have been 
especially interested in the way in which equal remuneration for work of equal value is assessed 
under different country systems. Our research in this area has helped us to amplify the scope of 
international labour standards, as well as to identify what in international terms may be considered 
µJRRG practice¶ approaches to tackling equal remuneration and the universal dilemma of the 
µJHQGHUSD\JDS¶ (GPG). 
In order to describe and analyse the regulatory framework under the Fair Work Act, as required by 
our terms of reference, we have focused on the new Part 2-7, as well as the provisions in sections 
721 and 724 dealing with alternative remedies. Other sections requiring analysis have included 
WKRVHGHDOLQJZLWKWKHµPRGHUQDZDUGVREMHFWLYH¶VHFWLRQWKHµPLQLPXPZDJHVREMHFWLYH¶
(section 284) and the requirements for work value adjustments to modern award minimum wages 
(sections 156 and 157).  
The process of analysing this regime has inevitably required us to express opinions as to the 
meaning of what are novel statutory provisions. In that regard we have, unsurprisingly, devoted 
considerable attention to the decision by Fair Work Australia (FWA), as the Fair Work Commission 
was then known,5 in the SACS case ± the only instance to date in which Part 2-7 has been 
considered and applied. Our aim has been to identify issues arising in the conduct of that case, and 
in the decision making process, which might be relevant to the Commission and the parties when 
addressing equal remuneration issues in future cases. The fact that the case ultimately revealed a 
significant division of opinion among members of the Full Bench, as explained in Chapter 4, 
underscores the potential for disparate interpretations in this area.  
In order to fully appreciate the decision in the SACS case, as well as the interpretation and effect of 
the current federal regulatory framework, an understanding of past legislation and case law is 
essential. That extends to the decisions of industrial tribunals within the State system, which for 
reasons we will explain form an important part of the background to the present federal provisions.  
We have also sought in this report to identify and explain analyses of the GPG ± defined here as a 
ratio that converts average female earnings into a proportion of average male earnings to calculate 
the pay gap between the sexes. The persistent nature of the GPG both nationally and 
internationally is well-established. Less clear cut is agreement on the contributory and underlying 
                                                     
5 FWA was renamed the FWC with effect from 1 January 2013: see Fair Work Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) Sch 9. 
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factors for that gap. This and associated matters have been the subject in Australia of various 
inquiries by parliamentary committees and industrial tribunals. The discipline of labour economics 
RIIHUVFRPSHWLQJDQDO\VHVRIWKHVFRSHDQGQDWXUHRIZRPHQ¶VZDJHGLVDGYDQWDJHEXWWKHUHLV
widespread agreement that women, relative to men, do not receive wages consistent with their 
education and labour market experience. The available research, which we summarise in the 
report, offers some insights about the factors that contribute to this disadvantage ± insights that can 
potentially assist the parties to equal remuneration proceedings. 
Finally, we have endeavoured to provide an information base which can be drawn upon by the 
various actors and participants involved in equal remuneration proceedings, to better inform them 
about a very complex and continually developing area of labour law and industrial practice. We 
believe that the analysis we have presented will assist both applicants and respondents in 
understanding and interpreting Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act, and the types of evidence that may 
be used either in support of, or to resist, the making of an equal remuneration order.  
1.2 Structure of the report 
Of the many ways in which this report could have been structured, we have chosen to follow a 
pathway of: 
x setting the global scene, by describing the international labour standards on equal 
remuneration, providing international data on the GPG and summarising key elements of the 
approaches taken in selected overseas jurisdictions (Chapter 2); 
x analysing the treatment of equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act (Chapter 3);  
x outlining the SACS case and explaining the various decisions given by FWA (Chapter 4); 
x reviewing available literature on how the GPG might be explained and assessed (Chapter 5); 
and 
x drawing on the research we have undertaken for the above purposes, outlining approaches 
which might usefully guide the conduct of future proceedings under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work 
Act (Chapter 6). 
The report also includes three substantial appendices. The first two detail the development of equal 
remuneration regulation at the federal level (Appendix A) and under the State industrial systems 
(Appendix B). The third, Appendix C, provides an overview of the approaches taken in the 
European Union and ten selected countries ± Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
1.3 Terminology 
The laws, decisions and literature that we have reviewed for the purpose of this report utilise a 
range of differeQWWHUPVWRGHVFULEHWKHREMHFWLYHRIUHJXODWLRQLQWKLVDUHDLQFOXGLQJµHTXDO
UHPXQHUDWLRQ¶µJHQGHUSD\HTXLW\¶µSD\HTXLW\¶DQGµHTXDOSD\¶)UHTXHQWO\WKHVHDUHXVHG
interchangeably. A variety of similar terms ± µSD\LQHTXLW\¶µJHQGHUSD\LQHTXLW\¶µXQHTXDOSD\¶± 
are likewise used where the objective of equal remuneration for men and women workers is not 
met.  
The diverse use of such terms cannot be homogenised, but it is possible to set out some key 
understandings that inform the choice of language in this report. For the most part, we use the term 
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equal remuneration, most obviously because it is the phrase adopted in the Fair Work legislation. 
Where we speak of gender pay equity, we are generally using that term to describe an objective ± 
that being equality in remuneration between men and women in the paid workforce. This can be 
extended to all forms of remuneration, and includes equality of access to all forms of remuneration. 
$VDFOHDUH[DPSOHWKH,/2GHILQHVUHPXQHUDWLRQWRLQFOXGHµWKHRUGLnary, basic or minimum wage 
or salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever payable, directly or indirectly, whether in cash 
or in kind by the employer to the worker and arising out of WKHZRUNHU¶VHPSOR\PHQW¶VHHVHFWLRQ
2.2.2. The foundation provided by ILO standards on equal remuneration is detailed further in the 
next chapter.  
In practice, the goal of gender pay equity can be conceived in various ways. At its broadest, it can 
encompass regulatory and policy approaches that seek to ensure equal access to all forms of 
employment and remuneration, not just equality in remuneration as such. But it is the latter 
objective that is explicitly adopted in the Fair Work Act. The Act seeks to ensure that where men 
and women workers perform work of equal or comparable value, it should be remunerated equally. 
Gender pay equity is thus achieved where people are rewarded equally for their work, irrespective 
of whether they are men or women. There have been difficulties, historically and currently, in 
applying this IUDPHZRUNSDUWLFXODUO\DVWRKRZWKHFULWHULDRIµHTXDOYDOXH¶RUµHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOH
YDOXH¶DUHDVVHVVHGDQGZKHUHUHOHYDQWUHPHGLHG7KHVHLVVXHVDUHDGGUHVVHGLQ&KDSWHUVDQG
4, as well as in Appendices A and B. 
$VIRUWKHWHUPVµHPSOR\HHV¶DQGµZRUNHUV¶WKHVHDUHJHQHUDOO\XVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\WKURXJKRXW
WKHUHSRUW6WULFWO\VSHDNLQJµHPSOR\HHV¶DUHRIWHQXQGHUVWRRGIRUOHJDOSXUSRVHVWRPHDQWKRVH
ZKRZRUNIRUVRPHRQHHOVH¶VEXVLQHVVRURUJDQLVDWLRQXQGHUDFRQWUDFWRIHPSOR\PHQWZKHUHDV
the tHUPµZRUNHUV¶FDQDOVRFRPSUHKHQGWKRVHZKRDJUHHWRSURYLGHWKHLUODERXURQVRPHRWKHU
basis, for instance as independent contractors or as volunteers. As we explain in Chapter 3, Part 2-
7 of the Fair Work Act is for the most part applicable only to employees in the narrow sense. Hence 
our focus throughout the report is primarily on the question of equal remuneration for male and 
female employees1HYHUWKHOHVVZHRIWHQXVHWKHWHUPµZRUNHUV¶DVDV\QRQ\PIRUHPSOR\HHV
partly for variety, but partly also because it is the term actually used in relevant legislation or case 
law. 
1.4 Preparation of the report and feedback from stakeholders 
Preparation of this report has followed a two-stage process. A draft report was posted on the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VZHEVLWHRQOctober 2013, with interested parties invited to provide written 
comments to the Pay Equity Unit by 13 November 2013. Parties were advised that all comments, 
including the names of persons or organisations providing them, were to be published on the 
CommisVLRQ¶VZHEVLWH 
A total of 11 comments or submissions were received, from the following organisations:6  
x Australian Business Lawyers & Advisors, on behalf of the Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (ACCI), Australian Business Industrial (ABI) and the Tasmanian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry; 
x Australian Federation of Employers and Industries (AFEI); 
                                                     
6 See http://www.fwc.gov.au/index.cfm?pagename=adminremuneration (accessed 25 November 2013). 
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x Australian Industry Group (Ai Group); 
x Australian Institute of Employment Rights; 
x Business SA; 
x Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia (Associate Professor Sara Charlesworth 
and Fiona Macdonald); 
x Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia; 
x Livingstones (on behalf of a number of clients in the childcare industry); 
x Local Government NSW; 
x SafeWork SA; and 
x Workplace Gender Equality Agency (WGEA). 
Seven of the submissions came from employer organisations or other bodies representing 
employers, two from government agencies, and two from independent researchers or advocates. 
We note that no responses were received from trade unions or other worker organisations.  
We have made various changes to the report in response to these comments. In some instances 
we have adopted suggested amendments. In others ± especially where we do not agree with a 
comment or have not fully accepted a suggestion for change ± we have noted the views of the 
commenting organisation, referencing its submission.  
A number of comments on the draft report appear to reveal a degree of confusion about the nature 
and purposes of the project that led to this report. There are therefore three specific points which 
we feel it necessary to emphasise. 
The first concerns authorship. 9DULRXVFRPPHQWVVSHDNRIWKHUHSRUWDVEHLQJµby¶ the Pay Equity 
Unit, or more broadly the Commission. We strongly emphasise that the report is the product of 
independent research, and represents the views of its authors alone. It is work that has been 
commissioned and published by the Commission, but it is not in any sense work by the 
Commission or its Pay Equity Unit. 
The second matter concerns the relationship of our project to the childcare industry proceedings 
that, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, have recently been initiated. The existence of the 
project may have been publicised after those proceedings commenced, but the project was 
conceived and development was already under way before the childcare claim was lodged. The 
report was (and still is) intended to operate as a general resource for those interested in the 
operation of Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act. 
Thirdly, we have not in our view travelled beyond our terms of reference, but instead appropriately 
responded to them. We were asked, as independent researchers and analysts, to present a view 
as to the interpretation and application of Part 2-7 and, as well, to suggest µbest practice¶ 
approaches for equal remuneration matters. Given that the new jurisdiction is at an early stage of 
development, these tasks have necessarily required us to form and express opinions, as noted 
earlier in this chapter. Those opinions are firmly based on a careful and rigorous assessment of the 
legislation, its interpretation in the SACS case and a large body of available literature on possible 
approaches to the issue of equal remuneration, both in Australia and overseas. 
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All that said, we acknowledge that many valuable points were made by stakeholders in response to 
our draft report. We record our gratitude to those who took the trouble to respond. In our view their 
input has significantly improved the final document.  
1.5 Acknowledgments 
In preparing this report we have drawn heavily on ± and indeed reproduced material from ± an 
earlier research report on equal remuneration principles prepared for what was then FWA (Romeyn 
et al 2011). We are grateful to the Commission (and to the authors) for permission to use this 
resource, with appropriate attribution in the relevant parts of the text. We would also like to thank 
the staff of the Commission¶V3D\(TXLW\8QLWZKRSURYLGHGVXSSRUWDQGDVVLVWDQFHLQUHODWLRQWR
the project, in particular Shannon-Kate Archer, Mike Preston and Kim Rusling.  
That said, and as noted in section 1.4, the findings and views that appear in this report should not 
be attributed to the Commission or its Pay Equity Unit. As authors, we take full responsibility for the 
content of this publication. We do, however, repeat the thanks expressed in section 1.4 to those 
organisations that commented on the draft report published in October 2013.  
This project was organised through the University of Adelaide, and we wish to thank the staff of 
both the Adelaide Law School and Adelaide Research and Innovation for their help in making it 
happen. In particular, we want to acknowledge our gratitude to Hannah Hannaford Gunn and Henry 
Winter for their efficient and helpful research assistance, and to Renee Hakendorf for the cover 
design. 
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2 Equal remuneration: The international picture 
This Chapter takes a global view of the treatment of equal remuneration, focusing on three 
aspects. The first involves the international labour standards concerning equal remuneration. We 
discuss their relevance, interpretation and application, looking first at instruments promulgated by 
the United Nations (UN) and then in more detail at those of ILO. The second concerns the 
international approaches that have been used to ascertain whether the goal of equal remuneration 
has been achieved in different countries, by reference to the concept of the GPG. Understanding 
the key concepts and different forms of data gathering are important when considering the various 
ways of assessing the GPG, as well as the way in which it is used ± a subject to which we return in 
more detail in Chapter 6. Thirdly, we look at some of the lessons to be learnt from a review of how 
equal remuneration is addressed in ten different countries around the world. 
2.1 United Nations instruments 
2.1.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) sets out the basic rights and freedoms to 
which all women and men are entitled. It seeks to establish a common international standard by 
which fundamental human rights are protected. The UDHR refers to the protection and promotion 
of equality between men DQGZRPHQDQGVSHFLILFDOO\SURYLGHVWKDWµ(YHU\RQHZLWKRXW
GLVFULPLQDWLRQKDVWKHULJKWWRHTXDOSD\IRUHTXDOZRUN¶$UWLFOH)XUWKHUPRUHLWVWLSXODWHV
WKDWµHYHU\RQHZKRZRUNVKDVWKHULJKWWRMXVWDQGIDYRXUDEOHUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶$UWLFOH. 
Australia became a signatory to the UDHR in 1948. 
As the name of the instrument infers, the UDHR is not of itself binding, but the fundamental rights 
and freedoms it contains have become binding through two other instruments adopted in 1966: the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. Of these, it is the former that specifically refers to 
equal remuneration. 
2.1.2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Included within the ICESCR is the proposition that states recognise the rights of everyone to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, in particular remuneration. Article 7 requires 
that as a minimum all workers should be provided with: 
fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women 
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work.  
The ICESCR was ratified by Australia in 1975. 
2.1.3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women  
The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
requires that states take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in a 
number of fields, including employment, and ensure equality for men and women. Article 11(1)(d) 
VSHFLILFDOO\PHQWLRQVµWKHULJKWWRHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQLQFOXGLQJEHQHILWVDQGWRHTXDOWUHDWPHQWLQ
respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of 
ZRUN¶ 
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,QDGGLWLRQWRWKLVSURYLVLRQLQWKH81¶V&RPPLWWHHRQWKH(OLPLQDWLRQRI'LVFULPLQDWLRQ
against Women adopted General Recommendation No 13.7 This requires states to adopt gender 
QHXWUDOMREHYDOXDWLRQV\VWHPVDQGFRPSDUHWKHµYDOXHRIWKRVHMREVRIDGLIIHUHQWQDWXUHLQZKLFK
ZRPHQSUHVHQWO\SUHGRPLQDWHZLWKMREVLQZKLFKPHQSUHVHQWO\SUHGRPLQDWH¶SDUDV±3). 
Australia ratified CEDAW in 1983. 
2.2 ILO instruments 
2.2.1 Introduction 
ILO Conventions are international treaties, which are drawn up and adopted by the International 
Labour Conference according to rules set out in the ILO Constitution. Once they have been 
adopted by the International Labour Conference8, they are open to ratification by member states. 
Member states which have ratified an ILO Convention are then legally bound under international 
ODZE\LWVFRQWHQWDQGDFFRUGLQJWR$UWLFOHGRIWKH,/2&RQVWLWXWLRQDUHREOLJHGWRWDNHµVXFK
action as may be necessary to mDNHHIIHFWLYHWKHSURYLVLRQVRI>WKH@&RQYHQWLRQ¶ 
ILO Recommendations, on the other hand, are drawn up and adopted by the International Labour 
Conference (ILC) according to rules identical to those that govern the Conventions, but they are not 
binding legal instruments and are therefore not open to ratification. Their purpose is usually to 
accompany the Convention to which they relate and complete its provisions by recommending 
ways to implement the Convention.  
Declarations are instruments that can be adopted by either the ILC RUWKH,/2¶V*RYHUQLQJ%RG\9 
These are not subject to ratification and their influence largely depends on the purpose and aim of 
their adoption. International Labour Conference declarations differ from Conventions and 
Recommendations. They are not technically binding since they are not open to ratification, 
however, because of their subject matter and the process by which they are developed and voted 
upon in the ILC, they are regarded as being of a solemn nature, and may be perceived as an 
expression of customary international law. A recent example is the 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. By reason of the ILO Constitution, all member states 
are obliged to respect, promote and realise the fundamental principles and rights of work, whether 
they have ratified the fundamental conventions or not. These fundamental principles are contained 
LQZKDWWKH,/2¶V*RYHUQLQJ%RG\KDVGHVLJQDWHGDVWKHHLJKWµ)XQGDPHQWDO&RQYHQWLRQV¶DQGIRXU
                                                     
7 Available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom13 (accessed 4 October 
2013). 
8 The ILC is one of the three main bodies which make up the ILO. The other two main bodies are the Governing Body and 
the International Labour Office. The ILC is the general assembly of all member states of the ILO. It is tripartite and each 
member state is represented by two government delegates, an employer delegate and a worker delegate. The essential 
tasks of the ILC include adopting international labour standards and adopting resolutions that form guiding principles for 
ILO policy and activities. It also elects members of the Governing Body and decides whether to accept new member 
states. Each delegate \is entitled to vote individually irrespective of the vote cast by the other delegates from the member 
state. A majority of two thirds of the votes cast by delegates present is necessary for a final vote for the adoption of a 
Convention or Recommendation or other instruments such as a Declaration. 
9 The Governing Body performs the role of an executive. It is tripartite and is composed of 28 members of government, 14 
employers and 14 workers. 10 of the government seats are permanently held by the most industrially important states, the 
other government members are elected by the government delegates to the ILC. Employers' and workers' representatives 
are elected by their respective delegates. The Governing Body can take decisions on ILO policy and establish the agenda 
for the ILC, amongst other responsibilities. 
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µ3ULRULW\&RQYHQWLRQV¶7KH&onventions on Equal Remuneration and Discrimination (Employment 
and Occupation), discussed below, are two of the Fundamental Conventions.10 
The principle of equal pay for women and men for work of equal value has been an objective of the 
ILO since its foundation in 1919. It is expressed in the Preamble to the ILO Constitution as one of 
WKHFRQGLWLRQVZKLFKDUHXUJHQWO\UHTXLUHGQDPHO\WKHµUHcognition of the principle of equal 
UHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶ 
The major specific ILO instrument on equal remuneration arose as a result of a Resolution on 
Equal pay for Equal Work for Men and Women Workers in 1948 which was adopted by the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. This Resolution led to the adoption by the ILO 
in 1951 of Convention No 100 concerning Equal Remuneration (generally referred to in this report 
DVµWKH(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQ, and also Recommendation No 90 concerning Equal 
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value11 (Equal Remuneration 
Recommendation). 
2.2.2 Equal Remuneration Convention 
Three Articles in the Equal Remuneration Convention set out the primary obligations of member 
states: 
Article 1 
For the purpose of the Convention - 
(a) WKHWHUPµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶LQFOXGHVWKHRUGLQDU\EDVLFRUPLQLPXPZDJHRUVDODU\DQGDQ\
additional emoluments whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by 
the employer to the worker DQGDULVLQJRXWRIWKHZRUNHU¶VHPSOR\PHQW 
(b) WKHWHUPµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQZRUNHUVIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶UHIHUVWRUDWHV
of remuneration established without discrimination based on sex. 
Article 2 
1. Each Member shall, by means appropriate to the methods in operation for determining rates of 
remuneration, promote and, in so far as is consistent with such methods, ensure the application 
to all workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of 
equal value. 
2. This principle may be applied by means of: 
(a) national laws or regulations; 
(b) legally established or recognised machinery for wage determination; 
(c) collective agreements between employers and workers; or 
                                                     
10 The others are the Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No 29), the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention 1948 (No 87), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (No 98), the 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957 (No 105), the Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No 138) and the Worst Forms 
of Child Labour Convention 1999 (No 182). The Priority RUµ*RYHUQDQFH¶Conventions are the Labour Inspection 
Convention 1947 (No 81), the Employment Policy Convention 1964 (No. 122), the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) 
Convention 1969 (No 129) and the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention 1976 (No 144). 
11 For a detailed history of the background to the Equal Remuneration Convention, see Määttä 2008: 91ff. 
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(d) a combination of these various means. 
Article 3 
1. Where such action will assist in giving effect to the provisions of this Convention measures shall 
be taken to promote objective appraisal of jobs on the basis of the work to be performed. 
2. The methods to be followed in this appraisal may be decided upon by the authorities responsible 
for the determination of rates of remuneration, or, where such rates are determined by collective 
agreements, by the parties thereto. 
3. Differential rates between workers which correspond, without regard to sex, to differences, as 
determined by such objective appraisal, in the work to be performed shall not be considered as 
being contrary to the principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of 
equal value. 
Australia ratified the Equal Remuneration Convention in 1974.12 
2.2.3 Equal Remuneration Recommendation 
The Equal Remuneration Recommendation is not binding on member states, but it contains 
measures to facilitate the application of the principles of the Equal Remuneration Convention 
(Swepston 2000; Romeyn et al 2011: 77). After referring to the Equal Remuneration Convention, 
WKH5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVWDWHVWKDWLWLVGHVLUDEOHWRLQGLFDWHµFHUWDLQSURFHGXUHVIRUWKHSURJUHVVLYH
DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHSULQFLSOHVODLGGRZQLQWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶ 
Paragraph 1 provides that member states should ensure the principle of equal remuneration 
applies to all employees of central government departments or agencies, as well as employees of 
State, provincial or local government departments or agencies where these have jurisdiction over 
remuneration rates6WDWHVDUHDOVRHQFRXUDJHGE\3DUDJUDSKWRFRQVXOWZLWKHPSOR\HUV¶DQG
ZRUNHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGWDNHDFWLRQWRHQVXUHWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHSULQFLSOHVLQDOORFFXSDWLRQV
µDVUDSLGO\DVSUDFWLFDEOH¶7KLVVKRXOGSDUWLFXODUO\EHGRQHLQUHODWLRQWRWKe establishment of 
minimum or other wage rates in industries and services determined under public authority, 
industries and undertakings operated under public ownership or control and, where appropriate, 
work executed under the terms of public contracts. 
IQDGGLWLRQ$UWLFOHUHTXLUHVPHPEHUVWDWHVµWRHVWDEOLVKRUHQFRXUDJHWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI
methods for objective appraisal of the work to be performed, whether by job analysis or by other 
procedures, with a view to providing a classification of jobs withRXWUHJDUGWRVH[¶$Q\VXFK
methods should be applied in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Convention. 
2.2.4 Other ILO instruments 
Other ILO Conventions which either refer to equal remuneration or further the objectives of the 
Equal Remuneration Convention, are the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 
1958 (No 111); the three ILO conventions on minimum wage fixing (Nos 26, 99 and 131); and the 
Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention 1981 (No 156) (Swepston 2000; Romeyn et al 
                                                     
12 For details of this and other ILO ratifications by Australia, see 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102544 (accessed 23 
September 2013). 
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2011: 77). Australia has ratified each of these instruments, but we concentrate here on Convention 
No 111.13 
The principal objective of Convention No 111 is to eliminate all discrimination, as defined in the 
Convention, in respect of all aspects of employment and occupation through the concrete and 
progressive development of equality of opportunity and treatment in law and practice. Member 
states are required to develop and implement a multifaceted national equality policy (ILO 2012b: 
307). DiscriminatiRQLVGHILQHGLQ$UWLFOHRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQDVµDQ\GLVWLQFWLRQH[FOXVLRQRU
preference made on the basis of [certain grounds14], which has the effect of nullifying or impairing 
HTXDOLW\RIRSSRUWXQLW\RUWUHDWPHQWLQHPSOR\PHQWRURFFXSDWLRQ¶7KURXJKWKis broad definition, the 
Convention covers all discrimination that may affect equality of opportunity and treatment, and any 
discrimination, either in law or in practice, and whether direct or indirect, falls within its scope (ILO 
2012b: 312).  
Article 1(3GHILQHVµHPSOR\PHQW¶DQGµRFFXSDWLRQ¶DVLQFOXGLQJDFFHVVWRYRFDWLRQDOWUDLQLQJ
DFFHVVWRHPSOR\PHQWDQGWRSDUWLFXODURFFXSDWLRQVDVZHOODVWRWKHµWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVRI
HPSOR\PHQW¶7KLVODVWSKUDVHLVIXUWKHUHQXQFLDWHGLQ5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ1Rconcerning 
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation. This recommendation requires member 
states to formulate a national policy to be applied by legislation, collective agreements or other 
means so that all persons should, without discrimination, enjoy equality of opportunity and 
WUHDWPHQWLQUHVSHFWRIµUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶3DUDJUDSKEY$VD
consequence, equal remuneration for work of equal value should be a component of any national 
policy (ILO 2012b: 317). 
2.2.5 Interpreting the Equal Remuneration Convention 
The most important source of interpretation with regard to the ILO Conventions is the work 
XQGHUWDNHQE\WKH,/2¶V&RPPLWWHHRI([SHUWVRQWKH$SSOLFDWLRQRI&RQYHQWLRQVDQG
Recommendations (CEACR). The mandate of the CEACR has recently been the subject of 
discussion and is set out in the most recent report of the Committee on the application of 
international labour standards (ILO 2013). In summary, the CEACR is an independent body 
composed of legal experts charged with examining the application and implementation of ILO 
Conventions and Recommendations by member states. In order to do this, it must consider the 
legal scope and meaning of those instruments (ILO 2013: 13). The CEACR is not authorised to 
give definitive interpretations of Conventions. The competence to do that is vested in the 
International Court of Justice under Article 37 of the ILO Constitution. However, in the absence of a 
contradictory ruling from that court, the opinions and conclusions of the CEACR are considered as 
valid and generally recognised as guiding the actions of ILO member states (ILO 2013: 13±14).  
7KH&($&5¶VYLHZVRQWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQFDQEHIRXQGLQD
QXPEHURIVRXUFHV7KHVHLQFOXGHWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VµJHQHUDOVXUYH\V¶RIUHSRUWVRQ the Convention 
,/2DUHSRUWRQµ(TXDOLW\DW:RUN7DFNOLQJWKH&KDOOHQJHV¶,/2DQG
µ*LYLQJ*OREDOLVDWLRQD+XPDQ)DFH¶DSXEOLFDWLRQZKLFKSURYLGHVDQHDV\UHDGLQJJXLGHRQWKH
                                                     
13 7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH,/2¶VPLQLPXPZDJHV&RQYHQWLRQVDQGWKHLPSDFWWKH\KDYHRQHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQLVGLVFXVVHG
in Romeyn et al 2011: 77±91. 
14 The grounds as set out in the definition are race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin 
DQGµVXFKRWKHUGLVWLQFWLRQH[FOXVLRQRUSUHIHUHQFH«DVPD\EHGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH0HPEHU«DIWHUFRQVXOWDWLRQ«¶ 
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interpretation and application of the Convention, together with examples of good practice (ILO 
2012b: 275±305). 
The CEACR has expressed the view that the application of the Equal Remuneration Convention 
involves examining equality at two levels: first, the level of the job ± whether the work is of equal 
value; and second, the level of remuneration ± whether the remuneration is equal (ILO 2012b: 
$VWKHGHILQLWLRQLQ$UWLFOHDPDNHVFOHDUWKHZRUGµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶UHIHUVWRPRUHWKDQMXVW
RUGLQDU\EDVLFRUPLQLPXPZDJHVRUVDODULHV,WLQFOXGHVµDQ\ DGGLWLRQDOHPROXPHQWV¶HYHQLIQRW
payable directly by the employer to the worker concerned (ILO 2012b: 288).  
$VIRUWKHFRQFHSWRIµZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶WKLVUHTXLUHVHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQWREHSDLGWRPHQDQG
women, not only when they perform the same or identical work, but also when they perform work 
which is different yet nevertheless of equal value. It is this notion that has proved the most 
problematic. Many member states still apply this concept in a limited way and confine it to either 
WKHµVDPHZRUN¶µVLPLODUZRUN¶RUHYHQµVXEVWDQWLDOO\LGHQWLFDOZRUN¶$OWKRXJKµYDOXH¶LVQRWH[SOLFLWO\
defined by the Equal Remuneration Convention, contextually it requires something more than 
market forces to determine its application, as market forces may be inherently gender biased (ILO 
,/2E$VWKH,/2¶V'LUHFWRU-General stated in a recent report (ILO 2007: 74): 
Pay equity is about redressing the undervaluation of jobs typically performed by women and 
remunerating them according to their value. This is not necessarily a reflection of market factors or skill 
requirements, but may mirror differences in collective bargaining power, preconceived ideas about 
VFDUFHVNLOOVPDUNHWUDWHVRUWKHKLVWRULFDOXQGHUYDOXLQJRIµIHPDOH¶MREV 
The concepWRIµHTXDOYDOXH¶DOVRUHTXLUHVVRPHPHWKRGRIPHDVXULQJDQGFRPSDULQJWKHUHODWLYH
value of different jobs (ILO 1986: para 138). This requires an examination of the respective tasks 
involved, undertaken on the basis of entirely objective and non-discriminatory criteria to avoid the 
assessment being tainted by gender bias. While the Equal Remuneration Convention does not 
proscribe any specific method for such an examination, Article 3 presupposes the use of 
appropriate techniques for objective job evaluation, comparing such factors as skill, effort, 
responsibilities and working conditions (ILO 2007: para 4). At the same time, the corollary is that 
differential rates between workers are compatible with the principles of the Convention if they 
correspond, without regard to sex, to differences determined by such evaluation. 
Article 3(1) of the Equal Remuneration Convention states that promoting the principle of equal 
UHPXQHUDWLRQUHTXLUHVDQµREMHFWLYHDSSUDLVDORIMREV¶7KLVH[SUHVVLRQUHIHUVWRPHFKDQLVPVRU 
procedures used to examine the content of jobs, so as to classify them according to their value. 
Jobs or occupations of equal value are required to be equally remunerated for both men and 
women. By way of summary, the ILO (2007: 272) has indicated that appraisal of jobs: 
x is separate from the assessment of each worker's productivity or performance; 
x LVUHTXLUHGWREHEDVHGRQMREFRQWHQWUDWKHUWKDQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHZRUNHUV¶JHQGHURURWKHU
personal characteristics; and 
x must itself be based on objective and entirely non-discriminatory criteria, to avoid the very 
assessment being tainted by gender bias.  
7KH,/2EKDVSXEOLVKHGDµVWHSE\VWHSJXLGH¶ZKLFKVHWVRXWJRRGSUDFWLFHIRUGHYHORSLQJ
gender neutral job evaluations. The evaluation of jobs is based on four factors: qualifications, 
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work/effort, responsibility, and conditions of work.15 As a matter of practice the factors are usually 
broken down into sub-factors and require weighting processes to be applied. 
More recently, in 2013, the ILO has published a practical guide to illustrate how equal remuneration 
for men and women for work of equal value can be applied in a variety of ways according to each 
QDWLRQDOFRQWH[W2HO]HWDO,WGUDZVXSRQWKH,/2¶VZRUNLQFOXGLQJFRPPHQWVRIWKH,/2
VXSHUYLVRU\ERGLHVDQGLVEURDGO\DLPHGDWDVVLVWLQJJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVZRUNHUV¶DQGHPSOR\HUV¶
organisations, policy makers and practitioners. Chapter 5 is devoted to comparing jobs and 
determining equal value, and describes in detail various job evaluation methods. It also provides 
examples of selected job evaluation methods, which are regarded as free from gender bias. The 
topics covered by the publication include describing two formal job evaluation methods, the first 
being global or ranking evaluation methods and the second being analytical job evaluation 
methods. Also included is a list of frequentO\RYHUORRNHGMREFKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQµZRPHQ¶VZRUN¶XQGHU
each of four categories: skills, physical and emotional demands, responsibility and working 
conditions. There is also reference to job evaluation methods used in Sweden, Switzerland, Spain 
and the United Kingdom.  
The CEACR has indicated that the principle of equal remuneration should be applied beyond the 
enterprise level, since the remuneration paid by each employer is often based on rates fixed 
through conditions and procedures that go beyond that enterprise (such as collective agreements, 
public sector pay scales or through the minimum wage processes). The reach of the comparison 
between jobs performed by men and women should be as wide as permitted by the level at which 
wage policies, systems and structures within a country are coordinated (ILO 1986: para 54).  
The challenges for governments and courts lie in how to implement the broad principles articulated 
E\WKH,/2DWDGRPHVWLFOHYHO$V&RUQLVKKDVREVHUYHGµ,WLVFOHDUWKDWWKH difficulty 
lies not in the breadth of the international rules but in fashioning the pay equity mechanisms that 
ZLOOGHOLYHUWKHSURPLVHRIWKRVHVWDQGDUGV¶7KH,/2KDVSURYLGHGFRQVLGHUDEOHDVVLVWDQFHLQLWV
recent publications as referred to above, to help achieve pay equity. Much depends on the 
approaches taken in each of the countries for implementation, and for countries to find ways to 
better monitor and assess pay equity outcomes.  
2.3 Gender pay gap data 
Before examining the varying approaches to pay equity in different countries, it is relevant to look at 
international data on the GPG. 
Prior to doing so it is useful to note that some international data is based on median earnings, while 
other data is based on average (mean) earnings. In Australia the most commonly used data in the 
calculation of the earnings gap is average (mean) earnings. The difference between the two 
measures is this: 
x Average (mean) earnings is the amount obtained by dividing the total aggregated earnings of 
the group under question (for example all adult males, or all adult females) by the number of 
units in that group. 
                                                     
15 These four factors are also reflected in the New South WaOHV,QGXVWULDO5HODWLRQV&RPPLVVLRQ¶V wage fixing principles 
(see sections B.2.2) and the 4XHHQVODQG,QGXVWULDO5HODWLRQV&RPPLVVLRQ¶V Equal Remuneration Principle (see B.3.2). 
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x Median earnings is the amount which divides the earnings distribution into two equal groups, 
half having earnings above the median, half having earnings below the median. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regularly publishes data 
on gender gaps in wages compiled by its Social Policy Division (OECD 2012). This data covers 
each of the countries we have selected for more detailed analysis. Two selected charts 
demonstrate overall GPGs for full-time employees and, more specifically, the gap in full-time 
earnings at the top and bottom of the earnings distribution. For the purposes of these figures the 
µJHQGHUZDJHJDS¶LQXQDGMXVWHGIRUPLVPeasured as the difference between male and female 
earnings expressed as a percentage of male earnings. Estimates of earnings used in the 
calculations refer to gross earnings of full-time wage and salary workers. However, this definition 
may slightly vary from one country to another. 
Figure 2.1: Gender gap in median earnings of full-time employees, 2000, 2007, 2010 
 
Source: Data sourced from OECD (2012), OECD Family Database, OECD, Paris (www.oecd.org/social/family/database), 
specifically, LMF1.5: Gender pay gaps for full-time workers and earnings differentials by educational attainment, 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/LMF1.5%20Gender%20pay%20gaps%20for%20full%20time%20workers%20-
%20updated%20290712.pdf (accessed 15 September 2013 ) 
The GPGs indicated in Chart 1 are smallest in Spain, Poland, Hungary, and New Zealand. In 
almost all countries, the GPG in median earnings has decreased over time. The OECD average 
*3*IRUZRPHQ¶VZDJHVLQFRPSDULVRQZLWKPHQIHOOIURPDURXQGSHUFHQWWRSHUFHQWRYHU
the period. This average includes very high gaps in Korea and Japan. The greatest decrease over 
the 10 year period was achieved by Ireland which fell from around 20 per cent to slightly over 10 
per cent. The United Kingdom fell from 25 per cent to below 18 per cent. In Canada, the GPG 
dropped from just under 25 per cent to around 18 per cent.  
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Figure 2.2: Gender gap in full-time median earnings at the top and bottom of the earnings 
distribution, 2010 
 
Source: Data sourced from OECD (2012), OECD Family Database, OECD, Paris (www.oecd.org/social/family/database), 
specifically, LMF1.5: Gender pay gaps for full-time workers and earnings differentials by educational attainment, 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/LMF1.5%20Gender%20pay%20gaps%20for%20full%20time%20workers%20-
%20updated%20290712.pdf (accessed 15 September 2013 ) 
Generally speaking, the GPGs for the top eightieth percentile (the highest earners) overall is 
greater than the GPG for the bottom twentieth percentile (the lowest earners). The OECD report 
suggests that the smaller gap for the low earners in many countries reflects the influence of 
legislated minimum wages and collective agreements to protect low income workers (OECD 2012: 
1).  
Canada and Ireland reveal a different trend. In Canada, the lowest earning women have a 
marginally larger wage gap of 20 per cent of male earnings, in comparison with the highest earners 
where the gap is around 18 per cent. In Ireland, the low earners have a pay wage gap of around 14 
per cent, in comparison with slightly over 10 per cent for the high earners. This contrasts with New 
Zealand, Norway, Hungary and Australia, where the pay gap is significantly higher for the high 
earners in comparison with the low earners. It is to be noted that Hungary and Norway have a 
disproportionally high gender gap at the top of the distribution and that in these countries the gap 
between the median earnings of male and female is a more reliable indicator of the pay gap 
(OECD 2012: 1). 
The OECD data is dependent upon definitions which are used in each of the countries and 
therefore there can be some variation. It is also only able to use data from 2010. More recent data 
can be found through other sources. For example, more up-to-date information on European Union 
(EU) member states can be found in the reports Tackling the gender pay gap in the European 
Union and Progress on equality between women and men in 2012: A Europe 2020 initiative 
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(European Commission 2013a, 2013b), which refer to Eurostat data. The latest Eurostat data is set 
out below. 
Figure 2.3: Gender pay gap, average gross hourly earnings, selected EU countries 
 2010 2011 
EU (27 countries) 16.2 (p) 16.2 (p) 
Austria 24.0 27.3 (e) 
Belgium 10.2 10.2 
Bulgaria 13.0 13.0 
Croatia 15.5 17.6 (p) 
Czech republic 21.6 21.0 
Denmark 16.0 16.4 
Estonia 27.7 27.3 
Finland 20.3 18.2 (p) 
France 15.6 14.8 (p) 
Germany 22.3 22.2 ( p) 
Hungary 17.6 18.0 
Ireland 13.9 n/a 
Italy 5.3 5.8 
Latvia 15.5 13.6 
Lithuania 14.6 11.9 
Netherlands 17.8 17.9 
Norway 16.1 15.9 
Poland 4.5 4.5 
Portugal 12.8 12.5 
Romania 8.8 12.1 
Slovakia 19.6 20.5 
Slovenia 0.9 2.3 
Spain 16.2 16.2 (p) 
Sweden 15.4 15.8 
Switzerland 17.8 17.9 
United Kingdom 19.5 20.1 
p= provisional  e= estimated 
6RXUFH(XURVWDWµ*HQGHUSD\JDSLQXQDGMXVWHGIRUP¶
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/earnings/main_tables (accessed 15 September 2013). 
Note: The data in this figure represents the difference between the gross hourly earnings of male employees in female as a 
percentage of average gross hourly of male paid employees. The population consists of all paid employees in enterprises 
with 10 employees more. The GPG indicator is calculated within the framework of the data collected according to the 
methodology of the Structure of Earnings Survey (EC Regulation: 503/1999). 
As can be seen from this statistical set, there is some variation between the OECD and the 
Eurostat data in relation to the GPG. However, the trends can still be seen, and generally speaking 
the gap has lowered between 2010 and 2011 in all but eight countries. These datasets do not, 
however, include GPG statistics in respect of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the United 
States. 
In respect of the United States, the most recent statistics can be derived from the United States 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013), which suggests the gap is 23 per cent based on median 
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earnings of full time employees,Q1HZ=HDODQGWKH0LQLVWU\RI:RPHQ¶V$IIDLUVDQGWKH+XPDQ
Rights Commission rely on the annual New Zealand Income Survey, a subset of the Household 
Labour Force Survey, which looks at individual earnings. It reports that in 2012 the median hourly 
earnings between men and women resulted in a pay gap of 9.3 per cent (Statistics New Zealand 
2012).  
When looking at the country analyses, we should caution that it is not possible in the context of this 
report to assess the contributing factors to the GPG differentiation between the countries and 
analyse the extent to which differing legislation and practices have impacted upon a narrowing of 
the gap.  
2.4 Lessons from other countries 
For the purpose of this report, research has been undertaken across a number of different 
developed countries. The countries selected for specific focus were identified as having 
approaches in legislation and practice which contain elements comparable to the situation in 
Australia. Ten countries were chosen, all of which are members of the OECD. These are Belgium, 
Canada, Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. We have also undertaken a separate analysis of EU legislation. With the 
exception of Norway, all the countries selected which are not EU member states have common law 
systems. The 10 countries were also selected because the ILO in its publication Giving 
globalisation a human face noted that they all displayed instances of good practice (ILO 2012b).16 
The results of these country studies are set out in Appendix C. The approach taken in each case is 
to set out the legislation and some relevant recent case law; provide an overview of the various 
processes within the country for achieving equal pay, including promotional aspects as well as 
complaint mechanisms; and briefly summarise specific features that are particular to each country. 
Some additional examples from other countries are also included, generally to illustrate more 
innovative approaches.  
The various approaches discussed in Appendix C have, in one form or another, been based on the 
requirements of the Equal Remuneration Convention, together with ILO interpretation of the 
principles and materials which point to good practice in this area. In addition, those countries which 
are part of the EU have been driven to a very large extent by EU Directives and European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) case law. These are to the same effect as the ILO Convention and have a strong 
focus on promoting pay equity in a way that requires positive action to be taken by governments 
DQGHPSOR\HUV¶DQGZRUNHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQV 
2.4.1 Key practices in the selected countries 
:KDWZHKDYHLGHQWLILHGDVµgood SUDFWLFH¶LQWKHVHFRXQWULHVLQUHODWLRQWRSD\HTXLW\LQYROYHVD
coherent strategy within the country, with responsibilities at every level. This approach to 
considering good practice uses the benchmark of the minimum standards set out in Article 2 of the 
Equal Remuneration Convention, which indicates that the principle of equal remuneration for men 
and women workers for work of equal value may be applied by means of national laws or 
                                                     
16 Furthermore, information for these countries was available in English, whereas for other countries the bulk of source 
material was not available in English and was therefore unable to be considered for this report. 
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regulations, legally established or recognised machinery for wage determination, collective 
agreements between employers and workers, or a combination of these various means. 
7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\LVWRHQVXUHWKDWlegislation properly reflects and supports the 
requirements for pay equity and to also have a national policy of proactive promotion of pay equity 
including goals and targets. It should also ensure that there are government institutional supports 
such as equal pay commissions, labour commissions or human rights commissions which have 
staff dedicated to assist the process of proactive measures to attain pay equity, as well as to assist 
in the process of resolving pay inequity claims. The government also has a special responsibility by 
reason of itself being an employer and it should ensure that there are proper mechanisms for 
addressing pay inequity within the public sector.  
Although government may not be in a position to directly control remuneration in the private sector, 
many measures are now being taken in countries to legislate and require employers to themselves 
undertake pay equity measures, a process which is in turn monitored by government 
instrumentalities. 
7KHUHDUHDOVRUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVIRUHPSOR\HUV¶DQGZRUNHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVZKLFKDUHFUXFLDOWR
achieving pay equity at the national level. This is usually achieved through social dialogue, not only 
between the social partners (for example for the purposes of collective bargaining), but also with 
the government through tripartite dialogue. Further, employers are under an obligation at law to 
ensure equal remuneration for work of equal value and are also prohibited from discriminating 
against women in relation to conditions of work which would include remuneration.  
In order to achieve pay equity, there need to be appropriate models for assessing the value of work 
for the purpose of then ensuring that work of equal value receives equal remuneration. There are 
some different approaches as to how this is achieved, but there are some common features which 
appear from the country approaches.  
As part of the government responsibility, there needs to be adequate processes for seeking 
redress for examples of alleged pay inequity, such as commissions, ombudsmen, tribunals and 
courts. Whichever venue provides redress, the complaints system needs to be simple and 
available to individuals and groups with effective enforcement procedures and remedies. 
Each of these features, together with examples of good practice from individual countries, are 
discussed in WXUQEHORZ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWZKHQXVLQJWKHWHUPµRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶ in the 
sections that follow, we are generally referring to others in the group of countries which have been 
reviewed in this report, as opposed to other nations outside that group. 
2.4.2 7KHµZork of equal value¶VWDQGDUG 
The starting point at an international level for considering good practice is the wording which is 
used within the Equal Remuneration Convention: µHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶
which is the same terminology used in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) and in Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of Equal 
Opportunities and Equal Treatment of Men and Women in matters of Employment and Occupation 
WKHµ5HFDVW'LUHFWLYH¶see section C.1.1.3).  
A survey of the countries discussed reveals that most use that terminology, or adopt other 
H[SUHVVLRQVZKLFKVXEVWLWXWHWKHZRUGµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶IRUµSD\¶DQGWKHQGHILQHLWLQDEURDGZD\VR
as to indicate it is not limited solely WRZDJHV2WKHUFRXQWULHVUHIHUWRµthe same work or work of 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
30 
HTXDOYDOXH¶RUVXEVWLWXWHWKHZRUGVµHTXDOYDOXH¶ZLWKWKHZRUGVµVDPHYDOXH¶RUµFRPSDUDEOH
YDOXH¶7KHVHH[Sressions would comply with the Convention. 
There are some other countries which have used a restricted version of the standard. For example, 
in Ireland the Employment Equality Act uses the exprHVVLRQµOLNHZRUN¶ which is more limited than 
µwork of equal value¶. However because Ireland is a member of the European Union, it is obliged to 
recognise and enforce the provisions of Article 157 of the TFEU when interpreting equal pay 
legislation. This is exemplified in the decision of the ECJ in Kenny v Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform [2013] C-427/11 (Kenny) (see section C.3.1). It is interesting to note that the 
Equality Authority advocates an approach that is more expansive than that set out in the relevant 
legislation. In its Guidelines for Employment Equality Policies in Enterprises, for example, the 
$XWKRULW\PDNHVUHIHUHQFHLQLWVGLVFXVVLRQRIJHQGHUSD\GLVFULPLQDWLRQWRZRUNZKLFKLVµVLPLODU¶RU
µLQYROYHVZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶ZKHUHWKHOHJLVODWLRQLVFRQILQHGWRµOLNHZRUN¶7KH*XLGHOLQHVDOVR
identify external benchmarking and refer to the use of µPDUNHWSODFH¶DVD benchmark, but note that 
there is a ZHDNQHVVµEHFDXVHJHQGHUELDVPD\DOUHDG\H[LVWLQFHUWDLQVHFWRUVWKHUHLV a danger 
WKDWH[WHUQDOEHQFKPDUNLQJPD\LQDGYHUWHQWO\SHUSHWXDWHJHQGHUGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶(TXDOLW\$XWKRULW\
2013: 6,11).  
In Finland, the 1986 Act on Equality between Women and Men does not use the term µHTXDOYDOXH¶
at all, EXWLQVWHDGUHIHUVWRµSD\RUother terms of employment so that an employee or employees 
are more disadvantaged on the basis of sex than one or several other employees employed by the 
VDPHHPSOR\HU¶,QRWKHUZRUGVLQUHODWLRQWRJHQGHUSD\WKHIRFXVLVRQGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQG
comparative disadvantage between employees of different sexes. Nonetheless, Finland would be 
required to apply Article 157 of the TFEU in the approach taken under that Act. The extent to which 
this has been implemented in practice is questionable, for the reasons discussed in section C.4.2.  
In Canada at the federal level, pay equity is dealt with in section 11 of the Canadian Human Rights 
Act (1985) (CHRA), which XVHVWKHH[SUHVVLRQµZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶%XWLQWKHfederal Public 
Sector Equitable Compensation Act (PSECA), which relates to the public sector only, the ILO has 
QRWHGWKDWFRPSDULVRQVDUHRQO\DEOHWREHPDGHEHWZHHQMREVZKLFKKDYHµVLPLODU¶GXWLHV, which is 
more narrow than the approach in the Equal Remuneration Convention (see section C.9.2). At the 
provincial level in Canada there is considerable variation. For example, equal pay for the same or 
similar work is a requirement of employment standards legislation in Ontario, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Yukon, Newfoundland and the northern territories; whereas equal remuneration for 
work of equal value is required in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, though only in the public sector 
(see section C.9.3). 
,Q1HZ=HDODQGWKHH[SUHVVLRQµWKH same or substantially similar VNLOOV¶LVXVHGDQGWKHFDVHRI
Service and Food Workers Union NGA Ringa Tota Inc v Terranova Homes and Care Ltd [2013] 
NZEmpC 157 ARC 63/12 at [20] demonstrates the limitation of its application (see section C.10.1). 
Notwithstanding the differing wording, New Zealand has some of the best practices for achieving 
pay equity and a lower GPG than many other countries. 
In the United States there is considerable variation between federal and State legislation. At the 
federal level, the Equal Pay Act 1963 prohibits sex based wage discrimination DQGUHIHUVWRµHTXDO
ZRUN¶on jobs which require µHTXDOVNLOOHIIRUWDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶7KLVLVPRUHOLPLWHGWKDQWKH
international norm. Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination against 
employees on the basis of sex, which includes payment of wages and refers to unlawful 
HPSOR\PHQWSUDFWLFHVEDVHGRQµGLVSDUDWHLPSDFW¶7KH&LYLO5LJKWV$FWLVLQWHUSUHWHGDVSRWHQWLDOO\
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extending beyond the narrow confines of the Equal Pay Act, as discussed in section C.11. The 
legislation across the 50 States also varies. Generally, the legislation in many States uses the 
same or similar wording as that set out in the federal Equal Pay Act 1963. There are, however, 
States which provide for comparable work or comparable worth, such as Montana. Although few 
States refer to the concept of comparable worth in their legislation, some 14 States have been 
noted as having made comparable worth and pay equity adjustments of some kind in selected 
occupations (see section C.11.3). 
It is to be noted that if pay equity is contained within discrimination legislation only, unless the 
legislation itself defines gender discrimination by reference to a failure to provide equal pay for 
work of equal value, then the legislation itself is more limited and may not capture feminised labour 
sectors. This is, for example, the situation in Finland.  
2.4.3 Defining equal value 
,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUµZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶, some of the 
countries in our study expressly identify the criteria to be applied when assessing equal value and 
also recognise aspects of gender segregation in jobs. For example in Norway, section 5 of the 
Gender Equality Act 2005 SURYLGHVWKDWSD\IRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXHVKDOODSSO\µUHJDUGOHVVRI
whether such work is connected with different trades or professions or whether the pay is regulated 
E\GLIIHUHQWFROOHFWLYHZDJHDJUHHPHQWV¶,QDGGLWLRQVHFWLRQILYHSURYLGHVWKDWZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH
LVWREHGHWHUPLQHGµDIWHUDQRYHUDOODVVHVVPHQWLQZKLFKLmportance is attached to the expertise 
that is needed to perform the work and other relevant factors, such as effort, responsibility and 
working conditions¶. The definition is inclusive and allows other factors to be taken into account 
(see section C.6.1). 
Similarly in Sweden, the Discrimination Act 2009, Chapter 3, section 2, indicates that work is to be 
regarded as of equal value with other work if, on an overall assessment of the requirements and 
nature of the work, it can be deemed to be equal in value to the other work. The assessment of the 
requirements of the work is to take into account criteria such as knowledge and skills, responsibility 
and effort and in particular working conditions (see section C.7.1). 
$OWKRXJKQRWXVLQJWKHH[SUHVVLRQµZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶8QLWHG6WDWHVOHJLVODWLRQ(both federally 
and also in some States) specifically refers to assessing work by having regard to skill, effort, 
responsibility and working conditions (see section C.11.1). 
In Canada, section 11 of the CHRA identifies the criteria relevant to assessing work of equal value 
and refers to skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions. These are further elaborated in the 
Equal Wages Guidelines 1986, issued pursuant to section 11 of the CHRA (see also section 
C.9.1). 
2.4.4 Defining µrHPXQHUDWLRQ¶ 
,QUHODWLRQWRWKHZRUGµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶the Equal Remuneration Convention requires more than just 
a consideration of ordinary, basic or minimum wages or salaries; it includes all work emoluments, 
whether in cash or in kind. A number of countries (other than those countries examined here) 
define remuneration to include benefits such as the supply of uniforms, laundering work clothes, 
the provision of accommodation or food, vocational allowances, productivity bonuses, seniority 
allowances, residential allowances and dependency allowances (ILO 2012b: 288). 
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Generally speaking, however, when the global scene is considered, the focus is usually limited to 
wages alone. Account is rarely taken of overtime and bonuses, or of other forms of benefit such as 
leave from work. Also it would appear that court cases tend to focus mainly on differential wages or 
salaries and not always the entire remuneration package. 
,QWKH(8µSD\¶LVGHILQHGLQ$UWLFOHof the TFEU as meaning the ordinary basic or minimum 
wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which a worker receives 
directly or indirectly in respect of employment. As noted in section C.1.1.2, the ECJ has also 
treated pay as having a very broad definition, which includes not only basic remuneration but also: 
x overtime payments; 
x bonuses; 
x travel expenses/ allowance;  
x compensation for attending training courses and other self-education expenses;  
x termination/redundancy payments; and 
x pensions. 
In Brunnhofer v Bank der Osterreichischen Postsparkasse AG [2001] ECR I 4961 (Brunnhofer) at 
[80], WKH(&-SURYLGHGJXLGDQFHDVWRWKHEURDGVFRSHRIWKHFRQFHSWRIµHTXDOSD\¶ 
Equal pay must be ensured not only on the basis of an overall assessment of all the consideration 
granted to employees, but also in the light of each aspect of pay taken in isolation. 
Many countries have defined WKHZRUGµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶RUµSD\¶LQOHJLVODWLRQWR encompass broader 
factors beyond economic ones:  
x In the EU countries this is demanded by EU standards, for example in Belgium (see section 
C.2.1) and Norway (see section C.6.1), but not Finland at the present time (see section C.4.1).  
x In the Netherlands, the concept of pay, as defined in the Equal Treatment of Men and Women 
in Employment Act (ETA) and applied by the Dutch courts, is in line with the wide 
interpretation given by the ECJ (Sjerps 2007: 68). It includes occupational pensions as well as 
DZLGHUDQJHRIµEHQHILWV¶WKDWIORZIURP the employment relationship. For example, section 
9(2) sHWVRXWWKDWµQRQ-cash salary components shall be taken into account as pay at the 
PDUNHWYDOXHWKDWFDQEHDVVLJQHGWRWKHP¶ 
x %\FRQWUDVWLQ2QWDULRµSD\¶LVOLPLWHGWRPRQHWDU\DPRXQWVZKLFKPHDQVDOOVDODULHVZDJHV
payments and benefits paid or provided to an employee for performing work for which they 
receive a fixed or ascertainable amount (Ontario Pay Equity Commission 2012: 105). 
x ,Q1HZ=HDODQGµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶LVGHILQHGDVPHDQLQJWKHVDODU\RUZDJHVDFWXDOO\DQGOHJDOO\
payable and includes overtime bonuses, special payments and allowances whether paid in 
money or not (see section C.10.1).  
The topic of pensions is highly important in the context of EU member states as it is dependent on 
wages and tax contributions made over a work life. This aspect is not always considered in 
countries outside the EU, where there can sometimes be universal pensions paid by government, 
regardless of previous wages received. However, sometimes universal coverage may be combined 
with contributions required to be made by employers towards superannuation funds for an 
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employee based on their wages. Therefore the issue of pensions and the disadvantage which 
occurs to women later in life E\UHDVRQRIKDYLQJORZHUµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶LValso relevant. 
Good practice is best demonstrated by broad definitions RIµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶ in legislation to 
encompass all aspects of benefits associated with employment in order to reflect the real level of 
disadvantage that occurs to women when they are not remunerated fairly. 
2.4.5 Exceptions 
Some countries have specified that differences in remuneration are allowable in certain situations. 
SHFWLRQRI2QWDULR¶V3D\(TXLW\$FWexpressly states that the Act does not apply to prevent 
differences in µFRPSHQVDWLRQ¶EHWZHHQDIHPDOHMREFODVVDQG a male job class if the employer is 
able to show that the difference falls within certain narrowly defined exceptions, which are as 
follows: 
1. a formal seniority system that does not discriminate on the basis of gender;  
2. a temporary employee training or development assignment that is equally available to male 
and female employees and that leads to career advancement for those involved in the 
program; 
3. a merit compensation plan that is based on formal performance ratings that does not 
discriminate on the basis of gender; 
4. WKHSHUVRQDOSUDFWLFHNQRZQDVµUHG-FLUFOLQJ¶ZKHUHEDVHGRQJHQGHUQHXWUDOUH-evaluation 
process the value of a position has been downgraded;  
5. a skills shortage that is causing a temporary inflation in remuneration because the employer is 
encountering difficulties in recruiting employees with the record skills for positions in the job 
class; 
6. if the employer can show, after having achieved pay equity, the differences in compensation 
between bargaining units result from differences in bargaining strength of the units;  
7. if an employer designates a position as being µcasual¶. 
A similar approach is set out in the CHRA, section 11(4) of which refers WRWKHµUHDVRQDEOHIDFWRUV¶
which are considered a legitimate basis for differences. These are further elaborated upon in the 
Equal Wages Guidelines 1986. The factors included in the list are:  
x different performance ratings, where a formal system of performance appraisal is in place; 
x seniority; 
x red circling of a position which has been downgraded or an employee has been demoted; or 
x rehabilitation assignment; temporary training position; internal labour shortage in a particular 
job classification; reclassification of a position to a lower level; and regional wage rates (see 
section C.9.1). 
In the United States, section 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act names four exceptions: a seniority 
system; a merit system; a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; 
DQGµGLIIHUHQWLDOEDVHGRQDQ\IDFWRURWKHUWKDQVH[¶$VGLVFXVVHGin section C.11.1, this last factor 
has resulted in FRXUWVVRPHWLPHVDFFHSWLQJDµPDUNHWIRUFHV¶WKHRU\WRMXVWLI\SD\GLIIHUHQWLDOVLQ
spite of the 1974 Supreme Court decision in Corning Glass Works v Brennan (1974) 417 US 188. 
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The importance of articulating exceptions in legislation is to provide clarification on the criteria 
which may explain remuneration differentials between men and women doing work of equal value. 
This process helps in identifying the unexplained gaps once all other objective gender neutral 
factors have been brought to account. 
2.4.6 Burden of proof 
An important influence on EU member states is the burden of proof provision set out in Article 19(1) 
of the Recast Directive, which states that: 
Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their national judicial 
systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal 
treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from 
which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the 
respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. 
7KHUHLVQRGHILQLWLRQRIWKHSULQFLSOHRIµHTXDOWUHDWPHQW¶VHWRXWLQWKH5HFDVWDirective, but there is 
case law that assists in the approach to be taken with regard to the burden of proof. In Brunnhofer 
[2001] ECR I 4961 at [80], the ECJ held that: 
[I]t is for employees who consider themselves to be the victims of discrimination to prove that they are 
receiving lower pay than that paid by the employer to a colleague of the other sex and that they are in 
fact performing the same work or work of equal value, comparable to that performed by the chosen 
comparator; the employer may then not only dispute the fact that the conditions for the application of the 
principle of equal pay for men and women are met in the case but also put forward objective grounds, 
unrelated to any discrimination based on sex, to justify the difference in pay. 
The importance of having a provision which reverses the burden of proof is twofold. First, it 
recognises that the employer has the obligation in law to ensure that there is gender pay equity. 
Second, the bases for setting remuneration typically lie within the knowledge and control of the 
employer, making it difficult for a complainant to carry the burden of proving the case throughout 
legal proceedings.  
Therefore under EU law it is for the employee to adduce evidence that the pay she receives from 
her employer is less than that of her chosen comparator, and she does the same work or work of 
equal value to that performed by her comparator (Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961 at [58]; Kenny 
[2013] C-427/11 at [19]). Such evidence would amount to a prima facie case of discrimination on 
the basis of sex. It would then be for the employer to prove that there was no breach of the 
principle of equal treatment in relation to pay (Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961 at [60]). The employer 
by way of defence could either: 
x deny that the conditions for the application of the equal pay principle were met, for example by 
establishing that the activities actually performed by the two employees were not in fact 
comparable; or 
x justify the difference in pay by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination based on sex, 
by proving that there was a difference, unrelated to sex, to explain the payment of a higher 
monthly supplement to the chosen comparator (Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961 at [59]±[62]; 
Kenny [2013] C-427/11 at [20]).  
Importantly in Handels-og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss [1989] ECR 03199 the ECJ held that where an 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
35 
employer applies a system of pay which is lacking in transparency, it is open to a female worker to 
establish on a prima facie basis, in relation to a relatively large number of employees, that the 
average pay for women is less than that for men. If so, it is then for the employer to prove that its 
practice in the matter of wages is not discriminatory. While allowing that recourse to the criterion of 
length of service may involve less advantageous treatment of women than of men, the ECJ went 
on to hold that the employer does not have to provide special justification for such an approach (at 
[24]±[25]). By adopting that position, the ECJ acknowledged that rewarding accumulated 
experience which enables a worker to perform their duties better constitutes a legitimate objective 
of pay policy.  
In Belgium, Article 33 of the Gender Act transposes Article 19 of the Recast Directive regarding the 
burden of proof, and obliges a claimant to present a prima facie case, after which the defendant 
must demonstrate that there is no discrimination. A prima facie case is established by producing 
µHOHPHQWDU\VWDWLVWLFDOPDWHULDOZKLFKUHYHDOVDQXQIDYRXUDEOHWUHDWPHQW¶$UWLFOH 
The burden of proof in pay discrimination cases in Finland is divided between the alleged victim 
and the defendant, so that the victim must substantiate on a prima facie basis an allegation of pay 
discrimination. The onus then shifts to the defendant to show that there has been no violation.  
In Norway section 16 of the Gender Equality Act provides that: µLIWKHUHDUHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKDWJLYH
UHDVRQWREHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHKDVEHHQGLUHFWRULQGLUHFWGLIIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQW«VXFKGLIIHUHQWLDO
treatment shall be assumed to have taken place unless the person responsible proves on the 
EDODQFHRISUREDELOLWLHVWKDWVXFKGLIIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWQRQHWKHOHVVGLGQRWWDNHSODFH¶17 This 
provision requires an employer to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that differential treatment 
did not take place. A prime facie case is required, however, before the burden shifts to the 
employer (Equal Pay Commission 2008: 6). 
In the United Kingdom, the use of the burden of proof is discussed in Hartley v Northumbria 
Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust (UK Employment Tribunal, ET Case no 2802136/2007, 6 April 
2009). A discussion about the burden of proof arose in three circumstances related to whether job 
evaluation schemes which had been applied to staff in the National Health Service (NHS) were 
gender discriminatory, both in the framework of the evaluation as well as in its application to 
specific jobs. In essence the Tribunal decided that even if there had been a job evaluation study 
undertaken to establish equal or comparable value, that did not mean that jobs were thereby of 
equal value for the purposes of determination later in court. A challenge could still be raised about 
the process as well as the application. There was also discussion of the burden of proof when an 
employer wished to avoid a reference of an equal value issue to a panel of independent experts 
appointed by the Tribunal. In essence, a reference can be avoided if the employer can point to a 
study or studies and evaluations complying with equality provisions in section 1(5) of the Equality 
Act 2010. It is then for the employee to show reasonable grounds for suspecting that the evaluation 
was made under a system which discriminated on grounds of sex or is otherwise unsuitable to be 
relied upon (at [575] to [580]).  
                                                     
17 Section 3 of the Act defines direct and indirect differential treatment. In relation to indirect differential treatment, as it is a 
generalised statute it lacks clarity as to how it should be applied in relation to equal pay. For example the legislation states 
WKDWLQGLUHFWGLIIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWLVSHUPLWWHGµLIWKHDFWLRQKDVDQREMHFWLYHSXUSRVHWKDWLVLQGHSHQdent of gender and the 
means that is chosen is suitable, necessary and not disproportional intervention in relation to the VDLGSXUSRVH¶ 
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By contrast, the same approach regarding burden of proof is not taken in the other countries in our 
study.  
In the United States, before an employer is required to proffer an affirmative defence based on the 
four exceptions under section 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie 
case showing wage discrimination. The plaintiff, usually female, must then identify a comparable 
PDOHHPSOR\HHZKRPDNHVPRUHPRQH\IRUSHUIRUPLQJµVXEVWDQWLDOO\HTXDO¶ZRUNZKLFKUHTXLUHV
equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions. 
Alternative remedies are available in the United States pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 
Title VII has been interpreted as extending remedies beyond the narrow scope of the Equal Pay 
Act and potentially offers relief where men and women were in different jobs and were not 
SHUIRUPLQJµHTXDOZRUN¶ (see section C.11.1). Section 703(k)(1)(A) of Title VII refers to the burden 
RISURRILQXQODZIXOHPSOR\PHQWSUDFWLFHVEDVHGRQµGLVSDUDWHLPSDFW¶7KLVVHFWLRQLVFRQIXVLQJO\
worded; the consequence is that in the context of gender pay claims, the plaintiff has the burden of 
persuading the fact-finder that the employment practice used by the employer adversely affects the 
employment opportunities of women. If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the court must dismiss 
the action under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Case law indicates that a 
three-step model applies. The plaintiff must first prove a disparate impact. If that is established, 
then the emplo\HUPXVWGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKHFKDOOHQJHGSUDFWLFHLVMXVWLILHGE\µEXVLQHVVQHFHVVLW\¶
RUWKDWWKHSUDFWLFHLVµPDQLIHVWO\UHODWHG¶WRMREGXWLHV,IWKHHPSOR\HUGRHVQRWPHHWWKHEXUGHQRI
production and persuasion in proving business necessity, the plaintiff prevails. However, if the 
employer does meet these burdens, then there is a third step which requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that alternative practices exist that would meet the business needs of the employer 
which would not have a discriminatory effect. 
There are no specific burden of proof legislative provisions in either Canada or New Zealand. In 
Canada, in Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canada Post Corporation [2011] 2 FCR 221 
Justice Evans discussed the standard of proof when finding that members of the complainant and 
comparator groups were performing work of equal value. He concluded that the balance of 
probabilities was appropriate and added (at [198]): 
Because it may be impractical to collect the necessary data for all the jobs performed by members of the 
groups, it is sufficient to evaluate the work performed by representative samples of the groups. 
2.4.7 Requiring employers to provide information on remuneration 
One of the significant impediments for women in raising pay equity issues is that there is often 
insufficient information available to them on a regular basis to know what remuneration applies to 
other employees in different jobs or different sectors, even at the basic level of wages and even 
within the same enterprise. They do not even have the starting point to know about differential 
wages applicable to either equal jobs or jobs of equal value (Chicha: 2006: 55; Ontario Pay Equity 
Commission 2011: ch 3). 
The need for transparency arises first and foremost with regard to the information provided by an 
employer to employee representatives that are participating in either the process of job evaluations 
or collective bargaining. As JämO (the Swedish Equality Ombudsman) has emphasised (as quoted 
in Chicha 2006: 55): 
In order for a trade union to meaningfully participate in the work, it must thus have access to relevant 
information about pay or other conditions that concern an individual employee.  
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In Québec, article 29 of the Pay Equity Act of 1996 provides that the employer is required to 
disclose to pay equity committee members information relevant to the elaboration of a pay equity 
program. A similar approach has been adopted in Sweden (Chicha 2006: 55±6). 
In the United Kingdom, section 77 of the Equality Act 2010 contains provisions which prevent the 
enforcement of pay secrecy clauses in employment contracts.  
The European CRPPLVVLRQ¶VStrategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015) 
highlights strategies to eliminate unequal pay (European Commission 2010). This includes 
exploring with social partners possible ways to improve the transparency of pay (see section 
C.1.2.4). Furthermore, in determining the difference in pay received by a female worker and a male 
worker, the ECJ has stressed the need for genuine transparency, which may only be achieved if 
the principle of equal pay is observed in respect of each of the elements of remuneration granted to 
men and women: see Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889 at 
[33]±[34]). 
Good practice would require laws that entrench the provision of information to employees who seek 
to claim pay inequity based on gender. This could involve provision of information to employee 
representatives or to individual complainants subject to confidentiality provisions depending on the 
particular circumstances. 
2.4.8 National policy 
The responsibility for equal remuneration under the Equal Remuneration Convention falls on 
member states. It is those states which have the responsibility for ensuring equal remuneration for 
men and women workers through laws and other machinery, and also to take measures to promote 
objective appraisal of jobs to achieve that end (see section 2.2.3).  
Similarly in the EU, both Article 157 of the TFEU and the Recast Directive place responsibility firmly 
on member states to ensure the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. They require states 
to address the problem of continuing gender-based wage differentials and to ensure enforcement 
of remedies and penalties (see sections C.1.1±C.1.2).  
7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VStrategy for equality between women and men (2010±2015) 
highlights five areas of action, one of which is specifically on equal pay (European Commission 
2010). The strategy notes that there are many causes of this pay gap; in particular, segregation in 
education and in the labour market. In order to contribute towards eliminating unequal pay, 
pursuant to the Strategy the Commission will: 
x explore with social partners possible ways to improve the transparency of pay; 
x VXSSRUWHTXDOSD\LQLWLDWLYHVLQWKHZRUNSODFHVXFKDVHTXDOLW\ODEHOVµFKDUWHUV¶DQGDZDUGV 
x institute a European Equal Pay Day; and 
x seek to encourage women to enter non-WUDGLWLRQDOSURIHVVLRQVIRUH[DPSOHLQWKHµJUHHQ¶DQG
innovative sectors. 
In addition, the publication Progress on Equality between Women and Men in 2012 ± A Europe 
2020 Initiative assesses the situation as at 2012 and cites good practices from many of the 
member states (European Commission 2013b). Furthermore, in 2013 the European Commission 
published Tackling the Gender Pay Gap in the European Union, which suggested many strategies 
and again highlighted good practice in each of the member states (European Commission 2013a). 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
38 
Those good practices include annual reports made by member states on the gender gap; examples 
of plans and audits to enable employers to measure progress in implementing gender equality and 
gender pay; and in some cases mandatory legislative requirements for their provision. 
Furthermore, reference is made to the importance of introducing pay transparency and the report 
also provides examples of implementing equal pay tools. 
More recently the European Parliament has called on member states to take on more proactive 
roles in endeavouring to reduce the GPG and to encourage social partners to create a more 
gender-equal wage structure (see section C.1.3). In particular, the European Parliament has 
requested the European Commission to support member states to reduce the GPG by at least five 
percentage points annually with the aim of eliminating it by 2020 (see section C.1.2). If this were to 
be implemented, it would thereby include obligations on the part of the member states to achieve 
equivalent progress in their respective countries. 
The ,/2¶VCEACR has welcomed the adoption by a number of countries of national plans or 
policies which provide specific measures to address the GPG and promote equal remuneration for 
men and women for work of equal value. They include Finland, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom (ILO: 2012b: 720). 
In Finland, the government has articulated a policy program to reduce the GPG to 15 per cent by 
2015, utilising nine goals (see section C.4.2).  
In New Zealand, the Plan of Action on Pay and Employment Equity in the public service provides 
for pay and employment equity reviews in response to plans which have been undertaken in a 
number of departments. (ILO: 2012b: 720). 
The ILO is encouraging more proactive measures to be undertaken by member states which 
include collecting, analysing and disseminating data and information about the GPG (ILO 2012b: 
669). This is seen as highly important to achieving a reduction of the GPG (ILO 2012b: 887±91). 
National policies which express short and long-term targets aimed at GPG reduction, accompanied 
by specific strategies to attain that outcome, plainly amount to good practice. 
2.4.9 Institutional supports 
This report has assessed the regulatory approaches relied upon in international jurisdictions and 
identified a diversity of approaches. Generally, gender pay equity complaints are addressed 
through the use of ombudsmen, human rights commissions and other similar entities for the 
purposes of mediating and/or resolving complaints without the need to progress to court litigation. 
Furthermore, there is an increasing emphasis on promoting processes to be undertaken by 
employers to have pay equity plans or actions within their enterprise, with monitoring to be 
undertaken by the various commissions.  
Within the jurisdictions of the countries reviewed, the role of tribunals and courts is generally 
viewed as a last resort. There is increasing focus on the need to have national policies which target 
the problem, ongoing promotion of the importance of gender pay equality and the means to 
achieve it. This emphasis requires governments, employer associations, employers, unions and 
workers to agree on equity strategies, plans and actions across industry sectors and individual 
enterprises. Good practice suggests that these processes should be mandatory rather than 
voluntary. There needs to be reporting of these actions on a regular basis, as well as efficient and 
effective monitoring. 
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The research undertaken in international jurisdictions has also indicated an overall decline in the 
number of cases taken before courts and tribunals on gender pay equity. A recent report from 
Europe indicated that very few (if any) claims on gender pay discrimination have progressed to 
regular or administrative courts in countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Croatia, Finland, 
Greece, Latvia, Lichtenstein, the FYR of Macedonia, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (Foubert et al 2010: 20). The same report indicated that case law 
on equal pay issues was indeed very scarce. Some of the explanations for the scarcity of cases 
included the problematic scope of comparison, the lack of personal resources for claimants, 
problems with time limits, and limited compensation and sanction possibilities. An additional 
explanation centred, in some instances, on a lack of trust in the legal and judicial system, including 
a lack of capacity to understand key technical concepts. There was also a preference to progress 
pay equity cases through ordinary labour law mechanisms, including employment discrimination 
laws (Foubert et al 2010: 21±4). 
Ireland and the United Kingdom represent exceptions to this trend. These two countries share 
another common feature, which is the use of experts or technical advisors appointed by a labour 
court or tribunal to assist with the determination of equal remuneration issues. 
In Ireland (see section C.3.2), there is an emphasis on investigative processes rather than 
adversarial processes. Equal pay claims may be referred to the Equality Tribunal for investigation 
by equality officers, and then a recommendation is made following investigation and assessment. A 
recommendation of the Equality Tribunal may be appealed to the Labour Court. At the Labour 
Court appeal stage, there is a provision for the appointment of technical assessors and the 
summoning of witnesses to assist the work of the assessors (Foubert et al 2010: 141). This is an 
unusual approach, bearing in mind that it is an appeal from a recommendation made by the 
Equality Tribunal.  
In the United Kingdom (see section C.8.2) there are Employment Tribunals with a complaints or 
grievance procedure. The Equality Act 2010 empowers the Employment Tribunal, before 
determining a complaint, to require a member of a panel of independent experts to prepare a report 
on the question of equal pay. The panel is designated by the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service. There are special tribunal procedures for work of equal value claims, as contained in the 
(PSOR\PHQW7ULEXQDO¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQDQG5XOHVRI3URFHGXUH5HJXODWLRQV013 and Schedule 3 of 
WKH(PSOR\PHQW7ULEXQDO¶V(TXDO9DOXH5XOHVRI3URFHGXUH6FKHGXOHVHWVXSWKHSURFHVV
which applies to proceedings involving an equal value claim, depending on whether the tribunal 
itself is ruling on equal value or requiring an independent expert to prepare a report. This includes a 
very tight scheduling arrangement. Given the number of cases before it, this is a much-needed 
requirement. In July 2012, a report was prepared for the Government Equalities Office on equal 
pay cases and pay audits (Incomes Data Services 2012). An appendix to this report provides case 
summaries of 41 cases. The study noted that tribunal statistics indicated 280 successful equal pay 
complaints in the 2010/11 reporting period alone. These cases represented 13.8 per cent of equal 
pay cases that went to an Employment Tribunal hearing (United Kingdom Ministry of Justice 
2011).18  
                                                     
18 7KHFDVHVUHSUHVHQWWKRVHLGHQWLILHGE\WKH(PSOR\PHQW7ULEXQDODVEHLQJµVXFFHVVIXODWWULEXQDO¶7KHWRWDOQXPber 
RIFDVHVWKDWZHQWWRDWULEXQDOKHDULQJLQFOXGHVWKRVHWKDWDUHFODVVLILHGE\WKHWULEXQDODVµVXFFHVVIXODWWULEXQDO¶
µGLVPLVVHGDWDSUHOLPLQDU\KHDULQJ¶µXQVXFFHVVIXODWKHDULQJ¶DQGµGHIDXOWMXGJHPHQW¶ 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
40 
At the federal level in Canada (see section C.9.2), there are considerable difficulties with tribunal 
and court procedures. Equal remuneration cases are complicated and protracted, with instances of 
experts giving testimony for weeks and even months (see Attorney General of Canada v Public 
Service Alliance of Canada (1999) 180 DLR (4th) 95). The Court of Appeal in that case indicated 
that it would be preferable if the approaches taken in provinces such as Québec and Ontario (see 
section C.9.3) were utilised.  
In Québec the Commission of Pay Equity receives complaints and may then mediate, conciliate or 
arbitrate the dispute. It has authority to initiate an investigation on its own motion without receiving 
a complaint. It may also utilise selected experts to conduct investigations.  
In Ontario, the Pay Equity Commission includes the Pay Equity Office and the Pay Equity Hearings 
7ULEXQDOZKLFKZRUNLQWDQGHP7KH3D\(TXLW\RIILFHLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUHQIRUFLQJWKHSURYLQFH¶V
Pay Equity Act 1990, including investigating and attempting to settle pay claims. This is the prime 
method by which gender pay matters are resolved. If not, then the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal is 
responsible for adjudicating disputes. It has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions of fact 
or law. 
In summary, the use of experts to assist with assessing the data and information relevant to 
whether work is of equal value and/or with remuneration levels which may be appropriate to ensure 
equal remuneration to provide information and advice to tribunals or other authorities responsible 
for deciding whether there is gender pay inequity, is an example of good practice.  
2.4.10 Requiring employers to undertake pay equity measures 
The European Commission publication, Tackling the Gender Pay Gap in the European Union in 
2013, suggests many strategies and highlights good practice in each of the member states 
(European Commission 2013a). Those good practices include annual reports published by member 
states on the gender gap; examples of plans and audits to enable employers to measure progress 
in implementing gender equality and gender pay; and in some cases mandatory legislative 
requirements for their provision. 
The ILO welcomes and indeed encourages measures which require employers to develop a plan to 
address equal pay. For example, Finland obliges both public and private undertakings with more 
than 30 workers to develop an equality plan, which must include information that enables workers 
to monitor the equality situation in the enterprise, including differences in pay. It must also set out 
measures to achieve pay equity and include a review of the impact of measures previously taken 
(ILO 2012b: 723).  
Reference is also made to Sweden which, by virtue of the Discrimination Act 2008, Chapter 3, 
requires an employer with 25 or more workers to survey and analyse provisions and practices 
every three years regarding pay and other terms of employment and pay differences between 
women and men performing work that is regarded as equal or of equal value (ILO 2012b: 723; 
European Commission 2013a: 18). 
In Austria, the National Action Plan for Gender Equality in the Labour Market includes a 
compulsory requirement for companies to publish equal pay reports over staggered years which 
commences with the largest companies. The equal pay reports are compulsory for companies with 
more than 1000 employees from 2011 for the year 2010, for companies with more than 500 
employees from 2012, for companies with more than 250 employees from 2013 and with more than 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
41 
150 employees from 2014. The goal is to create income transparency and to take measures to 
reduce GPGs (European Commission 2013a: 18). 
In Belgium, the government adopted legislation in April 2012 to reduce the GPG. The law requires 
GLIIHUHQFHVLQSD\DQGODERXUFRVWVEHWZHHQPHQDQGZRPHQWREHRXWOLQHGLQFRPSDQLHV¶annual 
audit. The annual audits are to be transmitted to the National bank and this information is publicly 
available. The law also stipulates that every two years, firms with over 50 workers should establish 
a comparative analysis of the wage structure of female and male employees. In the case of 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQEHLQJVXVSHFWHGZRPHQFDQWXUQWRWKHILUP¶VPHGLDWRUZKRZLOOHVWDEOLVKZKHWKHU
there is indeed a pay differential and if so, will try and find a compromise with the employer (see 
section C.2.2.2; European Commission 2013a: 18). 
In Québec, the Pay Equity Act of 1996 requires public and private sector employers with more than 
100 employees to develop a pay equity plan. Further, an employer with between 50 and 99 
employees may choose to set up a pay equity committee to determine value and wages. If there 
are less than 50 employees, a process is still required and one method which may be chosen is the 
creation of a pay equity plan (see section C.9.3.3). 
In addition to legislative good practice, organisational and governmental bodies have also been 
established or utilised to take an active role to address pay equity in the marketplace. In Québec, a 
joint advisory committee with both employer and worker representation has been established to 
advise the Equal Pay Commission regarding the making of regulations, developing tools in order to 
facilitate the achievement or maintenance of pay equity and addressing any problems in carrying 
out the Pay Equity Act (ILO 2012b: 725). 
In Ontario the Pay Equity Act places an onus on every employer and pay equity is achieved when 
every job class in an establishment has been compared to a job class or job classes under one of 
the comparison methods mentioned in the Act (see section C 9.3.4). Also in 2011, the Pay Equity 
office in Ontario launched the Wage Gap Program which targets specific non-unionised private 
sector workplaces of Ontario and obtains compensation data. There is therefore an active 
monitoring of the self-managed process required by employers to attain pay equity. 
Finally, on this point, even in countries such as Belgium, Sweden and Finland which have highly 
structured centralised collective bargaining and wage setting, there is still a requirement for 
individual corporations covered by collective bargaining to be responsible for ensuring pay equity 
within their own organisations. 
In summary either a mandatory system, or a self-assessment system requiring pay equity to be 
implemented by employers, would provide a good base for achieving pay equity. Such a system 
would be efficiently and effectively monitored and assessed, both within the organisation through 
social dialogue between employers and employees, as well as by independent bodies such as pay 
equity commissions.  
2.4.11 Models for assessing the value of work 
2.4.11.1 Appraising equal value 
The Equal Remuneration Convention underlines the importance of objective appraisals of work. 
7KHFRQFHSWRIµHTXDOYDOXH¶UHTXLUHVDPHWKRGfor measuring and comparing the relative value of 
different jobs. The Convention provides for the promotion of objective job appraisal on the basis of 
the work to be performed, where this will assist in giving effect to the provisions of the Convention. 
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Recognising different contexts, the Convention provides for flexibility in the appraisal methods that 
can be used. In Australia, µwork value¶ has been the method primarily relied upon by industrial 
tribunals, as will be apparent from many of the cases discussed in Appendices A and B). 
,QFRQWHPSRUDU\WLPHVWKH,/2KDVPRUHURXWLQHO\XVHGWKHWHUPµMREHYDOXDWLRQ¶UDWKHUWKDQµMRE
DSSUDLVDO¶-REHYDOXDWLRQLVDEURDGJHQHULFFRQFHSWLQFRUSRUDWLQJDZLGHUDQJHRIPHWKRGVDQG
processes, practised in a number of contexts, and by a range of stakeholders (including tribunals). 
Viewed broadly, it is a systematic process for defining the relative worth or size of jobs in order to 
establish relativities and provide a basis for designing an equitable grade and pay structure (Oetz 
et al 2013: 39; Armstrong et al 2003: 4). It includes formal and informal approaches. The use of a 
particular approach may be more common in certain types of context ± the key criterion is that the 
method used to assess the value of jobs be free of gender bias.  
There are number of different types of formal job evaluation schemes, including analytical and 
non-analytical schemes, but also a significant amount of variants and hybrids. In the context of 
equal remuneration proceedings, analytical job evaluation schemes feature most prominently in 
those contexts and jurisdictions that favour applications for equal remuneration confined to a single 
workplace or organisation. 
Armstrong et al (2003: 4) describe the most common anaO\WLFDODSSURDFKDVDµSRLQts-factor 
VFKHPH¶. This has DµIDFWRUSODQ¶ZKLFKGHILQHVWKHIDFWRUVDQGWKHLUOHYHOVDQGDWWDFKHVVFRUHVWR
each level. The factors include: 
x skills and qualifications acquired through education, training or experience; 
x responsibility for equipment, people and money; 
x effort, which can be physical, mental and psychosocial; and 
x working conditions, which encompass both physical (eg noise, dust) and psychological 
aspects (eg stress, frequent interruptions, client aggression). 
A weighting is applied to each factor which has regard to levels of intensity or frequency and regard 
to the importance to the enterprise. The total score of the points attributed to the combination of the 
factors and their weighting becomes the numerical value of the job (Pay Equity Taskforce 2004, 
cited in Oelz et al 2013: 39). That figure is then used to determine whether or not different jobs 
have the same value or comparable value. Different jobs that have the same numerical value are 
entitled to equal remuneration. Remuneration differences are allowable for equal value jobs, but 
only if the reason for them is not related to the sex of the job holder (Armstrong et al 2003: 48). 
By contrast, non-analytical job evaluation schemes include global or ranking evaluation methods. In 
these approaches jobs are described and compared in order to place them in rank order or in a 
grade, without analysing their constituent parts or elements. The most common non-analytical 
DSSURDFKLVWRµPDWFK¶UROHVDVGHILQHGLQUROHSURILOHVWRGHILQLWLRQVRIJUades or bands, or to role 
profiles of jobs that have already been graded. When designing the grade structures, the initial step 
may be to rank the jobs in order of perceived value (Armstrong et al 2003: 4±5). Thus, ranking 
methods may ascertain the importance of jobs within organisations, but they do not necessarily 
determine the difference in value between them. In the view of many commentators, as well as the 
ILO, non-analytical schemes do not meet the legal requirements for the assessment of equal value 
(Armstrong et al 2003: 4±5; Oelz et al 2013: 39; Harriman & Holm 2001; Katz & Baitsch 1996; 
Hastings 2003). But they may still have a place as another means of achieving pay equity. 
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Job evaluation as a process is not itself immune from gender bias, as the factors and weightings 
that comprise an analytical scheme, for example, may themselves be gendered. The concern with 
job evaluation methods is that even when such methods capture the skills of typical female jobs, 
these often score lower than male jobs. One illustration is the undervaluation of emotion labour ± 
work which is mostly performed by women (Steinberg 1999; Mastracci et al 2006). It has also been 
noted that even the Hay Guide Chart Profile Method, which has helped reveal the existence of sex 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGVRFLDOSUHMXGLFHVLQWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIZRPHQ¶VZRUNGLVSOD\VVRPHJHQGHU
bias. It can place a heavy emphasis on skills, mental effort and responsibility. As such it may favour 
high-ranking positions where men prevail, and disregard aspects such as caring and being 
responsible for other people, which often characterise jobs performed by women (Steinberg 1992; 
Katz & Baitsch 1996). 
2.4.11.2 Methods of objective job appraisals 
The analytical job evaluation approaches reviewed in the international jurisdictions assessed for 
this report are primarily deployed in situations or claims involving a single workplace or 
organisation. The exceptions mainly involve countries with strong collective bargaining which is 
centralised at the national level and/or at the industry level. Relevant examples include Finland and 
Belgium, in both the private sector and the government sector. In Finland (see section C.4.2) there 
is a national framework agreement which sets guidelines for industry level negotiations. Similarly 
there are collective agreements for government employees generally. A similar approach is taken 
in Belgium (see section C.2.2). Other examples of job evaluations not being limited to a single 
enterprise or workplace can be found in government sectors. Using just one illustration, the 
provincial jurisdiction of Ontario in Canada undertakes job evaluation across different public sector 
departments (see section C.9.3.4). 
There are two basic approaches to analytical job evaluation. The first is a job evaluation based on 
identifying job factors (skills, responsibility, effort and working conditions, and sub-factors of each) 
and applying a weighting (such as intensity, frequency and the importance of the factor to the 
organisation) to the factors, without gender bias. This process does not require a male or female 
comparator in order to be free of gender bias. Regard is had to factors relevant to both jobs 
predominantly done by men and jobs predominantly done by women to ensure, in particular, that 
job characteriVWLFVRIµZRPHQ¶VZRUN¶LVQRWRYHUORRNHG7KHRXWFRPHRIWKLVSURFHVVLVDKLHUDUFK\
of jobs that are free from discrimination. Examples of this form of job evaluation can be found in: 
x the ACAS publication Job evaluation: consideration and risks (ACAS 2011); 
x WKHHTXDOSD\DXGLWWRRONLWGHYHORSHGE\WKH8.¶V(TXDOLW\DQG+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLVVLRQ19 
x WKH8.¶V1DWLRQDO-RLQW&RXQFLO-RE(YDOXDWLRQ6\VWHP2HO]HWDO 
x the guide prepared by Armstrong et al (2003: 4); and 
x WKH6ZHGLVKµ6WHSVWR3D\(TXLW\¶+DUULPDQ	+ROP.DW]	%DLWVFK+DVWLQJV
2003).  
Additionally there is an increasing use of software programs such as Analytical Evaluation of Jobs 
(ABAKABA) and EVALALFI from Switzerland (Oelz 2013: 42);20 ISOS from Spain (Oelz 2013: 42); 
                                                     
19 Available at http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/advice-and-guidance/tools-equal-pay/equal-pay-audit-toolkit/ (accessed 
2 October 2013). 
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and the Equal Pay Quick Scan developed by the Netherlands Equal Treatment Commission 
(Foubert et al 2010: 18).  
After such evaluation, the remuneration of those jobs is then assessed to ensure that those that are 
ranked equal have equal remuneration. Differences in remuneration are permissible if they are 
given for reasons other than gender, consistent with Article 3 of the Equal Remuneration 
Convention. In relation to the jurisdictions considered, generally government authorities such as 
departments of labour, equal opportunities commissions or pay equity commissions promote 
analytical job evaluation. Examples can be located in the Canadian federal system as well as the 
provinces of Québec and Ontario, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. 
The second form of job evaluation requires identifying female and male dominated jobs and then 
later assessing the value of those gender dominated jobs using factors which are bias free. This 
form of evaluation requires comparisons to be made between female dominated jobs and male 
dominated jobs. This does not result in a hierarchy of jobs, but specifically identifies jobs of 
comparable value. This is often required by legislation. For example, the requirement for 
LGHQWLILFDWLRQRIµJHQGHUSUHGRPLQDQFH¶ RUµIHPDOHGRPLQDWHGMREV¶DQGµPDOHGRPLQDWHGMREV¶LVVHW
out in the Pay Equity Acts of Ontario, Nova Scotia and Québec (see section C.9.3), as well as the 
Equal Pay Acts of New Zealand and Montana (see sections C.10.1, C.11.3). It is also required by 
tKH&DQDGLDQ+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLVVLRQ¶V(TXDO:DJHV*XLGHOLQHVVHHsection C.9.1). However, 
not all job evaluation processes require gender dominant jobs for the purposes of comparability. 
Jurisdictions where this requirement was not evident include the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, 
Ireland, Sweden and the United States. 
The job evaluation approach which is reliant on utilising a comparator from the spectrum of male 
dominated jobs within an enterprise may result in no comparison being found within an enterprise 
and therefore alternative comparators may be required. Ontario is an example of this approach 
(see section C.9.3.4),WV3D\(TXLW\$FWUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHZDJHVRIDOOHPSOR\HHVZLWKLQµIHPDOHMRE
FODVVHV¶WKDWLVZKHUH per cent or more are female) be adjusted so that they are at least equal 
to the wages of employees in male job classes found to be of comparable value. Value is 
determined by four factors: skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions. Three forms of 
comparison apply: a job to job method; a proportional value method; or a proxy method. The 
SURSRUWLRQDOYDOXHPHWKRGFRPSDUHVWKHIHPDOHMREFODVVZLWKDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶PDOHMREFODVVRU
classes. The proxy method, which is only utilised for employees in the public sector, allows public 
VHFWRURUJDQLVDWLRQVWRXVHIHPDOHMREFODVVHVIURPDµSUR[\HPSOR\HU¶EHLQJDGLIIHUHQW
department in the public sector, so long as those female job classes have had their pay equity 
wages assessed using the job to job method or the proportional value method.  
If no comparator as required by legislation can be found, an action can only be taken by women on 
the basis of sex discrimination. For example, pursuant to the 8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V Equality Act, where 
a woman claims gender pay based inequity in relation to her contractual pay and there is no actual 
male comparator doing work of equal value, then a sex equality clause cannot operate and she 
must then claim sex discrimination based on a hypothetical male comparator (see section C.8.1). 
                                                                                                                                                                
20 The process used in these two programs involves regression analysis and criticisms have been made that the approach 
does not adequately take into account female dominated sectors (Chicha 2006). 
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Various States and provinces in the United States and Canada have used comparable work 
evaluations which have compared very different jobs undertaken by men and women and included 
jobs across different government departments. In selected applications, analytical job evaluation 
has been used to compare female and male dominant jobs, while on other occasions it has been 
limited to individuals occupying jobs (National Committee on Pay Equity (undated); Oelz et al 2013: 
42). For example, clerk typists have been compared to male delivery van drivers; female 
microfilmers to grain samplers; a female administrative secretary to a male meat cutter; a female 
library associate to a natural resource specialist; an administrative secretary to a welder; a 
taxi/towing regulator to a gardener; and a registered nurse to an electrician (National Committee on 
Pay Equity (undated)). These examples demonstrate the use of an analytical job evaluation 
process to assess the comparable value of jobs across very different fields of occupation and 
employment.  
In relation to countries where there is collective bargaining across industries, the process used in 
arriving at the wage salary structure for the various jobs in the particular industries is not easily 
ascertained by desktop research. The ILO has described some examples in which it is expressly 
included in collective agreements that there is a court requirement for objective job evaluation 
methods to be applied (ILO 2012b: paras 705, 724). In Iceland, collective agreements requiring 
objective job evaluation methods have been negotiated between 15 unions and the City of 
Reykjavik. In Algeria there is a national level collective agreement which contains provisions 
relating to the classification of jobs, which must be established by enterprise agreements using an 
objective evaluation process including specific criteria for job evaluation. In Luxembourg there is a 
statutory obligation to negotiate equality plans with regard to employment and remuneration in the 
framework of collective agreements. In Spain, legislation establishes an obligation to provide 
information, whenever a new collective agreement is signed, on the pay structure and measures 
adopted to promote equality with respect to wages. In Belgium, a collective agreement on equal 
remuneration between men and women workers was extended by Royal Order, providing that all 
sectors in enterprises must review and adapt their classification systems. This requirement extends 
to the choice of criteria, weighting of criteria and converting values into remuneration (Oelz et al 
2013: 55). 
In relation to industry-level collective bargaining, there is a risk, absent an objective job evaluation 
process which is gender bias free, that where men and women are divided between different 
industry sectors or different workplaces, any job evaluation approach may not necessarily exclude 
VWHUHRW\SLQJDQGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIXQGHUYDOXHGZRPHQ¶VZRUN(YHQLQFRXQWULHVZKHUHWKHUHDUH
significant levels of collective bargaining operating across industry sectors, there can be a 
legislative requirement that individual enterprises, even if within a sector covered by collective 
arrangements, are required to develop pay equity plans, or pay equity actions or wage mapping. 
This may apply if they are enterprises with more than 25 employees (Sweden), more than 30 
employees (Finland) or more than 50 employees (Belgium). These requirements, if efficiently and 
effectively monitored, provide an added method to eliminate gender pay inequity. 
In the international sphere, there are instances where job evaluation schemes have come under 
scrutiny, specifically as to whether they may involve sex discrimination. In the case of Hartley v 
Northumbria Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust (UK Employment Tribunal, ET Case no 
2802136/2007, 6 April 2009) there was significant discussion of the tools used at the national level 
and also by the NHS in job evaluation across more than 16,000 staff. The case included a 
consideration of the mandatory national job evaluation study provisions, the NHS collective 
agreement and the job evaluation study used within NHS (JES NHS). The claim was largely one of 
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sex discrimination under the Equal Pay Act 1970 (UK). Challenges were made as to whether the 
NHS collective agreement, the JES and the NHS approach were discriminatory as to the process 
of job evaluation generally, and also in its application to specific jobs. The Tribunal gave 
consideration to the job evaluation methods used, which included analytical job evaluation, using 
points and weightings, as well as the use of profiles and matching and hybrid matching/evaluation 
processes, with respect to the grading of employees.  
This case is by no means a representative case before the UK Employment Tribunal, but it does 
highlight how a scheme of job appraisal can be subject to direct judicial scrutiny. The case also 
raised important issues regarding legal concepts, procedure and evidentiary material. The volume 
of material in that case was daunting, as indeed was the time taken for its hearing before the 
Tribunal. It proceeded over 24 days, with 46 ring binders of documents, several containing 
thousands of pages of audit trails.  
2.4.11.3 Reliance on comparators 
The experience of the international jurisdictions reviewed for this report, and also the work of the 
ILO more generally, did not reveal any example where pay inequity was addressed in a manner 
compatible with the Equal Remuneration Convention, other than by objective job appraisal, and 
usually by analytical job evaluation processes. In practice, pay inequity issues come to the fore as 
a result of an allegation or complaint that, for example, women are not being remunerated at the 
same level as men for the same or comparable work. It is this factor, in those jurisdictions, that has 
led to the use of comparators for the purpose of assessing whether the allegation or complaint is 
made out.  
The international approaches reviewed indicated that the comparator(s) did not necessarily have to 
be from a male dominant job, nor indeed be male: they could be female. Comparators in the private 
sector, although usually from a single enterprise, could also come from a different enterprise. In 
government, the comparators could come from jobs across different government departments. 
Furthermore, the comparators did not necessarily have to be doing the same or similar job; 
comparators could do a whole spectrum of jobs and, using analytical job evaluation, would have 
values ascribed by which remuneration deficits could be identified and remedied.  
One exception to the requirement for a comparator can be found in a recent New Zealand case, 
Service and Food Workers Union NGA Ringa Tota Inc v Terranova Homes and Care Ltd [2013] 
NZEmpC 157 ARC 63/12, which included a complaint of sex discrimination (see section C.10.1). 
The court considered the scope of section 3 of the Equal Pay Act 1972 (NZ), which sets out the 
criteria to be applied in determining whether an element of differentiation in remuneration based on 
sex exists. It decided that the criteria could not merely be determined by reference to what men 
would be paid to do the same work, abstracting from skills, responsibility, conditions and degree of 
effort, as well as any systematic undervaluation of the work derived from current, historical or 
structural gender discrimination. It was also possible to consider what is paid to males in other 
industries, if other employees of the same employer, or other similar employers, would be an 
inappropriate comparator group. The case demonstrates using hypothetical comparators or 
comparators from other industries. 
In conclusion, the examples drawn upon in this section of the report highlight the diversity of 
approaches and the steps undertaken within particular jurisdictions to address gender bias.  
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This review suggests that good practice is one which provides the most flexible approaches to 
identifying and remedying gender pay inequity. Such approaches are not limited to requiring male 
dominated job comparators, and permit a representative comparator, or female comparators whose 
jobs have previously been evaluated using a gender bias free job evaluation process (ILO 2008b).  
2.4.12 Enforcement procedures and remedies 
There is a wide spectrum of enforcement procedures and remedies adopted in the countries 
studied. They are largely dependent upon whether a complainant is a union member, whether the 
claim is made for gender discrimination or whether it is a claim for gender pay inequity, the nature 
of the relief sought and time limitations related to the claim. Generally speaking there is confusion 
as to where to seek relief.  
Titles II and III of the Recast Directive require all EU member states to ensure the enforcement of 
remedies and penalties. Article 25 indicates that sanctions, which may comprise the payment of 
compensation to the victim, must also EHµHIIHFWLYHSURSRUWLRQDWHDQGGLVVXDVLYH¶. Article 18 
provides that where there has been a breach of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of 
equal value, member states are obliged to introduce into their national legal systems such 
measures as are necessary to ensure real and effective compensation or reparation. The ECJ has 
further noted that national law may not preclude the award of interest (Marshall v Southampton and 
South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1993] ECR 1-04367). 
More recently the European Parliament called on the member states and the Commission to 
implement strategies that might include, inter alia, provision for collective redress against violations 
of the equal pay principle by enabling individuals or representative bodies to bring a case for others 
(see section C.1.3). The Parliament stated that Article 20 of the Recast Directive should be revised 
VRDVWRHQKDQFHWKRVHERGLHV¶PDQGDWHE\VXSSRrting and advising victims of pay discrimination, 
and further that there should be legal powers to impose sanctions in cases of breaching the 
principle of equal pay for equal work and/or to bring wage discrimination cases to court (see 
section C.1.3). 
In relation to practice in the EU countries, the following examples are notable. 
x In Belgium, by virtue of the Protection of Remuneration Act of 1965, it may be possible to 
claim compensation for discrimination during the whole period of employment, whatever the 
duration (see section C.2.2.1). 
x In Ireland the Equality Tribunal can order arrears of pay up to a maximum of three years (see 
section C.3.2). 
x In Finland, remedies for victims of pay discrimination are complicated. There is no access to 
mediation or any similar procedure, other than through the ordinary courts. The Ombudsman 
for Equality and the Equality Board that supervise the implementation of the 1986 Act on 
Equality mainly act in a consultative and supervisory capacity. They lack the jurisdiction to, for 
example, prohibit the continuation of a discriminatory practice (see section C.4.2.1). 
x In the Netherlands discriminatory dismissals and victimisation dismissals can be ruled to be 
void under the ETA or the General Equal Treatment Act (GETA). The employee can ask the 
court to invalidate the termination of the contract, whereby an employee can claim wages and 
seek reinstatement. Alternatively, the employee can claim pecuniary damages before the 
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courts under the system of sanctions in general administrative law, contract law and/or tort law 
(see section C.5.2.1). 
x In Norway, there are three different processes for enforcement. If a complaint is made under 
the Gender Equality Act 2005 (GEA) it can either be made to the Gender Equality and Anti-
Discrimination Ombudsman (Ombud) or to the Gender Equality and Anti-Discrimination 
Tribunal. The Ombud is limited to making a recommendation which is not legally binding, 
although this is usually followed. The Tribunal does not have the power to award damages or 
compensation or impose sanctions. An order for compensation for a breach of the GEA can 
only be made by a court. Compensation is fixed at an amount that is reasonable and the 
courts will grant compensation from the date of the claim for up to three years. In addition to 
these remedies the Labour Court has jurisdiction, but it is primarily concerned with collective 
agreements. If a provision of a collective agreement is found to be in violation of the GEA, it 
will be declared null and void by the Labour Court so that the compensation to be paid is 
retrospectively dated back to the moment that the invalid provision was put into force. In short, 
there are significant limitations for complainants, particularly those that are not covered by 
collective agreements, to obtain redress for claims of pay inequity (see sections C.6.2±C.6.3). 
x In Norway, there is a right to both punitive and economic damages which can be ordered by a 
Labour Court, but there are complex rules regulating time limits (see section C.7.2.1). 
In the non-EU countries, remedies are dependent upon whether a claim is brought before a court, 
through human rights or equal pay tribunals or commissioners, or through an employment or labour 
tribunal (see sections C.9±C 11). In Canada, for example, the Canadian Human Rights Act Review 
Panel has concluded that pursuing a complaint through the current federal system was an onerous 
process with lengthy and complex proceedings often required to be taken (Ontario Pay Equity 
Commission 2011: ch 3). 
Good practice in this respect is a model in which there are simple processes to make a complaint, 
SUHIHUDEO\WKURXJKDµRQH-stop-VKRS¶DSSURDFK7KHUHVKRXOGDOVREHSURYLVLRQIRUEDFNSD\WREH
awarded, subject to reasonable time limits, particularly if an employer has failed to provide 
remuneration information. Good practice would also have a facility for access to legal aid to assist 
individual claimants if they are not supported by a union in making a claim. It is usually only a court 
which can actually enforce a claim and therefore if a mediated outcome or an arbitration requires 
enforcement, a separate action may need to be instituted in a court.  
2.4.13 Conclusion 
7KLVUHYLHZRIRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶ODZVDQGSUDFWLFHVSURYLGHVDQLPSRUWDQWRSSRUWXQLW\WRFRQVLGHU
where Australia sits in its approach to tackling the ongoing issue of gender pay inequity. It provides 
good examples of trends and specific illustrations of ways to improve outcomes for women workers 
more generally, and also provides suggestions as to approaches which may inform the 
Commission in considering evidence and procedures in cases which come before it. In some 
instances Australia would be a leader in many of the good practices referred to in the review.  
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3 The Fair Work Act 
This chapter explains in some detail the way in which the issue of equal remuneration is addressed 
under the Fair Work Act 2009. It is particularly concerned with Part 2-7, which empowers the 
Commission to make equal remuneration orders. However, it is not possible to fully understand the 
$FW¶VSURYLVLRQVZLWKRXWDQDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKHODZLQWKLVDUHDKDVHYROYHGERWK
at federal and State levels. Accordingly, the first section of this chapter briefly reviews some of that 
background. More detailed accounts of the history of federal and State regulation in this area can 
be found in Appendices A and B.21 
3.1 Background: the law prior to the Fair Work Act  
3.1.1 Award rates of pay 
For most of the twentieth century, pay equity was not an objective of either the federal or State 
systems of industrial regulation. Indeed the awards that set minimum pay rates for most Australian 
employees typically discriminated between male and female employees. This was in part explained 
by an assumption that, unlike women, men needed to be paid a wage that was sufficient not just to 
subsist on themselves, but to provide for a family. As explained in sections A.3 and A.4, it was not 
until the Equal Pay Case (1969) 127 CAR 1142 and the Equal Pay Case (1972) 147 CAR 172 that 
the federal industrial tribunal, then known as the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, ended 
the practice of having different rates within awards for male and female workers. The first of these 
decisions accepted the principle of equal pay for equal work, although confined it to work 
performed by women that was of a similar or like nature to that done by men, and excluded work 
WKDWZDVµHVVHQWLDOO\RUXVXDOO\SHUIRUPHGE\IHPDOHV¶7KHVHFRQGHPEUDFHGWKHEURDGHUSULQFLSOH
RIµHTXDOSD\IRUZRUNRIHTXDO YDOXH¶DVHPERGLHG in the ,/2¶V(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQRI
1951 (see section 2.2.2). The National Wage Case 1974 (1974) 157 CAR 293 subsequently 
accepted that the minimum wage for award-covered workers should be the same for men and 
ZRPHQWKXVILQDOO\DEDQGRQLQJWKHµEUHDGZLQQHU¶PRGHORIZDJHGHWHUPLQDWLRQ 
In the 1972 Equal Pay CaseWKH&RPPLVVLRQLQGLFDWHGWKDWZKHWKHUZRPHQ¶VZRrk was of equal 
YDOXHWRWKDWRIPHQVKRXOGEHDVVHVVHGE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHHVWDEOLVKHGFRQFHSWRIµZRUNYDOXH¶
Work value is typically defined to include an examination of the nature of the work, the skill and 
responsibility required and the conditions under which the work is performed. It was the concept 
relied upon by Australian industrial tribunals in determining wages and salaries for an area of work. 
The idea of a work value adjustment to minimum wage rates was an accepted part of the wage 
fixing priQFLSOHVRIERWKIHGHUDODQG6WDWHWULEXQDOVZKLOHFODLPVFRQFHUQLQJµDQRPDORXV¶
DVVHVVPHQWVFRXOGDOVREHDGGUHVVHGWKURXJKWKHµDQRPDOLHVDQGLQHTXLWLHV¶SURYLVLRQVRIWKRVH
principles. Typically, claims for an adjustment required evidence that there had been change in the 
µQDWXUHRIWKHZRUNVNLOODQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\UHTXLUHGRUWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKZRUNLV
SHUIRUPHG¶VLQFHWKHODVWWLPHWKDWWKHZRUNLQTXHVWLRQKDGEHHQIRUPDOO\DVVHVVHGE\WKH
tribunal: see eg National Wage Case March 2007 (1987) 17 IR 65 at 100; and for a more recent 
expression, Safety Net Review ± Wages, June 2005 (2005) 142 IR 1 at 125.  
No further explicit direction on this issue was given until 1986, when the Commission ruled that the 
1972 principle could not be applied by UHIHUHQFHWRWKHFRQFHSWRIZRUNRIµFRPSDUDEOHZRUWK¶VHH
                                                     
21 Some of what follows in this Chapter reproduces material from Smith & Stewart 2010 and Creighton & Stewart 2010. 
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Re Private Hospitals and Doctors Nurses (ACT) Award 1972 (1986) 13 IR 108. At this point the 
Commission referred the parties again to the explicit direction to work value in the 1972 equal pay 
for work of equal value principle. The Commission noted that the 1972 principle remained in 
operation and directed the parties to the anomalies and inequities principle, which was 
subsequently used to secure significant pay increases in some female-dominated industries: see 
eg Re Private Hospitals and Doctors Nurses (ACT) Award 1972 (1987) 20 IR 420.  
3.1.2 The 1993 federal legislation 
In 1993, the Keating Government introduced legislation that empowered the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (AIRC) to make equal remuneration orders for specified employees or 
groups of employees, on application by an employee, a trade union or the Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner. Under a new Division 2 of Part VIA of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), the 
AIRC had to be VDWLVILHGWKDWVXFKDQRUGHUZDVQHFHVVDU\WRVHFXUHµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUN
RIHTXDOYDOXH¶7KDWWHUPZDVH[SUHVVO\GHILQHGE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKH(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ
Convention, to mean rates of remuneration established without discrimination based on sex. 
When the 1988 Act was amended and renamed as the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WR Act) by 
WKH+RZDUG*RYHUQPHQW¶VWorkplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996, the 
equal remuneration provisions were retained. They also survived the sDPHJRYHUQPHQW¶VPRUH
VXEVWDQWLDOµ:RUN&KRLFHV¶UHIRUPVRIHIIHFWHGWKURXJKWKHWorkplace Relations Amendment 
(Work Choices) Act 2005, though with two major alterations. The amended provisions (now found 
in Division 3 of Part 12 of the WR Act) explicitly required applications to make reference to a 
comparator group of employees. In addition, the AIRC was excluded from hearing applications if 
the effect of the order sought would be to vary a minimum pay rate set for either award-covered or 
award-free employees under Division 2 of Part 7 of the Act. 
In practice, few applications were ever made under the 1993 provisions, and no orders were ever 
LVVXHGZKHWKHUEHIRUHRUDIWHUWKH+RZDUGJRYHUQPHQW¶VDPHQGPHQWV,QSDUWWKLVZDVEHFDXVH
of the difficulty of establishing that any disparity in earnings was the product of some form of 
µGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶VHHHJAutomotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries 
Union v HPM Industries (1998) 94 IR 129; Automotive, Food, Metals Engineering, Printing and 
Kindred Industries Union v David Syme & Co Ltd (1999) 97 IR 374. Both the 1993 provisions and 
the cases brought under them are discussed in more detail in section A.5, together with the 1996 
and 2005 amendments. 
3.1.3 The Equal Remuneration Principles in New South Wales and Queensland  
During the period that the 1993 federal legislation was in force, there was a much greater degree of 
activity in tackling gender pay inequity at State level, notably in New South Wales and Queensland.  
Section 23 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) requires the New South Wales Industrial 
5HODWLRQV&RPPLVVLRQWRHQVXUHWKDWDOOQHZ6WDWHDZDUGVSURYLGHµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQDQGRWKHU
conditions of employment for men and women doing work of equal or cRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶7KLV
provision prompted a major inquiry into pay equity by the Commission. In her report (Glynn 1998), 
Glynn J found evidence of significant undervaluation of work in a number of female-dominated 
industries or occupations (as well as one male-dominated occupation ± public sector geo-
scientists). Although her recommendations for legislative amendments were ignored, the report did 
OHDGWRWKHDGRSWLRQRIDQ(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ3ULQFLSOH(53DVSDUWRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VZDJH-
fixing principles: Re Equal Remuneration Principle (2000) 97 IR 177. This was subsequently used 
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to identify and correct significant undervaluation of work on the part of public sector library staff and 
childcare workers, resulting in sizeable wage increases for the workers concerned.22 
In Queensland, a similar report from the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (Fisher 
2001) was more successful in prompting legislative amendments, in the form of the Industrial 
Relations Amendment Act 2001 (Qld). As a result, the Commission is obliged under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1999 not just to ensure that awards provide for equal remuneration for work of equal 
or comparable value (s 126(e)), but to refuse to certify workplace agreements if they do not 
conform to that principle or disclose that steps are being taken to implement the principle (ss 
156(1)(l),(m), 193(b), 203(7)). In contrast to the position in New South Wales, the term 
µUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶LVVSHFLILFDOO\GHILQHGIRUWKHVHSXUSRVHVLQ6FKHGXOHWRLQFOXGHRYHU-award or 
over-agreement benefits ± that is, benefits provided by an employer in excess of those required as 
a minimum by the relevant industrial instrument.  
As in New South Wales, the Queensland Commission has formally adopted an ERP: see Equal 
Remuneration Principle (2002) 114 IR 305. This has led to significant wage increases for the likes 
of dental assistants and childcare workers.23 In Queensland Services, Industrial Union of 
Employees v Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ltd (2009) 191 QGIG 19 it was also 
used to secure wage rises for a wide range of community services workers covered by the 
Queensland Community Services and Crisis Assistance Award. The Commission accepted that 
existing wage rates in the sector were significantly undervalued, especially when compared to the 
outcomes from enterprise bargaining in local government and the Queensland Public Service. 
What is notable about the New South Wales and Queensland ERPs is that neither requires 
applicants to demonstrate evidence of sex-based discrimination; it is sufficient that the work in 
question is shown to be undervalued. Nor do the ERPs require that applications demonstrate 
undervaluation by way of reference to explicit comparator groups. Undervaluation is not explicitly 
defined, but the Queensland ERP lists the features of an occupation or industry that may be 
indicators of undervaluation. These include whether the work has carried a female characterisation, 
the industrial features of feminised industries and occupations, and whether sufficient and 
adequate weight has been placed on the skills and responsibilities typically exercised in feminised 
work. Both ERPs allow an assessment that existing rates of pay may not have been properly set, 
and provide the capacity for the tribunal to assess the current value of the work.  
A distinguishing feature of the Queensland case law is that the Commission has, in some 
instances, included an Equal Remuneration Component in addition to increases to award rates. 
These components have been awarded where the Commission was of a view that increases in 
minimum award rates would not sufficiently address the undervaluation established by the 
applicants, because of the typical inability of workers in the relevant sector to secure higher wages 
through enterprise bargaining. 
The scope and effect of the ERPs in New South Wales and Queensland have been significantly 
limited by changes to the configuration of labour law regulation in Australia. After the Work Choices 
                                                     
22 See Re Crown Librarians, Library Officers and Archivists Award Proceedings (2002) 111 IR 48; Re Miscellaneous 
:RUNHUV¶.LQGHUJDUWHQVDQG&KLOG&DUH&HQWUHVHWF6WDWH$ZDUG (2006) 150 IR 290. 
23 See Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (Queensland Branch) v Australian Dental Association (Qld Branch) 
(2005) 180 QGIG 187; Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union, Queensland Branch, Union of Employees v Children's 
Services Employers Association (2006) 182 QGIG 318. 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
52 
amendments took effect on 27 March 2006, section 16 of the amended WR Act precluded most 
State or Territory industrial laws from applying to federal system employers, including all 
µFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRUSRUDWLRQV¶WKDWLVWUDGLQJILQDQFLDORUIRUHLJQFRUSRUDWLRQV6HFWLRQF
specifically extended this exclusion to laws allowing a court or tribunal to make an order in relation 
to equal remuneration.24 The exclusion has been retained under section 26(2)(d) of the Fair Work 
Act. Indeed its effect is now broader than it was under the Work Choices regime. This is because of 
the decision by all States except Western Australia to co-operate with the Commonwealth in 
expanding the coverage of the federal regime (Creighton & Stewart 2010, ch 5). The Fair Work Act 
now applies to in relation to the employees of µQDWLRQDOV\VWHPHPSOR\HUV¶7KHVHFRPSULVH: 
x all non-government employers (with the exception of non-constitutional corporations in 
Western Australia, such as sole traders, partnerships or corporations that do not have 
substantial trading or financial activities); 
x all Commonwealth, Victorian and Territory government agencies; and 
x local government employers in Tasmania (and possibly some in Western Australia, if they 
qualify as constitutional corporations). 
Hence the only employers in New South Wales and Queensland that can now be the subject of 
equal remuneration proceedings under the provisions described above are to be found in the State 
and local government sectors. That said, there are transitional provisions in the federal legislation 
to ensure that employees who have been shifted into the federal system as a result of the 2005 or 
2009 changes retain the benefit of State pay equity orders that had previously been made: see Fair 
Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Legislation) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth) 
Schedule 3 Part 8, and Schedule 3A Part 4 Division 1A. 
3.2 The Fair Work Act: introduction 
Unlike the New South Wales or Queensland provisions described above, the Fair Work Act does 
not require the Fair Work Commission to ensure equal remuneration under awards and enterprise 
agreements. Nor is the goal of pay equity made an object of the Act as a whole.25 But the Act does 
deal explicitly with the issue of equal remuneration in two distinct ways: as part of the principles 
relating to the safety net of minimum wages and conditions set under the Act; and by providing 
more specifically for the making of equal remuneration orders. It also obliges the Commission, in 
exercising any of its functions, to take into account µWKHQHHGWRUHVSHFW and value the diversity of 
the work force by helping to prevent and eliminate discrimination¶ The relevant provisions of the 
Act are set out and analysed in the next two sections. 
In theory, it would also be possible for a lack of equal remuneration to bHUDLVHGXQGHUWKHµJHQHUDO
SURWHFWLRQV¶DJDLQVWZURQJIXORUGLVFULPLQDWRU\WUHDWPHQWLQ3DUW-1 of the Act. Specifically, it might 
EHDUJXHGWKDWDQHPSOR\HUZDVLQEUHDFKRIVHFWLRQZKLFKSURKLELWVµDGYHUVHDFWLRQ¶DJDLQVW
                                                     
24 Section 208(4) of the amended WR Act did seek to preserve the effect of phased wage increases flowing from pay 
equity-related adjustments made by State industrial tribunals prior to 27 March 2006, even where those increases were 
due to take effect after that date. But this may not have picked up increases, including ERC increases, that may have 
been decided upon before the cut-off date, but that were not formally enshrined in an order until afterwards: see Connolly 
et al 2012: 121. 
25 Compare the recommendations of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment and Workplace 
Relations 2009: 127. 
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an employee because of (among other possible reasons) their sex. But for reasons explained in 
section A.6, such individual complaints are likely to be rare. 
A further point to note about the Fair Work Act, by way of introduction, concerns its coverage. 
0HQWLRQKDVDOUHDG\EHHQPDGHRIWKHµQDWLRQDOV\VWHPHPSOR\HUV¶WRZKLFKWKH$FWDSSOLHVVHH
section 3.1.3. It should also be understood that the provisions discussed in the next two sections 
are only applicable to those employers in relation to their employees7KHWHUPµHPSOR\HH¶LVQRW
fully defined in the Act. Instead, it is interpreted by reference to certain well-established common 
law principles: see eg Cai v Rozario [2011] FWAFB 8307; Corke-Cox v Crocker Builders Pty Ltd 
[2012] FMCA 677. Under those principles, a distinction is drawn between employees who work for 
VRPHRQHHOVH¶VEXVLQHVVRURUJDQLVDWLRQSXUVXDQWWRDZULWWHQRUYHUEDOFRQWUDFWRIHPSOR\Pent, 
DQGWKRVHZKRSHUIRUPZRUNRQVRPHRWKHUEDVLVIRUH[DPSOHDVDQµLQGHSHQGHQWFRQWUDFWRU¶
supplying services as part of their own business (see Creighton & Stewart 2010, ch 7). A contractor 
cannot be covered by an award or an equal remuneration order made under the Fair Work Act, 
with just one exception. There are special provisions in Division 2 of Part 6-$WKDWGHHPDµ7&)
RXWZRUNHU¶WREHDQHPSOR\HHIRUPRVWSXUSRVHVXQGHUWKH$FWLQFOXGLQJ3DUW-7. A TCF 
outworker is defined by section 12 to mean a person who performs work in the textile, clothing and 
footwear industry at residential premises, or at other premises not conventionally regarded as 
business premises. 
3.3 Wage fixing and work value claims 
Section 134(1) VHWVRXWDµPRGHUQDZDUGVREMHFWLYH¶WKDWLVWRJXLGHWKHCommission in exercising 
YDULRXVIXQFWLRQVRUSRZHUVUHODWLQJWRPRGHUQDZDUGV7KHRYHUDOOREMHFWLYHLVWRµHQVXUHWKDW
modern awards, together with the National Employment Standards (NES), provide a fair and 
relevant minimum safeW\QHWRIWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQV¶$PRQJRWKHUWKLQJVWKHCommission must 
WDNHLQWRDFFRXQWµHWKHSULQFLSOHRIHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶ 
The Dictionary in s LQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHSKUDVHµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXal or 
FRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶LVGHILQHGLQVHFWLRQ 302(2). That subsection reads as follows: 
Equal remuneration for work of equal or comparable value means equal remuneration for men and 
women workers for work of equal or comparable value. 
Although section 302(2) is part of the equal remuneration order provisions in Part 2-7 discussed 
below, this definition has effect throughout the Fair Work Act, by reason of its inclusion in the 
Dictionary and the absence of any indication that it is to operate only in relation to Part 2-7. 
7KHUHLVDIXUWKHUUHIHUHQFHWRµWKHSULQFLSOHRIHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOH
YDOXH¶LQVHFWLRQ 284(1)7KLVHVWDEOLVKHVDµPLQLPXPZDJHVREMHFWLYH¶ZKLFKLVWRJXLGHWKH
Commission in setting and adjusting minimum wage rates, whether as part of modern awards or 
through national minimum wage orders. Once again, the Commission is required to take account of 
WKHSULQFLSOHDVRQHRIDQXPEHURIIDFWRUVLQHVWDEOLVKLQJDQGPDLQWDLQLQJµDVDIHW\QHWRIIDLU
minLPXPZDJHV¶26 
                                                     
26 Compare section 221(a) of the WR Act, as amended by the Work Choices legislation, which required the Australian Fair 
Pay Commission to µDSSO\WKHSULQFLSOHWKDWPHQDQGZRPHQVKRXOGUHFHLYHHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶
in exercising its minimum wage fixing powers. 
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To date, the issue of equal remuneration has not featured significantly in the annual wage rulings 
handed down by the Commission¶V0LQLPXP:DJH3DQHO, or indeed in submissions to the Panel 
by major stakeholders (Macdonald & Charlesworth 2013: 581±3). The Panel has placed only 
limited emphasis on the significance of minimum wage adjustments as a tool for promoting gender 
pay equity. For example, in Annual Wage Review 2011±12 (2012) 222 IR 369 at [231] it observed 
that: 
Given women are disproportionately represented amongst the low paid, an increase in minimum wages 
is likely to promote pay equity, although moderate changes in award rates of pay would be expected to 
have only a small effect on the overall differences in earnings between males and females 
,QLWVPRVWUHFHQWGHFLVLRQWKH3DQHOUHSHDWHGWKLVYLHZDGGLQJWKDWµWKHUHDUHRWKHUPHFKDQLVPV
within the Act, such as bargaining and equal remuneration provisions, which provide more direct 
PHDQVRIDGGUHVVLQJSD\HTXLW\¶Annual Wage Review 2012±13 [2013] FWCFB 4000 at [484]±
[485]. As in previous rulings it did also, however, cite the need to take account of the principle of 
equal remuneration for work of equal or comparable value as supporting the maintenance of 
µFRQVLVWHQWPLQLPXPUDWHV¶DVRSSRVHGWRWDNLQJµDQDZDUG-by-award approach to minimum wage 
IL[DWLRQ¶DW>@ 
For completeness, it should be noted that the concept of work value adjustments is also formally 
recognised in the Fair Work Act. Sections 156(3) and 157(2) expressly allow modern award 
minimum wages to be varied outside the annual wage review, whether as part of the regular 4-
\HDUO\UHYLHZRIPRGHUQDZDUGVRULQEHWZHHQWKRVHUHYLHZVVRORQJDVWKLVLVGRQHIRUµZRUN
YDOXHUHDVRQV¶7KDWSKUDVHLVGHILQHGLQVHFWLRQWRPHDQµUHDVRQVMXVWLI\LQJWKHDPRXQWWKDW
employees should be paid for doing a particular kind of work, being reasons related to any of the 
following: (a) the nature of the work; (b) the level of skill or responsibility involved in doing the work; 
(c) WKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKHZRUNLVGRQH¶ 
It may be significant that there is no reference in these provisions to any requirement that a 
particular change in work value be established, although historically (as noted earlier) that has 
been the basis on which federal and State tribunals have addressed the issue. There have 
certainly been some cases where it appears to have been assumed that the work value principles 
established in decisions such as Re Child Care Industry (Australian Capital Territory) Award 1998 
(Australian Industrial Relations Commission, PR954938,13 January 2005) remain relevant in 
relation to the Fair Work Act: see eg Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Paper 
Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FWA 4267 at [47]. But in Re Master Builders Australia Ltd [2012] FWA 62 
DW>@6HQLRU'HSXW\3UHVLGHQW:DWVRQQRWHGWKDWLWZDVµQRWFOHDUWKDWWKHZRUNYDOXHSULQFLSOHV
RIWKHSDVWDSSO\DXWRPDWLFDOO\WRZRUNYDOXHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIVRIWKH$FW¶± although he did 
not need to decide the point. 
3.4 Equal remuneration orders 
3.4.1 The provisions of Part 2-7 
Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act deals with equal remuneration orders. Its central provision is 
section 302(1):  
(1) The [Fair Work Commission] may make any order (an equal remuneration order) it considers appropriate 
to ensure that, for employees to whom the order will apply, there will be equal remuneration for work of equal 
or comparable value. 
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As noted earlier, section 302(2) defines WKHSKUDVHµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDORU
comparable YDOXH¶ to mean µHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQZRUNHUVIRUZRUNRIHTXDORU
FRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶. 
An equal remuneration order may be made on application by an employee to whom the order will 
apply, a registered trade union entitled to represent the interests of such an employee, or the Sex 
Discrimination Commissioner (s 302(3)). The Commission can only make an equal remuneration 
order if it is satisfied that, for the employees to whom the order will apply, there is not equal 
remuneration for work of equal or comparable value (s 302(5)).  
In deciding whether to make such an order, the Commission must take into account any orders and 
determinations made by its Expert Panel (formerly the Minimum Wage Panel) in the annual wage 
reviews mandated by Part 2-6 of the Act, as well as the reasons given by the Panel for such 
decisions (s 302(4)). It is also obliged by section 578 (which applies to all functions or powers 
exercised by the Commission under the Act) to take into account: 
x the objects of the statute; 
x µHTXLW\JRRGFRQVFLHQFHDQGWKHPHULWVRIWKHPDWWHU¶DQG 
x µWKHQHHGWRUHVSHFWDQGYDOXHWKHGLYHUVLW\RIWKHZRUNIRUFHE\KHlping to prevent and 
HOLPLQDWHGLVFULPLQDWLRQRQWKHEDVLVRI>YDULRXVJURXQGVLQFOXGLQJVH[@¶ 
An equal remuneration order may increase rates of remuneration, but must not decrease them (s 
303). Hence, as the Explanatory Memorandum for what was then the Fair Work Bill 2008 confirms, 
the Commission FRXOGQRWµUHGXFHWKHKLJKHUUDWHVRIUHPXQHUDWLRQRIDPDOHRUSUHGRPLQDWHO\
male) comparator group to bring the rates into line with the lower rates of remuneration of female 
employees subject to the applicatiRQ¶SDUD+RZHYHUDQ\LQFUHDVHVPD\EHSKDVHGLQ
where the Commission FRQVLGHUVWKDWLWLVµQRWIHDVLEOH¶WRSURYLGHIRUHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQZLWK
immediate effect (s 304). Section 306 makes it clear that an order will override any term of a 
modern award, enterprise agreement or Commission RUGHUWKDWLVµOHVVEHQHILFLDO¶WRDQDIIHFWHG
HPSOR\HH7KHVDPHLVWUXHLQUHODWLRQWRDQ\µROG¶DZDUGVDJUHHPHQWVRUSD\VFDOHVWKDWUHPDLQLQ
effect from previous legislation (Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential 
Amendments) Act 2009 Sch 10 item 3). 
Section 305 provides that an employer must not contravene a term of an equal remuneration order. 
6LQFHDQRWHWRWKLVSURYLVLRQLQGLFDWHVWKDWLWLVDµFLYLOUHPHG\SURYLVLRQ¶WKDWPHDQVWKDWLWLV
enforceable under the provisions of Part 4-1 of the Act. A corporate employer breaching an equal 
remuneration order could be required, in court proceedings, to pay a penalty of up to $51,000 per 
breach, while an unincorporated employer could face a fine of up to $10,200 (ss 539, 546). Orders 
could also be made to redress the effects of the breach, most obviously by rectifying any 
underpayment to affected employees (s 545). Similar penalties or orders could also be made 
against anyone else knowingly involved LQWKHHPSOR\HU¶VEUHDFKVVXFKDVDGLUHFWRU
manager or external adviser. 
Having set out the relevant provisions of Part 2-7, in the sections that follow we consider various 
aspects of their potential scope and operation. Where relevant, we refer to the observations of the 
Full Bench of what was then FWA in the SACS case, although that case is considered in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
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3.4.2 A more expansive concept of equal remuneration 
The Part 2-7 provisions clearly embody a broader conception of equal remuneration than under the 
equivalent provisions in the WR Act, and before that the Industrial Relations Act 1988. As noted 
previously, those provisions effectively defined equal remuneration to mean equal rates of 
remuneration for work of equal value, established without discrimination based on sex. By contrast, 
the Fair Work Act not only refers to work of equal or comparable value, but makes no mention of 
any need to establish discrimination. In Re Equal Remuneration Case ,5µER 
Case No 1¶DW>@WKH)XOO%HQFKDJUHHGWKDWWKLVZDVµDVLJQLILFDQWGHSDUWXUH¶DQd accordingly 
QRWHGWKDWµGHFLVLRQVXQGHUWKH>:RUNSODFH5HODWLRQV@$FWDUHQRWGLUHFWO\DSSOLFDEOHEHLQJPDGH
XQGHUSURYLVLRQVOLPLWHGWRHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶ 
The intention that Part 2-7 should have a broader operation was also confirmed in paragraphs 
1191 and 1192 of the Explanatory Memorandum for the Fair Work Bill 2008 (Explanatory 
Memorandum): 
The principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal or comparable value 
requires there to be (at a minimum) equal remuneration for men and women workers for the same work 
carried out in the same conditions. However, the principle is intentionally broader than this, and also 
requires equal remuneration for work of comparable value. This allows comparisons to be carried out 
between different but comparable work for the purposes of this Part. Evaluating comparable worth (for 
instance between the work of an executive administrative assistant and a research officer) relies on job 
and skill evaluation techniques. 
The Bill also removes the current requirement for the applicant to demonstrate (as a threshold issue) that 
there has been some kind of discrimination involved in the setting of remuneration. Instead, an applicant 
must only demonstrate that there is not equal remuneration for work of equal or comparable value. 
The one question mark here concerns the apparent emphasis in the first paragraph on the use of a 
comparator-based methodology. This is at odds with the approach adopted by the New South 
Wales and Queensland tribunals, which as noted earlier have rejected any need to establish 
undervaluation by reference to explicit comparator groups. However, it should be remembered that 
the Explanatory Memorandum is not part of the Act, but merely an aid to interpretation: see Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB. Moreover, it is not clear that the passage in question was 
intended to express any kind of limitation on the operation of Part 2-7.  
At any event, in ER Case No 1 the Full Bench, while quoting the above passages from the 
([SODQDWRU\0HPRUDQGXPZLWKDSSDUHQWDSSURYDODOVRPDGHLWFOHDUWKDWµDPDOHFRPSDUDWRU
JURXSLVQRWUHTXLUHG¶DW>@9DULRXVHPSOR\HUJURXSVDQG6WDWHJRYHUQPHQWVDUJXHGWKDWLW
was implicit in the terms of Part 2-7, and especially sectLRQWKDWµDFRPSDULVRQLVUHTXLUHG
between work performed by women in a female dominated industry or occupation and work 
SHUIRUPHGE\PHQLQDPDOHGRPLQDWHGLQGXVWU\RURFFXSDWLRQ¶ (at [231]). In rejecting this 
approach, the Full Bench commented tKDWDOWKRXJKWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDµvalid male comparator 
group¶PLJKWPDNHLWHDVLHUWRGHPRQVWUDWHDQDEVHQFHRIHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQ, the absence of such 
a comparator would not be fatal to a claim (at [232]:  
The question is whether and how gender-based undervaluation is to be established. The existence of a 
valid male comparator group which receives higher remuneration than a female dominated group 
performing work of equal or comparable value is one way of demonstrating the need for an equal 
remuneration order. We do not accept that as a matter of logic it is the only way. The presence of a male 
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FRPSDUDWRUJURXSPLJKWPDNHWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶WDVNHDVLHUDQGWKHDEVHQFHRIVXFKDJURXSPDNHWKH
task relatively more difficult, but it does not follow that in the absence of a male comparator group the 
application must inevitably fail. 
This point was underscored by the willingness of the Full Bench (as discussed in the next chapter) 
to find that gender-based undervaluation existed in the SACS sector, despite the DSSOLFDQWV¶
decision not to point to a specific male comparator group. 
7KH)XOO%HQFKDOVRDFFHSWHGDW>@WKDWµLWLVQRWQHFHVVDU\WRHVWDEOLVKWKDWUDWHVKDYHEHHQ
HVWDEOLVKHGRQDGLVFULPLQDWRU\EDVLV¶LQRUGHUWRVHFXUHDQHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQRUGHU. But again, it 
stressed that the question of discrimination was far from irrelevant (at [233]): 
The essence of a successful application is that the prevailing rates are discriminatory. Whether that 
discrimination is the result of a conscious act or course of conduct by a particular individual or individuals 
may be relevant in some cases²for example some cases involving a single employer. But we are 
dealing with a broad range of rates operating in a diverse industry spread throughout Australia. The idea 
that the great diversity of rates actually paid has been fixed in a consciously or unconsciously 
discriminatory way would be difficult to demonstrate and perhaps somewhat artificial. In the particular 
circumstances of this case, it seems unlikely that discrimination in that sense could play a significant role 
in deciding whether, for the employees concerned, there is not equal remuneration for work of equal or 
comparable value. On the other hand, where it can be shown that rates have been fixed on a 
discriminatory basis, that will be a clear indication of gender-based undervaluation. A case in which no 
predominantly male comparator group is relied upon can only succeed if the applicant establishes that 
the remuneration paid is subject to gender-based undervaluation. 
This last sentence in particular emphasises that, whether or not an applicant chooses to put 
forward a male comparator, or to show some discriminatory conduct, it is not sufficient to establish 
that the relevant work is undervalued ± the undervaluation must be based in some way on the 
gender of the relevant employees. It is notable, however, that the Full Bench did not stipulate any 
prescribed method by which applications should address this requirement (see section 4.5). 
3.4.3 A discretionary power 
In New South Wales and Queensland, as mentioned earlier, the State tribunals are required to 
ensure equal remuneration in awards and enterprise agreements. Under the Fair Work Act, by 
contrast, there is no such imperative. Section 302(1) states that the Commission may, not must, 
make an equal remuneration order. Although it cannot make an order unless it is satisfied that 
equal remuneration does not exist for the employees concerned, this is a necessary but not 
sufficient consideration for the exercise of what is framed as a discretionary power. So much was 
confirmed by the FWA Full Bench in ER Case No 1 at [227]±[228]. 
Accordingly, the objective of equal remuneration in the Fair Work Act is merely one of a number of 
factors to which the Commission must have regard in setting and adjusting minimum rates of pay. It 
could accept that work was undervalued in a particular industry or occupation, yet choose to do 
nothing about it. This might, for example, be because of a concern about the economic implications 
of awarding wage increases: see eg ER Case No 1 at [230], [274]. Or it might flow from a belief 
WKDWWRJUDQWDQHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQRUGHUZRXOGKDYHDµFKLOOLQJ¶HIIHFWRQFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJ
(including multi-enterprise bargaining) in the relevant sector.  
As noted earlier, the Commission is obliged by section 302(4), in determining whether or not to 
make an equal remuneration order, to have regard to the wage-fixing principles established by its 
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own Expert Panel. It is not, by contrast, constrained by either the modern awards objective in 
section 134 or the minimum wages objective in section 284, since neither of those provisions 
applies in its terms to an exercise of power under Part 2-7. This was confirmed in ER Case No 1 at 
[229], although the Full Bench added: 
Nevertheless considerations related to the safety net, including the terms of modern awards, are apt to 
be taken into account pursuant to the object in s.3(f) of the Act. We are required, therefore, by s.578(a) 
to take into account, among other things, the need to ensure there is a safety net of fair, relevant and 
enforceable minimum terms and conditions. 
Despite this comment, we believe it remains true to say that the Commission need not conceive of 
an equal remuneration order as being part RIWKHµVDIHW\QHW¶RIPLQLPXPWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQV
under the Fair Work Act. That safety net, as section 3(b) makes clear, is provided by the NES, 
modern awards and national minimum wage orders.  
A broader but related point concerns the balance struck by the Commission between its power to 
make equal remuneration orders and its obligation to act in accordance with the general objects in 
section 3 of the Act. These objects are broad-ranging but encompass the safety net of terms and 
conditions, an emphasis on enterprise-level bargaining, protections against unfair treatment and 
discrimination, and a direction towards economic prosperity and social inclusion.  
Finally, it may be noted that while there is nothing in the Fair Work Act that requires the 
Commission to formulate an Equal Remuneration Principle to guide its determinations under Part 
2-7, nor is there anything that forbids it either. Historically, conciliation and arbitration tribunals were 
willing to articulate principles to guide the process of setting minimum wage rates, or indeed 
sometimes other conditions of employment. These principles, which could be (and routinely were) 
modified in light of ongoing reflection and experience, provided valuable guidance to parties as to 
how certain claims should be presented, and how they would be judged. As noted earlier in the 
Chapter, and explored at more length in sections B.2 and B.3, the adoption of Equal Remuneration 
Principles has been integral to the operation of the pay equity regimes in New South Wales and 
Queensland. 
In the ER Case No 1 at [289] the Full Bench stated that: 
We do not at this stage think it is desirable to issue a formal statement of principles in this case. To do so 
on the basis of one case only would be premature and run the risk of limiting the discretion available 
under Part 2-7. This decision, together with any other decision we make in these proceedings, will 
constitute a significant precedent in any event. 
This plainly does not preclude the adoption of an Equal Remuneration Principle in future 
proceedings under Part 2-7, should a Full Bench of the Commission be so minded. 
3.4.4 µ5HPXQHUDWLRQ¶ 
An order under Part 2-PXVWEHGLUHFWHGWRUDWHVRIµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶7KLVLVDWHUPWKDWLVQRW
defined in the Fair Work Act, although the Explanatory Memorandum suggests (at para 1190) that 
LWµHQFRPSDVVHVHQWLWOHPHQWVLQDGGLWLRQWRZDJHVLHLWHQFRPSDVVHVZDJHVDQGRWKHUPRQHWDU\
HQWLWOHPHQWV¶7KLVYLHZLVVXSSRUWHGE\FDVHODZRQWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPLQWKHcontext of 
termination of employment provisions. There it has been regarded as having a broader meaning 
WKDQWKHZRUGµZDJHV¶H[WHQGLQJWRDQ\IRUPRIµUHFRPSHQVHRUUHZDUGIRUVHUYLFHVUHQGHUHG¶
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LQFOXGLQJµQRQ-FDVKEHQHILWV¶VHHOliveri v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2005) 145 
IR 120 at [25]±[26]; Rofin Australia Pty Ltd v Newton (1997) 78 IR 78 at 81. 
In ER Case No 1 the FWA Full Bench discussed the option of employees in the SACS sector 
entering into tax-HIIHFWLYHµVDODU\VDFULILFH¶RUµVDODU\SDFNDJLQJ¶DUUDQJHPHQWV7KH)XOO%HQFK
observed (at [244]) that it would not be µappropriate to regard the possible benefits of salary 
packaging as equivalent to remuneration¶7DNHQLQFRQWH[WKRZHYHUWKHUHZDVQRVXJJHVWLRQWKDW
the kind of non-cash benefits typically associated with salary packaging ± extra superannuation 
contributions, the provision of a motor vehicle, etc ± FRXOGQRWTXDOLI\DVµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶IRUWKH
purpose of Part 2-7. Indeed the Full Bench was not discussing how far the tHUPµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶
might extend. Rather, it was rejecting an employer submission that the tax advantages from salary 
SDFNDJLQJVKRXOGEHµtaken into account in assessing the remuneration of employees in the 
industry¶DW>@7KH)XOO%HQFKQRWHGWKDWRnly a third of employees in the industry took 
advantage of such arrangements, and that even then the benefits varied from individual to 
individual. It was for this reason, the uncertain nature of any tax advantages, that the Full Bench 
determined not to have regard to the availability of salary packaging. 
At any event, it seems clear that an equal remuneration order can stipulate rates that are higher 
than the minimum rates set by a relevant award for the same employees. In other words, it can 
regulate over-award payments. This is apparent not only from the fact that the equal remuneration 
order provisions are separated from those relating to minimum rates of pay in Part 2-6 of the Act, 
but from the confirmation in section 306 that an order can override the terms of an otherwise 
applicable enterprise agreement. 
3.4.5 Alternative remedies 
3.4.5.1 Sections 721 and 724 
Section 721(1) of the Fair Work Act provides that no equal remuneration order can be made under 
Part 2-7 if the Commission is satisfied that there is available to the relevant employees an 
µDGHTXDWHDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\¶WKDWZLOOHQVXUHHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOH
YDOXH7KLVPD\EHDUHPHG\XQGHUµDODZRIWKH&RPPRQZHDOWKRWKHUWKDQ3DUW-7) or a law of a 
6WDWHRU7HUULWRU\¶7KHUHIHUHQFHWR3DUW-7 makes it clear that any other Part of the Fair Work Act 
PD\FRQVWLWXWHDµODZRIWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK¶IRUWKLVSXUSRVH 
The Commission is also barred by section 724(1) from dealing with an application if proceedings 
IRUDQµDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\¶WRHQVXUHHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQRUDJDLQVW unequal remuneration, have 
been commenced under a federal law (again, other than Part 2-7), or a State or Territory law. 
Conversely, any application under Part 2-7 will itself have the effect of barring the applicant from 
commencing proceedings for an alternative remedy under any other law (s 724(3)). The exception 
in both cases is where the application in question is discontinued by the applicant, or fails for lack 
of jurisdiction (s 724(2), (4)). It is also made clear that the availability of (or application for) a 
UHPHG\XQGHUDQHPSOR\PHQWGLVFULPLQDWLRQODZWKDWµFRQVLVWVVROHO\RIFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUSDVW
DFWLRQV¶GRHVQRWFRQVWLWXWHDQDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\VV 
3.4.5.2 7KHPHDQLQJRIµDGHTXDWHDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\¶ 
$VWRZKDWPLJKWFRQVWLWXWHDQµDGHTXDWHDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\¶VXIILFLHQWXQGHUVHFWLRQWREDUDQ
application for equal remuneration order, there is little in the way of guidance from past equal 
remuneration proceedings. The provisions introduced in 1993 did also provide (in section 170BE of 
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the Industrial Relations Act 1988, and later the WR Act) that the availability of such a remedy would 
bar an application for an equal remuneration order. However although this provision was 
considered by a Full Bench of the AIRC in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering and Kindred 
Industries Union v Gunn and Taylor (2002) 115 IR 358 (see section A.5.6), this was purely as to 
whether the availability to an individual employee of an action under anti-discrimination laws 
constituted an adequate alternative to pursuing an equal remuneration order of general application. 
The Full Bench resolved that it did not, a decision that is effectively now confirmed by section 
721(2) of the Fair Work Act. The case was decided on fairly narrow grounds and was in any event 
concerned with a set of provisions which, as we have noted, embodied a narrower conception of 
equal remuneration than the present legislation. 
One other possible source of gXLGDQFHDVWRWKHPHDQLQJRIµDGHTXDWHDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\¶OLHVLQ
the case law that developed on the use of that term in the original federal unfair dismissal 
provisions, also introduced in 1993. The wording and context of the relevant provision 
(section 170EB of the Industrial Relations Act 1988) differ in certain respects from section 721 of 
the Fair Work Act, so that any comparison must be approached with caution. However in Wylie v 
Carbide International Pty Ltd (1994) 55 IR 326 at 330 Justice Keely of the Industrial Relations 
Court of Australia accepted that in determining whether a particular remedy could be regarded as 
µDGHTXDWH¶LWZDVDSSURSULDWHWRUHIHUWRWKHOxford English Dictionary definition of that word as: 
1. Equal in magnitude or extent; FRPPHQVXUDWHQHLWKHUPRUHQRUOHVV«&RPPHQVXUDWHLQILWQHVV
equal or amounting to what is required; fully sufficient, suitable, or fitting.27 
On that basis, it would be necessary to consider whether any possible alternative method of 
dealing with a pay equity concern FRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGµFRPPHQVXUDWH¶LQHIIHFWWRDQDSSOLFDWLRQ
for an equal remuneration order. 
On this point, it is worth noting a small but potentially critical distinction in the wording of sections 
721 and 724. The latter bars an application under Part 2-LIµSURFHHGLQJVIRUDQDOWHUQDWLYH
UHPHG\¶WRHQVXUHHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQKDYHLQIDFWEHHQFRPPHQFHGDQGQRWGLVFRQWLQXHG7KH
WHVWLVQRWZKHWKHUWKHRWKHUUHPHG\UHSUHVHQWVDQµadequate DOWHUQDWLYH¶EXWPHUHO\ZKHWKHULWLV
DQµDOWHUQDWLYH¶7KH([SODQDWRU\0HPRUDQGXPGRHVQRWRIIHUDQ\H[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQ
language. But on ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, it must be assumed that Parliament 
intended to apply a different and less onerous test under section 724. In other words, it is 
conceivable that while the mere possibility of seeking a particular remedy might not be enough to 
bar an application for an equal remuneration order, section 724 might preclude any attempt to 
pursue that remedy and seek an order under Part 2-7.  
3.4.5.3 Possible examples 
In considering what kind of remedy might be caught by sections 721 and 724, a number of 
possibilities may be mentioned.  
One that may be discounted fairly quickly is the possibility of making an enterprise agreement 
under Part 2-4 of the Act. It is true that a group of female or predominantly female workers may 
seek to negotiate higher rates of pay through such an agreement. But even if enterprise bargaining 
                                                     
27 This approach was subsequently cited with apparent approval by Chief Justice Wilcox and Justice Keely in Liddell v 
Lembke (1994) 56 IR 447 at 456. 
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is a meaningful possibility for a given group, or indeed has happened before in the relevant 
industry, it LVKDUGWRVHHWKLVRSWLRQDVDQ\NLQGRIDQµDOWHUQDWLYH¶WRDQHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQRUGHU
let alone an adequate alternative. There is nothing to require an employer to reach agreement or to 
pay any attention to issues of gender pay inequity. An employer may also demand trade-offs for 
any pay increase that may diminish the effect of any gains to the employees in question. 
It is true that under Division 9 of Part 2-4 of the Act, the Commission may issue a µlow-paid 
authorisation¶ in relation to a proposed multi-enterprise agreement for a group of unrelated 
HQWHUSULVHVWKDWHPSOR\µORZ-SDLG¶ZRUNHUV28 In such a case, the Commission may take various 
steps under section 246 to facilitate bargaining; and if no agreement results, it may impose what is 
HIIHFWLYHO\DQDUELWUDWHGRXWFRPHE\PDNLQJDµORZ-SDLGZRUNSODFHGHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶XQGHU'LYLVLRQ
of Part 2-5. In theory, such a process could be used to pursue equal remuneration for a feminised 
sector. But even leaving aside the many requirements that must be satisfied to obtain a 
determination, and the fact that none has been sought (let alone made) in the first four years of the 
$FW¶VRSHUDWLRQWKHUHLs again nothing in these provisions to ensure a focus on equal remuneration. 
It is particularly unlikely that the mere availability of enterprise bargaining under Part 2-4 could be 
sufficient to trigger section 721, since by definition the option of making an agreement is always 
open ± DQGZRXOGWKXVLIFRQVLGHUHGDVDQµDGHTXDWHDOWHUQDWLYH¶, mean that no group of workers 
could ever seek an equal remuneration order. 
This last point applies also to the prospect that the mere possibility of seeking the establishment of, 
or improvements in, award rates of pay would invoke section 721.The very fact that the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSRZHUWRJUDQWHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQRUGHUVLVFRQIHUUHGXQGHUDVHSDUDWHSDUWRIWKH
Act (Part 2-7) to those dealing with modern awards (Part 2-3) or annual wage reviews (Part 2-6), 
and is subject to separate criteria and objects (as noted above in section 3.4.3) militates against 
any suggestion that award-covered employees cannot be the subject of a claim for an equal 
remuneration order. The fact that section 306 explicitly provides that such an order overrides the 
effect of any less beneficial provision in an award (or an enterprise agreement) simply strengthens 
WKHYLHZWKDW3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQWHQWLQFUHDWLQJ3DUW-7 was not to treat these various types of 
instrument as mutually exclusive forms of regulation. 
That said, the specific possibility of the Commission being asked under sections 156(3) or 157(2) to 
YDU\DZDUGUDWHVRISD\RQµZRUNYDOXH¶JURXQGVraises more substantial issues. As we explore later 
LQVHFWLRQWKHFRQFHSWRIµZRUNYDOXH¶LVQHFHVVDULO\HQJDJHGE\DQ\FODLPWKDWHTXDO
remuneration for work of equal or comparable value is lacking. Many of the New South Wales and 
Queensland cases considered in sections B.2 and B.3 were indeed pursued as both equal 
remuneration and work value claims. 
The relationship between the two types of claim may in the end depend on what is required in each 
case to obtain redress. Traditionally, work value claims have required proof that something about 
the relevant work has changed since it was last valued by an industrial tribunal (see section 3.1.1). 
That type of work value claim is relatively easy to distinguish from a claim for equal remuneration, 
since even if the latter claim is pursued on the ground that the work in question has been 
undervalued, the attempt to establish that may have nothing to do with any changes that have 
occurred, but rather rest on the assertion that the work has never been properly valued. 
                                                     
28 7KHWHUPµORZ-SDLG¶LWPD\EHQRWHGLVQRWGHILQHGLQWKH$FW)RUGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHORZ-paid bargaining provisions, see 
Naughton 2011. 
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As pointed out in section 3.3, it is at least possible that the new work value provisions in the Fair 
Work Act may be interpreted not to require any demonstration of a change in value. If so, the 
strength of the point just made may be diminished but noting also that in eras where a work value 
case did not require simply that applicants demonstrate a change in work value, but rested on 
applicants seeking a reassessment of work value, there is evidence that there was insufficient 
attention to gender-neutral assessments of work value and the valuation of feminised work (see 
sections B.2.1, B.3.1). Nonetheless, in the SACS case the Full Bench of FWA pointed out that the 
HTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQSURYLVLRQVLQWKH)DLU:RUN$FWµDUHGLUHFWHGQRWDWXQGHUYDOXDWLRQLWVHOIEXWDW
undervaluation which is gender-EDVHG¶ER Case No 1 at [266]). This supports the view that the 
WZRW\SHVRIFODLPDUHQRWWREHUHJDUGHGDVµFRPPHQVXUDWH¶LQQDWXUH  
If that is correct, it would mean that the bare possibility of a work value claim should not be treated 
under section 721 as barring an application for an equal remuneration order. But given the different 
(and lower) standard required under section 724, it does not necessarily follow that an applicant 
could simultaneously pursue both types of claim before the Fair Work Commission, as was 
generally done in the New South Wales and Queensland pay equity proceedings. Depending on 
the framing and nature of the work value claim, it is certainly possible that it might be treated as a 
VXIILFLHQWµDOWHUQDWLYH¶DVWRSUHFOXGHWKHJUDQWLQJRIUHOLHIXQGHU3DUW2-7. 
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4 The SACS case 
The SACS case was the first major test of the equal remuneration order provisions in Part 2-7 of 
the Fair Work Act. It was instituted by the Australian Services Union (ASU) and four other unions, 
to extend the benefit of an equal pay case that had already been successfully run in the 
Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) in relation to the social and community 
services (SACS) sector.  
The Queensland case, Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Queensland 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ltd (2009) 191 QGIG 19, is summarised in more detail 
section B.3.5. It is sufficient here to note that Commissioner Fisher found that the work of the 
mainly female workforce covered by the Queensland Community Services and Crisis Assistance 
Award had been significantly undervalued. She granted substantial increases in the minimum rates 
VHWE\WKH$ZDUGWRJHWKHUZLWKDSHUFHQWµ(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RPSRQHQW¶7KLVODVWZDVLQ
recognition of the difficulty for workers in the sector to access higher rates of pay through 
enterprise bargaining. The decision, however, did not affect constitutional corporations in the SACS 
sector, since by that stage the Work Choices reforms had ensured that all employers in that 
category were subject to federal rather than State law (see section 3.1.3). By definition too, the 
Queensland ruling was of no effect outside the State. 
The federal claim was itself ultimately successful, though not immediately. In May 2011 a Full 
Bench of FWA (as it then was) determined that work in the SACS sector was undervalued on a 
gender basis. But it also sought further submissions as to how this might be remedied, and in 
particular as to the extent to which the undervaluation was gender-based: Re Equal Remuneration 
Case ,5µER Case No 1¶$IXUWKHUGHFLVLRQZDVKDQGHGGRZQLQ)HEUXDU\
determining the remedy to be awarded: Re Equal Remuneration Case ,5µER 
Case No 2¶7KHWHUPVRIDQHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQRUGHUZHUHVHWWOHGLQ-XQHRe Equal 
Remuneration Case (2012) 223 IR 410.  
The order granted significant wage increases for most (but not all) employees performing work 
covered by the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Industry Award 2010. 29 
These increases ranged from 19 per cent to 41 per cent, depending on classification, to be phased 
in over eight years. The decision also provided for a cumulative 4 per cent loading, again phased 
over eight years, on the basis that there was a limited prospect of enterprise bargaining for 
employees covered by the award. 
This Chapter describes the conduct of the SACS case, focusing in particular on the ways in which 
WKHDSSOLFDQWVVRXJKWWRGHPRQVWUDWHXQGHUYDOXDWLRQERWKEHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHWULEXQDO¶VLQLWLDO
ruling. 
4.1 The application 
In March 2010, an application was lodged with FWA, seeking the making of an equal remuneration 
order for the social, community and disability services industry: see Application for Equal 
Remuneration order by Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union, FWA 
Form F1, 11 March 2010. It was made by the ASU, together with the Health Services Union, the 
                                                     
29 The order eventually made in the June 2012 decision applies to employees in the classifications listed in Schedule B of 
the 2010 award (social and community services employees) and Schedule C (crisis accommodation employees). The 
order does not apply to those covered by Schedule D (family day care employees) or Schedule E (home care employees). 
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$XVWUDOLDQ:RUNHUV¶8QLRQRI(PSOR\HHV4XHHQVODQG8QLWHG9RLFH89DQGWKH$XVWUDOLDQ
Education Union. 
The proposed order contained a new set of wage and classification structures for various types of 
work in the industry, to replace those applicable under (among other instruments) the Social, 
Community, Home Care and Disability Services Industry Award 2010. The application asserted that 
work in the sector, SUHGRPLQDQWO\SHUIRUPHGE\ZRPHQZDVµHPRWLRQDOO\DQGLQWHOOHFWXDOO\
GHPDQGLQJ¶S\HWVLJQLILFDQWO\XQGHUYDOXHGS 
The remuneration set by the 2010 Award, and in particular the schedule of wage rates, was influenced 
by the history of regulation in the industry. The history of award regulation in the industry includes the 
following features: 
a. Award coverage in the industry is relatively new; 
b. There has been an historical prevalence of low wage awards; 
c. First awards were set without proper valuation of the work; 
d. Where work value increases have been awarded they have not taken into account the historical 
undervaluation of the work; and 
e. Award stipulated allowances that are inherently low, and/or are low compared to similar or 
comparable work-related allowances in other industries. 
The application also noted that a further factor contributing to the undervaluation of work in the 
industry had been (p 55): 
a lack of opportunity to bargain at the enterprise level due to barriers to enterprise bargaining. Those 
barriers include: 
a. a low level of unionisation in the workplace, 
b. the number and diversity of small workplaces, 
c.  workplaces have only small numbers of employees, 
d.  the nature of the work and the priority commitment of workers to the needs of their disadvantaged 
FOLHQWVUDWKHUWKHZRUNHUV¶RZQULJKWV 
e.  employers comprising volunteer boards with little if any experience in human resource management 
or industrial relations, and 
f.  there being little time available to workers to complete their work, and a lack of excess time to 
address employment or industrial issues. 
,WZDVIXUWKHUQRWHGWKDWµ6$&6HPSOR\HHVDWDOOOHYHOVDQGSDUWLFXODUO\DWOHYHOVZKHUHHPSOR\HHV
hold tertiary and vocational education qualifications, are paid significantly less than other 
employees performing similar or comparable work, for example in the state and local government 
VHFWRUV¶S,QRUGHUWRDGGUHVVWKDWSUREOHPWKHDSSOLFDWLRQSURSRVHGWKDWHPSOR\HHVLQWKH
sector receive the rates of pay deWHUPLQHGLQWKH4,5&¶VSD\HTXLW\UXOLQJZKHUHWKH\ZHUHQRW
already applicable. 
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4.2 The ASU/Commonwealth agreement 
During proceedings in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission for the modernisation of 
awards in the SACS sector, it was revealed that the federal government and the ASU had reached 
a formal agreement in relation to the equal remuneration claim: see Australian Government and 
$XVWUDOLDQ6HUYLFHV8QLRQµ+HDGVRI$JUHHPHQW¶2FWREHUDYDLODEOHDW
http://www.airc.gov.au/awardmod/databases/social/Submissions/ASU_social_ED2.pdf, as 
Attachment 5). This committed the government to provide assistance by way of presenting 
evidence and research on relevant aspects of the sector. It also proposed the development of an 
agreed statement of facts, something that was seen to have been a useful feature in many of the 
pay equity cases brought under the New South Wales and Queensland systems, in helping to limit 
DUJXPHQWV$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHJRYHUQPHQWUHVHUYHGLWVSRVLWLRQDVWRµWKHDSSURSULDWHTXDQWXP
DQGIXQGLQJDUUDQJHPHQWVRIDQ\SD\LQFUHDVH¶SDUD 
)RULWVSDUWWKH$68DFNQRZOHGJHGLQWKHDJUHHPHQWWKDWµWKHUHZRXOGEHYHU\VLJQLILFDQW
budgetary impacts to state, territory and Commonwealth governments in the event of any 
VLJQLILFDQWLQFUHDVHWRWKHFXUUHQWUDWHVRISD\RI6$&6ZRUNHUV¶SDUD30 Accordingly, it indicated 
it would support an application by the Commonwealth for any wage increases to be delayed by at 
least six months to allow appropriate funding arrangements to be put in place, and then phased in 
over a period of at least four and half years, at least in the case of workers outside Queensland. 
4.3 Preliminary ruling 
The application lodged with FWA made no mention of asking the tribunal to establish an Equal 
Remuneration Principle. However, the agreement between the federal government and the ASU 
indicated that the government ZRXOGµVXSSRUWWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDQDSSURSULDWHHTXDO
remuneration principle for the federal jurisdiction drawing on the Queensland Equal Remuneration 
3ULQFLSOHRIDQGH[SODQDWRU\QRWHVDQGUHOHYDQW1HZ6RXWK:DOHVMXULVSUXGHQFH¶SDUD 
When the ASU lodged its application, it proposed that the proceedings be divided into two streams: 
the first dealing with the operation of the equal remuneration provisions under the Fair Work Act, 
and the second dealing with the substance of the application. The ASU submitted that this course 
was desirable, as a preliminary decision on the operation of the equal remuneration provisions 
would provide the parties with guidance concerning the approach that FWA would adopt in 
addressing the merits of the application. However, the Full Bench convened to hear the application 
determined not to separate the proceedings, as it was not convinced that this course would result 
in substantial efficiencies. It also indicated its preference for addressing the operation of the 
relevant provisions with a factual context before it: Equal Remuneration Case [2010] FWAFB 3339. 
4.4 Submissions 
7KH$68¶VSULPDU\FRQWHQWLRQZDVWKDW):$VKRXOGIROORZWKHDSSURDFKWRXQGHUYDOXDWLRQWDNHQLQ
New South Wales and Queensland. This would involve a two stage process. The first step involved 
establishing that the SACS sector was female dominated, that work in the sector was undervalued, 
                                                     
30 Many employers in the SACS sector deliver public services under contract to federal, State or Territory agencies, and the 
level of government funding for these services has a direct impact on wage levels: see ER Case No 1 at [207]±[224], 
[270]±[272]. 
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and that the undervaluation was referable to the sector being female dominated. The second stage 
involved addressing the undervaluation by way of remedy.31  
In seeking to demonstrate that the work was undervalued, the ASU led evidence consistent with 
the marker points of undervaluation in the Queensland Equal Remuneration Principle. The 
evidence consisted of testimony from academic and professional experts, union officials and 
individual employees.32 This evidence, much of which contained a detailed attention to work 
functions and responsibilities, sought to establish that the services delivered by employees in the 
industry involved caring work which has a female characterisation. The ASU contended that the 
characterisation of the work as caring work can lead to undervaluation of the work, by failing to 
value or account for the complexity of skills that are required to deliver services. On this point the 
ASU asserted that there had been insufficient and inadequate assessments of work value in the 
industry, noting also that there had been changes to work in recent years such as increased 
compliance requirements.  
In addition to the evidence led by the applicants, the tribunal visited various establishments in the 
SACS industry, as well as some State and local government establishments that provided similar 
VHUYLFHV7KHVHVLWHYLVLWVµDVVLVWHGWKH)XOO%HQFKLQJDLQLQJDEHWWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHQDWXUH
and range of SACS industry services and the environments in which services arHSURYLGHG¶ER 
Case No 1 at [182]). The proceedings were also in receipt of a comprehensive profile of workers in 
the social, community and disability services sector. This profile was prepared by the federal 
government, in accordance with the Heads of Agreement, and included in its submissions (ER 
Case No 1 at [124], [225]). Further evidence was led by various employers and employer bodies, 
consisting of testimony from academics and senior managers in the industry (ER Case No 1 at 
[183]±[188], Appendix B). 
The application for an equal remuneration order was supported by a number of bodies, including 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the Australian Council of Social Service, Jobs 
Australia, National Disability Services, the National Pay Equity &RDOLWLRQDQGWKH:RPHQ¶V(OHFWRUDO
Lobby. A number of other employer associations also gave qualified support, as did some 
individual employers, though generally on the condition that any wage increases were appropriately 
funded by government.  
Various employer bodies, however, opposed the application. These included the Australian 
Industry Group (Ai Group), the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) and 
Australian Business Industrial (ABI). Each outlined the disamenities that would occur if equal 
remuneration orders were used to circumvent the minimum wages and modern awards objectives 
and the award safety net. For example (at [83], [89]): 
$L*URXSFRQWHQGHG«WKDWan equal remuneration order would undermine the stability and maintenance 
of the modern award safety net « Making an order would also remove impetus for enterprise bargaining 
in the SACS industry, contrary to the objects of the Act. Modern award rates should not be aligned with 
                                                     
31 For details of this and the other submissions referred to below, see 
http://www.fwc.gov.au/index.cfm?pagename=remuneration&page=introduction (accessed 27 September 2013). The 
primary submissions are summarised in ER Case No 1 at [17]±[144]. 
32 This evidence is summarised in ER Case No 1 at [146]±[181] and Appendix A. For completeness, we note that one of the 
authors of this report gave evidence for the applicants. 
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the negotiated outcomes of enterprise or certified agreements, whether the agreements are in the public 
or private sectors. 
«Ai Group submitted that gender pay equity is a complex issue and that we should not attempt to 
implement community-wide solutions, including taking into account government commitments in relation 
to funding, when making decisions about minimum wage cases «Ai Group warned against job losses 
and reductions in services and the possibility of the outcome being pursued in other industries where the 
majority of employees are female. 
Various employer bodies also cautioned FWA against adopting the approach utilised in 
Queensland, with ABI rejecting explicitly the prospect of equal remuneration orders being based on 
comparisons with occupations covered by bargained outcomes. The Ai Group further illustrated the 
FRQFHUQRIVRPHSHDNHPSOR\HURUJDQLVDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJ):$¶VDSSURDFKWRHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQ
In its primary submission, the Ai Group rejected the use of the equal remuneration provisions to 
initiate increases in award rates of pay. Noting that its primary submission might not be accepted, it 
identified an approach for FWA to adopt in addressing applications under Part 2-7, including that 
applications should make explicit reference to the work of comparators.  
The Commonwealth encouraged FWA to determine an Equal Remuneration Principle within the 
scope of the Fair Work Act, but drawing upon the experience of the New South Wales and 
Queensland jurisdictions. Further, it contended that FWA could utilise a number of approaches to 
assess whether the work was undervalued, but should give consideration to a range of factors in 
determining a remedy should undervaluation be found.  
The Queensland government made no direct submission on the merit of the application, but 
directed FWA to the experience in the Queensland jurisdiction of developing and applying an Equal 
Remuneration Principle. The submissions of the New South Wales and Victorian governments 
contended that the proper construction of Part 2-7 was that it required a comparison between the 
work of male and female employees in order to demonstrate that the objective of equal 
remuneration had not been met. 
4.5 The May 2011 decision 
A Full Bench of FWA handed down the first of the two major decisions in the proceedings in May 
2011 (ER Case No 1). The bench was headed by the President, Justice Giudice, and also included 
Vice President Watson, Senior Deputy President Acton and Commissioners Harrison and Cargill. 
The major features of this decision were a finding that the work was undervalued on a gender 
basis, and a direction to the parties to make further submissions on remedy. In doing so FWA 
revealed its approach, at this point, to Part 2-7 and its method for assessing whether there was 
evidence of gender-based undervaluation. As noted in the previous chapter, the Full Bench 
confirmed that its power to grant equal remuneration orders is a discretionary one, and there is no 
requirement for applicants to establish that rates of pay were established on a discriminatory basis 
(ER Case No 1 at [226], [233]). The Full Bench did not specify that applicants were obliged to 
nominate a comparator group, and specifically noted that a male comparator group is not required 
to sustain an application (at [232], [234]). Additionally the Full Bench noted that there was not a 
specific benchmark of female employment required to enable an application for equal remuneration 
orders. In making this point the Full Bench noted that the case posed complexities due to the 
industry wide nature of the application and the diversity of the SACS industry (at [232], [277]).  
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The Full Bench adopted undervaluation as a means of assessing whether the objective of equal 
UHPXQHUDWLRQZDVPHWEXWLQGLFDWHGLWVFRQFHUQDWZKDWLWGHVFULEHGDW>@DVWKHµLQGLFLD
DSSURDFK¶WRGHPRQVWUDWLQJJHQGHU-based undervaluation originally formulated by the New South 
Wales Industrial Relations Commission in its Pay Equity Inquiry (Glynn 1998). The Full Bench 
noted that applicants simply identifying the features of undervaluation set out by the Inquiry, or in 
the Queensland Equal Remuneration Principle, would not necessarily have provided evidence of 
gender-based undervaluation. It commented (at [248]±[249]): 
 Many if not most of the indicia may in themselves be gender neutral. While the indicia may be indicative 
of gender-based undervaluation of work in some circumstances, they may also be observed in 
workplaces, sectors or industries which are mainly male or in which neither gender predominates. Many 
workers employed by a small employer are not union members and have low bargaining power. This 
may be so whether the workforce is predominantly female, predominantly male or neither. The 
DSSOLFDQWV¶DSSURDFKPD\WKHUHIRUHWHQGWRFRQFHDOVRPHRIWKHUHDOFDXVHVRIXQGHUYDOXDWLRQE\
imputing a gender bias where none exists. 
:HGRQRWWKLQNWKDWWKHLQGLFLDDSSURDFKZDVHYHULQWHQGHGWREHDSUHVFULSWLYHIRUPXOD«(YHQLIDOORI
the indicia are present it does not necessarily follow that gender-based undervaluation exists. 
Conversely, if none or only a minority of the indicia are present in a particular occupation or industry it 
does not necessarily follow that there is no gender-based undervaluation. The list of indicia is no more 
than a framework for considering whether there is undervaluation. 
Nevertheless the Full Bench went on to use some of these marker points of undervaluation to 
consider the position in the SACS industry. Its findings in this regard operated as set of interlocking 
and reinforcing premises, leading to the conclusion that there was evidence of gender-based 
undervaluation. It recorded its view that the applicants had established that (at [253]): 
(a) PXFKRIWKHZRUNLQWKHLQGXVWU\LVµFDULQJ¶ZRUN 
(b) the characterisation of work as caring work can disguise the level of skill and experience required 
and contribute, in a general sense, to a devaluing of the work 
(c) the evidence of workers, managers and union officials suggests that the work, in the SACS industry, 
again in a general sense, is undervalued to some extent, and 
(d) because caring work in this context has a female characterisation, to the extent that work in the 
industry is undervalued because it is caring work, the undervaluation is gender-based. 
,WQRWHGWKDWWKHVHFRQFOXVLRQVZHUHµFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHHYLGHQFHRIDFDGHPLFVDQGRWKHUVLQWKLV
case and ZLWKVLPLODUFRQFOXVLRQVLQWKH4XHHQVODQG(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQGHFLVLRQ¶DW>@ 
FWA did not make an immediate decision on remedy, but rejected the immediate and 
straightforward adoption of the rates in the Queensland award. This was in part because of various 
distinguishing features about the QIRC decision. It was based on an agreed statement of facts that 
included a concession by all parties that undervaluation existed, something contested by a number 
of parties in the federal proceeding (at 264]). It ZDVFRQGXFWHGRQWKHEDVLVQRWMXVWRIWKH4,5&¶V
Equal Remuneration principle, but on work value grounds. The FWA Full Bench considered that 
µWKH>4,5&¶V@GHFLVLRQWRDZDUGVLJQLILFDQWZDJHLQFUHDVHVZDVQRWEDVHGVROHO\RQHTXDO
remuneration consideratiRQV¶DQGWKDWLWZDVµXQFOHDUZKDWFRPSRQHQWRUSURSRUWLRQZDV
DWWULEXWDEOH¶WRWKHIDFWRURIJHQGHUDW>@,WDOVREHOLHYHGWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQZDVEDVHGDWOHDVW
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in part, on local factors and comparisons that were not necessarily applicable to other parts of 
Australia (at [266]±[267]). 
The Full Bench also expressed concern about creating a nexus between the minimum rates of pay 
LQDQDZDUGDQGSDLGRUPDUNHWUDWHVREVHUYLQJWKDWWKHµGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQPLQLPXPDZDUG
wages and wages in other instrumHQWVVXFKDVHQWHUSULVHDZDUGVDQGDJUHHPHQWV«KDVORQJ
EHHQREVHUYHGLQWKHIHGHUDOV\VWHP¶HYHQLILWKDGQRWDOZD\VEHHQDIHDWXUHRIZDJHIL[DWLRQLQ
States such as Queensland (at [260]). 
In reaching a conclusion about the SACS sector, the Full BencKREVHUYHGWKDWLIµFRQVLGHUDWLRQ
ZHUHRQO\JLYHQWRWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKHGLUHFWHPSOR\HUVLQWKH6$&6LQGXVWU\«LWZRXOGEHKDUGWR
DVFULEHDQ\JHQGHUEDVHGUHDVRQVIRUVDODULHVSDLG¶ZLWKµQRHYLGHQFHRIDSUHIHUHQFHIRURQH
JHQGHURYHUDQRWKHU¶DW]). It added (at [279]): 
It is also important that the employees chosen by the applicants as notional comparators are themselves 
likely to be mainly women. The applicants have not sought to establish unequal remuneration for men 
and women workers by a comparison between employees covered by the claim and a group of 
employees of a different gender. The fact that there are differences in general rates of remuneration 
between one workforce made up predominantly of women and another workforce made up 
predominantly of women may suggest that factors other than gender have contributed to the differences. 
Despite these reservations, however, the Full Bench was satisfied that there was cause to 
intervene. As it noted (at [281]): 
[T]here is a large gap in many cases between the rates paid in the SACS industry and those paid in state 
and local government. To the extent that the gap is gender-based we should take action to correct it if we 
can. This requires an examination of the causes or probable causes of the differences in rates. 
Its formal conclusion was as follows (at [285]):  
We record our view, reached on the material before us, that for employees in the SACS industry there is 
not equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal or comparable value by 
comparison with state and local government employment. 
The applicants were directed to make further submissions on remedy, including specifically the 
extent to which the undervaluation was gender-based, though without any indication as to what 
kind of evidence might be required for that purpose (at [286]). The tribunal made itself available to 
facilitate conciliation between the parties to explore the scope for agreement (at [295]). 
4.6 The Joint Submission on remedy 
In November 2011, the Gillard Government announced two billion dollars of funding to assist the 
resolution of gender pay equity in the SACS industry. This funding would allow the Commonwealth 
WRµIXQGLWVVKDUHRIDQ\ZDJHLQFUHDVHV¶DZDUGHGDVDUHVXOWRI the equal remuneration 
proceedings. Included in the announcement was a commitment from the Commonwealth to future 
Joint Submissions with the applicants on the question of remedy (Gillard 2011).  
7KLVGHYHORSPHQWEURXJKWDFKDQJHWRWKH$68¶VSRVLWLRQRQUemedy. In submissions made in 
June 2011, the ASU had contended that all of the undervaluation was gender-based. This was a 
position that stood some way from that of the federal government, which assessed that at this point 
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the ASU had not addressed the requirement to assess the extent to which undervaluation was 
gender-based.33 In the wake of the funding announcement, however, the applicants and the 
&RPPRQZHDOWKIRUPXODWHGDQµDJUHHGRXWFRPH¶ZKLFKZDVSXWWR):$RQ1RYHPEHUE\
way of a joint submission: see Equal Remuneration Caseµ-RLQWVXEPLVVLRQRIWKH$SSOLFDQWVDQG
WKH$XVWUDOLDQ*RYHUQPHQWRQUHPHG\´1RYHPEHUµ-RLQW6XEPLVVLRQ¶ 
4.6.1 Identifying the extent of gender based undervaluation 
The Joint Submission addressed the proportion of undervaluation attributable to gender at each 
level of the proposed classification structure in the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability 
6HUYLFHV,QGXVWU\$ZDUG7KLVDSSURDFKZDVSUHIDFHGE\VXEPLVVLRQVQRWLQJWKDWµWKHWDVNRI
ascertaining the degree of gender-based undervaluation should not be made so technical and 
GLIILFXOWDVWRKLQGHUWKHJUDQWLQJRIUHOLHIZKHQLWLVFOHDUO\ZDUUDQWHG¶DW>@ 
The Joint Submission addressed the task of quantifying gender-based undervaluation in two 
distinct ways. The first involved taking FWA to the established research record concerning 
persistent gender-based wage inequities in the Australian labour market. Typically these 
econometric studies examine earnings differentials between women and men, and through 
regression analysis assess which proportion of the earnings differentials can be explained by a 
vector of industry, workforce or productivity characteristics. These characteristics include 
education, training and experience. That part of the earnings gap which cannot be explained by 
factors other than gender, typically called the unexplained earnings gap, is held to indicate adverse 
treatment.34 The Joint Submission, drawing on research tracing developments in these studies and 
their findings, drew attention to the significant, persistent and unexplained GPG between men and 
women (at [2.31]).  
The second approach utilised by the ASU and the federal government underlined the complexity of 
the test set by the Full Bench. For each classification and pay point the Joint Submission calculated 
the undervaluation attributable to gender and the percentage wage increases that would be 
required to achieve gender neutral wage outcomes. To illustrate this process, we have replicated 
the steps relied upon in the Joint Submission utilising the Level 3, Year 1 wage rate (Table 4.1). 
This same approach was followed for the eight classification levels in the 2010 modern award, 
which span twenty five pay points. The data showed that there were potentially two courses open 
to FWA. It might determine percentage increases that would align the rates of pay in the modern 
award with the public sector comparator. Alternatively, it could fix percentage increases that would 
align the rates of pay in the 2010 modern award to the Queensland Community Services and Crisis 
Assistance Award. 
  
                                                     
33 See Equal Remuneration Case$SSOLFDQWV¶6XEPLVVLRQVRQ5HPHG\-XQHDW>@Equal Remuneration Case, 
Submission of the Australian Government, 8 July 2011 at [3.3]±[3.7]. 
34 The type of methodology used in these studies is well explained in Cassells et al 2009b: see also section 5.3.1. 
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Table 4.1: Method relied upon by the Joint Submission to formulate a remedy 
Modern Award classification and rate $39,042.43 
Public sector comparator rate (based on an average of all applicable public sector industrial 
instruments) 
$49,239.50 
Difference between SACS Modern Award and public sector comparator (Total Undervaluation) $10,197.07 
% undervaluation attributable to gender (based on analysis of caring work by Junor and Briar) 89% 
Undervaluation attributable to gender $9,075.39 
Gender neutral wage outcome (SACS Modern Award rate plus undervaluation attributable to 
gender) 
$48,117.82 
% increase from modern award to achieve gender neutral wage outcomes 23% 
% increase from modern award to achieve Queensland SACS rates 20% 
Queensland SACS rate $46,892 
Source: Equal Remuneration Case, ASU Exhibit 141 
The Joint Submission justified this approach in the following terms (at [2.9]): 
The method the Government and the applicants propose in this submission first identifies differences in 
the value of comparable work nationally, by reference to appropriate public sector comparator rates, and 
then proposes a means of ensuring that, for SACS workers nationally, there will be equal remuneration 
for work of comparable value. In this way the Bench is able to ensure that there will be equal 
remuneration for the employees to whom the [equal remuneration order] proposed by this application will 
apply, as required by s. 302(1).  
The approach of the Joint Submission in attributing a proportion of undervaluation to gender 
LQYROYHGWKHXVHRIµFDULQJZRUN¶DVDSUR[\IRUJHQGHU-based undervaluation. Critical here was the 
centrality of caring work to thH)XOO%HQFK¶V0D\GHFLVLRQWKDWZRUNLQWKH6$&6LQGXVWU\ZDV
undervalued. The Joint Submission relied on a study which assessed the degree of care work at 
each level of the modern award classification scale (Junor and Briar 2011). Care work was defined 
to include both direct and indirect care work. Direct care work was considered to mean being 
available in person to assist and work with clients individually or in groups. It included: working face 
to face with clients, for example in counselling or in providing assistance with daily living; general 
oversight of vulnerable clients in day care or residential care settings; making phone calls to or on 
behalf of clients; providing mediation/advocacy in situations involving clients and/or social, medical, 
legal providers and authorities; and keeping clear, detailed, accurate and easily accessible case 
notes. Indirect care work enables the direct work to occur and to be as effective as possible. It can 
include program planning, creating training manuals or programs to deal with recurring problems, 
peer supervision, protecting staff from trauma or attack and providing as safe and healthy a work 
environment as possible. It also includes receiving or providing on-the job training or educating 
oneself about the causes of the problems encountered by clients. 
4.6.2 The proposed wage increases 
The Joint Submission proposed an equal remuneration order based on the percentage increases 
that would be required to match the rates in the Queensland SACS award, rather than the 
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percentage increases that would align the rates to the public sector comparator. The increases 
would operate as a separate order identifying percentage increases to the rates in the modern 
award, as opposed to a direct variation to the modern award rates. This approach reflected earlier 
statements by the Full Bench concerning the preservation of award relativities in the modern award 
(ER Case No 1 at [285]). The equal remuneration order proposed by the Joint Submission provided 
for wage increases to be phased in over six years with a cumulative annual loading of one per cent 
over the first four years of the implementation period, with the loading a recognition of the 
impediments to bargaining in the industry (at [3.17]). 
The decision by the parties to the Joint Submission to base their proposed equal remuneration 
order on the Queensland SACS Award, rather than the nationwide public sector comparator, 
appeared to lie in an assessment that the Full Bench would not be amenable to the public sector 
nexus. The choice of reference guide was important not only due to the assessment of its likely 
acceptance but also because each provided for different percentage increases, particularly in the 
more highly skilled classifications. These differences are highlighted in Table 4.2. While the 
percentage increases are broadly comparable for Classification Levels 2 through 3, the public 
sector comparison yielded higher increases from Classification Level 4 onwards. In determining to 
utilise the percentage increases based on the Queensland SACS Award, the Joint Submission 
QRWHGWKDWµWKHILQDORUGHUPD\QRWUHIOHFWWKHIXOOH[WHQWRIWKHJHQGHUXQGHUYDOXDWLRQLGHQWLILHGDWDOO
OHYHOVRIWKHPRGHUQ6$&6DZDUG¶DW>@)XUWKHUWKH-RLQW6XEPLVVLRQYDOLGDWHGWKHUHIHUHQFH
guide provided by the Queensland SACS award on the basis that rates in the Queensland award 
had been set as a result of an equal remuneration order, and that the classifications in the 
Queensland SACS Award were almost identical to the federal SACS modern award (at [2.59]). 
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Table 4.2: Comparison between proposed increases based on public sector comparator rates and 
Queensland SACS Award 
 
SACS modern award classification % increases to match 
nationwide public sector 
comparator rates  
% increases to match 
Queensland SACS Award 
Level 2 Year 1 21 18 
Level 2 Year 2 21 18 
Level 2 Year 3 20 19 
Level 2 Year 4 20 20 
Level 3 Year 1 23 20 
Level 3 Year 2 24 22 
Level 3 Year 3 24 22 
Level 3 Year 4 27 23 
Level 4 Year 1 36 28 
Level 4 Year 2 38 27 
Level 4 Year 3 38 28 
Level 4 Year 4 37 29 
Level 5 Year 1 43 33 
Level 5 Year 2 43 33 
Level 5 Year 3 44 33 
Level 6 Year 1 37 36 
Level 6 Year 2 42 36 
Level 6 Year 3 40 35 
Level 7 Year 1 48 38 
Level 7 Year 2 50 38 
Level 7 Year 3 50 38 
Level 8 Year 1 53 41 
Level 8 Year 2 54 41 
Level 8 Year 3 52 41 
Source: Equal Remuneration Case, ASI Exhibit 141 
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4.7 The February 2012 decision 
7KH)XOO%HQFK¶V)HEUXDU\GHFLVLRQER Case No 2) included a majority judgment by Justice 
Giudice, Senior Deputy President Acton and Commissioners Harrison and Cargill, together with a 
dissenting opinion by Vice President Watson.  
4.7.1 The majority decision on remedy 
The majority indicated its preparedness to grant equal remuneration orders comprising percentage 
increases to the rates set by the SACS modern award. It was unwilling to agree to an order that 
would provide for a nexus with wage rates arising from an equal remuneration order in either a 
State or local enterprise agreement or an award (at [62]). It also expressed some reservations 
DERXWWKHLQFOXVLRQRILQGLUHFWFDUHZRUNLQWKH-RLQW6XEPLVVLRQ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIFDUHZRUN
Nevertheless, the majority largely accepted the use of care work as a proxy for gender-based 
XQGHUYDOXDWLRQQRWLQJWKDWWKHSHUFHQWDJHVµSURSRVHGLQWKH-RLQW6XEPLVVLRQDUHDSSURSULDWH¶DW
[63]).  
There were reservations too concerning percentage increases that were based on an average of 
applicable public sector rates of pay, given that market factors influenced some aspect of public 
sector pay rates (at [63], [69]). Nonetheless, there was ultimately little difference in the percentage 
increases sought in the Joint Submission and those determined finally by the majority of the Full 
Bench. These rates are compared in Table 4.3. The impact of the determined increases is best 
illustrated by the weekly wage rates prior to the equal remuneration order for a select group of 
classifications, for example the diploma, associate degree entry point (Level 3, Year 1, $770.50), 
and the three year degree entry point (Level 3, Year 3, $809.60).  
The majority noted the importance of the Commonwealth agreeing to fund its share of the 
increased costs, but voiced its concern about the risks to programs and activities that were not 
government funded (at [65]). Accordingly, it determined an eight rather than six year 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQSHULRG7KLVORQJHULPSOHPHQWDWLRQSHULRGDVVLVWHGDOVRWRDVVXDJHWKHPDMRULW\¶V 
concerns about the proximity of the awarded wage increases to public sector rates, given that by 
the end of the implementation period, rates of pay in State and local agreements would have 
increased as a result of enterprise bargaining (at [67]). Even so, the majority agreed to an 
additional loading, recognising the impediments to bargaining in the industry. Rather than the 
proposed loading of one per cent per annum for four years, the Full Bench determined to phase the 
cumulative four per cent loading over eight years (at [69]).  
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Table 4.3: Comparison between percentage increases sought by Joint Submission and granted by 
FWA 
 
SACS modern award classification Joint Submission FWA 
Level 2 Year 1 18 19 
Level 2 Year 2 18  
Level 2 Year 3 19  
Level 2 Year 4 20  
Level 3 Year 1 20 22 
Level 3 Year 2 22  
Level 3 Year 3 22  
Level 3 Year 4 23  
Level 4 Year 1 28 28 
Level 4 Year 2 27  
Level 4 Year 3 28  
Level 4 Year 4 29  
Level 5 Year 1 33 33 
Level 5 Year 2 33  
Level 5 Year 3 33  
Level 6 Year 1 36 36 
Level 6 Year 2 36  
Level 6 Year 3 35  
Level 7 Year 1 38 38 
Level 7 Year 2 38  
Level 7 Year 3 38  
Level 8 Year 1 41 41 
Level 8 Year 2 41  
Level 8 Year 3 41  
Source: Equal Remuneration Case, ASU Exhibit 141, ER Case No 2 at [5], [66] 
4.7.2 The dissenting judgment 
In his dissenting judgment, Vice President Watson took the view that the applicants had failed to 
demonstrate that any undervaluation of work in the SACS sector was gender-based. He was 
SDUWLFXODUO\FRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHDEVHQFHRIZKDWKHGHVFULEHGDVDµOHJLWLPDWHFRPSDUDWRU¶7KH
DSSOLFDQWVKDGµQRWVRXJKWWRPDNHFRPSDULVRQVEHWZHHQZRPHQ¶VSD\DQGPHQ¶VSD\¶EXWUDWKHU
to establish a comparison with similar work performed in the public sector by workers who were 
themselves mostly female (at [87], [96]).  
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
76 
Vice-President Watson did not classify the case as an equal pay case, of the sort familiar in other 
jurisdictions around the world, but rather as an application for a large minimum over-award 
SD\PHQWµIRUDOOPHQDQGZRPHQLQWKHHQWLUH6$&6LQGXVWU\WRa level approaching public sector 
ZDJHOHYHOV¶DW>@Having alluded to the approach taken in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, he observed (at [98]±[99]): 
Questions of appropriate comparators and causation are important aspects of the case law in other 
jurisdictions. An inappropriate comparator or an alternative justification for a difference in pay is fatal to 
DQHTXDOSD\FODLP«This international perspective and considerations of logic require the claim in this 
matter to be based on the establishment of a reliable benchmark or comparator and the elimination of 
any factors not related to gender from any comparisons that can legitimately be made. If a benchmark is 
sought to be utilised, it must be reliable. It must constitute equal or comparable work in every respect. 
Generalised comparisons of work between industries are insufficient. Comparable roles must be fully 
assessed against work value criteria. Remuneration for comparable roles must not contain additional 
elements such as the inevitable differences in pay between employers and between different industries 
or superior bargaining outcomes that generally arise in different sectors of employment. 
The Vice President rejected the use of the public sector as a comparator, given that there were 
inherent differences between the SACS industry and the public sector which had not been 
addressed in submissions (at [96]). The available evidence suggested that there was a public 
sector premium in the Australian labour market that was unrelated to gender (at [101]). He also 
took the view that the annual loading sought by the Joint Submission and granted by the majority of 
the Full Bench had the effect of excising the SACS industry from the enterprise bargaining 
framework, provided a significant challenge to the enterprise bargaining provisions of the Fair Work 
Act, and set a precedent for other feminised industries where there was an absence of over-award 
payments+HVDLGWKDWLWZDVµnot an overstatement to suggest that the future status of enterprise 
bargaining in this and other industries with similar attributes is at stake¶ (at [119]).  
Vice President Watson reached the following conclusion (at [112]): 
[T]he current rates of pay for SACS industry employees are not entirely the result of the circumstance 
that a significant proportion of employees in the SACS industry are female. The rates are the result of 
market and funding arrangements which cannot be equated with gender undervaluation. 
$OWKRXJKLWZDVKHVDLGµindisputable that employees in the SACS industry deserve more 
recognition and reward for the work they undertake¶WKHµVWURQJHPRWLRQDODSSHDO¶RIWKDWIDFWRU
ZDVQRWUHOHYDQWWRWKHWULEXQDO¶VWDVNXQGHU3DUW-7 of the Fair Work Act (at [86]). Rather than 
increase award rates, he advocated the use of government funding to support enterprise 
bargaining in the sector (at [120]). 
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5 Explaining the gender pay gap: A literature review 
This chapter provides an overview of various inquiries and studies that examine the GPG. It makes 
reference to international and Australian reviews, including specific pay equity inquires and studies 
by labour economists. This overview assists in understanding the factors that contribute to earnings 
differences between women and men. This is a wide-ranging area of research and includes 
consideration of factors such as differences in education and labour market experience, 
occupational segregation, and social, institutional and workplace practices. Previous work in this 
area has been considered by gender pay equity inquiries and equal remuneration proceedings, 
often with a view to assessing how work value decisions contribute to earnings differences, and 
providing information about the characteristics of undervalued work.  
This chapter relies extensively on, and reproduces material contained in, an earlier report on equal 
remuneration principles (Romeyn et al 2011: ch 3).35 In addition to providing a more extensive 
explanation of approaches to researching the GPG, this chapter also highlights research published 
since the time of that report. 
Besides the specific findings in these studies, this overview is intended to assist with an 
understanding of some the key concepts covered in this report. 
Before considering this material, however, it is worth noting some measurement issues associated 
with the GPG. 
5.1 Options for measuring the gender pay gap 
There is general acceptance in the literature that a GPG exists, both in Australia and 
internationally. As noted in section 2.3, the GPG is generally expressed as a ratio that converts 
average female earnings into a proportion of average male earnings to calculate the pay gap 
between the sexes. The most frequently quoted measure of the GPG in Australia is the ratio 
between women¶V DQGPHQ¶VDYHUDJHZHHNO\RUGLQDU\WLPHHDUQLQJVIRUIXOO-time employees. 
However, as the Office for Women (2008: 2; 2009), the former Equal Opportunity for Women in the 
Workplace Agency (EOWA 2010)36 and Pointon et al (2012) explain, there are a number of 
different ways to measure the gap, each of which produces quite different results using Australian 
data. A number of these measures are set out in summary form in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
A GPG calculated using average total weekly earnings for all employees produces a GPG of 37.4 
per cent, as at May 2013 (ABS 2013). However, this measure has the disadvantage that it makes 
no adjustment for the fact that a much larger proportion of women work part-time than men ± and 
are therefore paid for fewer working hours. 
When only the average total weekly earnings of full-time adult employees are considered, the GPG 
reduces to 21.1 per cent, as at May 2013 (ABS 2013). However, this measure is also problematic. 
First, it makes no adjustment for the fact that men are much more likely to work and be paid 
overtime than women. Secondly, it excludes part-time employees from the analysis ± the majority 
of whom are women. Lips (2003: 90) is highly critical of this approach: 
                                                     
35 In particular, in sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5.1, 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 below. 
36 EOWA has now been replaced by the Workplace Gender Equality Agency (WGEA): see section A.7. 
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[Much] of the data used by governments around the world to measure the earnings gap between women 
DQGPHQLVEDVHGRQDPRGHOWKDWPDNHVPHQ¶VSDWWHUQRIZRUNWKHVWDQGDUGRUWKHQRUPDJDLQVWZKLFK
ZRPHQ¶VRXWFRPHVDUHMXGJHG,IZRPHQFDQQRWILWWKDWPRGHOWKH\DUHRPLWWHGIURPWKHFRPSDULsons or 
their lower pay is said to be justified.  
Converting average total weekly earnings of adult employees to an hourly rate, for full-time and 
part-time employees, can assist in addressing this issue. However, there are a number of 
limitations with deriving hourly rates of pay. 
Excluding overtime earnings and measuring only ordinary time earnings results in a GPG of around 
17.5 per cent for full-time adult employees, as at May 2013 (ABS 2013). However, it should be 
noted that measures of ordinary time earnings exclude bonuses as well as overtime. Discrimination 
in the allocation of bonuses may be a factor contributing to the size of the GPG. This measure is 
WKHPRVWFRPPRQO\XVHGDVWKHµIXOO-WLPH¶FULWHULRQUHPRYHVWKHLQIOXHQFHRIGLIIHULQJZRUNLQJWLPe 
arrangements while the ordinary time criterion adjusts for the fact that men are much more likely to 
work and be paid overtime than women (Pointon et al 2012: 6). 
Another measure of the GPG uses hourly rates. In Australia this generally derives from the biennial 
Employee Earnings and Hours (EEH) Survey from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). This is 
FRQVLGHUHGE\VRPHWREHDPRUHDFFXUDWHPHDVXUHRIZRPHQ¶VHDUQLQJVDVLWUHPRYHVWKHQHHG
to control for differences in the hours worked and allows part-time workers to be included. 
However, some international commentators have raised issues about the accuracy of hourly data 
(Lips 2003: 89). The detailed data that is available from this survey is for non-managerial 
employees, thus excluding the impact of managerial earnings. A smaller gap is indicated on the 
basis of these figures, as fewer women are managers and managerial earnings are higher. In 
2012, based on average hourly ordinary time earnings of full-time non-managerial adults, the EEH 
found a GPG of 9.3 per cent; if overtime earnings are taken into account and total earnings are 
considered, the GPG was 10.8 per cent (ABS 2012). 
Table 5.1 Measures of pay differentials between females and males from ABS Average Weekly 
Earnings and Employee Earnings and Hours surveys  
Measure of earnings Females ($) Males ($) Ratio of female to male 
earnings 
Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) survey measure (May 2013) 
Average weekly earnings (AWE) Average 
weekly total earnings of all employees 
849.90 1356.70 0.63 
Average weekly earnings for full-time adults 
(FTAWE) 
1267.40 1605.60 0.79 
Average weekly ordinary time earnings 
(AWOTE) for full-time adults 
1250.50 1516.40 0.82 
Employee Earnings and Hours Survey measure (May 2012) 
Average weekly ordinary time cash earnings 
(AWOTCE) for full-time non-managerial adult 
employees 
1207.30 1356.30 0.89 
Average hourly ordinary time cash earnings 
(AHOTCE) for full-time non-managerial adult 
employees 
32.20 35.50 0.91 
Average weekly total cash earnings (AWCE) for 
full-time non-managerial adult employees 
1226.40 1471.70 0.83 
Average hourly total cash earnings (AHCE) for 
full-time non-managerial adult employees 
32.30 36.20 0.89 
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Average weekly total cash earnings (AWCE) for 
all non-managerial adult employees 
852.50 1226.30 0.70 
Average hourly total cash earnings (AHCE) for 
all non-managerial adult employees 
30.50 34.50 0.88 
Source: Based on Pointon et al (2012: 5) and updated to include May 2013 data from ABS Cat. No. 6302.0 (Average 
Weekly Earnings Survey) and May 2012 data from ABS Cat. No. 6306.0 (Employee Earnings and Hours Survey) 
Table 5.2 Differing measures of the gender pay gap 
Measure GPG (%) Main features and limitations 
Average weekly earnings (AWE) 
Average weekly total earnings of all 
employees 
37.4 Includes all weekly earnings for all employees but makes 
no adjustment that a much larger proportion of women 
work part-time than men ± and are therefore paid for 
fewer working hours. 
Average weekly earnings for full-time 
adults (FTAWE) 
21.1 Includes all weekly earnings for all full-time adult 
employees but makes no adjustment for the fact that men 
are more likely to work and be paid overtime than women. 
Average weekly ordinary time earnings 
(AWOTE) for full-time adults 
17.5 Excludes overtime earnings. Part-time employees are 
also excluded, the majority of whom are women in lower 
paid occupations. Includes casual loadings for full-time 
casuals, effectively LQIODWLQJZRPHQ¶VHDUQLQJV 
Average weekly ordinary time cash 
earnings (AWOTCE) for full-time non-
managerial adult employees 
11.0 Confined to full-time non-managerial employees, thus 
excluding managerial employees. Based on weekly 
ordinary time earnings thus excluding overtime. 
Average hourly ordinary time cash 
earnings (AHOTCE) for full-time non-
managerial adult employees 
9.3 Confined to full-time non-managerial employees, thus 
excluding managerial employees. Based on hourly 
earnings. 
Average weekly total cash earnings 
(AWCE) for full-time non-managerial 
adult employees 
16.7 Confined to full-time non-managerial employees, thus 
excluding managerial employees. Based on weekly total 
earnings thus including overtime. 
Average hourly total cash earnings 
(AHCE) for full-time non-managerial 
adult employees 
10.8 Confined to full-time non-managerial employees, thus 
excluding managerial employees. Based on weekly total 
earnings thus including overtime. Based on hourly 
earnings, 
Average weekly total cash earnings 
(AWCE) for all non-managerial adult 
employees 
30.5 Includes all weekly earnings for all non-managerial 
employees but makes no adjustment that a much larger 
proportion of women work part-time than men ± and are 
therefore paid for fewer working hours. 
Average hourly total cash earnings 
(AHCE) for all non-managerial adult 
employees 
11.6 Includes all weekly earnings for all non-managerial 
employees. Based on hourly earnings thus takes account, 
to an extent, of the larger proportion of women work who 
part-time.  
Source: Based on Pointon et al (2012: 6) and updated to include May 2013 data from ABS Cat. No. 6302.0 (Average 
Weekly Earnings Survey) and May 2012 data from ABS Cat. No. 6306.0 (Employee Earnings and Hours Survey)  
Note: These measures are based on data presented in Table 5.1. They are drawn from different ABS instruments. 
5.2 Assessing the gender pay gap 
There are a number of reasons why the GPG and pay inequity are the subject of assessment. Pay 
inequity challenges important human and workplace rights that have been recognised 
internationally. It also imposes costs on individual women and their families in terms of loss of 
income ± losses that accumulate over a lifetime. Recent research suggests that these costs are 
VLJQLILFDQWDQGDIIHFWZRPHQ¶V economic independence and economic security. Cassells et al 
(2009a: 27±30) found that GPGs contribute to significant differences in expected lifetime earnings 
for men and women, as well as gaps in the capacity of men and women to accumulate wealth. 
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They nRWHGWKDWGHVSLWHZRPHQ¶VVXSHUDQQXDWLRQEDODQFHVEHLQJRQWKHULVHµWKH\DUHVWLOOQRW
FRPLQJFORVHWRWKDWRIPHQ¶&DVVHOOVHWDOD:KLOHWKH\IRXQGSDUWQHUHGZRPHQZHUH
EHWWHURIIILQDQFLDOO\ZRPHQ¶VJHQHUDOO\ORZHUUHWLUHPHQWLQFRPHVZHUH found to be of concern, 
given the incidence of divorce (Cassells et al 2009a: 8, 35). The ILO (2007:10) has also 
emphasised that severe and persistent discrimination at work can contribute to poverty and social 
exclusion. Eastough and Miller (2004: 271) suggested that at the lower end of the wage 
distribution, pay inequity can have important ramifications for health, welfare and community policy. 
Impacts on the economy have also been noted as a result of suboptimal allocation of resources 
which impact on the efficiency of the labour market ± affecting labour supply, labour turnover, 
productivity and economic growth (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment 
and Workplace Relations 2009: 1±3; Cassells et al 2009b: 20±8). 
More recently, inquiries in Australia have been initiated by the relatively stagnant nature of the 
GPG. As an example, Cassells et al (2009b: 3) noted that between 1990 and 2009 the GPG, 
although fluctuating slightly, remained between 15 and 17 per cent, with women receiving around 
WRSHUFHQWRIWKHDYHUDJHPDQ¶VZDJH 
Assessments of the GPG can employ a variety of approaches. Inquiries by international bodies 
(such as the ILO), parliamentary committees and industrial tribunals draw their findings from a 
large range of data, including but not limited to figures prepared by labour economists. Additional 
data can be drawn from case studies, which may be conducted at the industry or occupational 
level. The ILO (2007), in utilising such an approach, has observed that the causes and dimensions 
of the GPG are multiple and intersecting. These causes and dimensions are set out in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Causes and dimensions of the gender pay gap 
Cause Dimension 
Differences in productivity characteristics (or human 
capital) of men and women  
 Years of education 
 Fields of specialisation 
 Years of work experience 
 Seniority in the job 
Differences in the characteristics of enterprises 
and sectors employing men and women 
 Size of the enterprise 
 Type of industry 
 Unionisation  
Differences in the jobs held by men and women  Women under-represented in higher-paid jobs 
 Women over-represented in a smaller and lower- 
paying range of occupations than men 
 Women and men concentrated in different 
segments of the same broad occupations 
 Women over-represented in part-time work 
Differences in the number of hours devoted to paid work  Men work longer hours (in paid work) than women 
Direct discrimination in remuneration  Different pay for men (higher) and women doing the 
same or similar jobs 
 Different job titles (and pay) for the same or similar 
occupations 
Indirect discrimination in remuneration  Undervaluation of the skills, competencies and 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµIHPDOH¶MREV 
 Gender biases in job evaluation methods 
 Gender biases in job classification and job 
grading systems 
 Gender biases in job remuneration systems 
Source: ILO 2007: 73 
The most recent pay equity inquiry conducted in Australia was that conducted by the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Employment and Workplace Relations (2009). Like the 
ILO, it drew its evidence from a wide range of sources. It concluded that the factors contributing to 
the GPG are complex and multi-faceted (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Employment and Workplace Relations 2009: 8±9): 
x social expectations and gendered assumptions about the role of women as workers, parents and 
carers resulting in majority of primary unpaid caring responsibilities undertaken by women; 
x disproportionate participation in part time and casual employment leading to few opportunities for 
skill development and advancement resulting in a concentration of women in lower level 
classifications; 
x LQYLVLELOLW\RIZRPHQ¶VVNLOOVDQGVWDWXVOHDGLQJWRDQ XQGHUYDOXDWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VZRUNDQGWKHIDLOXUH
to re-assess changing nature of work and skill; unrecognised skills described as creative, nurturing, 
caring and so forth; 
x labour market tenure and engagement, and more precarious attachment to the workforce; 
x industry and occupational composition and segregation factors attributable to geography and 
desirability of work sex discrimination and sexual harassment; 
x concentrated in award-reliant employment with less opportunity to collectively bargain for higher 
wages, working in small workplaces and with low union participation; 
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x treatment by industrial tribunals and regulation; and the misguided belief that if men and women are 
subject to the same laws, rules and conditions, then equality will result; 
x ZRPHQ¶VDSSDUent higher job satisfaction with work at a given wage level means employers less 
likely to feel under pressure to improve wages for employees. Trade off between monetary rewards 
and non-monetary rewards; working in service rather than product related markets; 
x poor recognition of qualifications, including vastly different remuneration scales for occupations 
UHTXLULQJVLPLODUTXDOLILFDWLRQVDQGWKHZD\WKDWµZRUN¶DQGKRZZHYDOXHZRUNLVXQGHUVWRRGDQG
interpreted within the industrial system; and 
x women receive lower levels of discretionary payment such as over award payments, bonuses, 
commissions and service increments and profit sharing, partly because in the industries where 
women are employed, over award payments are not usually available. 
The inquiries conducted by industrial tribunals can direct their focus to an assessment of pay equity 
within the scope of particular awards. This was an approach employed by the Industrial Relations 
Commissions of New South Wales and Queensland in their pay equity inquiries (see sections 
B.2.1, B.3.1), through the case studies included in their inquiries. In these instances the tribunals 
had regard to history of the award, including whether there had been any assessments made of the 
work in the past and whether the rates had been assessed on the basis of the sex of the worker. 
It is generally acknowledged that the determinants of the GPG are complex (HREOC 2007; 
Swepston 2000; Gunderson 1994: 5±9; House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Employment and Workplace Relations 2009: 8±9; Preston & Whitehouse 2004: 311±12). It is also 
JHQHUDOO\DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWDVLJQLILFDQWFDXVHRIWKH*3*DQGZRPHQ¶VORZHUOLIHWLPHHDUQLQJVLV
that, despite the profound social changes of the last century, women remain the primary carers for 
young children and dependent adults and continue to bear the main responsibility for unpaid 
GRPHVWLFZRUN%HDULQJWKLVµGRXEOHEXUGHQ¶FDQLPSHGHZRPHQ¶VZRUNIRUFHHQJDJHPHQWDQG
career prospects. For example, women may seek out part-time work and breaks from employment 
to assist them to balance their paid, unpaid and caring responsibilities. Part-time work is often 
associated with fewer training opportunities and this, combined with periods out of the workforce 
associated with childbirth and caring rHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWHQGVWRLPSDFWRQZRPHQ¶VVNLOOVH[SHULHQFH
and promotional prospects, resulting in lower levels of pay and lifetime earnings (Office for Women 
2008: 5±10; HREOC 2007; Gunderson 1994: 7; Cassells et al 2009a; Rentsch & Easteal 2007; 
Carney 2009). 
5.3 The contribution of labour economics 
There have been a number of studies by labour economists that assess contributing factors to the 
GPG. We begin by making some general points about the work in this field and then move on to 
examine some of the particular factors highlighted by these and researchers as being relevant in 
assessing the GPG. 
5.3.1 How do labour economists study the gender pay gap? 
Labour economics uses particular research methodologies to examine earnings data. The purpose 
is generally to establish at an aggregate level whether women receive the same labour market 
rewards as men with comparable qualifications, experience and personal characteristics. This 
focus arises because gender differences in remuneration received by men and women are not of 
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themselves inequitable. They do, however, highlight areas of potential undervaluation and where 
investigation is warranted.  
Researchers typically used very large data sets, such as the EEH Survey from the ABS or the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. To this data, researchers 
DSSO\DµKXPDQFDSLWDO¶RUµHQGRZPHQW¶PHWKRGRORJ\LQZKLFKWKHUHODWLYHµUHWXUQV¶WRPHQDQG
ZRPHQLQWKHIRUPRIHDUQLQJVRULQFRPHDUHFRPSDUHGDJDLQVWWKHLUUHODWLYHµLQYHVWPHQWV¶LQ
education and work experience. Studies may also take account of demographic factors, job 
characteristics, industry and occupation. Some studies are established to examine the contribution 
of particular factors to the GPG, such as occupational segregation, industrial segregation, sector 
(public or private), firm size, income distribution and unionisation. Regression analysis and 
decomposition methodologies are typically utilised in these studies, generally using the Oaxaca-
Binder method or variations of that method to measure female wage disadvantage. 
7\SLFDOO\WKHVHVWXGLHVLGHQWLI\µH[SODLQHG¶DQGµXQH[SODLQHG¶GLIIHUHQFHVLQHDUQLQJV7KXVWKHVH
analyses may assess what proposition of earnings differences, among women and men, can be 
µH[SODLQHG¶E\WKHIDFWRUVLncluded in the regression analysis, such as levels of education and 
workforce experience. Researchers have variously termed the variables that can be explained 
µZDJH-UHODWHGFKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶µSURGXFWLYLW\-UHODWHGFKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶RUµHQGRZPHQWV¶ What cannot 
be explained is often termed the unexplained differences in earnings and are identified as being 
attributable to gender or an indication of discrimination. In these studies, the different returns 
received by men and women with the same characteristics are generally interpreted as measuring 
µGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶EXWPD\DOVRLQFOXGHRWKHUIDFWRUV$V&DVVHOOVHWDOE±5) put it, the 
SURSRUWLRQRIWKHZDJHJDSWKDWFDQQRWEHH[SODLQHGE\µUHZDUGV¶IRUZDJH-related or productivity- 
related characteristiFVRUHQGRZPHQWVUHSUHVHQWVµthe extent to which women are paid less than 
men once all other measurable characteristics are held constant, and may include discrimination as 
ZHOODVDQ\RWKHUXQREVHUYHGGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQPHQDQGZRPHQ¶ 
As Booth (2009: 600) notes, a fundamental challenge for labour economists has been to identify 
the extent to which observed gender differences in labour market outcomes for apparently identical 
PHQDQGZRPHQDUHGXHWRµGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶RWKHUXQREVHUYHGIDFWRUVRULQWULQsic differences 
between men and women. Thus, they have sought to assess the effect on the GPG of measurable 
differences between men and women which can be explained as deriving from rewards for different 
individual characteristics (such as differences in education, training and work experience). They 
have also sought to identify that proportion of the GPG that cannot be explained by such 
characteristics ± or in other words, to identify the extent to which similar characteristics of males 
and females are rewarded differently by employers. 
While these studies may have this overarching purpose, there are a number of key differences 
between studies that are important to the interpretation of the findings. These include the data on 
which studies are based (for example, whether they cover all employees, non-managerial 
employees, workers in specific age groups, full-time or part-time workers, or only low paid 
employees), and the scale and scope of factors that are included in their regression analysis. As 
noted, these analyses are most frequently constructed using large data sets, which may not align, 
for example, to the scope and incidence of an industry award. These different approaches mean 
that the results of the studies are often not directly comparable. However, general conclusions may 
be drawn, particularly when supported by different studies. 
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Cassells et al (2009b: 4, 7, 27±8) also observe that the task of decomposing the GPG has proved 
to be difficult because the factors that may influence the GPG are complex and likely to vary over 
WLPHDQGEHFDXVHWKH\PD\LQWHUDFWFDXVLQJµIHHGEDFNHIIHFWV¶VHHsection 5.3.2) which make 
isolating particular factors difficult. They also note differences and flaws in the way in which 
particular variables (such as previous work experience) are measured, which generally result from 
inadequacies in the data available for some variables. They emphasise that the assumptions 
underpinning the design of different models can also affect findings. As a result, they conclude that 
despLWHH[WHQVLYHUHVHDUFKµGUDZLQJILUPFRQFOXVLRQVDERXWWKHNH\GHWHUPLQDQWVRIWKHZDJHJDS
in Australia from the literature is difficult due to the range of findings, and the wide variation in 
VDPSOHVPHWKRGVDQGIRFXVLQHDUOLHUVWXGLHV¶&DVVHOOVHWDl 2009b: 27). 
$IXUWKHUGLIILFXOW\FDQDULVHLQKRZZHGHILQHµKXPDQFDSLWDO¶:DOE\DQG2OVHQGHILQHLW
as the skills and experience that a person brings to employment that are relevant to that 
employment. As Cassells et al (2009b: 6) explain, studies of the GPG generally measure human 
capital through formal educational attainment and years of work experience. Some studies also 
include additional variables, such as the use of employer-provided training. The literature usually 
takes as given the human capital developed at the point of entry to the labour market, focusing on 
post-school training. A data limitation in any study attempting to control for human capital is thus 
the non-formal acquisition of skills. Historical attribution of capabilitieVVXFKDVµFDULQJ¶DQG
µGH[WHULW\¶DUHQRWFDSWXUHGE\TXDQWLWDWLYHGDWDYDULDEOHVDQGKDYHKLVWRULFDOO\EHHQXQGHUYDOXHGLQ
the industrial and wages contexts. 
5.3.2 Competing analyses within labour economics 
Prior to explaining the type of findings generated by labour economists it is also worth noting that 
these types of studies are frequently the subject of debate, both within and outside the field. These 
FKDOOHQJHVDULVHEHFDXVHRIWKHDVVXPSWLRQVDQGSURSRVLWLRQVWKDWXQGHUSLQµKXPDQFDSLWDO¶RU
µHQGRZPHQW¶approaches, and the exclusion of institutional factors. 
The central proposition of human capital theory, as advanced by Becker, one of its foremost 
advocates, is that the acquisition of skills constitutes an investment that will generate future labour 
market benefits (Becker 1972: 781). Labour markets thus merely reflect differences in human 
capital brought to them by women and men. This approach is premised on a direct and positive 
relationship between investment and human capital and earnings. It assumes, consistent with 
orthodox or neoclassical economics, that rational decisions at the level of the individual are made 
with a view to maximising income. Wages will approximate the marginal productivity of each 
employee, which in turn is a function of the level of investment in human capital that each 
employee has made (Mumford 1989:LWKLQWKHVHDQDO\VHVµHPSOR\HUVDUHPRGHOOHGDVEHLQJ
LQYROYHGLQFRQWUDFWQHJRWLDWLRQRYHUODERXUVHUYLFHV¶LQDSHUIHFWO\FRPSHWLWLYHODERXUPDUNHW
involving individual employers and employees (Austen et al 2013: 64±5). It is assumed in turn that 
employers will offer a price for labour ± wages ± WKDWUHIOHFWVHDFKHPSOR\HH¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR
production, and that employees will be motivated by a desire to maximise the returns of their 
ODERXU'LIIHUHQFHVLQZDJHVDUHUHODWHGWRWKHPDUNHWYDOXHRUSULFHµRIWKHFRPPRGLWLHVWKH\
SURGXFHDQGWKHLUSURGXFWLYHQHVV¶$XVWHQHWDO7KHPDUNHWYDOXHLVDVVXPHGWRUHIOHFW
the social value of the goods and services produced. 
Some researchers also suggest, by implication, that regression analysis may understate the 
disadvantage endured by working women, because the data that guides such research embodies 
social assumptions that may themselves be flawed. Rubery et al (2002: 5-7) summarised two of the 
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assumptions underpinning the use of regression analysis. The first is that individual characteristics 
and work experience ± level of education, qualifications, length of service, occupation ± are the 
result of free choices made by men and women. As an example of the limitations of this 
DVVXPSWLRQWKH\QRWHWKDWZRPHQ¶VORZHUOHQJWKRIZRUNIRUFHH[SHULHQFHPD\UHIOHFWJUHDWHU
household responsibilities. The acquisition of education, the length and form of workforce 
experience and the choice of occupation may also reflect systemic labour market discrimination.  
The second assumption is that individual characteristics are taken as approximate measures of 
productivity and reward. Olsen and Walby (2004: 30) noted that women may face systemic 
disadvantage in the acquisition of human capital and that the dichotomy that is frequently made in 
regression analysis between factors that are associated with either human capital or discrimination 
may be overdrawn. On these grounds purely quantitative research such as regression analysis is 
unable to incorporate fully the management and social dimensions of the labour market.  
$UHODWHGFULWLFLVPLVWKDWWKHDVVXPSWLRQVWKDWXQGHUSLQµKXPDQFDSLWDO¶DSSURDFKHVH[FOXGHRU
significantly underplay the institutional context in which the labour exchange (including wage 
negotiations) takes place (Austen et al 2013: 65). Such dimensions include institutional 
arrangements for wage setting, including laws and regulations, the integration or co-ordination of 
wage setting systems, the resilience of gendered norms and valuations in collective bargaining 
systems, minimum wage systems and job gradings, and the social norms and values influencing 
changes in wage rates and wage systems (Rubery et al 2002: 91; OECD 2002: 113; Austen et al 
2013: 66). On these accounts, the exclusion of institutional factors fails to assess how policies and 
institutions can be systematically related to unexplained wage gaps (Christofides et al 2013). 
Short and Nowak (2009: 273±4) propose an explanation of how social and cultural values and 
H[SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKHLUµIHHGEDFN¶HIIHFWVFDQLQWHUDFWWRFRQVWUDLQ ZRPHQ¶VHPSOR\PHQWRSWLRQV 
Gender-related values pervade educational choices; education undertaken then affects the jobs offered 
to ZRPHQDVGRHVSRWHQWLDOHPSOR\HUV¶DQGFR-ZRUNHUV¶YDOXHVDQGDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVZRPHQ¶VIDPLO\
responsibilities. This affects the opportunities offered to and sought by women for training and 
developmental experience on the job. The economic value put on an occupation is, in turn, affected by 
the value put on human capital associated with the occupation by employers and industrial relations 
commissioners in the industrial relations system. Socially constructed personal values held by these 
powerful (and mostly male) actors are perceived by interviewees as affecting their assessment of that 
value. Societal and personal values also affect the monetary value put on skills, particularly those 
associated with being feminine, such as caring skills used in the service sector ... This all feeds back into 
educational choice when individuals and their parents anticipate the different treatment of women in the 
ODERXUPDUNHWDQGFKDQQHOZRPHQDZD\IURPPRUHµGLIILFXOW¶ZHOO-paid male jobs. 
Such factors contribute to the high degree of segregation in the labour market, with a majority of 
women engaged in a narrow range of occupations and industries, often involving elements of care 
and service (such as health care, childcare, education, social assistance and retail trade) and often 
UHJDUGHGDVµXQVNLOOHG¶RUµVHPLVNLOOHG¶ZRUN,WLVIUHTXHQWO\DUJXHGWKDWWKHVHµZRPHQ¶VMREV¶DQG
their associated interpersonal, emotional, coordination and other skills, have been undervalued. 
This may have occurred for a number of reasons, for example because of a tendency to assign 
PRUHZRUWKWRIHDWXUHVWKDWDUHFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKHZRUNSHUIRUPHGE\PHQDQGEHFDXVHZRPHQ¶V
low levels of unionisation contribute to limited attention being paid to their claims of undervaluation 
(see eg Smith 2009; Cortis 2000). 
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These assessments open up questions concerning the processes, institutional and otherwise, that 
are utilised to define, codify and value skill (Armstrong 2007). Such accounts work from the basis 
that skill has a socially constructed value, and that in areas of feminised work, such as customer 
service work, key aspects have been invisible to skill recognition processes (Junor & Hampson 
2005). Within some policy contexts this has placed renewed emphasis on the development of pay 
and employment equity tools that mainstream the process of skill identification and processes 
GHVLJQHGWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHµIXOOUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHLQWDQJLEOHVNLOOVRISUHGRPLQDQWO\IHPDOHMREVDQG
RFFXSDWLRQV¶-XQRUHWDO9: 208). 
The differences in approaFKWRWKHDQDO\VLVRIZRPHQ¶VHDUQLQJVKDYHEHHQWKHVXEMHFWRI
submissions to equal remuneration proceedings, including the SACS case (see Chapter 4). In that 
FDVHWKHDYDLODEOHGDWDRQZRPHQ¶VHDUQLQJVZDVLQWHUSUHWHGGLIIHUHQWO\)RUVRPHHFRQRPLVWVWKH 
DYDLODEOHGDWDLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKHHDUQLQJGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQZRPHQDQGPHQZHUHµH[SODLQHG¶E\
the factors modelled in the analysis, while for other economists the differences highlighted 
inequities (Barón & Cobb-Clark 2010; Cobb-Clark 2010a, 2010b; Cobb-Clark & Tan 2011; Austen 
2010a, 2010b; Austen et al 2010; Austen et al 2013).  
A related feature of this debate concerns implications for the remedies available to industrial 
WULEXQDOV6RPHODERXUPDUNHWHFRQRPLVWVXVHWKHLUDQDO\VLVRIZRPHQ¶VHDUQLQJVto assess the 
capacity of industrial tribunals to address pay equity. For some, the higher GPGs among high wage 
employees compared to low wage employees invites some questioning of the capacity of industry 
tribunals to remedy pay inequity through award variation (Healy & Kidd 2013). As will be addressed 
in section 5.4.4, there are significant debates in the labour economics studies about whether 
occupational segregation contributes to pay inequity. For those economists, findings that suggest 
WKDWZRPHQ¶VHDrnings are improved by the current pattern of occupational segregation indicate 
that tribunals have a limited rationale to address equal remuneration in highly feminised sectors of 
the labour market (see eg Barón & Cobb-Clark 2010; Cobb-Clark 2010a, 2010b).  
7KHILQGLQJVRIWKHPRVWIUHTXHQWO\XWLOLVHGDQDO\VHVRIZRPHQ¶VHDUQLQJVDUHDGGUHVVHGPRUH
comprehensively in the following material. Cassells et al (2009b) provide a clear, comprehensive 
and relatively recent review of the literature which considers the human capital, personality 
characteristics and labour market differences (for example, occupational segregation and sector of 
employment) between men and women which, together with other factors, assist in developing an 
understanding of the GPG. Their analysis is followed closely in the following sections, although 
additional and more recent material is included, in particular in relation to the international literature 
and the role of institutional factors.  
5.4 Particular factors in gender pay gap analyses 
5.4.1 Education and labour market experience 
A significant number of analyses of the GPG assess whether differences in education and labour 
market experience between women and men explain differences in earnings. Australian studies 
have found that returns on education for women are generally lower than those for men, despite 
ZRPHQ¶VVRPHZKDWKLJKHUOHYHORIHGXFDWLRQDODWWDLQPHQW0LOOHU5XPPHU\%DUyQ	
Cobb-Clark 2010; Cobb-&ODUN	7DQ$V0LOOHUQRWHVµDGGLWLRQDOVFKRROLQJ
opens XSDFFHVVWREHWWHUSD\LQJSRVLWLRQVPRUHUHDGLO\IRUPDOHVWKDQIRUIHPDOHV¶$QDO\VLQJ
gender differences in the likelihood of low pay in Australia, Austen (2003: 168) found that there 
were substantial differences between men and women in terms of the insurance provided by 
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education against the risk of low-paid employment. For males, she found that each educational 
qualification reduced the probability of low-paid employment relative to that recorded by those who 
left school at 15. However, for females, none of these effects was found to be statistically 
significant. Thus Austen noted that her findings added further weight to studies that showed the 
rates of return to investments in tertiary qualifications are lower for women than for men. A more 
recent analysis by Li and Miller (2012) noted that while the GPG for graduates is smaller than that 
reported in other studies, it widens at the age of graduation and is larger for older age groups in 
advanced stages of their career. Cassells et al (2009b: 7) observe that the Australian findings on 
returns to education are suggestive of discrimination and labour market rigidities. 
Previous work experience is widely acknowledged in the literature as important, but has proved to 
be more difficult to measure. It has generally been measured through a range of proxy variables, 
some of which Cassells et al (2009b: 8) claim have serious flaws: for example, where measures of 
experience do not take into account breaks in labour market experience or participation in part-time 
work. Despite these difficulties, Cassells et al (2009b: 8) found that the results from Australian 
studies (Eastough & Miller 2004; Miller 2005; Rummery 1992) generally confirmed that returns on 
work experience are higher for men than women. In other words, additional years of labour market 
experience translate into greater increases in wages for men than for women. 
The effects on the GPG of interruptions and alterations to labour market experience (that is, not 
working or working part-time) due to child bearing and caring duties are also widely acknowledged 
in the literature as potentially impacting on pay. Cassells et al (2009b: 8, citing Drolet 2001: 7 and 
Olsen & Walby 2004) noted that the effects of interruptions are not limited to the reduction in 
earnings for the period not worked. They observed that the possible repercussions of interruptions 
to work for lifetime levels of pay may arise because: 
x non-continuous work is associated with shorter periods of job tenure, which in turn is associated 
with lower pay; 
x the value of human capital may deteriorate while women are out of the workforce. When they return 
these effects may result in a lower likelihood of promotion or lower wages; 
x women facing interruptions to their career may choose not to participate in training, or may decide 
to accept low-wage jobs; 
x ODERXUPDUNHWZLWKGUDZDOVPD\FRLQFLGHZLWKWKHEHJLQQLQJRIZRPHQ¶VFDUHHUV± a time at which 
the acquisition of job skills (and therefore job advancement and wages growth) is particularly strong 
for non-withdrawers; and 
x withdrawals from the labour force can have a negative impact on earnings through discrimination. 
In Australian studies, interruptions to work have generally been captured through variables that 
measure how many children women have. The presence of children, particularly young children, 
has also been found to contribute to lower female earnings as it is generally associated with 
women either withdrawing from the labour market, or participating less in the labour market and 
working fewer hours than women without children or men (Cassells et al 2009b: 8±9, citing 
Lundberg & Rose 2000, Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel 2006 and Eastough & Miller 2004). 
Interestingly, Eastough and Miller (2004) found that in Australia, among full-time wage and salary 
earners, women with dependent children earned 7.5 per cent less than women without dependent 
children, whilst men with dependent children had slightly higher earnings than men who did not 
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have dependent children. The presence of children has also been found to LQIOXHQFHPHQ¶VDQG
ZRPHQ¶VOLIHWLPHHDUQLQJV&DVVHOOVHWDOD 
Cassells et al (2009b: 9, citing Booth & Wood 2006 and Rodgers 2004) observed that in contrast to 
international findings, in Australia current part-time work status has not been found to be a 
significant driver of the GPG. However, they noted that a prolonged history of part-time work may 
be associated with lower pay, due to factors such as lower on-the-job training being offered and 
taken up. Analysis undertaken by Austen et al (2008: 5IRXQGµXQH[SODLQHG¶GLIIHUHQFHVLQJHQGHU
HDUQLQJVDQGQRWHGWKDWWKHµSHQDOW\¶IRUZRUNLQJRQDSDUW-time or casual basis appeared to be 
higher among women than among men. Watson (2005: 382), analysing earnings and taking casual 
loadings into account, also found that both men and women were penalised by part-time and /or 
casual jobs, but that women experienced a higher penalty. 
More recently Chzhen et al (2013) examined gender gaps across the earnings distribution for full-
time employees in the Australia private sector. Their key focus was an examination of the effect of 
non-random self-selection into full-time employment. This focus enabled assessment of age of the 
youngest child in the household, and the prevalence of full-time employment for women with 
preschool children. Significant evidence of a self selection effect for women into full-time 
employment was not found to be relevant to the Australian context. Nevertheless, a large gender 
gap remained, with women receiving lower rewards for their characteristics than men.  
Assessing the impact of part-time employment on earnings distribution has also been the subject of 
international study. In the United Kingdom, Olsen and Walby (2004) pointed out that part-time work 
in itself may be associated with lower rates of human capital attainment, because years of 
experience in part-time work may not equate to the same level of skills acquisition (and therefore 
pay rate) as years of experience in full-time work. More recently Matteazzi et al (2013: 28), in a 
study of twelve European countries, examined the impact of part-time employment on widening the 
gender age gap. They concluded that the nature of part-time employment and labour market 
segregation were greater influences than part-time employment in itself. The found that horizontal 
segregation or differences in the sector of economic activity helped to explain the GPG among full-
time employees, while vertical segregation or differences in the hierarchical ladder explained the 
earnings differentials between full-time and part-time working women. 
3RODFKHNDQG;LDQJIRFXVHGRQGHPRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHVWRWHVWZKHWKHUZRPHQ¶VLQFHQWLYH
for lifetime labour force participation is an important determinant of the GPG. They used three data 
sets covering 40 countries and undertook analysis at the country rather than the individual level. 
7KH\IRXQGDFRXQWU\¶VIHUWLOLW\UDWHWKHDJHJDSEHWZHHQKXVEDQGDQGZLIHDWWKHILUVWPDUULDJH 
and the top marginal tax rate to be positively associated with the GPG. They explained that these 
IDFWRUVLQIOXHQFHZRPHQ¶VLQFHQWLYHWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHODERXUPDUNHWRYHUWKHLUOLIHWLPHDQG
hence, their human capital development. 
5.4.2 Personality characteristics 
A further area of analysis examines whether differences in personality characteristics between 
women and men provide an explanation for differences in earnings. Booth (2009) found that 
studies using survey-based psychological variables and studies generated from laboratory 
experiments both observed gender differences in competitive behaviour and risk-taking. For 
example, Booth observed that a number of studies have found women to be unwilling or unable to 
bargain on their own account. Studies have also found that women tend to ask for and receive less 
than men in negotiations (Booth 2009: 600-601; Peetz & Preston 2007: 29; Rentsch & Easteal 
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2007: 327). However, Booth noted that some studies suggest that these differences cannot be 
considered innate and can be shaped by the environment in which individuals are placed. Booth 
suggHVWHGWKDWVXFKGLIIHUHQFHVFRXOGH[SODLQµVRPHVPDOOSDUW¶RI*3*VDQGLQSDUWLFXODUWKH
observed widening of the GPG across the income distribution (discussed further below) ± 
identifying this as an area for further investigation (Booth 2009: 605). 
Cassells et al (2009b: 6) noted that some recent literature examines the effects of personality 
characteristics which may affect occupation choice, hours of work, promotion and so on, and thus 
ZDJHV7KH\REVHUYHGWKDW)RUWLQVWXGLHGWKHHIIHFWVRIµQRn-FRJQLWLYH¶WUDLWVIRUH[DPSOH
interpersonal skills, work/life preferences and personality traits such as self-efficacy) on wages and 
WKH*3*)RUWLQIRFXVHGSDUWLFXODUO\RQIDFWRUVZKLFKZHUHµNQRZQWRGLIIHUE\JHQGHU¶VXFKDVWKH
relative importance put on money/work and people/family) and found a modest but significant role 
for these variables. 
Cobb-Clark and Tan (2011) examined the influence of non-cognitive factors on occupational 
attainment and wages. Using data from the HILDA Survey, they found that non-cognitive traits had 
a substantial effect on the probability of employment in many occupations, but by no means all. 
Segregation into some occupations was found to occur because Australian men and women with 
the same characteristics had very different propensities to enter certain occupations. Examining the 
effects of the non-cognitive factors (along with other factors likely to influence wage gaps) for each 
occupation separately, they found that such factors did not provide an explanation for the GPG in 
Australia. This conclusion was influenced by Cobb-&ODUNDQG7DQ¶VILQGLQJVWKDWRFFXSDWLRQDO 
segregation is not the major driver of the GPG in Australia (see also section 5.4.4). 
5.4.3 Age 
Labour market analysis of the GPG is concerned also with the relationship between age and 
earnings differences between women and men. Australian and international studies have found 
that the GPG is smaller among young workers, but increases with age. The European Commission 
IRXQGWKDWWKH*3*WHQGVWRZLGHQZLWKDJHZLWKZRPHQ¶VUHODWLYHSD\ORZHVWIRUWKRVHRYHU
years of age (Plantenga & Remery 2006: 21). In a study of US college graduates, the American 
Association of University Women found that after controlling for hours worked, training and 
education and other factors, the proportion of the GPG gap that remained unexplained was 5 per 
cent one year after graduation, and 12 per cent ten years after graduation (Billitteri 2008: 245). 
In an Australian study of occupational segmentation, using data from the 1993 Survey of Training 
and Education, Wooden (1999) found that among young workers, females were better paid than 
males, although he noted that the gap was quite small. However, he found that among workers 
aged 30 to 44, occupational segmentation added around four per cent to the GPG, while among 
the oldest workers in the study it added around nine per cent. Wooden suggested two possible 
interpretations of these findings. One was that the effects of occupational segmentation on pay 
equity may be declining over time. Alternatively, he suggested that if the effects of gender 
discrimination occur through unequal accesVWRSURPRWLRQRUWKURXJKZRPHQ¶VSURGXFWLYLW\EHLQJ
undervalued after spending time out of the labour force, then it is to be expected that gender pay 
inequity would increase with age (Wooden 1999: 168±9). 
In a more recent study using HILDA data, Cassells et al (2009a: 25) also found that the wage gap 
was smaller amongst young workers ± with Generation Y women having the lowest wage gap 
amongst the generations. All Generation Y women were found to receive on average 85 per cent of 
the average Generation Y PHQ¶VZDJH*HQHUDWLRQ;ZRPHQUHFHLYHGSHUFHQWDQG%DE\
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Boomers around 64 per cent. After taking into account characteristics that affect income (including 
hours of work, number of children, occupation, industry of employment and work experience), 
Cassells et al (2009a: 26) found that for Baby Boomer women, the adjusted wage gap was over 13 
per cent, while for Generation X women it was 3.5 per cent and for Generation Y women it was 
µDOPRVWQRQ-H[LVWHQW¶DWSHUFHQW$VQRWHGDERYHDQGVXJJHVWHGEy Wooden, these results may 
reflect the effects of cumulative disadvantage with increased labour market experience. 
While not specifically concerned with the GPG, Austen (2003: 168) analysed gender differences in 
the likelihood of low pay in Australia. She QRWHGWKDWLQFUHDVHVLQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDJHJHQHUDOO\
reduce their risk of low-paid employment. However, she found an important gender-based 
difference in the relationship between age and the chances of low paid employment for the 50±60 
years age group. IQ$XVWHQ¶VVWXG\ZRPHQLQWKH±60 years age group had a 20.3 per cent 
higher chance of low-paid employment than women in their twenties. By contrast, she found that 
men aged between 50 and 60 years had a 4.8 per cent lower chance of low-paid employment than 
20 to 30 year old men. She concluded that age does not appear to offer women the same 
protection against low-paid employment as it does men (Austen 2003: 169±74). 
5.4.4 Occupational segregation 
As Cassells et al (2009b: 9) explain, possible determinants of the GPG cannot all be characterised 
as related to individual characteristics (such as age, education and experience). Interest has also 
focused on the role of failures in the market for labour; particularly labour market rigidities 
associated with occupational and industrial segregation, insufficient flexibility in the labour market 
to allow women to combine work with child-rearing, and discrimination. They note that a series of 
labour market factors broadly associated with wage determination (including occupational 
segregation, unionisation, public versus private sector employment, industrial sector and firm size) 
have been the focus of research interest. Their review shows that, while many of these appear to 
play some role in the persistence of the GPG in Australia, findings are mixed. 
Within this area of labour market research there is significant interest in the contribution of 
occupational segregation to explaining earnings differences between women and men. 
Occupational segregation by sex has been definHGDVWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKµZRPHQDQGPHQDUH
GLIIHUHQWO\GLVWULEXWHGDFURVVRFFXSDWLRQVWKDQLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHLURYHUDOOVKDUHVRIHPSOR\PHQW¶
&DVVHOOVHWDOFLWLQJ:DWWV,WKDVEHHQDµSHUVLVWHQWSKHQRPHQRQLQFRQWHPSRUDU\
labour marNHWV¶LQFOXGLQJLQ$XVWUDOLDZKHUHPDUNHGGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQPHQ¶VDQGZRPHQ¶V
occupational distribution have been noted (Preston & Whitehouse 2004: 309). 
2FFXSDWLRQDOVHJUHJDWLRQLVµZLGHO\DVVXPHGWRFRQWULEXWHWRRQJRLQJHDUQLQJVLQHTXDOLW\¶3UHVWRQ 
& Whitehouse 2004: 309). It has also been suggested that occupational segregation may affect 
ZDJHVGXHWRWKHHIIHFWVRIµFURZGLQJ¶± that is, an increased supply of labour competition for a 
restricted number of jobs (Gunderson: 1994: 7). Other explanations include that employers with 
some degree of monopsony power37 may take advantage of their superior bargaining strength to 
SXVKZDJHVGRZQEHORZWKHYDOXHRIWKHZRUNHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ$XVWHQ	3UHVWRQ5RJHUV
& Rubery 2003: 545±6; Rubery & GrimshaZ$PRQRSVRQ\LPSOLHVµWKDWHPSOR\HUVPD\
have power in the labour market and are able to use that power to reduce wage levels below 
                                                     
37 For those not familiar with thHWHUPDµPRQRSVRQ\¶RFFXUVZKHUHWKHUHLVRQO\RQHEX\HUIRUDSURGXFWDVRSSRVHGWRD
monopoly, where there is only one seller or supplier). 
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³FRPSHWLWLYH´OHYHOV¶,WLVDSRZHUWKDWµGHULYHVLQSDUWIURPWKHUHVWULFWHGRSWLRQVDYDLODEOHWRWKH
labour that WKH\HPSOR\¶5XEHU\	*ULPVKDZ  
International studies have attributed an important role to occupational segregation when explaining 
the GPG (for example, Anker 1998; Alonso-Villar & del Rio 2008). Despite this, there is significant 
debate within the available research about the impact of occupational segregation. Cassells et al 
(2009b: 10) observed that this is a complex issue, with a range of theoretical and empirical 
approaches available and different results possible depending on the ways in which occupation 
and occupational segregation are included in different models (see also Cobb-Clark & Tan 2011).  
A number of studies have concluded that occupational segregation contributes to the GPG in 
Australia (see eg Miller 1994; Preston & Whitehouse 2004; Robinson 1998; Wooden 1999). For 
example, Wooden (1999: 167) found that women employed in occupations where less than 20 per 
cent of the employees were women earned nearly 14 per cent more than comparable women 
employed in female-dominated occupations. Other work, however, has found that occupational 
segregation has the opposite effect, so that if occupations were desegregated and no longer had 
XQHTXDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIPHQDQGZRPHQZRPHQ¶VSD\ZRXOGEHORZHUQRWKLJKHU%DUyQ	
Cobb-Clark 2010; Preston & Crockett 1999a; Watts 2003). For example, Cobb-Clark and Tan 
(2011: 11) concluded that: 
[O]ccupational segregation is not the main driver of the gender wage gap. Australian women earn less 
on average because they earn less than their male colleagues employed in the same occupation, not 
because they work in different occupations. 
Short and Nowak (2009) suggested that apparent differences in findings between studies of 
occupational segregation may be explained by the level of aggregation of the data. This is a 
conclusion shared by Cardoso et al (2012) and Austen et al (2013: 69). Short and Nowak (2009: 
273) noted that Pocock and Alexander (1999) and Wooden (1999) found an inter-occupational 
effect using two digit occupational data, rather than the onHGLJLWGDWDXVHGµE\PRVWDUWLFOHV
VWXGLHG¶,QDGGLWLRQ:KLWHKRXVHVKRZHGWKDWIDOOLQJPDOHRFFXSDWLRQDOZDJHVUHODWLYH
WRWKHRFFXSDWLRQDODYHUDJHLQVRPHDUHDVRIWKHODERXUPDUNHWKDGHIIHFWLYHO\µEROVWHUHG¶LQWUD-
occupational gender pay ratios, making analysis of trends more difficult. 
'LIILFXOWLHVZLWKLQFRUSRUDWLQJFRQFHSWVRIµZRUNYDOXH¶LQTXDQWLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVIXUWKHUFRPSOLFDWH
analysis of the GPG at the occupational level. There are various limitations on data sources, 
including the unavailability of occupational data disaggregated to a meaningful level, that limits 
foundation analysis for identifying which employees are undertaking work of similar or comparable 
value (Pointon et al 2012: i). This includes questions as to whether proxy measures, such as the 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), are capable of 
capturing or identifying comparable value (Pointon et al 2012: i). This is a matter explored by 
Morgan et al (2011) in assessing the ability of indicative and aggregate skill classification schema 
and methodologies, such as the ANZSCO and the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO-66) to capture skill levels and value: 
The desk-EDVHGH[HUFLVHµREMHFWLYH¶EXWKDUGO\HPSLrical, of categorising jobs within the hierarchical 
system sees the criteria of skill level and skill specialisation to group jobs into occupations and 
RFFXSDWLRQVLQWRIRXUEURDGHUFDWHJRULHVXSWKHOHYHORIWKHµPDMRUJURXS¶6SHFLDOL]DWLRQLVGHILQHGRQ the 
basis of field of knowledge, tools used, material worked on, and goods or services produced. These 
concrete, tangible criteria are not likely to capture the less directly-observable skills of service sector. 
Skill levels are assigned in specializations using proxy criteria ± normally qualifications, length of prior 
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experience in a similar job, and time spent on on-the-job training ± again concrete criteria that may not 
capture the informal and non-codified aspects of skill (ABS/Statistics New Zealand, 2006: 4-21). 
Importantly, the ANZSCO criteria are threshold skill levels required for occupational entry or progression. 
ANZSCO is not particularly well equipped to take account of any growth or deepening of expertise on the 
job. Its concept of skill applies better to jobs in organisation-external labour markets (ELMs) than to those 
in internal labour markets ILMs), and better still to jobs in occupational labour markets (Piore 1980; 
Sengenberger 1981; Althuser 1989; Osterman 1987; Kohler et al 2006). A desk based system such as 
ANZSCO is particularly unlikely to reflect the skills in service occupations that rely heavily on the 
µLQYLVLEOH¶ZRUNSURFHVVHVWKDWDUHWKHIRFXVRIWKLVSDSHU 
As discussed, the concept of human capital poses particular difficulties in GPG analysis and this 
problem is compounded in occupational analysis and exacerbated in Australia, given the degree of 
gendered labour market segmentation. 
5.4.5 Industry segregation 
A further area of analysis assesses the contribution of industrial segregation to explaining earnings 
differences between women and men. This includes assessment of differences between public and 
private sector employment. International studies have found industrial segregation to be an 
important factor in explaining the GPG. However, the relative importance of occupational and 
industrial segregation has been found to vary from one country to another, reflecting variation in the 
level of occupational segregation and industrial segregation between countries (Alonso-Villar & del 
Rio 2008: 24, 28). 
Australian studies have generally shown that industrial segregation widens the GPG (Cassells et al 
2009b: 10, citing Cassells et al 2008; Miller 1994; Preston & Crockett 1999a). Preston and Crockett 
(1999a) found that industrial segregation accounted for around 45 per cent of the explained portion 
of the GPG ± with a particularly strong industry effect in Western Australia and Queensland. 
Cassells et al (2009b: 10) observed that Australian findings are consistent with those of a number 
of international studies which have also found that industrial segregation is associated with a larger 
GPG (see eg Grimshaw & Rubery 2002; Drolet 2001).  
In a report prepared for the Australian Fair Pay Commission, Healy et al (2008) found that much of 
the grRZWKRIZRPHQ¶VHPSOR\PHQWRYHUWKHSHULRGWRKDGEHHQLQIRXUµORZSD\¶
industries: retail, accommodation, property and health services. They also found that changes in 
employment composition over that period, including the movement of women into low-paid sectors, 
had increased the GPG, although they noted that the overall effect was small. They noted 
substantial variation in the GPG across industries. Analysing the extent to which the GPG could be 
DFFRXQWHGIRUE\ZRPHQDQGPHQ¶VGLIIHUHQWSURGXFWLYHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKH\IRXQGWKDWµLQGXVWULHV
with smaller overall gender wage gaps (ie retail and accommodation) also have the smallest 
proportion explained by gender-VSHFLILFGLIIHUHQFHVLQKXPDQFDSLWDO¶,QFRQWUDVWLQ
property and health, where the GPG was larger, human capital characteristics were found to 
explain a much larger proportion of the overall gap. Healy et al (2008: 239, 261) suggested that 
one interpretation of this result may be that industries with a strong award structure successfully 
limit the size of the GPG, but also decrease the wage variance and the consequent returns to 
human capital. 
In a US study, Miller (2009: 69) found that regardless of sector of employment, females had lower 
hourly rates of pay than males, other things being equal. However, Miller also found the GPG to be 
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generally larger in the private sector than among government employees. He suggested that the 
explanation may be differences in pay comparability practices and public sector collective 
bargaining. 
Cassells et al (2009b: 11), reviewing Australian studies of the public/private sector effects on the 
GPG, also found that the wage gap is generally larger in the private than the public sector (Barón & 
Cobb-Clark 2010; Kee 2006; Preston 2000; Preston & Jefferson 2009: 326). As Kee (2006: 424) 
explains: 
The principal finding is that in the public sector, the gender gap exists but is distributed fairly evenly 
across the distribution of wages. However, in the private sector, even after controlling for occupation and 
industry, the gender gap accelerated at the upper levels of the conditional wage distribution, and hence 
there is a glass ceiling. Clearly, the observed GPG in both sectors is a result of differences in returns to 
gender characteristics. 
It has been suggested by some researchers that the smaller GPG in the public sector may be 
related to more intensive anti-discrimination enforcement in that sector (Gregory & Borland 1999; 
Austen et al 2004: vii). Like Miller in the United States, Kee (2006: 424) suggested that a possible 
explanation of the identified difference between the public and private sectors could be the 
adoption of different pay schemes between the two sectors. In particular, the lack of standardised 
pay schemes across companies and firms in the private sector may provide greater scope for wage 
VHWWOHPHQWVIRUSHUFHLYHGµKLJKIOLHUV¶WRIDYRXUPHQ,QDUHYLHZRILQWHUQDWLRQDOH[SHULHQFH
Robinson (1998: 30) suggested that the enlargement of the GPG in public sector employment in 
some countries may arise from the spread of personal assessment as the basis for granting annual 
ZDJHLQFUHDVHVµVLQFHZRPHQWHQGWRGROHVVZHOOXQGHUWKLVVRUWRISD\PHQWV\VWHP¶ 
In Australia the greater prevalence of family friendly arrangements in the public sector has been 
noted as potentially important in contributing to a reduction of the glass ceiling (Kee 2006: 424). 
However, recent remuneration surveys of the Australian Public Service, commissioned by the 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, have found gender differences 
across remuneration at the Senior Executive Service (SES) levels and for nearly all non-SES 
classifications (Australian Public Service Commission 2010).  
5.4.6 Firm size 
Labour market analysis is concerned also with assessing whether firm size assists an 
understanding of earnings differences between women and men. Cassells et al (2009b: 11) found 
that firm size is associated in the international and Australian literature with higher levels of pay ± 
that is, larger firms pay more than smaller firms on average. They cited work by Daly et al (2006) 
which found that for both men and women, hourly rates of pay were higher in larger firms. Austen 
(2003: 166) also noted the strong link between small firms and the chances of low-paid 
employment. Firm size can also be a function of sector ± with some industries and sectors having a 
higher incidence of small firms than others. Therefore, separating out causality is important in firm 
size analysis. 
Australian and international studies have found that while larger firms tend to pay their employees 
higher wages, this does not necessarily mean that they have lower GPGs. A study by Mitra (2003) 
in the United States found that significant wage differentials existed among male and female 
professionals in every category of establishment size, even after controlling for human capital 
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variables and other characteristics. Mitra suggested that one factor contributing to the significant 
GPG in large firms may be unequal access and returns to supervisory jobs in such establishments. 
,Q$XVWUDOLD/HDQG0LOOHUIRXQGWKDWZRPHQZRUNLQJLQµYHU\ODUJH¶ZRUNSODFHVRU
more employees) were more likely to experience wage disadvantage than women working in 
smaller workplaces. They also found that women working in smaller workplaces had a lower 
probability of remaining at a wage disadvantage in contiguous years. They concluded that large 
workplaces played a key role in both generating and perpetuating gender wage inequality (Le & 
Miller 2001: 47±8). In addition, Cassells et al (2009b: 11) cited findings from the 2008 EEH survey 
showing that as firm size increases, the raw GPG also increases (ABS 2008).  
5.4.7 Income distribution 
A significant recent focus in labour market analysis has been the examination of the relationship 
between income distribution and the GPG. Both international and Australian studies have found 
that the GPG increases as income increases. Miller (2009: 55) noted that Arulampalam et al (2007) 
found the GPG to be larger at the top of the wage distribution than it is in the middle of the 
distribution across each of the 11 European countries included in that study. ,Q$UXODPSDODPHWDO¶V
study, Spain and Ireland were the only countries not to have a glass ceiling in the private sector, 
whereas Finland and Ireland were the only countries not to have a glass ceiling in the public sector. 
Cassells et al (2009b: 11) identified several studies that investigated the GPG along the income 
distribution in Australia. Barón and Cobb-Clark (2010), Kee (2006), Miller (2005, 2009), Austin et al 
(2008) and Preston and Jefferson (2009: 326±7) all found that the GPG increases at the top end of 
the income distribution; suggesting the prevalence of a glass ceiling in the Australian labour 
market. For example, Miller (2005: 413), using data from the 2001 Australian Census of Population 
and Housing Household Sample, found that the standardised gender wage differential increased 
from around 10 per cent for low-wage earners to 25 per cent or more for high-wage earners. 
However, both Barón and Cobb-Clarke (2010: 231) and Kee (2006) noted that this effect was most 
evident in the private sector. 
Analysing the determinants of the GPG along the income distribution more closely, Miller (2005: 
414) found that the gap between the pay-offs to education for men and women was greater among 
higher wage earners than it was among the low-wage group. He observed that this was 
µV\PSWRPDWLF¶RIWKHµXQGHUYDOXDWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VVNLOOV¶ 
Barón and Cobb-Clark (2010: 228) used HILDA data from 2001 to 2006 and found that for low-paid 
ZRUNHUVWKHSURSRUWLRQRIWKH*3*H[SODLQHGE\ZRUNHUV¶SURGXFWLYLW\-related characteristics was 
much larger than for higher paid workers: 
We find that, irrespective of labour market sector, the gender wage gap among low-paid, Australian 
workers is more than explained by differences in wage-related characteristics. The gender wage gap 
among high-wage workers, however, is largely unexplained in both sectors suggesting that glass ceilings 
(rather than sticky floors) may be prevalent. 
It should be noted, however, that Barón and Cobb-&ODUN¶VDQDO\VLVZDVIRFXVHGRQSXEOLFDQG
private sector employment and excluded those working for private not-for-profit and other non-
commercial organisations (Barón & Cobb-Clark 2010: 230). Healy et al (2008: 239) add further 
insight to findings for the low paid, noting that: 
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These differences by industry and occupation highlight an important feature of the low-paid labour 
market, in that there are generally smaller differences between male and female wages in the sectors 
where award reliance is high. But the gender differential is only one of several important dimensions of 
earnings inequality. In the lowest-paid sectors, the problem of inequality manifests less in the specific 
form of gender disparities, and more in the form of a distribution which is highly-skewed towards low 
hourly wages. While employees remain within these industries their prospects of attaining better-paying 
jobs are curtailed by the very small number of such jobs on offer. Male and female wages may be more 
closely aligned in these sectors, but only because both sexes are disadvantaged in these sectors relative 
to most other Australian employees. 
As Cassells et al (2009b: 11) noted, whilst finding variation in the GPG along the income 
distribution, researchers have emphasised that a substantial GPG exists at all points of the income 
distribution, and that efforts to address the gap need to be targeted at all income levels (see also 
Kee 2006: 424; Miller 2005: 414).  
5.4.8 Unionisation 
The potential influence of union membership and activity has also been a focus in analysis of the 
GPG, although there are relatively few recent studies of this factor. Gunderson (1994: 7) argued 
that unions can be an important vehicle for influencing the jobs available for women and the 
remuneration for those jobs. However, he observed that while in general unions tend to facilitate 
greater equality of pay between men and women, they can also contribute to the GPG: for 
example, where they devote more resources to male-dominated employment which is more likely 
to be unionised. It should be noted, however, that there have been significant changes to union 
GHQVLW\DQGVKLIWVLQXQLRQDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVIHPDOHPHPEHUVVLQFH*XQGHUVRQ¶VVWXdy was 
undertaken. 
Cassells et al (2009b: 11) found that some of the Australian literature (Barón & Cobb-Clark 2010; 
Miller 2005) suggested that unionisation may have contributed to reducing the GPG, particularly for 
lower wage workers. However, they observed that conclusions about this relationship have been 
mixed, with Wooden (1999), for example, finding insignificant or weak effects of union membership 
RQZDJHVDQG&DLDQG/LXILQGLQJWKDWXQLRQVKDYHDODUJHUHIIHFWRQPHQ¶VZDJHVWKDQRQ
ZRPHQ¶s. Wooden (1999: 165, citing Miller & Mulvey 1996) suggested than some research may 
have overestimated the relative wage effects of unions by not controlling for the effects of firm size. 
5.4.9 ,GHQWLI\LQJWKHµXQH[SODLQHG¶SDUWRIWKHJHQGHUSD\JDS 
As a result of differences in data, design, methodology and changing labour market conditions, 
Australian studies have produced a range of results. However, the results of the studies have been 
consistent over a number of years in their general finding that there is a significant, persistent, 
unexplained wage gap between men and women. The findings show that only a small proportion of 
the GPG can be attributed to differences in the productivity-related characteristics of men and 
women. The larger, unexplained gender wage effect suggests systemic gender bias in the wage 
V\VWHPRUWKHXQGHUYDOXDWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VZRUN 
For example, Le and Miller (2001: 34) summarised the findings of Australian studies as follows: 
Most studies report a difference in the mean hourly earnings of men and women of between 15 and 20 
per cent. When account is taken of the different skill levels of men and women, a gender wage 
differential of between 10 and 15 per cent remains. The division of the wage differential between men 
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and women into explained and unexplained components is reasonably robust across studies (for 
example, Kidd and Shannon 1996; Kidd and Meng 1997; Meng 1999; Wooden 1999), with around one-
quarter being explained, and three-quarters unexplained. 
Following a subsequent review of the Australian literature, Eastough and Miller (2005: 259) 
concluded: 
There is ... quite an array of results, but most research conducted since 1980 shows that between 60 
and 90 per cent of the difference between average male and average female wages in the working 
population remains once account is taken of the differences between males and females in the mean 
value of regressors included in the econometric model of wages. Thus, measures of the gender wage 
gap range from 7 to 18 per cent, with most estimates being between 12 and 14 per cent. 
Similarly, Short and Nowak (2009: 265) concluded from their recent review of the Australian 
literature that: 
These studies find a raw wage gap of between 11.5 per cent (Wooden, 1999) and 19.2 per cent (Preston 
and Crockett, 1999[a]) and an adjusted wage gap (unexplained by the variables used) of between 8.9 
per cent (excluding managerial employees; Wooden, 1999) and 16 per cent (Le and Miller, 2001). These 
VWXGLHVFRQILUPWKHFRQWLQXDWLRQRIDQµXQH[SODLQHG¶DQGSHUVLVWHQW wage gap between men and women, 
after allowance for the impact of the range of measured measurable variables, which impact productivity 
and hours worked (Short & Nowak, 2009: 265). 
Cobb-&ODUNDQG7DQ¶VUHFHQWVWXG\DOVRIRXQGDVLJQLILFDQWcomponent of the GPG which 
was unexplained, but highlighted the larger intra-occupational component of the gap: 
Almost three-quarters of the wage penalty that women face stems from gender differences in the wage 
returns to human capital, demographic characteristics, and noncognitive skills within occupations. These 
results are consistent with research on Australian data from the early 1980s which also found that most 
of the intra-occupational component of the gender wage gap resulted from the unequal wage returns to 
PHQ¶VDQGZRPHQ¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFV.LGG7KXVWKHUHDSSHDUVWREHDQHQGXULQJJDSLQUHODWLYH
wages within the same detailed occupational classification which remains to be explained. Moreover, this 
is by far the most important source of WKHRYHUDOOJDSLQZRPHQ¶VZDJHV 
&DVVHOOVHWDO¶VEUHYLHZRIWKHOLWHUDWXUHDOVROHGWKHPWRFRQFOXGHWKDW 
Findings about the determinants of the Australian gender wage gap generally show that rewards for 
endowments are more important than endowments themselves ... overall there is substantial evidence to 
suggest that a combination of discrimination or other unobserved characteristics play an important role in 
maintaining the wage gap in Australia. 
Following on from their literature review, Cassells et al identified a set of key variables to include in 
a decomposition of the GPG and undertook further analysis using data from the HILDA Survey 
(which includes part-time workers). They used a simulation approach pioneered by Olsen and 
Walby (2004) to minimise the drawbacks of traditional decomposition methodologies (particularly in 
relation to feedback effects). They summarised the findings of their research as follows (2009b: v): 
Utilising robust microeconomic modelling techniques, based on a comprehensive and critical evaluation 
of several methodologies, we found that simply being a woman is the major contributing factor to the gap 
LQ$XVWUDOLDDFFRXQWLQJIRUSHUFHQWRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQZRPHQ¶VDQGPHQ¶VHDUQLQJVDILQGLQJ
which reflects other Australian research in this area. Indeed, using wage gap analysis from the HILDA 
survey, the results showed that if the effects of being a woman were removed, the average wage of an 
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Australian woman would increase by $1.87 per hour, equating to an additional $65 per week or $3,394 
annually, based on a 35 hour week. 
Other key determinants of the gap that were identified and quantified as part of the microeconomic 
modelling component of our research were industrial segregation (25 per cent), labour force history 
(seven per cent), under-representation of women with vocational qualifications (five per cent) and under 
representation of women in large firms (three per cent). 
Overall ... our finding that simply being a woman is the major contributing factor to the wage gap in 
Australia is significant. Consistent with results from other Australian studies it highlights the considerable 
impact that discrimination and other differences between men and women, including differing motivations 
and preferences, can have on reducing the earnings of women relative to men, irrespective of similar 
labour force and work-related characteristics. 
5.5 The impact of institutional arrangements for wages  
Researchers have observed marked variation in the overall size of the GPG in different countries 
and sometimes between regions within a country. This has led them to consider whether and how 
the institutional arrangements in different countries and regions impact on the GPG. In particular, 
attention has focused on the regulatory and institutional arrangements of wage determination. This 
has included the degree of centralisation or coordination of collective bargaining and the presence 
and role, if any, of minimum wages. These studies, discussed below, include those that examine 
the impact of institutional arrangements across countries, in addition to those whose focus is 
confined to Australia. 
5.5.1 The concept of the minimum wage 
Before proceeding it is important to clarify some key concepts. In the international literature, 
references to µPLQLPXPZDJHV¶DUHJHQHUDOO\WRQDWLRQDORUUHJLRQDOVWDWXWRU\PLQLPDWKDWHVWDEOLVK
a wage floor. However, commonly they establish a single minimum rate for adults and a minimum 
rate for junior employees. In some countries where collective bargaining coverage is extensive 
(such as the Scandinavian countries ± Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland), collective 
bargaining agreements set wage floors, but in many other countries statutory mechanisms give 
effect to national minima. 
By contrast, in Australia multiple minimum wage rates are established through an extensive 
framework of awards that set a legally binding minimum safety net of wages and conditions of 
employment. These award rates are not only relevant for award-reliant employees, but also 
establish legally binding minima for those whose actual rates of pay are determined by over-award 
payments and collective agreements. For award-reliant employees, award rates may have a direct 
impact on pay equity. For others, there may be a less direct impact to the extent that over-award 
payments or collectively bargained rates are influenced by or replicate the relativities in awards. 
5.5.2 Systems of wage determination 
An ongoing area of interest in gender pay equity research has concerned the impact of systems of 
wage determination, particularly with a view to assessing the differences between centralised and 
decentralised systems of wage determination. Within Australia this examination has focused also 
on assessing the award-reliance of women and men, compared to their participation in enterprise 
bargaining. 
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Women have been found to be disproportionately represented amongst the low-paid internationally 
(Salverda & Mayhew 2009: 151) and in Australia are much more likely than men to be dependent 
on the award rate (van Wanrooy 2009: 626; Jefferson & Preston 2010: 347). While around 20 per 
cent of employees are estimated to be totally reliant on awards, award reliance varies across and 
within major occupational groups (Bolton & Wheatley 2010: 15). A number of female dominated 
occupations (such as community and personal service workers, sales workers and hairdressers) 
show high degrees of award reliance. 
A range of earlier studies found that decentralised approaches to wage determination were 
generally less favourable to women than centralised systems, particularly for women on relatively 
low earnings (see eg Gunderson 1989; Mincer 1985; Blau & Kahn 1992, 1997; Gregory & Daly 
1991; Gregory & Ho 1985, Rowthorn 1992; Rubery 1992; Whitehouse 1992; Preston & Crockett 
1999b; Swepston 2000: 10; OECD 2002). There were two main reasons for this. First, centralised 
systems tend to reduce the extent of wage variation across industries and firms and thereby reduce 
inequality. Secondly, because women are over-represented at the bottom of the wage distribution, 
centralised approaches that raise minimum pay levels, regardless of gender, also tend to reduce 
inequality and narrow the GPG. 
Summarising the findings from the literature, Gunderson (1994: 13) noted that the earnings gap 
tended to be smaller in countries with centralised collective bargaining arrangements that 
HPSKDVLVHGµHJDOLWDULDQ¶ZDJHSROLFLHVLQJHQHUDOVXFKDV6ZHGHQ1RUZD\DQG$XVWUDOLDDQG
ODUJHVWLQFRXQWULHVWKDWHPSKDVLVHGDWUDGLWLRQDOµQRQ-HJDOLWDULDQ¶UROHIRUZRPHQ in the labour 
market (such as Japan) or had decentralised, market-oriented wage determination with enterprise-
level bargaining (such as the United States and Canada). He also noted that these latter countries 
had a greater degree of wage inequality in general, and that this accounted for much of the greater 
GPG because of the over-representation of women at the lower end of the wage distribution. 
Building on their earlier work, Blau and Kahn (2003) used micro-data from the International Social 
Survey Programme for 22 countries over the period 1985 to 1994 to examine the effect of 
institutions and market forces on the GPG. They found that countries with a more compressed 
male wage structure (i.e., a narrower male earnings distribution), combined with low female labour 
supply relative to demand, were associated with a lower GPG. They argued that the inverse 
relationship between the GPG and male wage inequality suggested that wage-fixing mechanisms, 
VXFKDVµHQFRPSDVVLQJFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQWVWKDWSUovide for relatively high wage 
IORRUV¶UDLVHGWKHUHODWLYHSD\RIZRPHQZKRZHUHIRXQGWREHDWWKHERWWRPRIWKHZDJH
distribution in all countries). Consistent with this view, they found that the extent of collective 
bargaining coverage in each country was significantly negatively related to the GPG ± that is, the 
greater the extent of collective bargaining coverage, the smaller the GPG (Blau & Kahn 2003: 138±
9). More recently, using a 40 country data set covering the period 1970 to 2002, Polacheck and 
;LDQJFRQILUPHG%ODXDQG.DKQ¶V conclusion that greater male or female wage dispersion is 
associated with a wider GPG, and that nationwide collective bargaining helps to reduce the GPG. 
Using census data, Eastough and Miller (2004: 270±1) compared wage outcomes in the wage and 
salary sector with those for the self-employed in Australia and the United States. They found the 
GPG to be significantly larger for the self-employed than among wage and salary earners; 
suggesting that the award system had offered females some degree of wage protection and more 
equitable earnings. By contrast, their analysis of the United States showed GPGs more than 
double those in Australia. They also observed that females in self-employment experienced a 
proportionately greater disadvantage in the US than those in Australia. They concluded that in a 
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deregulated environment, women experience significantly lower relative earnings, with those in 
self-employment suffering a more pronounced disadvantage. 
Daly et al (2006) analysed institutional arrangements and the GPG in four countries (Australia, 
France, Japan and the United Kingdom) to assess their role and whether major changes in these 
countries over the last 30 years had affected the GPG. Their analysis confirmed work published in 
the 1980s by Gregory and others which found that country specific factors, especially the 
institutional environment, were important in explaining the GPG. Based on 1997 OECD data, Daley 
HWDOFODVVLILHG$XVWUDOLDDQG%ULWDLQDVKDYLQJWKHµmost decentralised and uncoordinated 
ZDJHEDUJDLQLQJV\VWHPV¶RIWKHIRXUFRXQWULHVVWXGLHG7KH\IRXQGWKDWWKH*3*GLGQRWFKDQJH
substantially for those working full-time over the 1990s in Australia, France and Britain, although it 
declined in size in Japan. The change in Japan was attributed to the shift away from seniority-
based pay structures to structures linked to results, which were found to have benefited Japanese 
women compared to men. They concluded that deregulation and decentralisation did not appear to 
have disadvantaged Australian or British women. However, they emphasised that their findings 
were based on data for females working full-time and might differ if part-time workers had been 
included in the analysis. Other Australian studies discussed below highlight the limits of aggregate 
data for analysing the impact of institutional arrangements on women. 
5.5.3 Income distribution and systems to address low pay 
A related area of research concerns the relationship between earnings outcomes for women and 
men, and patterns of income or wage distribution. These studies have frequently assessed 
systems of wage determination (as discussed above). They have also been interested in changes 
in the representation of women and men, and full-time and part-time workers, at different points in 
the income distribution, and in the contribution of measures specifically directed to low pay.  
For example, Rubery and Grimshaw (2009: 5±7) examined OECD data, and data from the Eurostat 
Structure of Earnings Survey, and founGVXSSRUWIRUµWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWV
IRUUHJXODWLQJORZZDJHZRUNFDQPDNHDGLIIHUHQFHLQUHGXFLQJZRPHQ¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\WRORZSD\¶
7KH\DOVRVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHLUILQGLQJVµFRPSOHPHQWWKHPRUHJHQHUDOILQGLQJWKDWPRUH
coordinated and centralised wage bargaining institutions generate a more egalitarian wage 
VWUXFWXUHDQGFRQWULEXWHWRFORVLQJWKHSD\JDS¶,QSDUWLFXODUWKH\IRXQGWKDWLQFRXQWULHVZLWK
µHLWKHUQRRUDORZOHYHOPLQLPXPZDJHFRXSOHGZLWKZHDNFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJ FRYHUDJH¶ZRPHQ
were almost three times as likely to be low-paid compared to men. Further, they concluded that 
countries with no or a low minimum wage and weak bargaining were more likely to register wide 
GPGs. 
A major study conducted by the ILO examined the literature and wage trends in member countries 
(ILO 2008a). The ILO expressed disappointment at the limited progress in closing the GPG in 
PDQ\FRXQWULHVJLYHQZRPHQ¶VVLJQLILFDQWHGXFDWLRQDODFKLHYHPHQWV7KHVWXG\IRXQGWKDWKLJKHU
minimum wages were generally associated with reduced wage inequality and gender wage 
differentials in the bottom half of the wage distribution (ILO 2008a: 43±5). The study also confirmed 
µDVWURQJUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQFHQWUDOLVHGDQGRUFRRUGLQDWHGEDUJDLQLQJDQGORZHUZage disparity, 
LQFOXGLQJDQDUURZHUJHQGHUSD\JDS¶,/2D+RZHYHULWQRWHGWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUHQGVLQ
these two important factors were often in different directions ± ZLWKDµUHYLYDOLQPLQLPXPZDJHV¶
contrasted with low and /or declining rates of collective bargaining coverage observed in a number 
of countries (ILO 2008a: 34±40). The ILO study noted that in some countries, complex systems of 
minimum wages had emerged to compensate for the absence of effective collective bargaining 
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arrangementV,QLWVFRQFOXVLRQVWKH,/2DHPSKDVLVHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIµXVLQJ
minimum wages as an instrument of social protection, to provide a decent wage floor, and not ± as 
is often the case ± as a permanent substitute for bargaining among social partnHUV¶7KHUHVKRXOG
be a µFRKHUHQWDUWLFXODWLRQEHWZHHQPLQLPXPZDJHVDQGFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJ¶ZLWKWKHWZRWR
operate as complementary and mutually reinforcing elements of comprehensive wage policies (ILO 
2008a: 33, 67). 
Similar conclusions were drawn b\WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V*URXSRI([SHUWVRQ*HQGHU
Social Inclusion and Employment following a review of the literature and a comparative review of 
the experience of 30 European countries. They noted the importance of wage structures and 
institutional arrangements in reducing the GPG, and expressed concern at the trend towards more 
decentralised and individualised arrangements. They concluded that women seemed to be 
µVZLPPLQJXSVWUHDP¶7KDWLVDOWKRXJKZRPHQZHUHIRXQGWRKDYHLPSURYHGWKHLUHGXFDWLRnal 
DWWDLQPHQWKDGIHZHUFKLOGUHQDQGVKRUWHUSHULRGVRIHPSOR\PHQWGLVUXSWLRQWKH\ZHUHµFRQIURQWHG
with a labour market with growing wage differentials and a reduced share of collectively agreed 
wages and wage components. As a result, the differences iQZDJHVUHPDLQPRUHRUOHVVWKHVDPH¶
(Plantenga & Remery 2006: 8). 
6LPLODUILQGLQJVZHUHHYLGHQWLQ6DOYHUGDDQG0D\KHZ¶VH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHLQFLGHQFHRIORZ
SD\LQ(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVDQGWKH86$7KH\IRXQGWKDWFRXQWULHVZLWKPRUHµLQFOXVLYH¶wage-
VHWWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVH[SHULHQFHGORZHULQFLGHQFHVRIORZSD\7KH\GHILQHGµLQFOXVLYH¶WRPHDQµWKH
existence of mechanisms, formal or informal, to extend terms and conditions negotiated by workers 
with strong bargaining power to workers with less barJDLQLQJSRZHU¶+RZHYHUWKH\IRXQGWKDW
collective bargaining coverage was not necessarily sufficient on its own to avoid a high incidence of 
ORZSD\7KH\REVHUYHGWKDWµEDUJDLQLQJLQFOXVLYHQHVVFDQEHEROVWHUHGRUZHDNHQHGE\RWKHU
LQVWLWXWLRQV¶LQFOXGing minimum wage legislation, employment protection legislation, product market 
regulation, social benefits and the regulation of temporary employment (Salverda & Mayhew 2009: 
:LWKUHVSHFWWRWKHUROHRIPLQLPXPZDJHVWKH\FRQFOXGHGWKDWµthe mere 
SUHVHQFHRIDPLQLPXPZDJHRIIHUVOLWWOHSURWHFWLRQ«,WVOHYHOLWVXQLYHUVDODSSOLFDWLRQDQGLWV
HQIRUFHPHQWDUHHVVHQWLDO¶6DOYHUGD	0D\KHZ 
While Salverda and Mayhew (2009: 151) observed that the incidence of low pay varied from 
country to country, like numerous other researchers they found that the composition of the low paid 
VKRZHGµVWURQJVLPLODULWLHVDFURVVDOOFRXQWULHV¶VWXGLHG,QSDUWLFXODUSDUW-timers, the young, 
women and minorities were disproportionately represented in the low paid group. 
Consistent with the findings of international studies, Jefferson and Preston (2007: 127) argued that 
E\µFRPSUHVVLQJWKHZDJHGLVWULEXWLRQDQGUDLVLQJWKHUHODWLYHZDJHRIWKRVHRQWKHERWWRPWKH
Australian wage setting system was able to deliver greater levels of gender equity than those 
REVHUYHGLQPRVWRWKHU:HVWHUQGHYHORSHGHFRQRPLHV¶2WKHU$XVWUDOLDQOLWHUDWXUHKDVDOVR
demonstrated links between wage setting institutions, wage negotiation and gendered outcomes 
(Preston & Jefferson 2009: 326; Peetz & Preston 2007; Preston et al 2006; Nevile & Kriesler 2008). 
Austin et al (2008) used an analytical method developed by Fortin and Lemieux to identify links 
between minimum wage decisions and gender differences in earnings in the Australian labour 
market between 1995±96 and 2005±06. They found that in Australia the real value of the minimum 
wage was maintained between 1995 and 2005. Considering the implications for gender wage 
GLIIHUHQFHVWKH\FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHµPLQLPXPZDJHDGMXVWPents awarded between 1995 and 2005 
FRQWULEXWHGWRDUHGXFWLRQLQWKH*3*E\DSSUR[LPDWHO\SHUFHQWDJHSRLQWV¶$XVWHQHWDO
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,QDGGLWLRQWKH\QRWHGWKDWVWXGLHVRIZRPHQ¶VODERXUVXSSO\VXJJHVWHGWKDWZDJH
LQFUHDVHVKDYHOLQNVZLWKZRPHQ¶V willingness to participate in the labour force. This led them to 
FRQFOXGHWKDWµPLQLPXPZDJHGHFLVLRQVFDQSOD\DGXDOUROH± increasing wage equity and 
encouraging labour force participation, particularly among low-ZDJHHPSOR\HHV¶$XVWLQHWDO
52). 
:KLWHKRXVHFKDOOHQJHGWKHQRWLRQWKDW$XVWUDOLD¶V*3*KDGUHPDLQHGVWDEOHGHVSLWHD
prolonged period of deregulation by looking beyond the aggregate statistics. Using unpublished 
data from the ABS EEH survey to analyse total (rather than ordinary time) hourly earnings, she 
found that a number of different trends were evident underneath the relatively static picture of the 
aggregate statistics. In particular, she found a continuing widening of the part-time/full-time 
earnings gap, which she argued hDGµQHJDWLYHLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHJHQGHUSD\UDWLRLQWKHORQJHU
term so long as women remain overrepresented in part-WLPHHPSOR\PHQW¶:KLWHKRXVH
She also found evidence that the aggregate gender pay ratio was being bolstered by falling male 
occupational wages (relative to the occupational average) in some areas of the labour market 
:KLWHKRXVH6KHDUJXHGWKDWDµPRUHGLYLGHGODERXUPDUNHWZLWKLQFUHDVLQJGLIIHUHQFHV
between full-time and part-WLPHMREVDQGFDVXDODQGSHUPDQHQWMREV¶ was adversely affecting both 
PHQDQGZRPHQLQLUUHJXODUHPSOR\PHQWµDOWKRXJKLWLVWKHZRPHQZKRFXUUHQWO\EHDUWKHJUHDWHVW
FRVWJLYHQWKHLURYHUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQVXFKMREV¶:KLWHKRXVH 
Before leaving this topic it is worth noting the release of a recent Productivity Commission Staff 
Working Paper examining trends in the distribution of income in Australia. This is a highly technical 
report including detailed discussion of different measures of income inequality and the reporting of 
data against those measures. The key focus of the report is changes in the distribution of income 
between 1988±89 and 2009±10 and analysis of recently observed changes in summary measures 
of inequality. An example here would be higher rates of growth in real individual and household 
LQFRPHDWWKHµWRSHQG¶RIWKHGLVWULEXWLRQVFRPSDUHGWRWKHµERWWRPHQG¶7KHUHSRUWLVQRW
specifically directed to gender pay equity and underlines the point that its interest lies in identifying 
those factors that assist an understanding of increasing labour inequality. On this point the authors 
observe that WKHµRYHUDOOLQFUHDVHLQODERXULQFRPHLQHTXDOLW\EHWZHHQ±89 and 2009±10 
DSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQDUHVXOWRIIDFWRUVWKDWDIIHFWPHQDQGZRPHQLQVLPLODUZD\V¶*UHHQYLOOHHW
al 2013: 9). 
5.5.4 Australian data sources and methods of pay setting 
Australian researchers have frequently commented on the need for more detailed earnings data. 
This matter was raised in the discussion of the impact of occupational segregation on earnings 
differences (see section 5.4.4). But the particular focus here is on the availability of data that 
distinguishes between full-time and part-time workers, and also the availability of reliable data on 
pay setting. These assessments are identified in this section of the chapter and they are joined to 
more recent data on gender outcomes according to the method of pay setting.  
3UHVWRQDQG-HIIHUVRQLQH[DPLQLQJWKHVWDELOLW\RI$XVWUDOLD¶V*3*FDXWLRQHGDJDLQVWWKH
use of aggregate trend data as an accuratHPHDVXUHRIPHQ¶VDQGZRPHQ¶VODERXU-market 
experiences. They found that apparent stability in the GPG (measured by reference to data for all 
full-time employees) at a national level neglected important variations between State-level data and 
the growing significance of part-time employment. They also argued that apparent improvements or 
VWDELOLW\LQWKH*3*DWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOPD\KDYHEHHQDUHVXOWRIPHQ¶VGHWHULRUDWLQJODERXU
market position. Confirming measurement issues noted above, they argued that measures of the 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
102 
GPG that focused on full-WLPHHPSOR\PHQWXQGHUVWDWHGWKHHIIHFWVRIZRPHQ¶VHPSOR\PHQWLQ
labour market sectors traditionally reliant on award wage-setting processes, including the 
increasingly important area of part-time employment. They concluded that to gain a more accurate 
picture required monitoring time-series data on hourly earnings, disaggregated by industry, 
occupation, sector, sex and method of pay setting (Preston & Jefferson 2007: 80). 
A more recent study of earnings differences between women and men was concerned with 
examining the utility of the HILDA Survey to draw meaningful data on the methods of setting pay, 
relative to that drawn from the ABS EEH Survey (Wilkins & Wooden 2011). This particular purpose 
was a matter of some wider investigation in the research community, specifically the need for 
reliable data on pay setting, and the recipients of the decisions of industrial tribunals (Healy 2011; 
Healy et al 2011). Having concluded that the HILDA Survey provided meaningful and comparable 
data to that drawn from the ABS survey, Wilkins and Wooden (2011: 19±20) found that GPGs were 
smaller for more centralised methods of setting pay (awards), compared to other methods of 
setting pay: 
In summary, there are, on average, no obvious differences between the hourly pay of male and female 
employees who are award-reliant that cannot be explained by differences in other characteristics that are 
usually thought to influence pay, such as health and disability, experience, education and skills. In 
contrast, among other employees who rely on bargaining or individual negotiations for their pay, the gap 
EHWZHHQPHQDQGZRPHQ¶VSD\WKDWFDQQRWEHH[SODLQHGE\RWKHUFKDUDFWHULVWLFVLVVL]HDEOHUDQJLQJ
from 8.5 per cent when industry is controlled for to 11.2 per cent when it is not.  
More recently, Pointon et al (2012) undertook an analysis of award reliance and difference in 
HDUQLQJVLQJHQGHU7KHUHVHDUFKHUV¶NH\IRFXVZDVDQDVVHVVPHQWRIZKHWKHULQFUHDVHVLQWKH
minimum wage, and the form of that increase (percentage or flat), impacted the GPG. Their data 
confirmed that women are more likely than men to be award reliant. As part of their research they 
assessed earnings differences between women and men according to the method of setting pay, 
and also by indicative skill levels based on ANZSCO. On this matter the researchers noted the 
limitations of using aggregated data sets, and proxy measures for work value such as that provided 
by ANZSCO. A key area of interest was the difference in wage outcomes for women and men who 
were award reliant, and those who had their pay determined by other means (informal over-award 
payment, formal collective or individual agreement, or a common law contract). The key findings of 
this research using ABS data included (Pointon et al 2012: i±iii): 
x Women are more likely than men to be award reliant, but are also concentrated in the higher 
skill levels of both awards, and other instruments. 
x Females covered by awards tend to earn more than males. Their Average Hourly Ordinary 
Time Cash Earnings (AHOTCE) was 106.3 per cent of males and their Average Weekly 
Ordinary Time Case Earnings (AWOTCE) 103.4 cent of males. A key contributory factor was 
that women tended to be employed at higher skill levels.  
x In contrast to the findings for award-reliant workers, there was a reverse of gender outcomes 
for employees who were not award-reliant. Females covered by these instruments received an 
AWOTCE that was 84.9 per cent of males, and an AHOTCE that was 88.4 of males, despite 
being more highly concentrated than males at higher skill-level classifications. 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
103 
5.6 Conclusion 
Only a small proportion of the earnings differences between women and men can be explained by 
differences in education and work experience or other productivity related characteristics. 
Research assessing explanations for other contributory factors to the GPG assessed by Romeyn et 
al (2011: 60) and Pointon et al (2012: 3±4) that remain supported by subsequent research include: 
x differences in the types of jobs held by men and women and the method of setting pay for 
those jobs, including: 
 the industries and occupations in which they work, but noting the complexities in the 
findings concerning the impact of occupational segregation; 
 the location of their work ± Australian studies reveal significantly higher gaps for 
employees in the private than the public sector, in large workplaces, and at the top of the 
wage distribution than for those at the bottom; 
 the regulatory and institutional arrangements of wage determination, recognising in the 
Australian context the greater earnings differences between women and men among 
non-award reliant workers (including factors such as the degree of centralisation or 
coordination of wage determination and the presence and role, if any, of minimum 
wages); and 
 different levels of discretionary payments made to those in male and female occupations; 
x structures and workplace practices which restrict the employment prospects of workers with 
family responsibilities, resulting in: 
 differential working times, as females have less access to paid overtime and are more 
likely to be in part-time or casual positions, but noting the complexities of the research 
findings concerning the impact of the disproportionate representation of women in part-
time work; and 
 less access to training and promotion for female workers; 
x the ongoing undervaluation of feminised work and skills, including: 
 differences in pay for males and females doing similar or comparable jobs; 
 different job titles (and pay) for the same or similar occupations; 
 XQGHUYDOXDWLRQRIWKHVNLOOVFRPSHWHQFLHVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµIHPDOH¶
jobs; and 
 gender biases in job evaluation methods, job classification systems, and job 
remuneration systems. 
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6 Proceedings under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act: Key issues 
6.1 Introduction 
We turn now to the carriage of equal remuneration proceedings in the Australian federal 
jurisdiction. As outlined in Chapter 3, equal remuneration applications are brought under Part 2-7 of 
the Fair Work Act. In the only proceedings completed under these provisions to date (the SACS 
case, discussed in Chapter 4), the Full Bench of FWA set out an approach to applications for equal 
remuneration orders with the following key features: 
x There is no requirement to demonstrate discrimination as a threshold to an equal 
remuneration claim. 
x 8QGHUYDOXDWLRQZDVDGRSWHGDVDNH\SDUWRIWKH)XOO%HQFK¶VDSSURDFKLQDVVHVVLQJHTXDO
remuneration claims. 
x There is a requirement to establish that the asserted undervaluation is linked or attributable to 
gender. 
x There is no requirement for applications to reference an explicit male comparator group, 
although such references may be included. 
x 7KHµLQGLFLD¶RIXQGHUYDOXDWLRQGHYHORSHGWKURXJKWKH1HZ6RXWK:DOHVDQG Queensland 
jurisdictions (see sections B.2.1, B.3.2) provide a framework for considering whether there is 
undervaluation but do not constitute a prescriptive formula. 
x The Full Bench recognised that impediments to bargaining can impede equal remuneration. 
x Consistent witKDSSURDFKHVXWLOLVHGLQWKHSDVWWKH)XOO%HQFKDGRSWHGDµSKDVHG¶DSSURDFKWR
wage adjustments established through the equal remuneration order. 
x Additionally, the Full Bench did not indicate that it would depart from its traditional reliance on 
work value as a means of assessing the value of work. 
The Commission may yet reconsider its approach to these issues and we note that the SACS case 
may have provided a particular set of circumstances that were facilitated by the federal 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VIXQGLQJDQQRXQcement (see section 4.6). Additionally, as noted in Chapter 1, an 
application for an equal remuneration order in relation to certain childcare workers is presently 
before the Commission. In those proceedings the Full Bench has asked the applicants and 
respondents to address a number of issues concerning the assessment of gender based 
undervaluation.38 This may provide a platform for the discussion of issues raised in both the May 
2011 and February 2012 majority and minority decisions in the SACS case. 
In this chapter we consider the prospect and content of an equal remuneration principle (ERP) or 
VRPHHTXLYDOHQWIUDPHZRUNQRWLQJWKDWWKHWHUPLQRORJ\RIµSULQFLSOH¶RUµIUDPHZRUN¶LVOHVV
important than considerations of purpose and content. Prior to doing so we assess the key 
concepts that may be considered in such a principle, noting that the starting point for this 
consideration is the approach taken by the Full Bench in the SACS case and the key concepts that 
have emerged in recent developments in equal remuneration regulation. 
                                                     
38 See eg the draft directions issued on 8 October 2013, available at 
http://www.fwc.gov.au/sites/caeremuneration/listings/NoL-19-Nov-2013.pdf (accessed 17 October 2013). 
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6.2 The emergence of undervaluation in equal remuneration regulation 
It is clear from the SACS case, and from earlier cases in New South Wales and Queensland, that 
the concept of undervaluation provides a focus for identifying and addressing pay inequity in 
Australia. Its emergence in Australian labour law was a response to the difficulty in discrimination 
based approaches to pay equity. This difficulty was evidenced in the HPM proceedings and in the 
under-utilisation of the equal remuneration provisions introduced at a federal level in 1993 and 
maintained (with some amendments) until the Fair Work Act commenced in 2009 (noting that Part 
2-7 did not commence until 1 January 2010).  
It had been envisaged that the legislative reference to discrimination in equal remuneration 
legislative provisions would give the right to equal remuneration a more substantial legal 
foundation. In practice, the requirement to demonstrate discriminatory processes in the 
determination of wages made the task of successfully claiming equal remuneration more difficult. 
The sex discrimination test supported a narrow form of job comparison between men and women. 
The legal hurdles it imposed also meant that it favoured prosecution at the level of the individual 
worker, or of the workplace, rather than at the level of an entire industry, sector or occupation. It 
was these obstacles that led to industrial tribunals in New South Wales and Queensland 
developing ERPs with undervaluation as a key and central concept. 
6.3 What is undervaluation and why is it distinct? 
As a concept, and in contrast to discrimination-based approaches to equal remuneration, 
undervaluation focuses on the valuation of work in female dominated industries and occupations, 
so as to determine whether that work has been inappropriately or inadequately valued. A finding of 
gender based undervaluation may be based on evidence of a failure to recognise or give proper 
weighting to the characteristics of feminised work. Additionally, other gender-associated factors, 
either singly or in combination, may have contributed to a lack of (or inadequate) work value 
assessments, resulting in rates of pay that do not reflect the value of the work. 
Our assessment is that an equal remuneration approach that focuses on undervaluation is 
necessarily broader than a work value exercise, at least as traditionally conceived (see section 
3.1.1). This is because its scope goes beyond assessing changes in work value, or changes in 
work value within a stipulated time frame. Equally an explicit focus on undervaluation is more 
capable of assessing whether the objective of equal remuneration has been met. In the New South 
Wales and Queensland jurisdictions the concept has permitted the tribunal to avoid having to 
operate on an assumption that existing rates of pay have been properly set. It facilitates an 
acceptance that past work value assessments, if they have occurred, may have acted to 
undervalue the work because such assessments have been affected by gender. 
This noted, State industrial tribunals considering equal remuneration claims have acknowledged 
the close relationship between considerations of undervaluation and work value. For example, in 
Re Miscellaneous Workers¶ Kindergartens and Child Care Centres etc (State) Award (2006) 150 IR 
290, the applicant, the Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (LHMU), led evidence 
concerning undervaluation and changes in work value. It was submitted by the LHMU that the 
existing classification structure and rates of pay were undervalued due to the feminised nature of 
the industry, and normative assumptions concerning the valuation of the work concerned with the 
care, nurturing and development of children. In doing so, the LHMU utilised an award history to 
demonstrate the absence of any comprehensive assessment of the value of the work, and highlight 
the impact of consent arrangements on the determination of award rates. The evidence led with 
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reference to the work value principle concerned changes to licensing requirements, accreditation 
and training arrangements, as well as health and safety requirements and mandatory reporting 
obligations flowing from child protection legislation. In considering the nature of the applications 
before it, the New South Wales Commission held that both the work value change and 
undervaluation were established. It did not apportion a proportionate weighting to its findings in 
either claim, but considered (at [243]) that the proper remeG\ZDVDQµDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHYDOXHRI
WKHZRUNWREHFRQVLGHUHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHDZDUGVDSSO\LQJWRWHDFKHUV¶VHHDOVRVHFWLRQ
B.2.4).  
In its May 2011 decision in the SACS case, the FWA Full Bench noted that the successful claim in 
Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Queensland Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Ltd (2009) 191 QGIG 19 ± which as explained in Chapter 4 prompted the federal 
application that was before FWA ± had been pursued on the grounds of both equal remuneration 
DQGFKDQJHVLQZRUNYDOXH7KH)XOO%HQFKREVHUYHGWKDWµalthough work value change is not 
irrelevant under Part 2-7 [of the Fair Work Act], it is clear that the equal remuneration provisions 
are directed not at undervaluation itself, but at undervaluation which is gender-EDVHG¶ER Case No 
1 at [266]). 
For reasons explained in section 3.4.5, it is unclear whether it is possible to pursue parallel claims 
for an equal remuneration order under Part 2-7 and for work value adjustments under sections 
156(3) or 157(2) of the Fair Work Act. But this does not, in our view, preclude the Fair Work 
Commission from (a) determining that the work performed by a group of female (or mostly female) 
workers is undervalued, (b) attributing that undervaluation to factors that are grounded in their 
gender, and (c) seeking to remedy that undervaluation ± even if some part of that undervaluation 
might alternatively have been capable of being addressed through establishing a change in work 
value.  
6.4 Is the use of comparators central to a finding of undervaluation? 
A related question considered in both the New South Wales and Queensland jurisdictions and in 
the SACS case was whether the process of establishing a lack of equal remuneration for work of 
equal or comparable value must be undertaken by reference to some form of comparative 
exercise. In the SACS case the Full Bench did not indicate that comparators were a necessary 
precondition and specifically noted that applications do not need to specify a male comparator (a 
view not shared by Vice President Watson in his dissenting decision). As explained in sections B.2 
and B.3, the New South Wales and Queensland Commissions have regarded such exercises as 
potentially helpful, but not as essential. Indeed the Inquiries that preceded the equal remuneration 
decisions in both jurisdictions held that a concentration solely on comparative assessments 
including a mandatory requirement for comparators would be unduly limiting.  
The absence of a mandatory requirement for comparators, including the absence of a requirement 
for gender-based comparators, is linked to the concept of undervaluation, given that this concept 
does not revert routinely to a male standard. 9DOLGDWLQJWKHXQGHUYDOXDWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VZRUNE\
reference to a comparable male group can be inherently flawed, because it relies on an 
assumption that µPDOH¶UDWHVRISD\ZHUHREMHFWLYHO\VHWE\UHIHUHQFHWRZRUNYDOXH2QWKLV
reasoning, comparisons within and between occupations and industries should not be required in 
order to establish undervaluation of work. As noted in the SACS case, mDOHµFRPSDUDWRUV¶PLJKWEH
used for illustrative purposes but are not an evidentiary precondition (ER Case No 1 at [232]). 
Applicants may choose to use a range of comparisons, including other areas of feminised work.  
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,PSRUWDQWO\FRPSDUDWRUVPD\QRWQHFHVVDULO\DVVLVWWKHWULEXQDO¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ
When assessing the viability of comparator-based evidence and methodology in valuing work in a 
heavily feminised industry (the child care industry), the New South Wales Commission agreed with 
expert evidence which noted that µWKHXQLTXHQHVVRI the work of child care workers limited the 
usefulness of selecting any particular male dominateGLQGXVWU\DVD³FRPSDUDWRU´¶ (Re 
Miscellaneous Workers¶ Kindergartens and Child Care Centres etc (State) Award (2006) 150 IR 
290 at [103]).  
Equally, while comparators may not be a prerequisite, they may assist the work of industrial parties 
and industrial tribunals. As an example, the New South Wales Crown Librarians case was built on 
the findings of the case study developed for the New South Wales Pay Equity Inquiry by the Office 
of the Director of Equal Opportunity in Public Employment, in which two points/factor job evaluation 
systems39 were applied in comparing the work of librarians and geologists. The case study included 
the award structures and histories, career paths and remuneration for both areas of work. Together 
ZLWKWKH1HZ6RXWK:DOHV3D\(TXLW\,QTXLU\¶VRZQILQGLQJVWKHFDVHVWXG\SURYLGHGDSDUtial 
basis for agreement between the parties that there was gender-UHODWHGXQGHUYDOXDWLRQRIOLEUDULDQV¶
work. As the question of whether the work was undervalued was not contested, the Full Bench of 
the New South Wales Commission that heard the application was not required to provide further 
guidance than that available in the ERP decision as to what was required to establish gender-
related undervaluation. It was accepted, however, that it was appropriate to compare the work of 
librarians with other public sector-based professions and it was relevant that librarians were paid 
less than other professions where work value had been assessed by the Commission in setting 
UDWHV5HOHYDQWIDFWRUVLQWKHFRPSDULVRQZHUHWKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUDEDFKHORU¶VGHJUHHRU
equivalent for entry, and career progression based on experience and merit-based appointment for 
promotion (Re Crown Librarians, Library Officers and Archivists Award Proceedings ± Application 
under the Equal Remuneration Principle (2002) 111 IR 48 at [26]; and see also section B.2.3). 
Comparators may also assist industrial tribunals in establishing rates of pay for areas of work they 
have assessed to be undervalued. In the Queensland SACS case, Commissioner Fisher 
considered that she was required to assess rHODWLYLWLHVZKLFKLQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VYLHZunderstated 
the nature of the work, skill and responsibilities at levels 5 to 8 of the Queensland Community 
Services and Crisis Assistance Award ± State. In determining how the relativities should more 
properly be set, the Commission noted comparators were not mandatory but can provide guidance 
as to appropriate levels of remuneration. In considering the rates to be applied in the Award, the 
Commission was guided by the rates in a number of different industrial instruments in local 
government and the Queensland Public Service. In this case, these included bargained outcomes, 
including the State Government Departments Certified Agreement 2006. The Commission found 
that this Agreement provided a useful point of comparison because a criterion for its certification 
was that the rates provided equal remuneration for men and women employees for work of equal 
or comparable value. The Commission agreed that it was appropriate to use certified agreement 
rates as a guide to ascertaining appropriate rates. This was consistent with an overriding public 
interest objective of ensuring that employees in the community services sector are remunerated 
commensurate with their work value (see also section B.3.5).  
                                                     
39 These were the Hay and OCR systems. The nature of such systems is addressed in section 2.4.11.1. 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
108 
6.5 Establishing that undervaluation is gender-based or has a gender 
associated cause 
A potential area of contest in proceedings under Part 2-7 concerns the parameters of gender-
based undervaluation: specifically, the evidentiary bar for gender-based undervaluation, and the 
means through which parties could demonstrate that undervaluation was gendered or had a 
gender-associated cause. 
The means through which gender is aligned to undervaluation will inevitably be shaped by the 
circumstances of individual applications. Nevertheless, parties may wish to consider the material 
that State tribunals have previously found to be persuasive in this context, noting that a feature of 
some recent equal remuneration proceedings has been agreed statements of facts between the 
parties. 
x In concluding that hairdressing work was undervalued, Justice Glynn, in the New South Wales 
Pay Equity Inquiry, identified the inadequacy of the existing flat classification structure and the 
accompanying absence of a post trade classification structure. Post-trade qualifications and 
training were not rewarded in hairdressing; in contrast motor mechanics and other male-
dominated trade occupations were compensated for additional skills and knowledge (Glynn 
1998: vol 1, 383±9). 
x In finding that the work of beauty therapists was undervalued, Justice Glynn noted that while 
beauty culture had been offered as a trade course since 1985, and had been recognised as 
such in the relevant award from 1989 onwards, the work was not aligned with the trade 
qualification in the relevant classification and wage rates structure. The Inquiry determined 
that this was clear evidence of undervaluation of a sort that did not characterise any other 
trade-based (and primarily male dominated) work (Glynn 1998: vol 1, 340). 
x Justice Glynn considered that the inadequacy of classification structures in the relevant State 
and federal awards was fundamental to a finding that the work of clothing outworkers was 
undervalued. Specifically, the classification structures did not provide skill descriptors for 
levels above the trade aligned rate of remuneration. The Inquiry found that the inadequacy of 
the award classifications was sufficient to reach a finding of undervaluation, and it also found 
that the work was undervalued by reference to the work of the machinists in the metal industry 
(Glynn 1998: vol 1, 642). 
x Justice Glynn determined that work of a highly feminised seafood processing classification ± 
trimmers ± was undervalued. The work of trimmers was undervalued because it had been 
classified at the same level as the general hand and below that of butchers (a highly 
PDVFXOLQLVHGRFFXSDWLRQ7KLVVLWXDWLRQKDGLWVRULJLQVLQWKHVLPSOHHTXDWLRQRIWKHµDOORWKHUV¶
IHPDOHUDWHZLWKWKHµDOORWKHUV¶PDOHUDWHLQWKHYDULDWLRQVWKDWIROORZHGWKH6WDWHEqual 
Pay Case. This long-standing failure to examine the nature of the work and recognise the 
dexterous, repetitive, high-VSHHGQDWXUHRIµWULPPLQJ¶ZDVQRWUHPHGLHGE\an award variation 
that had introduced structural efficiency adjustments, and a contributory factor was the 
consent arrangements between the parties (Glynn 1998: vol 1, 699±709). 
x In the New South Wales Librarians case, the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations 
Commission of New South Wales considered and gave weight to the findings of the New 
South Wales Pay Equity Inquiry (Re Crown Librarians, Library Officers and Archivists Award 
Proceedings ± Application under the Equal Remuneration Principle (2002) 111 IR 48 at [28]-
[29]; see also section B.2.3). The Inquiry, which had considered a case study involving 
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librarians and geologists, had found clear evidence of undervaluation had concluded that rates 
for librarians had been set on the basis that they were not qualified professionally. The value 
of the work had not been assessed by the Commission for a considerable period and there 
had been changes in the value of the work that had not been recognised by re-evaluation 
and/or through new classifications (Glynn 1998: vol 1, 490±7).  
x In the New South Wales Child Care case, a Full Bench of the New South Wales Commission 
concluded that, while it might EHµGLIILFXOWWRGHWHFWJHQGHU-EDVHGXQGHUYDOXDWLRQ¶, no witness 
had supplied explanations that challenged the evidence or the findings of the Pay Equity 
Inquiry (Re 0LVFHOODQHRXV:RUNHUV¶.LQGHUJDUWHQVDnd Child Care Centres etc (State) Award 
(2006) 150 IR 290 at [210]; see also section B.2.4). The Inquiry had concluded that the level of 
pay for childcare workers, a highly feminised occupation, needed to be viewed against the low 
level of unionisation, their poor access to overtime and payment for overtime, the small size of 
the workplaces in the sector and the service nature of the industry. These factors had 
contributed to the poor recognition of the training and credentials held by childcare workers by 
way of remuneration and career paths in childcare. The industrial processes had not been 
sufficient to recognise the changing nature of the childcare industry nor to overcome normative 
assumptions concerning the value of work involving the care and development of young 
children (Glynn 1998: vol 1, 4270-286).  
x Similar evidence was considered in the Queensland Child Care case, In these proceedings 
the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission held that the work performed by childcare 
workers had been historically undervalued, based on the gender of the workers and 
assumptions concerning the valuation of caring work (Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous 
Union, Queensland Branch, Union of Employees and Children's Services Employers 
Association, Queensland Union of Employers and Others (2006) 182 QGIG 318, see also 
section B.3.4).  
x In the Queensland Dental Assistants case, the Queensland Commission had access to case 
study material presented at the Queensland Pay Equity Inquiry. The material had identified a 
female dominated occupation characterised by a high incidence of consent arrangements and 
the absence of detailed work value assessment. Contributing to the undervaluation was the 
incomplete or inappropriate application of wage adjustment processes, inadequate recognition 
RIWUDLQLQJDQGTXDOLILFDWLRQVµVRIWVNLOOV¶UHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKH
work was performed (Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (Queensland Branch) v 
Australian Dental Association (Qld Branch) (2005) 180 QGIG 187; see also section B.3.3). 
x In the Queensland SACS case, the Queensland Commission assessed that factors that 
contributed to the undervaluation of the work included the female characterisation of that work. 
Specifically, the nature of the work in the community services sector was considered to be an 
extension of work undertaken by women in the domestic sphere, including the caring and 
nurturing of dependants. This characterisation had impeded industrial recognition of the work 
and there had been an absence of work value investigations in the award. In consequence, 
the prevailing classification structure and wage rates failed to recognise post-school 
qualifications held by employees in the sector (Queensland Services, Industrial Union of 
Employees v Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ltd (2009) 191 QGIG 19; see 
also section B.3.5). 
In the federal SACS proceedings, the Full Bench made an initial determination that the work was 
undervalued on a gender basis, through a series of interlocking conclusions. These were that: 
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x much of the work is caring work;  
x such a characterisation can contribute to devaluing work;  
x the work was in fact undervalued; and  
x given that caring work has a female characterisation, the undervaluation was gender-based 
(see section 4.5 and ER Case No 1 at [253]).  
In its direction as to the framing of any remedy, however, the Full Bench effectively imposed an 
empirical requirement on the applicants, requiring submissions as to what proportion of the 
undervaluation could be attributed to gender (see section 4.5 and ER Case No 1 at [286], [295]). 
As we explained in Chapter 4, the ASU used a research study to assess the proportion of caring 
work evident at each classification level in the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability 
Services Award 2010. Caring work, both direct and indirect, was then used as a proxy for gender. 
Whether a proxy-based methodology is accessible or appropriate for all applicants, however, is a 
point of some debate.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, the available research on gender pay equity identifies the complexity of 
separating gender from a range of other reinforcing and interconnected considerations that shape 
ZRPHQ¶VHDUQLQJV'LIIHUHQWGLPHQVLRQVRIXQGHUYDOXDWLRQFDQFRQWULEXWHWRSD\LQHTXLW\LQDn 
additive and cumulative way.  
In New South Wales and Queensland, tribunals have taken the view that the assessment of equal 
remuneration claims involves balancing a number of considerations, and that it is not always 
possible to identify the extent of gender-based undervaluation in a forensic manner. This 
disinclination by State tribunals to mandate a proportionate identification of gender-based 
undervaluation is linked to what those tribunals have assessed as a key task, namely assessing 
the current value of the work in question and ensuring that the minimum rates of pay for it have 
been properly set.  
Two further and related issues are raised by an insistence on a proportionate assessment of the 
contribution of gender to undervaluation. The first is whether this insistence introduces a de facto 
requirement for applicants to rely on comparators. The second is whether this insistence imports 
the weaknesses in the discrimination-based test that was effectively mandated under the previous 
federal legislation. Contemporary developments in equal remuneration regulation have indicated 
that an insistence on comparators may not aid the objective of equal remuneration. Similarly, one 
of the disamenities of the discrimination-based test was that it invoked a narrow and binary form of 
job comparison. 
Approaches to equal remuneration that affirm equality where women can demonstrate a 
µVDPHQHVV¶WRPHQEXWDUHDPELYDOHQWRURYHUO\UHVWULFWLYHDVWRKRZµGLIIHUHQFH¶IURPPHQVKRXOG
be assessed, measured and valued, carry a number of weaknesses. Such approaches can be 
overly formulaic and historically have failed to contest the undervaluation of feminised work, or to 
assess the direct and tacit means by which undervaluation may be embedded in the classification, 
organisation and remuneration of work (Smith 2011, e191). Additionally, these approaches fail to 
recognise that the value of male work has set key industrial standards and benchmarks, and that 
binary means of assessment against those standards, such as the discrimination test, have proven 
to be incapable of assessing the dynamics of gender pay inequity.  
One of the strengths of the concept of gender-based undervaluation is that it goes to the heart of 
addressing the institutional and cultural determinants of why women have generally been under-
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remunerated for their work. The ERPs which have been developed in New South Wales and 
Queensland articulate important aspects which are acknowledged through academic and other 
UHVHDUFKWRKDYHOHGWRZRPHQ¶VZork being undervalued and under-remunerated. This approach 
is in contrast to an empirical or proportionate weighting methodology, which may not be entirely 
capable of identifying and addressing gender-based undervaluation and which may unwittingly rely 
on benchmarks and established norms and practices that have been established in relation to male 
workers. As Justice Evans observed in Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canada Post 
Corporation [2011] 2 FCR 221 at [208]: µ(VWDEOLVKLQJWKHYDOXHRUPRUHDFFXUDWHO\SHUKDSVWKH
relative value of work is not a SXUHO\VFLHQWLILFH[HUFLVH¶Vee also section C.9.2).  
Requiring that the parties indicate or attribute the relationship between gender and undervaluation 
of work, by reason of the existence of feminised features of that work, enables a realistic 
examination of whether there is a gender-based undervaluation while still retaining the 
requirements for the work, skill, responsibilities and conditions for work to be assessed and 
appropriately remunerated.  
6.6 An equal remuneration principle 
The use of principles and guidelines in domestic and international jurisdictions on a wide range of 
gender pay equity related matters raises the question of whether a federal ERP would assist the 
understanding and carriage of matters under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act.  
This matter has already been considered in the State jurisdictions of New South Wales and 
Queensland, where ERPs have been articulated. In these jurisdictions the principles were 
developed in the wake of extensive and resource-intensive inquiries that included detailed case 
studies, economic evidence and extensive consideration of the capacity of particular regulatory 
approaches to address gender pay inequity. The principles that were adopted reflected each 
WULEXQDO¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHDSSURDFKHVWKDWKDGIDLOHGto ensure equal remuneration, and those 
that were more likely to ensure that this objective was met. As such, they could be regarded as key 
influences in any contemporary consideration of equal remuneration regulation.  
The need, or otherwise, for an ERP was also a question that emerged during the SACS case. As 
noted in section 3.4.3, the Full Bench was not prepared to adopt an ERP at that time, assessing 
that it would be premature to issue a formal statement of principle that would potentially limit the 
discretion available under Part 2-7. But nor did it rule out that being done in a future case.  
Though it is for the Commission to determine whether an ERP should be adopted in future cases, 
we make some comments below on the benefits of adopting an ERP and what might be included in 
such a principle.  
6.6.1 Benefits of an ERP 
Appropriately formulated, an ERP can occupy the ground between uncertainty and prescription, 
guide both the Commission and potential parties, as well as emphasise the importance of the 
concept of equal remuneration. A principle identifies for applicants and respondents the matters to 
be addressed in contentions and submissions. It could also facilitate the efficient conduct of 
proceedings, in all likelihood lessening the need for supplementary submissions, and multiple 
directions or hearings.  
We think that key support for the concept of a principle lies in the experience of the New South 
Wales and Queensland jurisdictions, as detailed in sections B.2 and B.3. One of the clear benefits 
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of the ERPs in New South Wales and Queensland is the explicit focus they have given to equal 
remuneration. Through their focus on undervaluation, as the means of assessing whether the 
objective of equal remuneration has been met, the principles have liberated the tULEXQDOV¶FDSDFLW\
to assess whether rates of pay for feminised work are properly set. 
We believe that there is no impediment to the Commission developing a federal ERP. We note that 
the development of principles was an approach relied on by the Commission¶VSUHGHFHVVRUVPRVW
notably in the area of wage fixing, but also in the area of equal pay. An ERP, to provide guidance to 
WKHSDUWLHVRQWKLVPDWWHUZRXOGQRWQHHGWREHDWWKHH[SHQVHRIUHTXLUHGIOH[LELOLW\LQWKHWULEXQDO¶V
approach to equal remuneration, nor antithetical to the efficient conduct of equal remuneration 
proceedings. This said, one of the beneficial features of the approaches in New South Wales and 
Queensland has been the explicit guidance provided to the industrial parties, a guidance that 
recognises the contested and protracted nature of pay equity claims, and the shortcomings in 
recent pay equity regulation. Additionally it can be argued that the approach adopted in New South 
Wales and Queensland, with their focus on undervaluation, has facilitated both the onset of equal 
remuneration applications and the outcomes that have been achieved. The approach taken by way 
of the ERPs in these jurisdictions has elevated the objective of equal remuneration and addressed 
some of the inertia in gender pay equity that had been apparent after the immediate breakthroughs 
of the 1969 and 1972 equal pay cases.  
This was a matter explicitly considered by the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission 
when considering whether an explicit ERP was required, given that the parties had recourse to 
Special Case and Work Value principles. The New South Wales Commission determined that a 
QHZSULQFLSOHZDVUHTXLUHGDVVHVVLQJWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V(TXDO3D\3ULQFLSOHKDGEHHQ
largely overlooked, and that WKDWDQXSGDWHGSULQFLSOHZDVUHTXLUHGµUDWKHUWKDQOHDYLQJ
XQGHUYDOXDWLRQFODLPVWREHSURFHVVHGXQGHUWKH6SHFLDO&DVHSULQFLSOH¶(Re Equal Remuneration 
Principle (2000) 97 IR 177 at [62]).The Commission addressed also the capacity of the existing 
Work Value Principle to address claims for equal remuneration. It was firmly of the view that this 
Principle was not suitable, given that it imposed requirements concerning a change in work value 
and time limits to date and limit the period of change. It accepted (at [@WKDWµWKRVHUHTXLUHPHQWV
might work an injustice because, for instance, no work value assessments had been conducted 
SULRUWRWKHUHOHYDQWGDWHV¶ 
Additional guidance in a new federal ERP on what comprises gender-based undervaluation would 
ideally direct parties to the type of evidence that may signal potential gender-based undervaluation, 
but note that claims still need to be assessed on a case by case basis. In its first decision in the 
federal SACS FDVHWKH)XOO%HQFKLQGLFDWHGLWVFRQFHUQVDERXWZKDWLWWHUPHGDQµLQGLFLD¶
approach to demonstrating undervaluation. It rejected an approach whereby applications would 
simply rest on demonstrating that the work featured in the application shared or paralleled the 
dimensions of undervaluation featured in the Queensland ERP.  
Nevertheless, what the SACS case )XOO%HQFKGHVFULEHGDVDµIUDPHZRUN¶IRUXQGHUYDOXDWLRQUDWKHU
WKDQDµSUHVFULSWLYHIRUPXOD¶PD\VWLOOEHDEDVLVIRUDQ\SRWHQWLDOSULQFLSOH,QGHHGWKH)XOO%HQFK
clearly relied on some of the dimensions outlined in the Queensland ERP to reach a view that the 
work in the SACS industry was undervalued on a gender basis. The key features here, as noted 
above, were the feminised nature of the industry, the female characterisation of the caring work in 
the industry, and the low incidence of enterprise bargaining. This would indicate that even if not 
formulated into a principle or framework these dimensions remain relevant in the conduct of equal 
remuneration proceedings. The benefit of a framework approach is the guidance given to the 
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parties. Dimensions included in the framework would represent an acknowledgement of factors that 
have been accepted in previous inquiries and tribunal decisions as shaping the undervaluation of 
feminised work. These dimensions may not be apposite or determinative in all cases, but either 
singly or more likely collectively, they may provide guidance as to whether the work under review 
has been undervalued on a gender basis. 
6.6.2 What should a federal ERP look like? 
Our view is that if the Commission were to adopt an ERP, the principle should provide a clear 
statement indicating that applications are to be assessed on the basis of historical and 
contemporary gender-based undervaluation, without the requirement to establish discrimination. 
Likewise, the principle should expressly state that an application need not be underpinned by 
reference to a male comparator. As an example, the Queensland ERP (see section B.3.2) states 
that gender discrimination is not required to establish undervaluation, and nor are comparisons 
within or between occupations and industries. 
Any new federal ERP should be clear as to where it applies and provide guidance on how work is 
to be assessed, including by setting out a non-exhaustive list of matters that may guide the 
Commission in its consideration of whether past assessments of the work and its remuneration 
have been affected by the gender of the workers. Put simply, the ERP should at least suggest the 
steps required to demonstrate that undervaluation was gendered or had a gender-associated 
cause. 
These matters could be identified as a framework rather than as a prescriptive formula and contain 
appropriate safeguards, including a direction that claims are to be assessed on a case by case 
basis. As discussed, the Queensland ERP carries explicit guidance as to the matters that may be 
considered in assessing undervaluation. These marker points have been referenced by the 
4XHHQVODQG&RPPLVVLRQLQLWVDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH3ULQFLSOH6XFKPDUNHUSRLQWVLQFOXGHµwhether 
the work has EHHQFKDUDFWHULVHGDV³IHPDOH´whether the skills of female workers have been 
undervalued and ... whether sufficient weight has been placed on the typical work, skills and 
responsibilities exercised by women, working conditions and other relevant work features¶Re 
Equal Remuneration Principle (2000) 97 IR 177). It recognises also that the different starting points 
of men and women in the labour market may have shaped the value of feminised work. The 
4XHHQVODQG(53LQSDUWLFXODUQRWHVWKDWDVSHFWVRIZRPHQ¶VODERXUPDUNHWSDUWLFLSDWLRQmay 
have influenced the valuation of their work. These include the degree of occupational segregation, 
the disproportionate representation of women in part-WLPHRUFDVXDOZRUNZRPHQ¶VORZUDWHVRI
unionisation and their low representation in workplaces covered by formal or informal work 
DJUHHPHQWV7KHODWWHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQKDVIDFLOLWDWHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VXVHRIHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQ
components to remedy undervaluation. 
There should also be specific guidance concerning assumptions about the merit or otherwise of 
prior work value assessments, and an emphasis on the importance of new assessments of work 
value. As an example both the New South Wales and Queensland ERPs facilitate the possibility 
that current rates of pay are not properly set but do not require a comparator based-methodology to 
demonstrate this outcome. Undervaluation can be demonstrated by showing that current rates of 
SD\DUHQRWLQDFFRUGZLWKWKHWULEXQDO¶VFXUUHQWDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHYDOXHRIZRUN 
The principle should provide clarity about its reliance on the construct of work value, in addition to 
other relevant work value features as a means of assessing the value of work. The principle should 
also underpin the importance of gender-neutral determinations of work value in ensuring that rates 
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of pay are properly set. As explained in Chapter 2, the ILO¶V(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ Convention 
underlines the importance of objective appraisals of work. 7KHFRQFHSWRIµHTXDOYDOXH¶UHTXLUHVD
method of measuring and comparing the relative value of different jobs. The Convention provides 
for the promotion of objective job appraisal on the basis of the work to be performed, where this will 
assist in giving effect to the provisions of the Convention. Recognising different contexts, the 
Convention provides for flexibility in the appraisal methods that can be used. In Australia, work 
value has been and should continue to be the method relied upon by industrial tribunals.  
As noted earlier, we do not regard the Fair Work Act as precluding the Commission from 
considering in Part 2-7 proceedings whether work performed by female or mostly female workers 
has been properly valued, despite the availability of a separate process for work value adjustment. 
Work value determinations made by tribunals may also be informed by external and internal 
assessments of job value, including those provided by an analytical job evaluation scheme. It may 
be the case that analytical job evaluation approaches have more direct application in proceedings 
that concern a claim confined to a single workplace or organisation. The clear objective is that the 
assessment of work value addresses, without gender bias, all factors relevant to the work. The 
Commission may wish to utilise measures that are taken up in international jurisdictions. This could 
include the use of tribunal-appointed expert panels or a requirement for parties to agree on experts 
to undertake a work value assessment, using an analytical job evaluation process to value the work 
cited in the application and any comparator(s). The role of the Commission could be to oversee 
that an objective appraisal processes free of gender bias was used by the experts and correctly 
applied, and on the basis of this and other evidence make work value assessments. 
It is possible also for the Commission to build safeguards into the principle. For example, the New 
South Wales Commission consciously built some of the safeguards from the New South Wales 
Work Value Principle into its ERP (see section B.2.2). This can be seen, for example in the 
requirement that alterations to wage relativities be based on the work, skill and responsibility 
required, including the conditions under which the work is performed (para (g)); in the guidance as 
to how any undervaluation is to be addressed (para (h)); in thHFDUHWREHWDNHQDJDLQVWµGRXEOH
FRXQWLQJ¶SDUDMDQGLQWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHSKUDVHµFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKHZRUNLV
SHUIRUPHG¶SDUDO 
6.7 Evidence in equal remuneration proceedings 
Both the equal remuneration proceedings in New South Wales and Queensland surveyed in 
Appendix B, and the SACS case in the federal jurisdiction, provide some guidance on the type of 
evidence germane to considerations of undervaluation. We note that in the New South Wales and 
4XHHQVODQGSURFHHGLQJVWKHSDUWLHV¶HYLGHQFHZDVVKDSHGE\WKHWHUPVRIWKH(53VLQWKRVH
MXULVGLFWLRQV,QVRPHRIWKRVHFDVHVWKHWULEXQDO¶VZRUNZDVDVVLVWHGE\WKHSDUWLHVVXEPLWWLQJDQ
agreed statement of facts. 
In previous proceedings the evidence has primarily been directed to demonstrating the 
undervaluation or otherwise of the work central to the application, including linking the 
undervaluation to gender or a gender associated cause. It is likely that the types of evidence 
outlined below may not be considered not only in isolation, but in a cumulative way, as the 
research reviewed in Chapter 5 indicates that multiple, reinforcing and intersecting factors impact 
on the GPG. As an example the undervaluation of the skills/qualifications, effort (physical, mental 
or psychosocial), responsibilities and working conditions (physical and psychological aspects) 
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associated with feminised work, may be reinforced by differences in the types of jobs held by men 
and women and the method of setting pay for those jobs.  
Provided below is a discussion of what we consider to be a helpful approach to evidence in equal 
remuneration proceedings, based on the material gathered in earlier chapters.  
6.7.1 Award history 
Compilation of an award history can, in our view, provide a foundation for reviewing the 
assessment of work value for the relevant areas of work. This should include an account of the 
timing and scope of any work value assessments made by previous industrial tribunals. If there 
were work value assessments, it should be indicated what classifications were involved, what 
criteria were applied, what evidence was considered, and what were the key outcomes. A further 
consideration includes the use, if any, of benchmark relativities. It may be the case that there has 
been an absence of work value assessments. Equally those assessments that were conducted 
may not have assessed the value of the work correctly, and the work may have been inadequately 
or incorrectly described. A key feature of the approaches in New South Wales and Queensland has 
been their recognition of this possibility, particularly concerning the work performed by women. 
Alternatively parties may rely on evidence which indicates that work value assessments already 
undertaken have assessed the value of the work correctly. Award histories may also involve the 
construction of timelines on the movement of rates for key classifications, and assessing changes 
in the relativities between classifications. A key focus would be examining whether the description 
of the work and the classification structure encompasses the scope of the work as practised, 
including all of the factors comprised by the work. An area for consideration may be skills identified 
through a skills assessment (see section 6.8.2) or that the ILO has identified as typically excluded 
or underestimated in the valuation of work (see Oelz et al 2013: 38±47). These are summarised in 
Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Frequently overlooked skills 
Skills Knowing emergency procedures when caring for people 
Using a number of computer software and database formats 
Operating and maintaining different types of office, manufacturing, treatment, diagnosis or 
monitoring equipment 
Manual dexterity in giving injections, typing or graphic arts 
Writing corresponGHQFHIRURWKHUVPLQXWHWDNLQJSURRIUHDGLQJDQGHGLWLQJRWKHU¶VZRUN 
Handling complaints 
Innovating ± developing new procedures, solutions or products 
Establishing and maintaining manual and automated filing or records management and disposal 
Training and orientating new staff 
Dispensing medication to patients 
Continuing reordering and reprioritizing tasks to meet external demands 
Interpersonal skills ± including non-verbal communication, knowing how to create the right 
atmosphere, counselling someone through a crisis 
Gathering and providing information for people at all levels in the organization 
Physical and 
emotional demands 
 
Adjusting to rapid changes in office or plant technology 
Concentrating for long periods ± computers or manufacturing equipment 
Performing complex sequences of hand eye coordination in industrial jobs 
Providing a service to several people or departments while working under a number of 
simultaneous deadlines 
Frequent bending or lifting ± including adults or children 
Regular light lifting 
Restricted movement, awkward positions 
Providing caring and emotional support to individuals (e.g. children or those in institutions) 
Dealing with upset, injured, irate, hostile or irrational people 
Dealing with death and dying 
Exposure to corrosive substances or materials e.g. skin irritations from cleaning 
Responsibility Acting on behalf of absentee supervisors 
Representing the organization through communication with clients and the public 
Supervising staff 
Shouldering the consequences of errors to the organization 
Managing petty cash 
Keeping public areas such as waiting rooms and offices organized 
Preventing possible damage to equipment 
Coordination of schedules for a number of people 
Developing work schedules 
Product quality 
Working conditions Stress from noise in open spaces, crowded conditions and production noise 
Exposure to disease 
Cleaning offices, stores, machinery or hospital wards 
Long periods of travel and/or isolation 
Stress from dealing with complaints 
Source: Oelz et al 2013: 40±1 
If there have been changes in work requirements, for example increased or altered regulatory 
requirements, it should be indicated whether these are recognised in classification structures. An 
additional consideration is the role of the award in the regulation of occupational entry points and 
whether particular classifications require a specific qualification. This analysis may be accompanied 
by reviewing the training and credentialing frameworks that operate within the occupation/industry 
and their history. Also relevant to the assessment of the description of the work is whether it has 
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been characterised in an explicitly or implicitly gendered way, or features skills and knowledge that 
may not have been assessed or valued properly.  
The history needs to deal with how the traditional criteria of work value ± especially skill, 
qualifications, and working conditions ± have been approached by industrial parties and tribunals. 
Showing undervaluation requires demonstrating that significant elements of work value have not 
been taken into account nor given enough weight in evaluating the work. The use of this type of 
evidence in the recourse to undervaluation would be to identify failures in the prior assessment, 
characterisation or valuation of feminised work.  
It is also of course open to the parties, if they are relying on a single comparator or a range of 
comparators, to assess the pattern of work description, rate of pay, and work value considerations 
for those comparators as well.  
6.7.2 Evidence to assist an assessment of the work 
It is open to the parties to prepare other material that may inform the assessments of the value of 
the work, including whether it is undervalued, or alternatively, valued correctly. This evidence may 
supplement or complement the work that is prepared as part of the award history. It may include: 
x Witness statements, or material that assists to identify all the components of work that is 
required in particular positions, and within the occupation or industry concerned. This would 
include attention to components of work value ± the skills and knowledge required to complete 
the work and the conditions under which it is performed. 
x Material to support a contention that there has been a change in work value, for example 
altered compliance or regulatory requirements, that is not presently recognised in classification 
descriptions. 
It is open also to the parties to present the results of objective assessments of indicative work that 
fall within the application. These assessments may be sourced from independent job assessment 
experts.  
There are newly developed resources available to the parties to assess whether previous job 
evaluations and any resultant grading that they rely upon are free from gender-bias. As an 
example, the Gender-inclusive Job Evaluation and Grading Standard is a voluntary standard 
developed by Standards Australia through a Standards Development Committee. The Committee 
comprised job evaluation and grading specialists, equity specialists, and representatives from the 
Australian Human Resources Institute, employer groups and unions. It is a standard that has 
particular application to analytical job evaluation approaches, setting out requirements about how 
job evaluation and grading can be done free of any effects of gender. It describes the use of 
analytical job evaluation as well as approaches to the use of role profiles, slotting and grading 
techniques, depending on the nature of the job evaluation required.  
To assist in its use, the Workplace Gender Equality Agency (WGEA) has produced a guide to the 
Standard which can be used in conjunction with it (WGEA 2013b). The main requirements of the 
Standard relate to ensuring that (WGEA 2013b: 7):  
x The plan for the job evaluation and grading project includes how the gender equity objectives will 
be met;  
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x Committee or group members are selected on a fair and clearly stated basis appropriate for the 
coverage of the project;  
x Participants in the project, including internal and external job evaluation and grading practitioners, 
and members of committees (job evaluation and grading committees, reference panels, steering 
committees) have appropriate education and training for their roles. The training needs to cover the 
job evaluation and grading system, its implementation and its gender equity objectives;  
x The job evaluation and grading system selected (including its factors or elements, and their 
weighting) can fully and fairly measure the significant components of all jobs being evaluated, 
without gender bias;  
x The benchmark sample for evaluation and grading is sufficiently representative of the range and 
distribution of all the jobs being evaluated and graded;  
x The job information used in job evaluation and grading is relevant and sufficient for job evaluation 
and grading free of gender bias;  
x The job evaluation and grading process consistently applies the job evaluation and grading system 
without gender bias;  
x The outcomes of evaluation and grading (factor by factor and overall rank order) are checked for 
consistency, and validated by the organisation;  
x Appropriate appeal processes enable testing and redress of any gender bias in evaluation and 
grading, including processes for checking how the appeals process is working;  
x Slotting of jobs not fully evaluated is conducted analytically, systematically and appropriately;  
x Job descriptions and evaluations are kept current; and  
x Grading structures and systems are soundly based, and consistently applied, free of gender bias. 
A further example is a skill recognition tool, Spotlight, which was developed by the New Zealand 
Department of Labour and has also been taken up in Australia. The tool featured in a pilot project 
by the EOWA40 to assess classification descriptoUVLQ$XVWUDOLDµVPRGHUQDZDUGV7KHSURMHFW
explored the potential contribution of the skills identification framework and job skills analysis tool 
provided by Spotlight in developing and promoting more gender-inclusive ways of defining, 
classifying and grading jobs (Junor et al 2012).41 Such products are designed as an aid to naming 
and classifying skills that are required to carry out work activities effectively, but that are hard to 
describe and easy to overlook. These skills have been identified by research as being historically 
poorly described, such as social and organisational skills. They involve shaping and sharing 
awareness, interacting and relating, integrating action and reflection, and coordinating activities at 
a point in time and over time. Different levels of these skills are required in different jobs, but the 
levels do not always neatly match formal qualifications. The Spotlight tool offers a methodology for 
identifying these skills so as to enhance existing skills recognition approaches, including job 
evaluation (New Zealand Department of Labour 2009: 5).This tool may assist the parties identify, 
                                                     
40 Now the Workplace Gender Equality Agency. 
41 The tool was relied upon by the applicants in the federal SACS case; see also witness statement of Dr Anne Junor, 16 
June 2010. 
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describe and classify skills that may have been excluded from classification description structures 
and descriptors, and so inform an assessment that all elements of the work have not been 
considered in work value assessments. 
Additionally, the many guidelines and toolkits which have been developed in a number of the 
countries covered in this report, through either equal pay commissions, human rights commissions 
or labour departments, can assist with the process of guiding employers, workers and also 
tribunals with some of the features which should be taken into account when assessing whether 
work is of equal value and in particular whether the work of women has been accorded its proper 
value.  
6.7.3 Labour market profile and earnings data 
Occupational and industry data disaggregated by gender may provide some guidance on 
employment patterns. This may include the degree to which relevant occupations are either 
feminised or masculinised, in addition to patterns of vertical and horizontal segregation by gender 
within the occupation or industry. This data may include patterns of full-time and part-time 
employment, including areas of concentration of part-time employment and the degree of 
unionisation. As noted in Chapter 5, however, this data may be at an aggregate level and may not 
always align neatly to the scope of the work in the application for an equal remuneration order. 
To this data, parties may add additional material that would assist the &RPPLVVLRQ¶V understanding 
of the sector. Further labour market profile data may include the duration of paid and unpaid 
overtime, employees by age group, qualifications attained and data on workforce shortages. 
Additional material may also address the overview, history and profile of the sector, its economic 
contribution, the breakdown by employment size of organisations in the sector, and any particular 
funding arrangements. 
Wage patterns and methods of pay setting disaggregated by gender may provide some guidance 
on the degree of award reliance, and the extent of enterprise bargaining for those areas of work 
that fall within the application. It is likely that initially this data will be drawn from sources such as 
the ABS or the HILDA Survey. But in time data may also be drawn from information collected either 
for or by the WGEA, under the new reporting requirements set out in the Workplace Gender 
Equality Act 2012 (see section A.7). In its comments on the draft version of this report, the WGEA 
(2013a: 2) noted that any data it collects will be aggregated and no individual or individual business 
will be able to be identified.42 The WGEA noted further that µthe current reporting matters do not 
address these issues¶. 
It is open to the parties to bring forward additional evidence, including from labour economic 
studies, with a view to drawing conclusions about the factors that contribute to the gender wage 
gap, and submitting that the portents of undervaluation are in evidence or not evident. This material 
may also draw on material concerning wage patterns and methods of wage setting in addition to 
occupational and industry data. As discussed in Chapter 5 these studies frequently rely on 
aggregate data sets that, in all probability, will not parallel the scope and incidence of the award or 
agreement cited in the application for equal remuneration orders. 
                                                     
42 See Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 s 14. 
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6.7.4 Applications concerning a single workplace 
In applications for equal remuneration orders that are confined to a single workplace or 
organisation, it is likely that evidence similar to that outlined above will be presented but localised 
to the particular organisation or workplace. In this instance it may be possible to utilise material 
submitted by the organisation to the WGEA, including an a analysis of earnings that provides a 
level and breakdown of different components of wages (base pay, over-award or over-agreement 
pay, bonuses and so on), by factors including occupation, gender and hours of work. Additional 
PDWHULDOPD\LQFOXGHDQRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VUHPXQHUDWLRQSROLF\RUVWUDWHJ\; the gender pay equity 
objectives, if any, which are included in the remuneration policy or strategy; whether any gender 
remuneration gap analysis has been undertaken and, if so, when; and the actions taken, if any, as 
a result of a gender remuneration pay analysis. 
As the WGEA (2013a: 2) has noted, any personal information (including salary data) collected by it 
is subject to privacy and confidentiality restrictions.43 Clearly, the WGEA cannot undertake to 
provide data relating to the remuneration of individual employees to the Commission, or to parties 
involved in proceedings before the Commission. Nor is the WGEA permitted to release private 
LQIRUPDWLRQUHODWLQJWRDSDUWLFXODUHPSOR\HUZLWKRXWWKDWHPSOR\HU¶VFRQVHQW%XWLQRXUYLHZWKHUH
would be nothing to prevent an employer involved in equal remuneration proceedings from 
choosing to defend an application by relying on material that it has prepared for submissions to the 
WGEA, provided that no employee is identified. Nor should there be any problem in another party 
being able to use material of this kind that an employer has chosen to make public. 
6.8 Concluding comments 
The material reviewed for this report indicates that the objective of equal remuneration for men and 
women workers for work of equal or comparable value poses a series of complex challenges for 
policy makers, industrial parties, courts and tribunals. 
Central to this challenge have been the difficulties in addressing and assessing the concept of 
equal or comparable value, in addition to understanding and accepting how gender has shaped a 
wide range of intersecting institutional and social processes, such that women were not receiving 
equal remuneration for work of equal or comparable value. 
6.8.1 National and international dimensions 
Our review demonstrates that the objective of equal remuneration is approached in diverse ways 
around the developed world. This diversity is not contrary to ILO Convention No 100 on Equal 
Remuneration, Article 2 of which emphasises that countries may support the objective of equal 
remuneration µE\PHDQVDSSURSULDWHWRWKHPHWKRGVLQRSHUDWLRQIRUGHWHUPLQLQJUDWHVRI
UHPXQHUDWLRQ¶(TXDOO\, while Article 3 of the Convention emphasises the importance of the 
µREMHFWLYHDSSUDLVDORIMREVRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHZRUNWREHSHUIRUPHG¶, the methods of job appraisal 
µPD\EHGHFLGHGXSRQE\WKHDXWKRULWLHVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIUDWHVRIUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶ 
The legal, social and political context in each country, including its approach to wage 
determination, will inevitably influence the nature and scope of equal remuneration claims. 
Compared to the international jurisdictions reviewed in Chapter 2 and Appendix C, it is far more 
                                                     
43 See in particular Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 ss 13C, 14, 14A; and 32. 
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likely that claims for equal remuneration orders in Australia will have application to an industry, and 
thus to multiple workplaces. In contrast, cases concerning equal remuneration in most international 
jurisdictions are more likely to concern a single workplace or organisation. This is not to suggest, 
however, that applications in Australia cannot be confined to a single workplace and concern, for 
example, the rates of pay in an enterprise agreement. There is nothing to prevent the Commission 
or the parties from referring to, considering, or finding some guidance or confirmation from 
practices evident in international jurisdictions; but clearly this examination needs to be tempered by 
an appreciation that these approaches may be shaped by the different regulatory apparatus 
evident in those jurisdictions. 
Differences in the institutions and policy frameworks established to address equal remuneration 
also influence the scope of the matters that fall to be considered and decided. It is likely that 
Australian tribunals, in addressing claims for equal remuneration, will not just assess the 
contemporary value of the work in question, but consider the factors that have contributed to the 
undervaluation (if any) of that work cited in the application and determine an appropriate remedy. 
Tribunals or authorities established to address equal remuneration in other countries may not have 
so broad a responsibility or jurisdiction. 
6.8.2 Relevance of the State jurisdictions 
Historically, attempts to address gender pay equity issues, both locally and internationally, have 
enjoyed only partial success. In relation to Australia, the material reviewed for the report showed 
that at a federal level, the 1972 principle of equal pay for work of equal value was not applied in full, 
while the impact of the 1993 equal remuneration legislation was limited by the requirement for 
applicants to demonstrate that earnings differences were a result of sex discrimination. These 
limitations are important to understanding the emergence of undervaluation as an approach utilised 
by industrial tribunals to hear applications for equal remuneration orders, to ensure that the 
objective of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal or comparable value 
is met. 
The emergence of new equal remuneration principles in the New South Wales and Queensland 
jurisdictions, founded on the concept of undervaluation, has inevitably influenced discussion of the 
most effective forms of federal equal remuneration regulation. A key similarity between the three 
regimes lies in the JRYHUQLQJFRQFHSWRIHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIµHTXDOor comparable 
vDOXH¶<HWWKHUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUNVLQ1HZ6RXWK:DOHVDQG4XHHQVODQGDUHQRWLGHQWLFDODQG
there are differences between these frameworks and that provided in the Fair Work Act.  
7KHILUVWNH\GLIIHUHQFHFRQFHUQVWKHGLVFUHWLRQDU\QDWXUHRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSRZHUWRLVVXHHTXDO
remuneration orders under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act. In New South Wales and Queensland, 
the relevant tribunals are required to ensure equal remuneration. As noted in section 3.4.3, there is 
no such imperative in the Fair Work Act. Thus in contrast to the provisions in New South Wales and 
Queensland, the objective of equal remuneration in the Fair Work Act is simply one of a number of 
factors to which the Commission must have regard in setting and adjusting minimum rates of pay.  
A second potential area of difference concerns the capacity for applicants to pursue simultaneous 
claims for both equal remuneration orders and µwork value¶ wage adjustments. In the SACS case 
the Full Bench of FWA pointed out that WKHHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQSURYLVLRQVLQWKH)DLU:RUN$FWµDUH
directed not at undervaluation itself, but at undervaluation which is gender-EDVHG¶ER Case No 1 
at [266]). As noted in section 3.4.5, this conclusion supports the view that the two types of claim are 
QRWWREHUHJDUGHGDVµFRPPHQVXUDWH¶LQQDWXUHOn this reasoning the bare possibility of a work 
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value claim should not be treated under section 721 as barring an application for an equal 
remuneration order. However given the different (and lower) standard required under section 724, 
ZKLFKSUHFOXGHVWKHSXUVXLWRIµDOWHUQDWLYH¶UHPHGLHVLQUHODWLRQWRHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQit does not 
necessarily follow that an applicant could simultaneously pursue both types of claim before the 
Commission, as has generally been done in the New South Wales and Queensland pay equity 
proceedings.44 
$WKLUGDUHDRIGLIIHUHQFHFRQFHUQVWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶$QRUGHUXQGHU3DUW-7 of 
the Fair Work Act is eYLGHQWO\WREHGLUHFWHGWRUDWHVRIµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶, and can, subject to the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGLVFUHWLRQVWLSXODWH rates that are higher than the minimum rates set by a relevant 
award for the same employees. In other words, and just as with the Queensland provisions, but in 
contrast to the provisions in New South Wales, the Commission can regulate over-award 
payments. This is apparent, for reasons recently discussed, not only from the fact that the equal 
remuneration order provisions are separated from those relating to minimum rates of pay in Part 2-
6 of the Fair Work Act, but from the confirmation in section 306 that an order can override the terms 
of an otherwise applicable enterprise agreement. 
A final point of distinction between the provisions in State jurisdictions and those available under 
the Fair Work Act concerns the regulatory provisions for the making of policy or principles. In 
Queensland section 288 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 provides that the QIRC may make a 
statement of policy about an industrial matter, whether or not a matter is before it. Arguably this 
capacity facilitated the determination of the Queensland ERP, directly following the Queensland 
Pay Equity Inquiry and legislative amendments in that jurisdiction. This is not to suggest that there 
are impediments to the making of principles in New South Wales, or under the Fair Work Act, but 
simply to note that the process for the making of the ERP in Queensland differed from that in New 
South Wales. 
6.8.3 Discretionary considerations under the Fair Work Act 
In determining whether to make an equal remuneration order under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act, 
the Commission must give due consideration to the objects of the Act. This was a matter raised by 
a number of employer organisations in their responses to the draft version of this report (AFEI 
2013: 11; ACCI et al 2013: 8±9; Livingstones 2013: 2±3).  
As detailed in section 3.4.3, the Commission is obliged by section 302(4), in determining whether 
or not to make an equal remuneration order, to have regard to any reasons given by the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V([SHUW3DQHOLQFRQGXFWLQJLWVDQQXDOUHYLHZVRIPLQLPXPZDJHUDWHV. By contrast, it 
is not constrained by either the modern awards objective set out in section 134 or the minimum 
wages objective in section 284, since neither of those provisions applies in its terms to an exercise 
of power under Part 2-7 (see also ER Case No 1 at [229]). Additionally the Commission need not 
conceive of an equal remuneration order as being part RIWKHµVDIHW\QHW¶RIPLQLPXPWHUPVDQG
conditions under the Fair Work Act. That safety net, as section 3(b) makes clear, is provided by the 
NES, modern awards and national minimum wage orders. On the other hand, the Commission 
must balance the requirement to perform its functions in relation to equal remuneration under Part 
                                                     
44 It may be noted that section 66 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) is cast in similar terms to section 724 of the Fair 
Work Act. But the QIRC does not appear to have considered whether this would preclude simultaneous claims of the type 
advanced in cases such as Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Queensland Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry Ltd (2009) 191 QGIG 19. 
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2-7 against the need to have regard to the general objects set out in section 3 of the Act. These 
objects are broad-ranging but encompass the QHHGWRPDLQWDLQDµfair, relevant and enforceable¶
safety net, an emphasis on enterprise-level bargaining, protections against unfair treatment and 
discrimination, and a direction towards economic prosperity and social inclusion.  
In our opinion, the approach to Part 2-7 adopted by the Commission in the SACS case was 
consistent with those objects. So too would be the development of an ERP of the type we have 
recommended. But we also acknowledge that there is scope for a range of different views about 
how the Commission should exercise its discretion under Part 2-7. 
In particular, 9LFH3UHVLGHQW:DWVRQ¶VGLVVHQWLQJMXGJPHQWLQWKHSACS case raised a number of 
issues about the interpretation of Part 2-7 that may be taken up in future proceedings. A key 
feature of his decision was the conclusion that the applicants had failed to demonstrate that any 
undervaluation of work in the SACS sector was gender-based. On this point he drew specific 
attention to what he termed a µOHJLWLPDWHFRPSDUDWRU¶, and noted that the DSSOLFDQWVKDGµQRWVRXJKW
WRPDNHFRPSDULVRQVEHWZHHQZRPHQ¶VSD\DQGPHQ¶VSD\¶. The Vice President was concerned 
also about the applicantV¶ reliance on comparisons with the public sector. He linked his 
interpretation to the approaches used in other countries, which (as noted above in section 6.8.1) 
generally do not feature industry-EDVHGDSSOLFDWLRQV9LFH3UHVLGHQW¶V:DWVRQ¶V approach plainly 
differs from that evident in New South Wales and Queensland, where tribunals have taken the view 
that gender-based binary comparisons are not required to make a finding of gender-based 
undervaluation. 
The reasoning relied on by Vice President Watson raises a broader point about the use of 
comparators in Part 2-7 proceedings. As noted by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Western Australia (2013: 1) in its comments on the draft version of this report, the Full Bench in the 
SACS FDVHµGLGQRWindicate that it was unnecessary for an applicant to identify any comparator 
whatsoever¶LWPHUHO\KLJKOLJKWHGthe absence of a requirement for applicants to utilise a valid male 
comparator group. In its response to the draft report, Local Government NSW (2013: 1) pressed its 
FDVHWKDWµUHOLDEOHFRPSDUDWRUVDUHHVVHntial to the exercise of power found in Part 2-7 of the Fair 
:RUN$FW¶7KLVLVVXHRIZKHWKHUWKHUHDUHDQ\FRQVWUDLQWVRQWKHW\SHRIFRPSDULVRQVDSSOLFDQWV
might rely upon is a matter to which the Commission may return in future proceedings. The same 
can be said of whether the Commission decides that comparator reference points (whether broad 
or more specific) are necessary to a finding of, and remedy for, gender-based undervaluation. 
A further issue raised by Vice President Watson in his dissenting judgment concerned what he 
assessed to be a tension between the type of wage increases provided by the equal remuneration 
order in the SACS FDVHDQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VREOLJDWLRQVXQGHUWKHHQWHUSULVHEDUJDLQLQJ
provisions of the Fair Work Act. Once again, this is a matter that will fall to the discretion of the 
Commission in its assessment of any application before it. If the Commission believes that 
enterprise-level bargaining is likely to be dissuaded by the making of an equal remuneration order, 
that will no doubt be an important factor to be considered. Of course, much may turn in that regard 
on how widespread such bargaining has been in practice in the relevant sector or enterprise(s), or 
is likely to be in the future.45 
                                                     
45 Compare in this regard the evidence as to the barriers to enterprise bargaining in the SACS sector: see eg ER Case No 1 
at [170]±[174]. 
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An additional matter for assessment conFHUQLQJWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI3DUW-7 is 
whether the SACS case embodied a particular set of circumstances that may not be repeated in 
future proceedings. A particular feature of that case ZDVWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK¶VGHFLVLRQWRIXQGa 
substantial part of the cost of any wage increases awarded by the Commission. The 
&RPPRQZHDOWKJRYHUQPHQW¶VIXQGLQJDQQRXQFHPHQWGLGQRWfigure LQWKH)XOO%HQFK¶VILQGLQJWKDW
there was gender-EDVHGXQGHUYDOXDWLRQEXWGLGIHDWXUHLQWKHPDMRULW\¶VGHFLVLRQFRQFHUQLQg 
remedy. The majority noted the importance of the announcement, but also that there were parts of 
the industry that were not government funded. With this in mind the majority determined an eight 
rather than six year implementation period for the awarded increases (ER Case No 2 at [65], [67]). 
Rather than seeing the funding announcement as setting the SACS case apart from other types of 
proceedings, however, it is perhaps more pertinent to observe that the financial impact of any wage 
increases, whether through an equal remuneration order or through other means, is a matter to 
which the Commission has historically given weight, and which will inevitably influence the exercise 
of its discretion. 
A further distinct feature of the SACS case concerned the methodology relied upon by the 
applicants to demonstrate the extent of undervaluation that was gender-based. As explained in 
section 4.6.1, this was a proxy methodology, whereby the applicants relied on a study that 
assessed the degree of care work at each level of the modern award classification scale and used 
µFDULQJZRUN¶DVDSUR[\IRUJHQGHU-based undervaluation. Critical here was the centrality of caring 
ZRUNWRWKH)XOO%HQFK¶V0D\GHFLVLRQWKDWZRUNLQWKH6$&6LQGXVWU\ZDVXQGHUYDOXHG 
Whether this type of approach will be applicable to all proceedings, or relied upon by all future 
applicants, will depend on whether the Commission continues to direct parties to this form of 
empiricism. Another factor for consideration is whether it is practically possible for applicants to 
replicate the proxy of µFDULQJZRUN¶LQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQFRQFHUQHGRUto establish another proxy that 
is linked to a finding of gender-EDVHGXQGHUYDOXDWLRQLQDZD\DQDORJRXVWRWKH)XOO%HQFK¶V
conclusions about caring work in the SACS case. These are challenges that the Commission will 
no doubt need to consider carefully, especially if it chooses (as we have suggested) to establish an 
ERP. 
6.8.4 A matter for the Commission 
The preceding discussion has highlighted the fact that addressing and resolving matters of gender-
based undervaluation, within the framework of the Fair Work Act, is neither automatic nor 
straightforward. Yet the capacity for equal remuneration orders, together with the development in 
regulation provided by the undervaluation approach, contributes to a changed regulatory 
framework to address equal remuneration. Australia is in a unique position by reason of its award 
structures to address gender pay equity, although the objective of equal remuneration is by no 
means confined to award-reliant workers. Award rates of pay can also have an influence on other 
wage outcomes given the role of the award safety net in influencing over-award payments or 
collectively bargained rates (Pointon et al 2012: 4). Equally, measures to address gender pay 
equity and gender equality more generally are not confined to those available under the Fair Work 
Act, and include, as an example, reporting under the Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (see 
section A.7). 
In this chapter we have assessed the emergence of key concepts in the development of recent 
equal remuneration regulation, and also highlighted an approach that we assess would facilitate 
the conduct of proceedings under Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act. In doing so we acknowledge that 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
125 
Part 2-7 carries the potential to be interpreted and applied in different ways to those that we have 
suggested in this report. It is for the Commission to decide how the Act should be interpreted, and 
how applications for equal remuneration orders should be handled. But we hope that the data and 
analysis presented in this report may inform parties to future proceedings about frameworks (be 
they an ERP or otherwise) which could lay down clear markers for the task of establishing (or 
refuting) gender based undervaluation. 
  
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
126 
Appendix A: Development of equal remuneration regulation in the 
federal jurisdiction 
This Appendix provides a general review of the treatment of equal remuneration in the federal 
jurisdiction in Australia prior to the enactment of Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). In broad 
terms, five stages of development can be identified: 
x WKHµEUHDGZLQQHU¶PRGHORIZDJHGHWHUPLQDWLRQ 
x measures shaped by wartime labour shortages; 
x the 1969 equal pay for equal work principle; 
x the 1972 equal pay for work of equal value principle; and 
x the introduction in 1993 of a statutory right to seek equal remuneration orders, including 
subsequent amendments in 1996 and 2005. 
This review assists in understanding the development of principles of equal pay and equal 
remuneration and places the current provisions in Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act in their proper 
historical context. The material identifies the types of evidence and submissions that tribunals have 
considered in their assessment of equal remuneration matters, and identifies the rationale for shifts 
in their approach to equal remuneration. Where available, the review identifies research that 
assesses the utility of particular approaches to pay equity regulation. At the end of the Appendix, 
brief mention is made of two other regulatory regimes with the potential to impact upon pay equity: 
sex discrimination laws and affirmative action legislation. A timeline of federal equal remuneration 
regulation which identifies key developments and cases reviewed in this Appendix is located in 
section A.8.  
This Appendix relies extensively on, and reproduces material contained in, an earlier report on 
equal remuneration principles (Romeyn et al 2011: 3±24).46  
A.1. The breadwinner model of wage determination 
For most of the twentieth century the issue of equal remuneration was addressed, if at all, through 
the general process of wage fixation. Under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), a 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was established to deal with industrial 
disputes that extended beyond the limits of any one State. Where such a dispute concerned the 
wages or other conditions to be afforded to a group of employees, the Court could resolve the 
dispute by making an award, a legally binding instrument that stipulated what were usually 
regarded as minimum entitlements. Over time, a network of such awards was created, some 
operating across whole industries or occupations, others confined to a single enterprise. These 
awards did not cover all Australian employees. Managerial and professional employees were 
generally excluded, at least in the private sector, leaving their wages to be set by private contract. 
Furthermore, many trade unions were content to operate within the parallel conciliation and 
arbitration (or wages board) systems that operated in each of the States, rather than creating the 
µLQWHUVWDWH¶GLVSXWHVQHFHVVDU\WRDWWUDFWWKHIHGHUDOWULEXQDO¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ,QGHHGuntil the Victorian 
arbitration system was dismantled by the Kennett Government in the 1990s, State awards covered 
                                                     
46 In particular, in sections A.3, A.4.1, A.4.2. A.5.1, A.5.2, A.5.3, A.5.4, A.5.5 and A.5.6 below. 
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more employees in total than the federal system. But as the twentieth century wore on, it was the 
federal tribunal that came to be treated as the predominant regulator of minimum wages. 
The wage fixing process that emerged under the federal arbitration system had a number of 
distinctive features. One was a willingness to set not just a single minimum wage, of the type found 
in other countries, but thousands of different wage rates, for different jobs in different industries. 
Besides basic wage rates, there were also special loadings, allowances and penalty rates for work 
performed in various conditions, or at certain times of the day or week, or in a particular capacity 
(for instance as a casual or a shiftworker). Another feature was the practice of having a regular test 
case ± usually once a year ± to review wage rates in selected awards and determine whether to 
grant any generalised wage increase. In these national wage cases, the tribunal would establish 
DQGLIQHFHVVDU\UHYLVHDVHWRIµZDJHIL[LQJSULQFLSOHV¶WKDWZRXOGJXLGHWKHUHVROXWLRQRIIXWXUH
applications to set or vary minimum wage rates. 
Early wage fixation was explicitly gendered. The pay received by men and women in the paid 
workforce was treated differently, reflecting wider social conceptions of men working full-time as 
IDPLO\µEUHDGZLQQHUV¶5\DQ	&RQORQ±3). The initial construction of the minimum or 
EDVLFZDJHLQZKLFKZDVWKHILUVWFRQFUHWHH[SUHVVLRQRIDµOLYLQJZDJH¶LQIHGHUDOZDJH
fixing, was based on the average weekly expenditure of an unskilled male worker with a wife and 
three children (Buchanan et al 2004: 123). When Justice Higgins established the basic wage in the 
Harvester decision of 1907 (Ex Parte H V McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1), he based his calculations on 
what it would cost for a working man to support his wife and a family of three children. The basic 
ZDJHZDVSUHGLFDWHGRQDµQHHGV¶EDVLVZKLFK+LJJLQVIDPRXVO\GHVFULEHGDVµWKHQRUPDOQHHGVRI
the averaJHHPSOR\HHUHJDUGHGDVDKXPDQEHLQJOLYLQJLQDFLYLOL]HGFRPPXQLW\¶Men were 
expected to support the family and separate arrangements to ensure that a woman could and 
might have to maintain her income from her paid work were not contemplated. This was a construct 
WKDWHIIHFWLYHO\HUHFWHGDEDUULHUEHWZHHQPHQ¶VDQGZRPHQ¶VZRUN0DFLQW\UH 
The Fruit Pickers Case of 1912 (5XUDO:RUNHUV¶8QLRQYMildura Branch of the Australian Dried 
Fruits Association (1912) 6 CAR 61) was the first to examine the principle of equal work for equal 
SD\DQGWKHYDOXHRIZRUNSHUIRUPHGE\ZRPHQ,QWKLVFDVH-XVWLFH+LJJLQVUHMHFWHGWKHXQLRQV¶
demand for equal pay for equal work. He explained that the minimum wage was premised on a 
consideration that an average employee with a wife and children had a legal obligation to provide 
for his family, whereas a woman had no such obligation. Consequently Justice Higgins established 
wage setting principles that resulted in two streams of female rates. The first stream applied where 
cheaper female labour could be deemed to place male jobs at risk. In these circumstances, Justice 
Higgins determined that women should be paid the same rates as men to avoid displacing men 
IURPHPSOR\PHQW7KHVHFRQGVWUHDPRSHUDWHGZKHUHZRPHQ¶VZork could not be deemed to 
place male labour at risk (because of gendered labour market segmentation). Here women were 
granted a proportion of the male rate, because it was presumed that they did not need to support a 
family. 
In the Theatrical Case (1917) 11 CAR 133, Justice Powers determined a living wage for females 
DQGUHLQIRUFHG-XVWLFH+LJJLQV¶YLHZWKDWWKHZDJHVKRXOGEHDVVHVVHGRQWKHEDVLVRIWKH
assumed needs of the sexes, rather than by reference to their productivity or other factors. In 1919 
the female basic wage was set at 54 per cent of the male basic wage: see Federated Clothing 
Trades of the Commonwealth of Australia v Archer (1919) 13 CAR 647 at 709; Thornton 1981: 469. 
Following the depression this ratio was maintained, even though the crLWHULRQRIµFDSDFLW\WRSD\¶
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UDWKHUWKDQµQHHGV¶FDPHWRGRPLQDWHWKHDSSURDFKRIWKH&RQFLOLDWLRQDQG$UELWUDWLRQ&RXUWLQ
assessing the male basic wage.  
The basic wage was set by reference to the needs of unskilled labour and was incorporated into 
awardVHLWKHUDVWKHXQVNLOOHGODERXUHUV¶ZDJHRUDVDFRPSRQHQWRIWKHZDJHVHWIRUDVNLOOHG
ZRUNHU7KHDPRXQWVLQH[FHVVRIWKHEDVLFZDJHZHUHµPDUJLQV¶RUµPDUJLQVIRUVNLOO¶+DQFRFN
2013: 243±62). In some industries women earned the same margins for skill as men, while in 
others they earned varying percentages of the male skilled rate, with no consistent pattern 
prevailing. General increases in margins came to be determined by test cases undertaken under 
the Metal Trades Award, which became a reference point for marginal rates in other awards 
(Hawke 1969). 
The rate of 54 per cent was for a considerable period the predominant benchmark for women, 
although female process workers were granted 66 per cent of the male rate Hancock 2013: 326±7). 
The application of these principles resulted in three models of female wages: jobs where equal pay 
was granted as male employment would be under threat by women earning lower wages; jobs 
where women earned between 54 and 75 per cent of the male rate on both the basic wage and the 
skill margin, where a margin applied; and jobs where women earned the same skill margin as men, 
but (based on the concept of the family wage) a lower basic wage (Short 1986: 316). 
A.2. The impact of wartime labour shortages 
The issue of gender pay equity came under scrutiny during the Second World War due to the 
LPSDFWRIODERXUVKRUWDJHV,QWKH&XUWLQ*RYHUQPHQWHVWDEOLVKHGWKH:RPHQ¶V(PSOR\PHQW
%RDUGWRRYHUFRPHODERXUVKRUWDJHVDQGVHWZRPHQ¶VZDJHUDWHVZKHUHZRPHQZHUHSHUIRUPLQJ
traditionaOPDOHZRUN7KH:RPHQ¶V(PSOR\PHQW%RDUGZDVUHTXLUHGWRVHWWKHVHUDWHVDWEHWZHHQ
60 to 100 per cent of the male rate (Butlin & Schedvin 1977: 33).  
The operation of the Board came under challenge both from the Senate of the Australian 
Parliament and employers and resulted in anomalies between those women in paid work who fell 
XQGHUWKH%RDUG¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDQGWKRVHWKDWUHPDLQHGRXWVLGHLW7KHEDVLVRIZDJHGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
also carried some distinctive features, including an emphasis on the productivity and efficiency of 
ZRPHQ¶VZRUNUHODWLYHWRWKDWRIPHQ¶VZRUNZLWKDSSOLFDWLRQWRERWKEDVLFZDJHVDQGPDUJLQV
(Ryan & Conlon 1975: 125). The Board ultimately made 299 decisions on 548 applications and set 
proportionate rates between 75 per cent and 100 per cent (Ryan & Conlon 1975: 136±7).  
In July 1944 the federal government passed the National Security (Female Minimum Wage) 
Regulations, which extended the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court in fixing basic 
wages in industries considered vital in wartime (Ryan & Conlon 1975: 133). Following a review 
FRPSOHWHGLQ)HEUXDU\WKH&RXUWGHWHUPLQHGWKDWZRPHQ¶VSD\ZDVQRWXQQHFHVVDULO\ORZD
measure of the dependency of wartime industries on cheap female labour. The legislature 
intervened in the form of new national security regulations and determined that women working in 
required vital industries would receive no less than 75 per cent of the male minimum (Curthoys 
1975: 94; Ryan & Conlon 1975: 134). The effect of this series of institutional arrangements was 
that it dictated uneven wage arrangements for women in paid work (Baldock 1988: 37±8).  
Following the special arrangements of the war years, the full powers of the Commonwealth 
Arbitration Court were restored. Given the circumstances of wage determination during the war, the 
1949±50 Basic Wage Inquiry was faced with an uneven pattern of wage determination. Evidence 
presented to the Inquiry noted that many women were already being paid more than the traditional 
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54 per cent of the male rate and that there was a shortage of labour (Short 1986: 317). In these 
circumstances, the Court decided to increase the female basic wage for all jobs to 75 per cent of 
the male basic wage: Basic Wage Inquiry, 1949±50 (1950) 68 CAR 735. Marginal payments 
followed the same pattern and rose to 75 per cent of the male margin (although the proportion of 
the margin for skill that was paid to women continued to vary across awards and jurisdictions). For 
some women doing previously male work this meant a decrease from their wartime rates and some 
industrial unrest resulted. For other women, however, it meant increased rates (Ryan & Conlon 
1975: 140±1; Short 1986: 317). 
Notwithstanding wartime measures the next significant impetus to gender pay equity measures 
was provided by the decision of the ILO in 1951 to adopt the Equal Remuneration Convention. 
Following this measure, unions lodged a further equal pay claim in 1952 with the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court. This was countered by employer claims for a 44-hour week, a lower basic wage 
and for women to receive 60 per cent of the male rate. In its decision the federal tribunal 
maintained its reliance on the needs principle as justifying the difference between male and female 
basic wages, although it rejected the HPSOR\HU¶VFODLPIRUDUHGXFWLRQLQWKHEDVLFZDJHRQWKH
basis that the existing rate of 75 per cent had not contributed to increased unemployment or 
significantly higher wage costs: Basic Wage and Standard Hours Inquiry 1952±1953 (1953) 77 
CAR 477; Curthoys 1988: 138. 
A.3. The 1969 Equal Pay Case   
In the 1967 National Wage Case (1967) 118 CAR 655, the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission (a body which had replaced the Court in 1956) abandoned the practice of 
awarding separate increases to the basic wage and margins in separate proceedings and 
introduced the concept RIDµWRWDOZDJH¶7KLVPHDQWWKDWLQFUHDVHVWRZDJHUDWHVWKDWZHUHEDVHG
on economic reasons would be applied to the whole wage in national wage cases. References to 
the basic wage were to be deleted from awards and award rates were to be expressed as a single 
ILJXUHµWRWDOZDJH¶$ZDUGLQJDPDOHWRWDOZDJHWKDWLQFRUSRUDWHGERWKWKHEDVLFZDJHZLWKLWVQHHGV
FRPSRQHQWDQGWKHVNLOOPDUJLQSURYLGHGDUHIHUHQFHSRLQWIRUDVVHVVLQJWKHYDOXHRIZRPHQ¶V
work, based solely on work value criteria. The Commission also decided to award the same 
general wage increase to both men and women. In its reasons for awarding the same increase for 
men and women, the Commission referred to changing social attitudes to women in the workplace 
DQGVRFLHW\¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIVH[Xal equality. The Commission also suggested (at 660) that the 
FRQFHSWRIHTXDOSD\IRUHTXDOZRUNZDVRQHWKDWUHTXLUHGWKRURXJKLQYHVWLJDWLRQDQGGHEDWHµLQ
ZKLFKDSROLF\RIJUDGXDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHG¶ 
The introduction of the total wage DQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHPDUNVLQWKHFDVHKHOSHGWRVHWWKH
stage for the 1969 Equal Pay Case (1969) 127 CAR 1142. Additional developments that provided 
significant impetus to that case included growing public opinion in support of the principle of equal 
pay; and the urgency and impetus given to the campaign for equal pay by feminists in the late 
1960s and 1970s (Smith 2010: 4±5; Sheridan & Stretton 2008: 150±1). 
In 1969, a Full Bench of the Commission heard an application, lodged by unions, to increase 
female wages to eliminate the difference between male and female wage rates irrespective of the 
work they performed. The ACTU argued that the needs method of wage determination was 
DQDFKURQLVWLFDVZDVWKHSUDFWLFHRIXQHTXDOSD\JLYHQZRPHQ¶VJURZLQJODERXU market 
participation. The ACTU also submitted that capacity to pay arguments, which it anticipated forming 
a key element in employer submissions, were no longer relevant given the climate of economic 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
130 
prosperity and relatively low levels of unemployment. WRPHQ¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQVDOVRLQWHUYHQHGWR
support the union submissions and emphasised the changing status and role of women and the 
need to remove gender based discrimination. Employer groups argued that the differences 
between male and female wage rates weUHQRWVROHO\EDVHGRQVH[GLVFULPLQDWLRQEXWRQPHQ¶V
more significant family and social responsibilities. The Commonwealth stated that it supported the 
principle of equal pay, provided that four conditions were met: the work performed by females 
should be the same or substantially the same as that performed by males under the same award; 
females must perform the same range and volume of work as males; females must perform the 
work under the same conditions as males; and the work must not be work essentially or usually 
performed by females. 
The Commission found that the concept of equal pay was difficult to define and apply with 
precision. It noted that, although the international conventions referred to by the parties 
represented international thinking on the matter, the conventions had not been ratified by Australia 
and their meaning in an Australian context was by no means clear. It acknowledged that these 
conventions should carry significant weight in a general way, but stated that they must be 
considered within the Australian context of wage fixation. The Commission indicated that it was 
influenced by the position of the States, which had been implementing the principle of equal pay 
progressively since 1958 through equal pay legislation (see section B.1), and the fact that the 
majority of women were covered by State awards. 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQUHMHFWHGWKHXQLRQ¶VDSSOLFDWLRQWRLQFUHDVHDOOIHPDOHZDJHVLQOLQHZLWKPDOH
wage rates, stating that before rates could be increased the equality of the work must first be 
determined and that no increase should be awarded without an examination of the work done. The 
Commission also found that gradual implementation would address economic concerns. It 
established principles to be applied in deciding future applications, which revealed a number of 
SRLQWVRIVLPLODULW\ZLWKWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK¶VSRVLWLRQ 
These principles (see Equal Pay Case (1969) 127 CAR 1142 at 1158±9) included: 
1. the male and female employees concerned, who must be adults, should be working under the 
same determination or award; 
2. it should be established that certain work covered by the determination or award is performed by 
both males and females; 
3. the work performed by both the males and the females under such determination or award should 
be the same or a like nature and of equal value, but mere similarity in name of male and female 
classifications may not be enough to establish that males and females do work of a like nature; 
4. for the purpose of determining whether the female employees are performing work of the same or a 
like nature and of equal value as the male employees the Arbitrator or the Commissioner, as the 
case may be, should in addition to any other relevant matter, take into consideration whether the 
female employees are performing the same work or work of a like nature as male employees and 
doing the same range and volume of work as male employees under the same conditions; 
5. consideration should be restricted to work performed under the determination or award concerned; 
6. in cases where males and females are doing work of the same or a like nature and of equal value, 
there may be no appropriate classifications for that work. In such a case, appropriate classifications 
should be established for the work which is performed by both males and females and rates of pay 
established for that work. The classifications should not be of a generic nature covering a wide 
variety of work; 
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7. in considering whether males and females are performing work of the same or like nature and of 
equal value, consideration should not be restricted to the situation in one establishment but should 
extend to the general situation under the determination or award concerned, unless the award or 
determination applies to one establishment; 
8. WKHH[SUHVVLRQRIµHTXDOYDOXH¶VKRXOGQRW EHFRQVWUXHGDVPHDQLQJµRIHTXDOYDOXHWRWKHHPSOR\HU¶
but as of equal value or at least of equal value from the point of view of wage or salary assessment; 
9. notwithstanding the above, equal pay should not be provided by application of the above principles 
where the work in question is essentially or usually performed by females but is work upon which 
male employees may also be employed.  
The Commission also provided that any pay increases were to be phased in over four years. 
A.4. The equal pay for work of equal value principle 
A.4.1. The 1972 Equal Pay Case 
In 1972 a Full Bench of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission was asked to 
consider whether the male minimum wage should apply to females and to formulate new principles 
in relation to equal pay for equal work: see National Wage and Equal Pay Cases 1972 (1972) 147 
CAR 172. 
A key impetus for the 1972 proceedings arose from the limited impact of the 1969 equal pay 
principle. This limitation was evident because the principles allowed parties to apply to vary award 
rates only on the basis of comparisons made within an award, and only where it could be shown 
that women were performing the same work as men, and did not extend to awards where work was 
performed predominantly by women. This construction limited the remedies that flowed from the 
decision to women who worked in identical jobs to men where there were separate and disparate 
male and female rates of pay. Only 18 per cent of women covered by federal awards had received 
wage increases and pay parity with male workers as a result of the 1969 decision.  
The Commission rejected the claim for a single minimum wage on the basis that the minimum 
wage was determined on factors unrelated to the work performed and included a family 
component; a concept which had previously been accepted by all parties and advanced by the 
unions in previous wage cases. The Commission noted the limited application of the 1969 decision, 
amendments since 1969 to legislation in State jurisdictions, as well as legislative developments in 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand which marked changed approaches towards equal pay for 
IHPDOHV,WDOVRQRWHGWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK*RYHUQPHQW¶VVXSSRUWIRUWKHFRQFHSWRIHTXDOSD\IRU
work of equal value and concluded that the 1969 concept of equal pay for equal work was too 
narrow and required expansion in light of changing social circumstances ((1972) 147 CAR 172 at 
178): 
,QRXUYLHZWKHFRQFHSWRIHTXDOSD\IRUHTXDOZRUNLVWRRQDUURZLQWRGD\¶VZRUOGDQGZHWKLQNWLPHKDV
come to enlarge the cRQFHSWWRµHTXDOSD\IRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶7KLVPHDQVWKDWDZDUGUDWHVVKRXOG
be considered without regard to the sex of the employee. 
The Commission also rejected the idea of creating a general principle for conducting work value 
reviews, on the basis WKDWWKLVDSSURDFKZRXOGEHµXQZLHOG\¶,WFRQFOXGHGWKDWDJHQHUDOSULQFLSOH
applied by individual Commissioners was likely to obtain better results. In addressing the likely cost 
of the implementation of equal pay for work of equal value, the Commission acknowledged that 
there would be a substantial increase in total wages bills, but suggested that the community was 
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prepared to accept these costs and that they could be reduced by phasing in over a period of two 
and a half years (at 178): 
We recognise ... that the increase in the total wages bill as a result of our decision will be substantial but 
its effect will be minimised by the method of implementation which we have adopted. In our view the 
community is prepared to accept the concept of equal pay for females and should therefore be prepared 
to accept the economic consequences of this decision. 
The Commission did not rescind the 1969 principles, which it said would continue to apply in 
appropriate cases. However, it developed a new principle of equal pay for work of equal value 
which was based on work value comparisons being performed to determine the value of the work 
µZLWKRXWUHJDUGWRWKHVH[RIWKHHPSOR\HHVFRQFHUQHG¶)RUWKHSXUSRVHRIDVVHVVLQJWKHYDOXHRI
the work, comparisons could be made between male and female classifications within an award. 
However, where such comparisons were unavailable or inconclusive, for example where the work 
was performed exclusively by females, the principle allowed comparisons to be made between 
female classifications within the award or in different awards. It also acknowledged that in some 
cases comparisons with male classifications in other awards might be necessary and that problems 
might be encountered, particularly where cross-award comparisons were involved.  
The principle was stated as follows (at 179±80): 
1. 7KHSULQFLSOHRIµHTXDOSD\IRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶ZLOOEHDSSOLHGWRDOODZDUGVRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ
%\µHTXDOSD\IRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶ZHPHDQWKHIL[DWLRQRIDZDUGUDWHVE\DFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKH
work performed irrespective of the sex of the worker. The principle will apply to both adults and 
juniors. Because the male minimum wage takes into account family consideration it will not apply to 
females. 
2. Adoption of the new principle requires that female rates be determined by work value comparisons 
without regard to the sex of the employees concerned. Differentiations between male rates in 
awards of the Commission have traditionally been founded on work value investigations of various 
occupational groups or classifications. The gap between the level of male and female rates in 
awards generally is greater than the gap, if any, in the comparative value of work performed by the 
two sexes because rates for female classifications in the same award have generally been fixed 
without a comparative evaluation of the work performed by males and females. 
3. The new principle may be applied by agreement or arbitration. The eventual outcome should be a 
single rate for an occupational group of classification which rate is payable to the employee 
performing the work whether the employee be male or female. Existing geographical differences 
between rates will not be affected by this decision. 
4. Implementation of the new principle by arbitration will call for the exercise of the broad judgement 
which has characterised work value enquiries. Different criteria will continue to apply from case to 
case and may vary from one class of work to another. However, work value inquiries which are 
concerned with comparisons of work and fixation of award rates irrespective of the sex of 
employees may encounter unfamiliar issues. In so far as those issues have been raised we will 
comment on them. Other issues which may arise will be resolved in the context of the particular 
work value inquiry with which the arbitration is concerned. 
5. We now deal with issues which have arisen from the material and argument placed before us and 
which call for comment or decision. 
a. The automatic application of any formula which seeks to by-pass a consideration of the work 
performed is, in our view, inappropriate to the implementation of the principle we have 
adopted. However, pre-existing award relativities may be a relevant factor in appropriate 
cases. 
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b. Work value comparisons should, where possible, be made between female and male 
classifications within the award under consideration. But where such comparisons are 
unavailable or inconclusive, as may be the case where the work is performed exclusively by 
females, it may be necessary to take into account comparisons of work value between female 
classifications within the award and /or comparisons of work value between female 
classifications in different awards. In some cases comparisons with male classifications in 
other awards may be necessary. 
c. The value of the work refers to worth in terms of award wage or salary fixation, not worth to 
the employer. 
d. Although a similarity in name may indicate a similarity of work, it may be found on closer 
examination that the same name has been given to different work. In particular this situation 
may arise with respect to junior employees. Whether in such circumstances it is appropriate to 
establish new classifications or categories will be a matter for the arbitrator. 
e. In consonance with normal work value practice it will be for the arbitrator to determine whether 
differences in the work performed are sufficiently significant to warrant a differentiation in rate 
and if so what differentiation is appropriate. It will also be for the arbitrator to determine 
whether restrictions on the performance of work by females under a particular award warrant 
any differentiation in rate based on the relative value of the work. We should, however, 
indicate that claims for differentiation based on labour turnover or absenteeism should be 
rejected. 
f. The new principle will have no application to the minimum wage for adult males which is 
determined on factors unrelated to the nature of the work performed.  
A.4.2. Implementation and assessment of the 1972 Equal Pay Case 
The equal pay decisions of the late 1960s and early VKDGDVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWRQZRPHQ¶V
wages and contributed to a narrowing of the GPG. The 1972 principles remedied key deficiencies 
of the 1969 case and provided the opportunity for the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission to make comparisons between different classifications of work within and across 
awards. From 1969 to 1977, average minimum wages for female employees rose from 72 to 92 per 
cent of the average minimum award wages for male employees (Eastough & Miller 2004: 258). The 
gender pay equity ratio increased from 64 per cent in 1967 to 80.1 per cent in 1980²an increase 
of 16.1 percentage points over a 13 year period (Smith 2009: 653). Analysts have suggested that 
changes of this magnitude could not be explained by market factors related to supply and demand 
or human capital improvements, and must be attributed in large part to the institutional 
developments (Gregory & Duncan 1981: 426; Gregory 1999: 277; Whitehouse 2001: 66). 
However, a number of commentators have argued that the 1972 principles failed to achieve their 
full potential, pointing to the plateau in gender pay equity ratios following the anticipated surge in 
ZRPHQ¶VZDJHVLQWKHZDNHRIWKHGHFLVLRQ.LGG	0HQJContributing factors 
identified in these analyses include: 
x limited attempts to address work value issues (Short 1986: 325); 
x barriers to properly establishing the value of feminised occupations, continuing a long history 
RIDVVXPSWLRQVRIZRPHQ¶VZRUNEHLQJVHPL-skilled or unskilled and the difficulty that industrial 
WULEXQDOVKDYHKDGLQSURSHUO\YDOXLQJWKHµVNLOOVH[KLELWHGDFTXLUHGDQGXVHGE\ZRPHQLQ
WUDGLWLRQDORFFXSDWLRQV¶6FXWW 
x the significant number of cases where the 1972 principle was applied through award variations 
by consent without substantive work value inquiries (Thornton 1981: 473, 477±80; Bennett 
1988: 540±1; Rafferty 1994: 453±4; Smith 2009: 655). 
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&HQWUDOWRWKHVHDQDO\VHVZHUHWKHGLIILFXOWLHVHQGHPLFLQDQ\DSSURDFKEDVHGRQµZRUNYDOXH¶
These difficulties were reflected in the limited work value applications lodged by unions in the wake 
RIWKHGHFLVLRQZKHUHZRPHQ¶VZRUNZDVURXWLQHO\FRPSDUHGDJDLQVWPDOHGRPLQDWHG
classifications or benchmarks. Such a strategy did not address the segregated nature of the labour 
market and was incapable of addressing the subtle, structural barriers to the industrial recognition 
of work value. It excluded consideration of problems concerning the reward of skill and career 
progression in feminised industries and jobs, and the effects of maternity and parenting on labour 
market participation. The remedy provided by such strategies all too often focused on women 
gaining equality through matching the ideals and attributes of a masculinist standard (Phillips 1987: 
19).  
A.4.3. The 1974 National Wage Case 
The 1972 decision was followed in 1974 by one which extended the concept of the male minimum 
wage to women. In the National Wage Case 1974 (1974) 157 CAR 293, the Australian Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission (as the federal tribunal was now known) decided to establish one 
minimum wage for adults, replacing the separate minimum adult male and female rates. The 
Commission specified a female minimum wage in the 1974 case, though only for the purpose of it 
being phased out.  
The concept of a male minimum wage had its origins in 1966 and had been further enshrined in 
1967 when (as we have seen) the federal tribunal abandoned the practice of basic wages and 
margins and introduced the total wage. In 1966 the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission introduced a minimum wage that was higher than the basic wage for males in order to 
raise the wages of the low paid in circumstances where no one could be found who was still being 
paid the basic wage (Short 1986: 320).The abandonment of gender-related assumptions regarding 
ZRUNHUV¶QHHGVDQGWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIRQHPLQLPXPZDJHIRUDGXOWVSURYLGHGDILUPHUEDVLVIRU
DVVHVVLQJZRPHQ¶VZRUNEDVHGRQZRUNYDOXHFULWHULD6KRUW 
A.4.4. The 1986 Comparable Worth Case 
The period preceding the 1986 Comparable Worth Case was characterised by significant change in 
Australian wage fixing arrangements. The operation of the Salaries and Wages Pause Act 1982 
(Cth) had inhibited the pursuit of wage claims. This situation laid the groundwork for a Prices and 
Incomes Accord (the Accord) between the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the 
Labor Government, an agreement which at that stage addressed the return of centralised wage 
fixing, the implementation of nominated features of the social wage, and a no extra claims 
commitment on the part of unions. Following the Accord, the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission in the National Wage Case October 1983 (1983) 4 IR 429 lifted the wage freeze and 
established a set of wage fixing principles that provided explicit criteria for wage increases outside 
of indexation. 
The 1986 Comparable Worth Case (Re Private Hospitals and Doctors Nurses (ACT) Award 1972 
(1986) 13 IR 108) arose from an application for wage increases for nurses employed under the 
3ULYDWH+RVSLWDOV¶DQG'RFWRUV¶1XUVHV$&7$ZDUG. The applicant unions, the Royal 
$XVWUDOLDQ1XUVLQJ)HGHUDWLRQ5$1)DQGWKH+RVSLWDO(PSOR\HHV¶)HGHUDWLRQRI$XVWUDOLD+()
supported by the ACTU, sought a series of rulings from the Commission. The RANF sought the 
variation on the basis that the 1972 equal work for equal pay principle had not been implemented 
for nurses. The Council of Action for Equal Pay argued that the Commission should adopt the 
SULQFLSOHRIµFRPSDUDEOHZRUWK¶DFRQFHSWWKHQSDUWRIWKHHTXDOSD\GHEDWHLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
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as a wage fixing principle which would allow for the rates of women in predominantly female 
occupations to be reassessed on a case-by-case basis. The Commonwealth and employers 
emphasised the distinctions between approaches based on comparable worth and the concept of 
work valuation traditionally applied by the Commission, and argued that the claim should be 
pursued through the anomalies and inequities provision of the wage fixing principles. 
In its decision the Commission rejected the use of comparable worth as a means of applying the 
1972 equal pay for work of equal value principle. In affirming the continued availability of the 1972 
SULQFLSOHWKH&RPPLVVLRQUHMHFWHGWKH$&78¶V submissions as to the method of processing the 
FODLPV,QWKLVUHJDUGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHJDUGIRUWKHFXUUHQWZDJHIL[LQJSULQFLSOHVZDV
paramount. It drew attention to that part of the 1983 principles which noted that all increases in 
wages, other than those for prices and productivity movements, should be in accordance with 
those principles. In rejecting the argument that the concept of comparable worth should be used to 
implement the 1972 equal pay principles, the Commission indicated its unease with the concept 
and concern that its acceptance as a wage fixing principle would open a floodgate of applications in 
other areas, which could undermine centralised wage fixation ((1986) 13 IR 108 at 113): 
It is clear that comparable worth and related concepts, on the limited material before us, have been 
applied differently in a number of countries. At its widest, comparable worth is capable of being applied 
to any classification regarded as having been improperly valued, without limitation on the kind of 
classification to which it is applied, with no requirement that the work performed is related or similar. It is 
capable of being applied to work which is essentially or usually performed by males as well as to work 
which is essentially or usually performed by females. Such an approach would strike at the heart of long 
accepted methods of wage fixation in this country and be particularly destructive of the present Wage 
Fixing Principles. 
The Commission also observed that on introduction of the Equal Pay Principle in 1972, it had 
specifically rejected in its wage setting principles assessing equal pay for work of equal value on 
WKHEDVLVRIµZRUWKWRWKHHPSOR\HU¶3ULQFLSOHF 
Although the Commission rejected the arguments for implementing comparable worth, it advised 
the parties that the equal pay for equal work principle remained available to awards which had not 
implemented the principle, and could be accessed through the anomalies and inequities principle of 
the then wage fixing principles. The wage fixing principles defined a limited range of bases which 
could be used to justify wage increases other than by indexation. The unions subsequently pursued 
their claims through this mechanism (5H3ULYDWH+RVSLWDOV¶	'RFWRUV¶1XUVHV$&7$ZDUG
(1987) 20 IR 420) and this was also a route utilised in equal pay cases in the public sector (Rafferty 
1994). 
A.5. A legislative entitlement to equal remuneration 
A.5.1. The 1993 and 1996 provisions 
The issues left unresolved by the comparable worth proceedings came under direct policy focus in 
1993±94 when the Industrial Relations Act 1988, which had replaced the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1904 as the main federal industrial law, was amended to enshrine the objective of 
equal remuneration for men and women. These amendments were enacted through the Keating 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VIndustrial Relations (Reform) Act 1993. In addition to equal remuneration the 
legislation marked a significant change in Australian industrial relations. It was intended to focus 
the industrial relations system on collective bargaining at the workplace or enterprise level as the 
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primary method of determining wages and employment conditions, although awards were still 
retained as a µVDIHW\QHW¶7KH&RPPRQZHDOWKDOVRXVHGLWVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSRZHURYHUµH[WHUQDO
DIIDLUV¶WRHVWDEOLVKQHZPLQLPXPHQWLWOHPHQWVbased on ILO standards (Pittard 1994). The point of 
using the external affairs power, rather than the conciliation and arbitration power on which federal 
industrial laws had traditionally been based, was to permit conditions to be set directly for workers, 
without any link to the presence or threat of an industrial dispute. 
In relation to equal remuneration, the changes involved the inclusion of a new Division 2 of Part 
9,$WLWOHGµ(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQIRU:RUNRI(TXDO9DOXH¶LQWKHIndustrial Relations Act 1988. 
$FFRUGLQJWRVHFWLRQ%$WKHVWDWHGREMHFWRIWKH'LYLVLRQZDVWRJLYHHIIHFWWRWKHµ$QWL-
Discrimination Conventions¶DWHUPGHILQHGWRLQFOXGHWKH(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQDV
ZHOODVWKH,/2¶V(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ1RDQG'LVFULPLQDWLRQ(PSOR\PHQW
and Occupation) Recommendation (No 111). However, to guard against the possibility of a 
challenge to the validity of Division 2 under the external affairs power, the Division was given an 
additional operation by s 170BI, allowing it to apply in circumstances where there was a potential 
industrial dispute over the issue of equal remuneration. As it transpired, in Victoria v 
Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 the High Court upheld the validity of Division 2 under both the 
external affairs and conciliation and arbitration powers.  
Division 2 empowered the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (as the federal tribunal had 
now become) to issue equal remuneration orders ± effectively increases in pay ± if an order was 
QHFHVVDU\WRVHFXUHµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶,PSRUWDQWO\GHILQLWLRQVZHUH
covered in section 170BB which provided: 
(1) A reference in this division to equal remuneration for work of equal value is a reference to equal 
remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value. 
(2) An expression has in subsection (1) the same meaning as in the Equal Remuneration Convention. 
1RWH$UWLFOHRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQSURYLGHVWKDWWKHWHUPµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQZRUNHUV
IRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶UHIHUVWRUDWHVRIUHPXQHUDWLRQHVWDEOLVKHGZLWKRXWGLVFULPLQDWLRQEDVHGRQVH[ 
Orders could only be made under section 170BC if the Commission was satisfied that: 
x the employees to be covered by the order did not have equal remuneration for work of equal 
value (section 170BC(3)(a)); 
x making such an order would give effect to one or more of the Anti-Discrimination Conventions 
or ILO Recommendation No 111 (section 170BC(3)(b)); 
x the application had been made by an employee or trade union entitled to represent the 
interests of the employees to be covered by the order, or by the Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner (section 170BD; and 
x no adequate alternative remedy was available under a State or Territory law (section 
170BE(a) and (b)). 
,QWKH+RZDUG*RYHUQPHQW¶VWorkplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
1996 substantially amended the Industrial Relations Act 1988, renaming it as the WR Act. 
However, the equal remuneration provisions were retained with only minor changes.  
Following their proclamation in March 1994, there were only 18 applications in total under the new 
equal remuneration provisions, four of which arose from claims for equal remuneration at HPM 
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Industries and David Syme & Co. Only one claim was arbitrated and no equal remuneration orders 
were made by the Commission (Smith 2009: 658; 2010: 11). The key cases are outlined in the 
sections that follow. 
A.5.2. The first HPM case 
In the first HPM case (Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries 
Union v HPM Industries ,5WKH$XVWUDOLDQ0DQXIDFWXULQJ:RUNHUV¶8QLRQ$0:8
made an application to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission for equal remuneration on 
behalf of the process and packer workers of HPM industries at its Darlinghurst site in Sydney . The 
employees concerned were employed under the Metal Industry Award 1984. A Full Bench was 
constituted to hear the matter, but following submissions from the Metal Trades Industry 
Association that the power to refer matters to a Full Bench was confined to matters involving an 
industrial dispute, the Full Bench decided it could not hear the matter. The matter was referred to a 
Commissioner for hearings and, in late 1997, proceeded to arbitration. The matter was considered 
a test case and, in addition to the submissions of the parties, there were submissions from a 
number of intervening parties. 
The union argued that the majority of process and packer workers were women who performed 
work of equal value to work performed by the general hands store persons at HPM, who were all 
men. In support of its claim that the work of process workers was equal to that of general hands, 
and the work of packers was equal to that of general hands and store persons, the union sought to 
rely on the competency standards process in the award. It argued that, even though the store 
persons and general hands were classified at C14 and C13 in the award, their rates of pay 
exceeded that of women process workers and general packers who had been assessed at higher 
competency levels within the award. The union claimed that this difference in remuneration 
occurred because over-award payments were made to male general hands and store persons, 
which were not available to women process workers.  
HPM contended that the nature of the work of process workers and packers was substantially 
different from that of store hands and general store persons and that high staff turnover of general 
hands and store persons had been alleviated by higher rates of pay for the general hands. The 
employer also argued that using the award classifications and competency standards as the only 
measure of work value failed to consider other elements which determined wage rates, such as 
work intensity, the heavier nature of the work and need for product knowledge. HPM claimed that 
the competency standards were not designed to be used for work value comparisons and could not 
account for over-award payments. 
In assessing what was required of applicants, Commissioner Simmonds noted that the legislation 
required the CommLVVLRQWREHVDWLVILHGDVDµILUVWVWHS¶WRPDNLQJDQRUGHUWKDWWKHUHOHYDQWUDWHV
RIUHPXQHUDWLRQZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGµZLWKRXWGLVFULPLQDWLRQEDVHGRQVH[¶± the test enshrined in 
Article 1 of the Equal Remuneration Convention ((1998) 94 IR 129 at 159). The Commissioner 
considered the definition of discrimination that should be applied for this purpose and decided that 
it would be undesirable for the Commission to follow two different definitions of discrimination; one 
for its award making functions and another for the purpose of equal remuneration orders. The 
Commissioner therefore decided (at 159) to adopt the definition of discrimination adopted by a Full 
Bench of the Commission in the Third Safety Net Adjustment and Section 150A Review, October 
1995 (1995) 61 IR 236, rather than the definition contained in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984. The 
)XOO%HQFK¶VGHILQLWLRQGLVWLQJXLVKHGGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGSURYLGHGWKDWDW±8): 
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Direct discrimination occurs when a person is treated less favourably in the same circumstances than 
someone of a different race, colour, sex, sexual preference, age, marital status, religion, political opinion, 
national extraction or social origin would be; or is treated differently in relation to pregnancy or physical 
or mental disability or family responsibilities. 
Indirect discrimination occurs when apparently neutral policies and practices include requirements or 
conditions with which a higher proportion of one group of people than another in relation to a particular 
attribute can comply, and the requirement or condition is unreasonable under the circumstances. 
To determine whether there had been different treatment of men and women in the same 
circumstances²and, therefore, direct discrimination²the Commissioner considered whether, on 
the basis of the information before the Commission, the work in question was of equal value. On 
this point, the Commissioner decided that there was no agreement between the parties to the use 
of competency standards as a method of determining the equivalence of the work. Further, in the 
absence of agreement about the equivalence of the work, the Commissioner considered that the 
competency standards process was not appropriate to establish equivalence. While the 
Commissioner found that WKHFRPSHWHQF\VWDQGDUGVSURYLGHGµDQREMHFWLYHDQGJHQGHUQHXWUDO
PHFKDQLVPIRUPHDVXULQJWKHUHODWLYHFRPSHWHQFLHV¶WKH\ZHUHIRXQGQRWWRSURYLGHDPHDQVIRU
DVVHVVLQJRWKHUDWWULEXWHVVXFKDVµHOHPHQWVRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\WKDWDUHQRWVNLOO-related, the nature 
RIWKHZRUNDQGWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKHZRUNLVSHUIRUPHG¶,5DW 
In his decision Commissioner Simmonds found that the Equal Remuneration Convention required 
that the methods relied upon by individual signatories to the Conventions be appropriate to local, 
national methods applicable for determining rates of remuneration. Given this direction, 
Commissioner Simmonds determined that the appropriate authority remained the 1972 Equal Pay 
Case. The principle adopted in that case explicitly required the Commission to use work value 
inquiries to determine application that sought equal pay orders. Commissioner Simmonds defined 
ZRUNYDOXHLQWHUPVRIWKHZDJHIL[LQJSULQFLSOHVLQSODFHDWWKHWLPHRIWKHFDVHQDPHO\µWKHQDWXUH
RIWKHZRUNVNLOODQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\UHTXLUHGRUWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKHZRUNLVSHUIRUPHG¶. 
The Commissioner noted that it was not appropriate for a single commissioner to establish a new 
method of work value evaluation applying award competencies LQSODFHRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
established work value principles (at 161). 
The Commissioner also noted that there were difficulties involved in valuing and comparing over-
award SD\PHQWVDVFRQVLGHUDWLRQVZLWKUHJDUGWRVXFKSD\PHQWVµPD\MXVWLILDEO\JREH\ond the 
ZRUNLWVHOIDQGLQFOXGHWKHLQGLYLGXDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHZRUNHU¶,QGHDOLQJZLWKVXFKSD\PHQWV
WKH&RPPLVVLRQHUVXJJHVWHGWKDWµDQ\DJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHVDERXWDQDSSURSULDWH
method of job appraisal will be highly persuasive, if not determinative where those over award 
SD\PHQWVDUHWKHUHVXOWRIFROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQWV¶at 161). 
Having decided that he was not satisfied that the evidence presented in the case had established 
direct discrimination, the Commissioner considered whether indirect discrimination had been 
established. The Commissioner did not consider that the reversal of onus provisions in the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 had been imported into the WR Act, but in any event found that the 
evidence that HPM had indirectly discriminated against its female employees was inconclusive (at 
164). 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQHUGLVPLVVHGWKHXQLRQ¶VDSSOLFDWLRQRQWKHEDVLVWKDWKHZDVQRWVDWLVILHGRQWKH
evidence and arguments presented that the different remuneration paid to process workers and 
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packers by comparison to that paid to general hands and store persons arose in circumstances 
that were sufficiently similar as to amount to discrimination based on sex (at 162). 
A.5.3. The second HPM case 
In Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v HPM Industries 
(Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Print Q1002, 19 May 1998) the AMWU lodged a 
VHFRQGDSSOLFDWLRQIRUHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUIHPDOHSURFHVVZRUNHUVDQGSDFNHUVDW+30¶V
Sydney site and sought a retrospective application of any order made dating back to 1985. The 
matter was settled by the parties in late 1998 by making an enterprise agreement after more than 
three years of proceedings before the Commission. Prior to the settlement, however, Justice Munro 
made a number of observations about the 1993 provisions, particularly concerning the equivalence 
of work.  
:KLOHQRWLQJWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VHVWDEOLVKHGZRUNYDOXHSULQFLSOHVDQGSUDFWLFHVKRXOGEHD
primary source of guidance, Justice Munro suggested (at [18]) that a number of evaluation 
techniques could be applied: 
$V6LPPRQGV&VWDWHGLQKLVGHFLVLRQRQ0DUFKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSULQFLSOHVDQGSUDFWLFH
related to work value comparison and changes are a primary source of guidance about what factors and 
considerations are of accepted relevance to such evaluation. However, experience of work value cases 
suggests that work value equivalence is a relative measure, sometimes dependent up an exercise of 
judgment. A history of such cases would disclose that a number of evaluation techniques have been 
applied for various purposes and with various outcomes from time to time. 
However, Justice Munro noted the necessity, and the difficulty involved, in establishing equivalence 
of the work in order to establish direct discrimination (at [17]): 
[T]here must at least be a clear and relatively complete depiction and hopefully finding about both the 
µZRUN¶RIWKHHPSOR\HHVWREHVXEMHFWWRWKHRUGHUDQGWKHµFRPSDUDWRU¶ZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH8SRQWKH
relevant two sets of work content being established, the valuation and relative equivalence of them will 
need to be established. That forensic task involves a requirement to persuade the Commission of both 
the validity of an evaluation principle to be used and of the equivalence of the work resulting from the 
application of it. 
A.5.4. The first Age case 
In Automotive, Food, Metals Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v David Syme & 
Co Ltd (1999) 97 IR 374, the AMWU made an application to the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission for an equal remuneration order to the Commission for female clerical employees at 
The Age newspaper to be paid the same rates as male employees paid at level 4 in the publishing 
department and level 3 machine room operator in the machine department. The claim formed the 
basis of two applications. 
In the first application the AMWU sought an order for female clerical employees. David Syme (the 
publisher of The Age) made four jurisdictional objections to the claim: the first related to the 
µDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\¶SURYLVLRQRIWKHOHJLVODWLRQWKHVHFRQGFODLPHGWKDWLIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQZHUH
granted it would create an inequity between male and female clerical employees; the third related 
WROHJLVODWLYHUHVWULFWLRQVRQWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDUELWral powers; and the fourth 
claimed that the application was uncertain and ambiguous. 
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9LFH3UHVLGHQW5RVVDVKHWKHQZDVUXOHGLQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VIDYRXURQWKHLVVXHRIDQDOWHUQDWLYH
remedy ± finding that the Commission could not determine applications made simultaneously under 
WKHµSULPDU\¶RSHUDWLRQRI'LYLVLRQXQGHUWKHH[WHUQDODIIDLUVSRZHUDQGLWVµVHFRQGDU\¶RSHUDWLRQ
under section 170BI in respect of a potential industrial dispute. On the inequity issue, he found that 
the Commission needed to be satisfied that there was not, at present, equal remuneration for work 
of equal value. Following the original HPM decision, he asserted that the first step in the 
determination of an equal remuneration application was an assessment of whether the rates in 
question had been established without discrimination based on sex ((1999) 97 IR 374 at 380): 
In this case the AMWU would need to show that the rates of pay for the relevant clerical employees were 
established having regard to the gender of the employees concerned or at least a large proportion of 
WKRVHHPSOR\HHV«,WIROORZVWKDWWKHUHLVQRLPSHGLPHQWWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQUHIHUULQJWRDOOFOHULFDO
employees as the central issue is not the gender of the employees but whether their remuneration was 
µHVWDEOLVKHGZLWKRXWGLVFULPLQDWLRQEDVHGRQVH[¶ 
,QUHODWLRQWRWKHFODLPHGUHVWULFWLRQVRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDUELWUDOSRZHUV9LFH3UHVLGHQW5RVV
found that section 170N, on which the company relied, concerned matters under Part VI (the 
dispute prevention and settlement part of the WR Act) and did not affect Part VIA, in which Division 
2 was located. He did not rule on the matter of ambiguity given the conclusions he had reached on 
the other jurisdictional matters, but noted that the application contained a number of ambiguities. 
The application was struck out and it was suggested that any further application would need to 
address the observations concerning the inequity submissions (at 381±4). 
A.5.5. The second Age case 
In its second application in the David Syme matter the AMWU sought an order applicable to all 
clerical workers employed by the company: Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and 
Kindred Industries Union v David Syme & Co Ltd (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Print 
R5199, 26 May 1999). The company again raised a number of jurisdictional matters as threshold 
LVVXHVLQFOXGLQJLQUHODWLRQWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VMXULVGLFWLRQWRLVVXHDVXPPRQVIRUWKHSURGXFWLRQ
of documents. In responding to these submissions, Commissioner Whelan considered the matters 
required to make out the successful elements for an equal remuneration order. Referring to Justice 
0XQUR¶VFRPPHQWVLQWKHVHFRQGHPM caseVKHDJUHHGWKDWµFRQVLGHUDEOHXQFHUWDLQW\H[LVWV
DERXWWKHHOHPHQWVQHFHVVDU\WRPDNHRXWDSURSHUFDVH¶Dt [20]). She also observed (at [28]) that 
in determining whether there is equal remuneration for work of equal value: 
The words of the [Equal Remuneration] Convention do not suggest that the only comparisons acceptable 
are those which compare the work being performed by males with that being performed by females. 
Indeed, it is clear that the issue is not who performs the work but the basis upon which the rates have 
been established. 
Commissioner Whelan referred to the decisions of Justice Munro and Commissioner Simmonds in 
the HPM FDVHVQRWLQJWKDWERWKKDGGLVFXVVHGWKHXVHRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSULQFLSOHVDQG
practices in relation to work value change and evaluation to provide guidance as to what factors 
are relevant in evaluating whether work of an equivalent value. She determined that it would be 
wrong to pre-empt the parameters of sections 170BC (a) and 170BC (b) due to the absence of 
advice on the evidence that the applicant sought to present and rejected the submission that the 
application was without foundation. The Commissioner considered that the request for documents 
as contained in a summons issued by the Commission was not oppressive and that evidence 
relevant to the application was likely to be held by the company (at [34]). 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
141 
David Syme appealed agDLQVW&RPPLVVLRQHU:KHODQ¶VGHFLVLRQ)ROORZLQJWKHIDLOXUHWRREWDLQD
stay of the decision pending an appeal (see Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and 
Kindred Industries Union v David Syme & Co Ltd (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Print 
R5856, 10 June 1999)), proceedings resumed before Commissioner Whelan, who issued further 
directions in June and August 1999. The matter was ultimately settled by consent (URCOT 2005: 
144). 
A.5.6.  The Gunn and Taylor case 
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering and Kindred Industries Union v Gunn and Taylor 
(Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Print PR914868, 1 March 2002) concerned a graphic 
design company which employed four plate makers, one of whom was female. All the plate makers 
were qualified trades persons and all had different rates of pay. The female employee had a similar 
length of service to the longest serving male employee, but received the lowest rate of pay. In this 
case the AMWU made an application for equal remuneration for female plate makers in the 
company. The union argued that the employee in question should be paid at the highest rate in the 
plate making department. 
The company objected to the application on the basis that a suitable alternative remedy existed 
under sex discrimination laws, as the matter could be dealt with as a sex discrimination matter 
relating to an individual employee, rather than as an application for equal remuneration. The 
company also argued that the award and an enterprise flexibility agreement that applied to it did 
not discriminate against men and women in classifications of pay and, therefore, there was no 
discriminatory treatment. They added that to pay the female plate maker at the highest rate of pay 
would be to discriminate against male plate makers who received lower rates. 
The matter was initially heard by Commissioner Whelan, who found that over-award pay set by an 
LQGXVWULDOLQVWUXPHQWZDVZLWKLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH$FW
Commissioner Whelan also rejeFWHGWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVXEPLVVLRQUHJDUGLQJDQDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\
as she was not satisfied that an individual anti-discrimination application would provide a 
VDWLVIDFWRU\UHPHG\IRUWKHXQLRQ¶VFODLPDW>@ 
To the extent that the union seeks an order of general application I am not satisfied that the Sex 
Discrimination Act or the Equal Opportunity Act meet the requirements of section 170BE in that they are 
not able to ensure equal remuneration for work of equal value for female employees employed, or who 
mD\EHHPSOR\HGDVJUDSKLFUHSURGXFHUVLQWKHSODWHPDNLQJGHSDUWPHQWRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVV 
The company appealed the decision to a Full Bench of the Commission: Automotive, Food, Metals, 
Engineering and Kindred Industries Union v Gunn and Taylor (2002) 115 IR 358. While the Full 
Bench found that a number of issues remained open to evidence and argument, in relation to the 
DOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\LVVXHWKH)XOO%HQFKXSKHOG&RPPLVVLRQHU:KHODQ¶VGHFLVLRQQRWLQJDW>@
that even though the order may affect only one employee, the remedy sought was of broader 
application: 
:HWKLQNLWLVDSSURSULDWHWKDWZHQRWHWKDWZHDJUHHZLWK&RPPLVVLRQHU:KHODQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDW
neither the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Commonwealth) nor the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Victoria) 
provides a remedy which would ensure equal remuneration for work of equal value and which would be 
of general application. We add this qualification. In the submissions made to us there was no exploration 
of the possibility of a class action under the Commonwealth Acts. Nor was there any debate concerning 
the power to make prospective orders under those laws in the circumstances of this case. Despite this, it 
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is clear that the provisions of Division 2 of the WR Act are designed to provide a remedy of general 
application. We are unconvinced that even if a remedy of general application were available elsewhere it 
would be an adequate alternative for the purposes of section170BE of the WR Act. 
A.5.7. Assessments of the 1993 federal equal remuneration provisions 
A notable feature of the 1993 equal remuneration provisions was the relatively small number of 
applications made under them, the uncertainties and limitations associated with their interpretation 
and application and, as a result, their failure to make a significant contribution to achieving gender 
pay equity (URCOT 2005: 144±7). 
On their face, the 1993 legislative provisions offered considerable promise in that they attempted to 
ZLGHQWKHFRQFHSWRIµHTXDOSD\¶HPEHGGHGLQWKHSULQFLSOHWRLQFOXGHµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶
which enabled consideration of over-award earnings (Smith 2009: 658±60; Smith 2010: 11±16). 
Additionally there were clear linkages to the relevant international instruments, and no explicit 
restriction on the type of work value comparisons that could be made (Smith 2010: 12).  
Yet the lived experience of the provisions suggests that important features and limitations of the 
provisions also need to be recognised. In particular, although the right to equal remuneration was 
HPERGLHGLQ$XVWUDOLD¶VSULQFLSDOLQVWUXPHQWRIODERXUODZµWKHULJKWwas far more external to the 
V\VWHPRIZDJHGHWHUPLQDWLRQDQGLQGXVWULDODZDUGVWKDQWKDWSURYLGHGLQDQG¶6PLWK
2010: 12). The legal hurdles associated with the provisions meant that, in practice, it favoured 
prosecution at the level of the individual worker or workplace, rather than providing the broader, 
award-based solutions of the 1969 and 1972 cases (Smith 2010: 16; URCOT 2005: 148). 
Additionally there were important limitations in the 1993 provisions that restricted their impact. One 
was the foundation of the provisions on the external affairs power, which compromised their 
relationship with other key sections of the legislation. For example, this limited the capacity of the 
Full Bench to hear applications under the provisions, constrained the parties from using the 
provisions as the basis for variation to a multi-employer award and meant that there were only a 
narrow range of opportunities through which the Commission could hear equal remuneration 
applications (Smith 2010: 13; URCOT 2005: 145). 
The second limitation was the requirement to demonstrate a sex-based discriminatory cause for 
HDUQLQJVGLVSDULWLHV7KHXVHRIWKHWHUPµZLWKRXWGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶LQWKH(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ
Convention was interpreted by the Commission to require the applicants to demonstrate that 
disparities in earnings had a discriminatory cause. This requirement tightened the grounds on 
which equal remuneration claims could be heard, presented a difficult threshold for applicants and 
impeded investigation of the differences in the work and wage structures. Lack of clarity around the 
PHDQLQJRIWKHWHUPµGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶DQGGLIILFXOW\LQDSSO\LQJWKHWHVWRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQDGGHGWRWKH
difficulties associated with the provisions (Smith 2010: 14±15; Smith 2009: 659±60). As will be 
seen in sections B.2.2, B.3.2, some of the State industrial tribunals have interpreted the 
requirements of the Equal Remuneration Convention differently, concluding that the Convention 
requires the establishment of equal remuneration to be free of discrimination based on sex, but not 
erecting as a governing criterion the establishment of discrimination per se. Principles developed in 
some States have also avoided some of the uncertainties and limitations of the federal provisions 
(URCOT 2005: 133, 145). 
The cases arising from the 1993 provisions consistently support the use of work value to assess 
whether different work was of equal value. Work value has a particular place in Australian labour 
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law and is typically defined to included examination of the nature of the work, the skill and 
responsibility required and the conditions under which the work is performed. Work value has been 
identified explicitly as a particular foundation of wage determination for industrial tribunals (Crown 
Employees' (Scientific Officers ± Division of Science Services, Department of Agriculture) Award 
(1962) AR 250 at 278): 
The function, truly understood, is to consider all the relevant features of the work, to take into account all 
relevant material, including such as will furnish a guide to fair valuation, to bear in mind the contentions 
of the parties to the arbitration and, in the light of these things, to fix amounts which the tribunal itself 
deems to be just and reasonable to meet the circumstances of the case. The amount so fixed will 
represent the tribunal's view of the value of the work. 
At times, the Commission has identified the type of factors that it relies on in reaching 
determinations of work value. These lists are not necessarily binding or determinative and work 
value criteria has been historically malleable (Bennett 1988: 537±8). -XVWLFH0XQUR¶VGHFLVLRQLQ
the second HPM case indicated that it was open to the Commission to adopt any of a range of 
evaluation techniques for that purpose indicating that parties were not bound to use a specific 
mechanism to establish work value. That the choice of the method of demonstrating that work was 
of equal value falls to the applicant was confirmed in the second HPM application and the second 
Age case (Smith 2010: 15±16; URCOT 2005: 145±6). While this suggests that work value 
equivalence is a relative measure that includes the exercise of judgement by the Commission, 
there is considerable debate as to whether the application of work value has been sufficiently 
inclusive of feminised work. This is a matter that was taken up by the New South Wales Pay Equity 
Inquiry: see section 2.1. 
Our analysis here has been confined to applications for equal remuneration orders heard under the 
legislative provisions introduced in 1993, whether in their original form or as subsequently 
amended. This is not to suggest that these were the only proceedings over this period in which the 
federal tribunal was asked to consider the valuation of feminised work. An obvious example is 
provided by the 2005 proceedings in the childcare industry, which involved claims for wage 
increases based on changes in work value: see eg Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous 
Union, re Child Care Industry (Australian Capital Territory) Award 1998, Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission, Print PR954938, 13 January 2005; Print PR957259, 13 April 2005; Print 
PR57914, 10 May 2005. 
 
A.5.8. The Work Choices amendments 
The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 introduced amendments to the 
Workplace Relations 1996 which came into effect in March 2006 and significantly altered the 
industrial relations framework and minimum wages setting. Importantly, the amendments sought to 
widen the federal jurisdiction by relying on the corporations power of the Constitution, in addition to 
a number of other constitutional powers. Their effect was to ensure that employers of a certain 
W\SHQRWDEO\µFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRUSRUDWLRQV¶WKDWLVWUDGLQJILQDQFLDORUIRUHLJQFRUSRUDWLRQVFRXOG
no longer be covered by State awards or industrial laws. 
The amendments created the Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) as the federal body 
responsible for the setting and adjusting of minimum wages. The legislation removed rates of pay 
from awards and created Australian Pay and Classification Scales (APCSs) which contained 
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wages and certain other provisions (see section 208 of the amended WR Act). The AFPC became 
the body responsible for adjusting the rates in APCSs, as well as creating and adjusting Federal 
Minimum Wages for award-free employees. In discharging these functions, it was required to apply 
the principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value in 
exercising any of its powers (WR Act section 222(a)). The AFPC informed itself on wage-setting 
matters through commissioned research, stakeholder consultation and public submissions. 
The equal remuneration provisions (Division 3 of Part 12 of the amended WR Act) were retained, 
but also amended to: 
x explicitly require applicants to make reference to a comparator group of employees (section 
622); and 
x exclude the Commission from hearing applications if the effect of the order sought would be to 
vary a minimum pay rate set under Division 2 of Part 7 of the Act. 
In addition, section 16(1)(c) of the DPHQGHG$FWH[FOXGHGWKHRSHUDWLRQRIµDODZSURYLGLQJIRUD
court or tribunal constituted by a law of the State or Territory to make an order in relation to equal 
UHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶7KLVSURYLVLRQDQGWKHH[SDQVLRQRIWKHIHGHUDOV\VWem 
effectively limited the application of approaches to equal remuneration that had begun to develop at 
the State level (Smith 2009: 662; Smith 2010: 15; Smith & Lyons 2007: 30; Baird & Williamson 
2009: 335). 
During its operation, from 2006 to 2009, the AFPC did not make, adjust or vary any pay scales for 
reasons relating to equal remuneration, on the basis that it did not receive any submissions 
claiming that specific pay scales did not provide equal remuneration: see Wage Setting Decision 
July 2008 (2008) 172 IR 119 at 194; Wage Setting Decision July 2009 (2009) 183 IR 1 at 11. The 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission remained responsible for hearing equal remuneration 
matters outside minimum wage setting. However, from 2005 to 2009 no equal remuneration 
applications were made. 
A.6 Sex discrimination laws 
While the Australian state has exercised its most direct influence on gender pay equity through 
industrial relations legislation and industrial tribunals, there are other laws that can potentially be 
brought to bear on the subject. These include the laws introduced from the 1970s onwards that 
allow women to complain of discrimination in the workplace. At the federal level, the principal 
statute of this kind is the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). Similar provisions exist at State and 
Territory level, though as part of more general measures dealing with equal opportunity and 
discrimination, such as the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) or the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 
(Vic).  
Sex discrimination laws encompass both direct and indirect discrimination on the ground of gender. 
Direct discrimination provisions, such as section 5(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act, prohibit 
HPSOR\HUVIURPµWUHDWLQJDQ\SHUVRQOHVVIDYRXUDEO\WKDQLQWKHVDPHRUVLPLODr circumstances they 
WUHDWRUZRXOGWUHDWDSHUVRQRIWKHRSSRVLWHVH[¶+XQWHU,QGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQ
measures, by contrast, address more structural forms of discrimination that arise because 
µRUJDQLVDWLRQDOQRUPVUXOHVDQGSURFHGXUHVXVHGWRdetermine the allocation of positions and 
benefits, have generally been designed whether deliberately or unreflectively, around the behaviour 
SDWWHUQVDQGDWWULEXWHVRIWKHKLVWRULFDOO\GRPLQDQWJURXSLQSXEOLFOLIH¶+XQWHU±6). They are 
concerned with policies or approaches that are neutral on their face, yet nonetheless have the 
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effect of discriminating against those with a particular characteristic. Hence section 5(2) of the Sex 
'LVFULPLQDWLRQ$FWSURKLELWVWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIµDFRQGLWLRQUHTXLUHment or practice that has, or is 
OLNHO\WRKDYHWKHHIIHFWRIGLVDGYDQWDJLQJSHUVRQVRIWKHVDPHVH[DVWKHDJJULHYHGSHUVRQ¶
Under section 7B, however, a defendant may escape liability by establishing that the relevant 
condition, requirement or practice LVµUHDVRQDEOHLQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ 
Until 1993, industrial awards and agreements were exempt from the provisions of federal sex 
discrimination legislation (Hunter 2002: 55). However, sections 153 and 194±195 of the Fair Work 
Act now prohibit awards or agreements from containing terms that discriminate against an 
HPSOR\HHE\UHDVRQRIWKHLUVH[H[FHSWZKHUHWKHUHDVRQIRUWKHGLVFULPLQDWLRQOLHVLQWKHµLQKHUHQW
UHTXLUHPHQWV¶RIWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSRVLWLRQ47 Section 46PW of the Australian Human Rights 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth) also provides that if the President of the Australian Human Rights 
Commission receives a complaint to the effect that an industrial instrument is discriminatory, they 
may refer the matter to the FWC. The FWC may in turn take action to vary the award or agreement 
in question (Fair Work Act ss 161, 218). 
Section 351(1) of the Fair Work Act also contains a more general prohibition on an employer taking 
µDGYHUVHDFWLRQ¶DJDLQVWDQHPSOR\HHEHFDXVHRIWKHLUVH[8QOLNHPRVWDQWL-discrimination laws, 
this provisions does not distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination. But its scope is 
QDUURZHGE\EHLQJVXEMHFWWRYDULRXVH[FHSWLRQV%HVLGHVDQµLQKHUHQWUHTXLUHPHQWV¶GHIHQFHV
351(2)(b)), an employer may not be liable for any actiRQWKDWLVµQRWXQODZIXOXQGHUDQ\
anti-GLVFULPLQDWLRQODZLQIRUFHLQWKHSODFHZKHUHWKHDFWLRQLVWDNHQ¶VD 
In theory, it is possible for individual complainants to use sex discrimination laws to complain of a 
lack of equal remuneration, and potentially even secure changes to instruments that affect a group 
of employees. But in practice they have not been used this way. The Sex Discrimination Act, for 
LQVWDQFHµKDVSOD\HGDOPRVWQRUROHLQDGGUHVVLQJJHQGHUSD\LQHTXLW\¶Macdonald & 
Charlesworth 2013: 567). Given that Part 2-7 of the Fair Work Act now offers broader and more 
flexible relief, without the need to establish discrimination as such (see section 3.4.2), it seems 
unlikely that this will change. 
A.7. Affirmative action 
Another form of equal opportunities legislation is concerned with imposing positive obligations on 
employers to promote employment opportunities for types of workers who have historically been 
GLVDGYDQWDJHGLQWKHODERXUPDUNHW,Q$XVWUDOLDVXFKµDIILUPDWLYHDFWLRQ¶laws have generally been 
confined to requiring employers to adopt processes that can identify and eliminate barriers to the 
employment or advancement of members of the chosen group, rather than setting hard quotas. 
This is true of the principal measure adopted in relation to women, a federal statute originally 
enacted as the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth). 
In its original form, the Act applied to private sector employers with over 100 employees and all 
higher education institutions. Organisations falling within the scope of the legislation were required 
to report annually to a statutory authority, the Affirmative Action Agency. The basis of the report 
was the implementation and progress of an affirmative action program. This had to be designed to 
ensure that appropriate action was taken both to eliminate discrimination by the relevant employer 
                                                     
47 There is also an exception for employment conditions at religious institutions, where those conditions are imposed in 
RUGHUWRDYRLGLQMXU\WRµreligious susceptibilities¶ 
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against women, and to promote equal opportunity for women in relation to employment matters. 
Further direction as to the requirements of a program was provided by the Agency, which provided 
an eight-step process for complying organisations to follow. In 1992 the scope of the legislation 
was widened to include community organisations, non-government schools, unions and group 
training companies with 100 employees or more. Legislative change at this time also provided that 
the Director of the Affirmative Action Agency had the discretion to waive particular reporting 
requirements for those organisations that had achieved a particular standard in the quality of their 
programs and reports.  
The legislation was reviewed by the Howard Government in 1998 to examine the costs of the 
legislation to business and the community (Sinclair 2000). The review resulted in a weakening of 
the reporting process, a diminution of the compliance requirements and a focus on individual 
business requirements (Andrades 2000: 175). The legislation was renamed the Equal Opportunity 
for Women in the Workplace Act 1999, while the administering agency became known as the Equal 
Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency. The Agency itself reported that such changes 
had not diminished its capacity to effectively resource organisations to address pay equity, pointing 
specifically to its development of an online pay equity tool that assisted organisations to identify 
gender pay inequity within their workplace (EOWA 2005: 8). 
Over the past year, the legislation has once again been amended and renamed (see Sutherland 
2013). It is now known as the Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012. From 2014, the focus of 
reports by employers to what is now called the Workplace Gender Equality Agency (WGEA) will 
shift from processes to outcomes, as measured against a set of standardised µJHQGHUHTXDOLW\
LQGLFDWRUV¶7KHVHDUHVSHFLILFDOO\GHILQHGE\VHFWLRQWRLQFOXGHµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ
ZRPHQDQGPHQ¶6HFWLRQDOVRSHUPLWVWKHUHOHYDQW0LQLVWHUWRSUHVFULEHµPLQLPXPVWDQGDUGV¶
which can be either general or industry-specific, and which may stipulate quantitative targets for 
particular indicators; though these will not apply until the 2014±15 reporting period. 
An employer will be non-compliant under the new regime if it fails to submit its required report, or 
supplies false or misleading information. It will also be in breach if it does not meet a minimum 
standard or at least show improvements against that standard within two further reporting periods. 
The consequences of non compliance with the Act are limited. The Agency may µname¶ a non-
compliant employer in a report to the Minister or by electronic or other means. Such an employer 
may also not be eligible to tender for contracts under the Commonwealth and some State 
procurement frameworks, or to receive certain Commonwealth grants or other financial 
assistance.48 However, the sanction concerning the ineligibility for federal government contracts is 
µEHOLHYHGQHYHUWRKDYHEHHQLQYRNHGLQLWV\HDUOLIH¶7KRUQWRQ49 It remains to be 
seen whether there is any greater willingness under the new regime to apply the sanction. 
The specific matters on which employers must report are detailed in the Workplace Gender 
Equality (Matters in relation to Gender Equality Indicators) Instrument 2013 (No 1), a regulation 
issued by the federal government in February 2013.50 ,QUHODWLRQWRµ*HQder Equality Indicator 3 ± 
HTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQEHWZHHQZRPHQDQGPHQ¶IRU±14 employers are required to report on 
                                                     
48 Further details are available on the WGEA website at www.wgea.com.au/report/compliance. 
49 See also Macdonald & Charlesworth 2013: 568±71, expressing scepticism (for this and other reasons) as to the potential 
for the Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 to have any great impact on the GPG. 
50 Further details as to the reporting regime are available on the WGEA website at www.wgea.gov.au.  
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remuneration data disaggregated by gender and by workplace profile categories. The data 
requirements included annualised average full-time equivalent base salary; and annualised 
average full-time equivalent total remuneration. From 2014±15, employers must also report on the 
individual components of annualised average full-time equivalent total remuneration. The 
components in question include base pay, superannuation, bonus payments or performance pay, 
discretionary pay, overtime, and other allowances.  
Employers will also be required to report on:  
x the existence of a remuneration policy or strategy;  
x the gender pay equity objectives, if any, which are included in the remuneration policy or 
strategy;  
x whether any gender remuneration gap analysis has been undertaken and, if so, when; and 
x the actions taken, if any, as a result of a gender remuneration pay gap analysis. 
One of the anticipated benefits of the new reporting requirements is that they will establish a 
comprehensive and long term data set for organisations about the gender profile of their 
workplaces. The data collected under the reporting matters will also inform the development of the 
minimum standards and standardised gender equality benchmarks against which business can 
monitor their outcomes and practice over time and in relation to their industry peers. 
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A.8 Timeline of federal equal remuneration developments 
This review has highlighted key phases in the development of federal equal remuneration 
regulation. Table A.1 draws together particularly significant cases and legislation and places them 
in a timeline of federal equal remuneration regulation. 
Table A.1: Significant cases in federal equal remuneration regulation, 1907±2012 
Year and development Cases 
1907 ± Harvester decision ± 
construction of the living wage 
Ex Parte H V McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1 
1912 ± rejection of the principle of 
equal pay for equal work 
5XUDO:RUNHUV¶8QLRQYMildura Branch of the Australian Dried Fruits Association 
(1912) 6 CAR 61 
1919 ± female wage set at 54 per cent 
of the male rate 
Federated Clothing Trades of the Commonwealth of Australia v Archer (1919) 13 
CAR 647 
1950 - female wage set at 75 per cent 
of the male rate 
Basic Wage Inquiry, 1949±50 (1950) 68 CAR 735 
1967 ± concept of basic wage and skill 
margin abandoned in favour of a total 
wage 
National Wage Case (1967) 118 CAR 655 
1969 ± introduction of the equal pay for 
equal work principle 
Equal Pay Case (1969) 127 CAR 1142 
1972 ± introduction of the equal pay for 
work of equal value principle 
National Wage and Equal Pay Case 1972 (1972) 147 CAR 172 
1974 ± concept of the male minimum 
wage extended to women 
National Wage Case 1974 (1974) 157 CAR 293 
1986 ± testing of the 1972 principle by 
way of the concept of comparable 
worth 
RE Private Hospitals and Doctors Nurses (ACT) Award 1972 (1986) 13 IR 108 
1993 ± introduction of a statutory right 
to seek equal remuneration orders by 
way of amendment to the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) 
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v 
HPM Industries (1998) 94 IR 129 (the first HPM case) 
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v 
HPM Industries (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Print Q1002, 19 
May 1998) (the second HPM case) 
Automotive, Food, Metals Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v 
David Syme & Co Ltd (1999) 97 IR 374 (the first Age case) 
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v 
David Syme & Co Ltd (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Print R5199, 
26 May 1999) (the second Age case) 
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering and Kindred Industries Union v Gunn and 
Taylor (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Print PR914868, 1 March 
2002) 
2009 ± introduction of new equal 
remuneration provisions in the Fair 
Work Act 2009 (Cth) 
Re Equal Remuneration Case (2011) 208 IR 345 (the first SACS case) 
Re Equal Remuneration Case (2012) 208 IR 4465 (the second SACS case) 
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Appendix B: Development of equal remuneration regulation in the 
State jurisdictions 
This appendix provides an overview of the treatment of equal pay and equal remuneration 
decisions in State jurisdictions in Australia. Following a brief look at the State wage fixing systems, 
the focus shifts to recent developments, including a series of government-initiated pay equity 
inquiries. In the three States in which these inquiries were conducted through industrial tribunals 
(New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania), the outcome was the establishment of a set of 
µHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQSULQFLSOHV¶,Q New South Wales and Queensland these principles look to 
undervaluation, rather than discrimination, as a means of assessing whether the objective of equal 
remuneration has been met. The following sections examine the inquiries and cases that 
developed the principles, and the key cases that have applied them. Material introduced through 
the pay equity inquires is also canvassed in Chapter 5 which discusses factors that contribute to 
the GPG. A timeline of State equal remuneration regulation which identifies key developments and 
cases reviewed in this Appendix is located in section A.5. 
This Appendix relies extensively on, and reproduces material contained in, an earlier report on 
equal remuneration principles (Romeyn et al 2011: 24±41).51  
B.1 Wage determination and State responses to the ILO Equal 
Remuneration Convention 
As was the case in the federal jurisdiction, wage fixing under the State arbitration or wages board 
systems reflected a breadwinner model of wage determination. Wages were determined on the 
assumed needs of men and women. Equal pay mechanisms were available, but only in severely 
limited circumstances. In the New South Wales jurisdiction, for example, legislative amendments in 
H[SDQGHGWKHWHUPµLQGXVWULDOPDWWHUV¶± which largely governed the power to make awards or 
deal with a dispute ± WRLQFOXGHµDQ\FODLPWKDWWKHVDPHZDJHVVKDOOEHSDLGWRSHUVRQVRIHLWKHU
VH[SHUIRUPLQJWKHVDPHZRUNRUSURGXFLQJWKHVDPHUHWXUQRISURILWRUYDOXHWRWKHLUHPSOR\HU¶
However the New South Wales Industrial Commission later noted that this provision was invoked 
only on rare occasions (Re Clerks (State) Award and Other Awards (1959) 58 AR 470 at 474).  
The application of a principle providing for equal reward of comparative skill did not disturb the 
disparate rates of pay within basic wages. In 1929, in setting rates for female hairdressers, the New 
South Wales Commission reiterated that the delineation of separate male and female basic wages 
did not apply to the setting of skill margins (Re Hairdressers etc, Females (State) Award (1929) 28 
AR (NSW) 39 at 44): 
This wage results from following (as is the practice of all arbitration tribunals in Australia) the principle of 
the distinction contemplated by Parliament between the living wage for males and that for females and 
from applying after observing that basis of difference, the principle of equal pay for both sexes doing the 
same work, so far as the margin for skill at least is concerned. 
Even within the same jurisdiction such templates were not always observed in practice. The New 
South Wales Commission noted in 1957 that whatever the theory concerning equal margins might 
have been, the practice had developed along different lines; some awards provided for equal 
                                                     
51 In particular, in sections B.2.1, B.2.2, B.2.3, B.3.2, B.3.3, B.3.4, B.3.5, B.3.6 and B.3.7 below. 
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margins between male and female workers, whilst others provided higher male margins than 
female margins (Re Paint and Varnish Makers etc (State) Award (1957) 56 AR (NSW) 87 at 108). 
This unevenness in practice by State tribunals was not confined to New South Wales (Hancock 
2013: 169±70). Even sRGLVSDUDWHZDJHVEHWZHHQZRPHQDQGPHQµZDVWKHQRUPUHIOHFWLQJ
several factors: custom and practice, a perception that women needed less than men because of 
their different family obligations, and resistance to any notion that women and men ordinarily 
SHUIRUPHGZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶+DQFRFN 
In response to the adoption in 1951 of the Equal Remuneration Convention, a number of States 
amended their industrial legislation to provide for equal pay. New South Wales was the first to pass 
legislation, with the Female Rates (Amendment) Act 1958 (NSW) requiring the Industrial 
Commission and conciliation committees, in certain specified circumstances, to insert provisions for 
equal pay as between the sexes into awards and industrial agreements. Other States followed, 
although not in quick succession. Western Australia did not pass legislation until 1968 and Victoria 
left it until 1969, although by that stage particular wages boards had already moved to implement 
equal pay (Short 1986: 318). 
The passage of the 1958 legislative amendments in New South Wales led a number of unions to 
file applications to vary awards. A Full Bench of the Industrial Commission was convened to hear 
applications specifically relating to a number of clerical awards, but also to provide clear direction 
on the interpretation of the 1958 legislation. Central to the position of the employer groups was the 
contention that the ambit of comparisons of work be tightly restricted and limited to work at a single 
ZRUNSODFHDQGWKDWµYDOXH¶be held to mean value to the employer. The Commission held that the 
µVSHFLILHGFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶QRPLQDWHGE\WKHOHJLVODWLRQPHDQWWKDWZRUNEHRIDVLPLODURUOLNH
nature, be of equal value and be work for which rates were fixed by a particular award or 
agrHHPHQWµ9DOXH¶ZDVLQWHUSUHWHGDVEHLQJWKHYDOXHRIWKHZRUNDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WULEXQDOVDV
opposed to that which the employer placed on the work (Re Clerks (State) Award and Other 
Awards (1959) 58 AR 470 at 470±1)7KHFRQWHQWLRQWKDWWKHWHUPµZRUN¶UHfer to particular work 
done at a particular establishment, an argument submitted by employer organisations, was also 
specifically rejected (at 494). The narrow interpretation of the legislative provisions was sharpened 
further through the scope of the work value comparisons that the tribunal determined were enabled 
E\WKHSURYLVLRQV7KHW\SHRIFRPSDULVRQVDFFHSWHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQZHUHUHVWULFWHGWRµD
comparison of the work performed by a group of female employees for whom an award or industrial 
agreement fixes rates with the work performed by a group of male employees for whom that award 
RULQGXVWULDODJUHHPHQWIL[HVUDWHV¶ (at 494). 
The wider ambit of the 1972 federal equal pay for work of equal value decision was soon to have 
application for workers covered by State awards. For example, the New South Wales Commission 
DGRSWHGZLWKRXWDPHQGPHQWWKHIHGHUDOSULQFLSOHRIµHTXDOSD\IRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶VHH section 
A.4.1) in 1973. The proceedings in the State arena differed a little from their federal counterpart, as 
the tribunal was required to consider the application of the principle against the scope of the 
existing equal remuneration provisions in the relevant statute (Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (NSW) 
s 88D). Additionally, the Commission was required to consider the application of the principle to the 
system of basic wages and skill margins still operational within the New South Wales jurisdiction at 
that time. It in fact held that the principle applied only to basic wages. The tribunal acknowledged 
that the application of equal margins had been uneven, but effectively assumed that existing skill 
margins represented the true value of the work, having being fixed without regard to sex. However, 
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it was open to the parties to demonstrate that margins had not been so determined (State Equal 
Pay Case (1973) 73 AR 425). 
B.2. Pay equity in New South Wales: the current framework 
Turning to more contemporary regulatory frameworks, a number of provisions of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1996 (NSW) require tKH6WDWH¶V,QGXVWULDO5HODWLRQV&RPPLVVLRQWRFRQVLGHUWKH
principle of equal remuneration when determining or reviewing award rates. Specifically, the basis 
for dealing with equal remuneration applications is to be found in sections 19, 21 and 23 of the 
IQGXVWULDO5HODWLRQV$FW16:6HFWLRQIDOVRPDNHVLWDQREMHFWRIWKH$FWWRµWRSUHYHQW
and eliminate discrimination in the workplace and in particular to ensure equal remuneration for 
PHQDQGZRPHQGRLQJZRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶ 
Section 21 provides that the Commission must, on application, make an award setting certain 
FRQGLWLRQVRIHPSOR\PHQW7KHOLVWWKDWIROORZVLQFOXGHVµEHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQDQGRWKHU
FRQGLWLRQVIRUPHQDQGZRPHQGRLQJZRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶6HFWLRn 23 goes on to 
SURYLGHWKDWµ:KHQHYHUWKH&RPPLVVLRQPDNHVDQDZDUGLWPXVWHQVXUHWKDWWKHDZDUGSURYLGHV
equal remuneration and other conditions of employment for men and women doing work of equal 
RUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶ 
Section 19 also provides for a three yearly review of all awards. Subsection (3) directs the 
&RPPLVVLRQWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWDUDQJHRIPDWWHUVLQFOXGLQJµHDQ\LVVXHRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQXQGHU
WKHDZDUGVLQFOXGLQJSD\HTXLW\¶µ3D\HTXLW\¶LVGHILQHGLQWKH'LFWLRQDU\RIWKH$FWDVPHDning 
µHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQGRLQJZRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶ 
These provisions were considered by the Commission in Re Equal Remuneration Principle (2000) 
97 IR 177, a decision that is reviewed below. It held that the operation of section 23 is confined to 
wage rates set by awards. It does not allow the Commission to examine over-award payments (at 
>@1RULQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VYLHZGRVHFWLRQVDQGSHUPLWDZLGHUDQJLQJLQYHVWLJDWLRQDV
to whether the rates and conditions set by an award involve the undervaluation of a particular class 
of work (at [110], [119]).  
1HYHUWKHOHVVLIWKH&RPPLVVLRQILQGVWKDWDSDUWLFXODULQVWUXPHQWGRHVQRWIL[µIDLUDQGUHDVRQDEOH¶
conditions of employment, as required by section 10, it may act to rectify that problem (at [130]). 
7KLVDFFRUGVZLWKWKHREMHFWVRIWKH$FWZKLFKLQFOXGHLQVHFWLRQIµWRSUHYHQWDQGHOLPLQDWH
discrimination in the workplace and in particular to ensure equal remuneration for men and women 
doing work of equal or coPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶DW>@ 
B.2.1. The 1998 Pay Equity Inquiry 
In 1996, the New South Wales Government established a Pay Equity Taskforce as part of its 
commitment to addressing pay equity. The taskforce was required to examine the way in which 
State and federal laws, and arrangements in selected international countries, promoted or impeded 
pay equity outcomes and the implications for the labour market. As part of its investigations, it 
commissioned case studies to examine wage inequities in female dominated industries (Shaw 
1996). The taskforce recommended, amongst other things, that there was a need for an inquiry into 
work value to be undertaken by the Industrial Relations Commission. Subsequently, the Minister for 
Industrial Relations developed terms of reference for the inquiry, which included consideration of: 
whether work in female dominated occupations and industries was undervalued in terms of 
remuneration relative to work in comparable male dominated occupations and industries; the 
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adequacy of tests and mechanisms for ascertaining the value of work; the extent to which, if at all, 
those tests and mechanisms were inequitable on the basis of gender; and any necessary remedial 
measures. The Minister referred the inquiry to the Commission. The inquiry was undertaken by 
Justice Glynn between December 1997 and July 1998, and a three volume report was presented to 
the Minister (Glynn 1998; Hall 1999). 
The Inquiry considered a wide range of evidence, including the history of equal pay cases at the 
federal and State level and case studies selected to enable assessment of female dominated and 
male dominated industries and occupations. The case studies included comparison of:  
x private sector childcare workers and engineering associates in the metals industry;  
x seafood processors and seafood butchers;  
x public sector librarians and public sector geoscientists;  
x private sector clerical workers and tradespersons in the metal industry;  
x hairdressers and beauty therapists, and motor mechanics;  
x public hospital nurses and coal miners; and  
x clothing industry outworkers and metal machinists.  
The case studies were selected to provide a cross section of professional, para-professional, 
skilled, unskilled, trades and non-trades positions in the public and private sectors. 
TKHWHUPµXQGHUYDOXDWLRQ¶HPHUJHGDVDNH\FRQVWUXFWWKURXJKWKH,QTXLU\KDYLQJDOUHDG\JDLQHG
some currency in previous New South Wales policy documents. At this point the term was not 
identified explicitly as a future core concept in gender pay regulation, but framed simply either as 
an a priori assumption (that feminised work is undervalued), or as a question warranting 
investigation ± LVIHPLQLVHGZRUNXQGHUYDOXHG"([DPSOHVLQFOXGHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSD\HTXLW\
strategy, which identified five key areas oIJRYHUQPHQWDFWLRQLQFOXGLQJµUHGUHVVLQJWKH
XQGHUYDOXLQJRIZRPHQ¶VVNLOOVDQGRFFXSDWLRQDOVHJUHJDWLRQE\SURYLGLQJDFFHVVWRRWKHUIRUPVRI
UHPXQHUDWLRQ¶1ew South Wales Department of Industrial Relations ± :RPHQ¶V(TXLW\%XUHDX
1996) and the report of the New South Wales tripartite Pay Equity Taskforce (New South Wales 
3D\(TXLW\7DVNIRUFH$GGLWLRQDOO\WKH3D\(TXLW\,QTXLU\¶VWHUPVRIUHIHUHQFHVSHFLILFDOO\
included the investigation of undervaluation. Through the course of the Inquiry the concept of 
µXQGHUYDOXDWLRQVLPSOLFLWeU¶ZDVUDLVHGLQWHUPVRIZKHWKHULWPLJKWEHDSSURSULDWHWRUHPHG\
undervaluation for feminised comparisons without recourse to male comparators. For example, an 
issues paper prepared by counsel assisting the inquiry posed the following question (Glynn 1998: 
vol 3, App 16, para 36):  
[D]o the Terms of Reference permit the examination of the valuation of female dominated industries and 
occupations per se such that the Commission may examine whether the work in a female occupation 
has been inappropriately or inadequately valued simpliciter? 
The evidence considered by Justice Glynn revealed significant issues about undervaluation of 
female work ± leading to the conclusion that despite the introduction of the principle of equal pay 
for equal work over 30 years previously, undervaluation remained. In particular, on the basis of the 
case studies, Justice Glynn found that there was evidence of undervaluation of childcare workers, 
hairdressers and beauty therapists, outworkers, trimmers undertaking seafood processing and 
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librarians. However, she found that there was insufficient evidence to make findings for nurses and 
clerical employees. She also noted that comparisons with male comparators did not always add to 
an understanding of the dimensions of undervaluation (Glynn 1998: vol 1, 380±647). 
7KH,QTXLU\IRXQGWKDWXQGHUYDOXDWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VZRUNFRXOGRFFXUIRUDQXPEHURIUHDVRQV
including as a result of gendered assumptions in work value assessments and occupational 
segregation (or female domination of an occupation). A range of other factors (such as low rates of 
unionisation and high rates of part time and casual employment) were also found to be important. 
These factors impacted on the bargaining position of female dominated occupations and industries 
and resulted in a high incidence of variations to awards by consent, absence of work value 
assessments and a low incidence of over-award payments (Glynn 1998: vol 2, 174, 179, 273±4). 
$µSURILOHRIXQGHUYDOXDWLRQ¶ZDVGHYHORSHGZKLFKLQFOXGHGWKHIROORZLQJLQGLFDWRUV 
x female characterisation of work; 
x female dominated occupation or industry; 
x no work value exercises conducted by the Commission; 
x inadequate application of equal pay principles; 
x weak union or few union members; 
x consent awards/agreements; 
x large component of part time and casual workers; 
x lack or, or inadequate recognition of qualifications (including misalignment of qualifications); 
x limited access to training or career paths; 
x small workplaces; 
x new industry or occupation; 
x service industry; and 
x home-based occupations. 
The Inquiry found that not all indicators would necessarily be present in every case, but it was likely 
that most cases of undervaluation would contain some of them (Glynn, 1998: vol 1, 45±6).The 
UHOLDQFHRQXQGHUYDOXDWLRQGUHZLQVSLUDWLRQIURPWKH,QTXLU\¶VUHYLHZRIWKHLQDGHTXDFLHVRIWKH
then discrimination test in federal legislation (see section A.5), and the experience of the 
comparable worth proceedings (see section A.4.4) (Glynn 1998: vol 2, 61±3, 121±3) (Hunter 2000: 
16-17). Undervaluation was advanced by the Inquiry as the threshold for establishing whether there 
was the basis for an equal remuneration claim. It rejected the requirement for a discrimination test, 
concluding that cases should not require the existence of, or proof of, gender causation. It also 
rejected any requirement for a causal connection between the rates of pay and some pre-existing 
circumstance connected to the gender of the workers concerned (Glynn 1998: vol 2, 157).  
Justice Glynn concluded that the establishment of an equal remuneration principle within the 
context of the New South Wales industrial system and the use of non gender-biased work value 
assessments offered the best means of redressing pay inequity (Glynn 1998: vol 2, 244). 
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Individual, court-based and rights based remedies, such as those contained in anti-discrimination 
legislation, were seen as incapable of rectifying undervaluation relating to whole occupations and 
industries or the systemic issues concerned with undervaluation (Glynn 1998: vol 2, 149, 153). In 
general terms, the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act and industrial principles of the 
Commission were considered capable of addressing equal remuneration issues, with some minor 
PRGLILFDWLRQ-XVWLFH*O\QQFRQVLGHUHGWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUGVµFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶LQWKH
GHILQLWLRQRIµSD\HTXLW\¶LQWKHIndustrial Relations Act and said: 
,QP\YLHZWKHLQFOXVLRQRIWKHZRUGVµFRPSDUDEOH YDOXH¶VHUYHVWZRSXUSRVHVLQWKHOHJLVODWLRQ7KHILUVW
purpose is to make plain that the legislation is directed to the comparison of value and not the 
LGHQWLILFDWLRQRIHTXLYDOHQWMREFRQWHQW7KXVWKHZRUGµFRPSDUDEOH¶LQGLFDWHVWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQLV 
UHTXLUHGWRPDNHDVVHVVPHQWVRIFRPSDULVRQVRIµYDOXH¶6HFRQGO\WKHZRUGµFRPSDUDEOH¶PDNHVLWFOHDU
that the assessment may include a comparison of dissimilar work as well as similar work. Thus, the 
UHIHUHQFHWRµFRPSDUDEOH¶LVQRWWRLQGLFDWHWKDWWKDt a likeness of value was required but that a 
comparison of the value of work there may be found sufficient basis to establish inequality of 
remuneration (Glynn 1998: vol 2 129). 
,QKHUUHSRUW-XVWLFH*O\QQSURSRVHGWKDWWKH,/2¶V(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHntion should be the 
foundation for a legislative scheme to address pay inequity and recommended that the Industrial 
Relations Act be amended to clarify the distinction between undervaluation and discrimination, 
distinguish discrimination from equal remuneration and ensure the Commission considered pay 
equity in all its deliberations (Glynn 1998: vol 2, 110, 135±6, 151, 154, 165). 
The report recommended that the proposed equal remuneration principle be developed through a 
State decision to guide the case-by-case identification of undervaluation and assessment of the 
µWUXH¶YDOXHRIWKHZRUNLQTXHVWLRQ(OHPHQWVWREHLQFOXGHGLQWKHHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQSULQFLSOH
were outlined in the recommendations. These elements included that it no longer be presumed that 
rates of remuneration had been properly assessed in female dominated industries in the past or 
that processes such as structural efficiency or minimum rates adjustment had been correctly or 
fully applied. In assessing whether work had been undervalued, comparisons were considered to 
be useful as a guide to the reliability of rates of remuneration, but it was not recommended that 
they be a requirement. When comparisons were used, it was necessary to establish that there was 
a proper basis for the comparison. Assessments of undervaluation were recommended to take a 
broad approach; having regard to the history of the award, whether there had been any 
assessments made of the work in the past and whether the rates had been assessed on the basis 
of the sex of the worker. In considering the latter, it was recommended that regard be paid to the 
range of factors identified in the report that could lead to undervaluation. Assessment of work value 
was to occur through the application of an objective, transparent and non-discriminatory 
assessment of the true value of the work ± not merely whether there had been changes in the 
work. The report also underlined the need for gender neutral assessment of traditionally female 
ZRUNWRJLYHDGHTXDWHZHLJKWWRIDFWRUVVXFKDVµGH[Werity, nurturing, inter-personal skills and 
VHUYLFHGHOLYHU\¶ 
In outlining the essential elements of the new equal remuneration principle, the report explicitly 
stated that it was not necessary to find causation by sex discrimination in order to make findings of 
gender-related undervaluation (Glynn 1998: vol 2, 88±96, 150±60, 174). On this point, Justice 
*O\QQ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKH(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQZDVWKDWLW*O\QQ
1998: vol 2, 89): 
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requires the establishment of equal remuneration being the provision of equal remuneration for work of 
equal value with such establishment to be free of discrimination based on sex. It does not erect as the 
governing criteria discrimination per se. 
In considering the economic impact of the recommended approach, Justice Glynn observed that 
much of the economic evidence presented at the Inquiry that predicted adverse economic impacts 
ODFNHGIRXQGDWLRQDQGRYHUVWDWHGWKHHIIHFWV7KHUHSRUWQRWHGWKDWZRPHQ¶VHPSOR\PHQWKDGEHHQ
µUHPDUNDEO\XQUHVSRQVLYH¶WRWKHDQGHTXDOSD\GHFLVLRQV,WDOVRQRWHGWKDWJHQGHU
discrimination represented a sub-optimal allocation of resources and that changes in the 
composition of employment because of pay equity could represent an improvement in economic 
efficiency and resource allocation and higher levels of productivity. In relation to outworkers in 
particular, Justice Glynn considered that there was a real possibility that a degree of monopsony 
existed, the removal of which would not have negative economic impacts. An evolutionary, case-
by-case approach was also endorsed as a means of moderating any economic impact. Other 
positive impacts were also identified, such as improvements in opportunities and choices for 
women by providing economic independence, reduced reliance on welfare or income support and 
more transparent award structures (Glynn 1998: vol 2, 357±72). 
An important finding of the Inquiry was that the Industrial Relations Commission should itself 
consider whether there was undervaluation when it reviewed an award, irrespective of whether the 
industrial parties made submissions on the matter. This was considered important to redress 
undervaluation in circumstances where unionisation was low, unions were unable or unwilling to 
take equal remuneration cases and consent arrangements had resulted in undervaluation. The 
possibility of Commission-initiated reviews was significant, given the resource demands of work 
value and equal remuneration cases (Hall 1999: 48). 
B.2.2. The 2000 Equal Remuneration Principle 
The legislative amendments recommended by Justice Glynn were not made to the Industrial 
Relations Act 1996. However, the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission developed 
and adopted an Equal Remuneration Principle which essentially folloZHG-XVWLFH*O\QQ¶V
recommended elements, following extensive discussion with representatives of employers, unions 
and government (Re Equal Remuneration Principle (2000) 97 IR 177). 
In its decision, the Full Bench noted that the Report of the Pay Equity Inquiry contained a wealth of 
information, material and recommendations that provided an appropriate starting point for its 
considerations. However, the Full Bench concluded that while it was entitled to have regard to the 
report, it was not bound by its findings (at [65]).  
In considering the need for a new principle, the Full Bench noted that the right of women to equal 
remuneration irrespective of their gender had been recognised by the United Nations and the ILO 
and enshrined in State legislation. It also noted that there was general agreement between the 
parties and interveners before it that an Equal Remuneration Principle should be included in the 
State Wage Case Principles. The focus was not on whether there should be such a principle, but 
what should be the terms of the principle. The Full Bench was also influenced by the general view 
H[SUHVVHGE\WKHSDUWLHVWKDWWKHH[LVWLQJHTXDOSD\SULQFLSOHKDGEHHQµYLUWXDOO\IRUJRWWHQ¶DQG
needed to be updated and elevated in status. In the circumstances, the Commission decided it was 
appropriate to adopt the consent of the parties and develop a new principle that would be part of 
WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VZDJHIL[LQJSULQFLSOHVDW>@±[64]).  
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In general terms, the Commission considered that the new principle needed to be (at [71]): 
designed to ensure there are no artificial barriers created to a proper assessment of the wages on a 
gender neutral basis. We consider this will be achieved if the only criterion for a revaluation of the work 
and its work value is that it be demonstrated the rate of payment hitherto fixed does not represent a 
proper valuation of the work and that any failure is related to factors associated with the sex of those 
performing the work. 
The Commission considered the legislative framework, noting WKDWWKHSDUWLHVKDGEHHQµDW
VLJQLILFDQWRGGVZLWKHDFKRWKHU¶DVWRWKHSURSHUFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHOHJLVODWLYHSURYLVLRQV
SDUWLFXODUO\VHFWLRQVDQGDW>@,WILUVWGHDOWZLWKWKHPHDQLQJRIµSD\HTXLW\¶DQGµHTXDO
UHPXQHUDWLRQ¶ZLWKLQWKH$FW,WQRWHGWKDWµSD\HTXLW\¶ZDVGHILQHGLQWKH$FWEXWWKDW
µUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶DQGµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶ZHUHQRW$IWHUFRQVLGHULQJWKHGHFLVLRQRIDQRWKHU)XOO
%HQFKZKLFKKDGFRQVLGHUHGWKHZRUGµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶WKHXVHRIWKHZRUGZLWKLQVHFWLRQV 
DQGDQGWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶ZLWKLQ,/2&RQYHQWLRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQFRQFOXGHG
that (at [94]±[95]): 
[T]KHWHUPµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶LVQRWXVHGLQWKH$FWLQWKHVDPHZD\WKDWWKHZRUGUHPXQHUDWLRQDQG
equal remuneration are defined in the Convention.  
:KDWQHFHVVDULO\IROORZVLVWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKHZRUGµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶ZKHUHLWDSSHDUVLQWKH$FWLQ
WHUPVVXFKDVµHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQDQGRWKHUFRQGLWLRQVRIHPSOR\PHQW¶PD\EHXQGHUVWRRGDVEHLQJ
used, pertinently in this case, as not including overaward payment. 
The Full Bench rejected submissions that it was required, when exercising its powers under 
sections 19, 21 or 23, to conduct a wide ranging investigation or inquiry into the question of 
whether pay equity had been achieved in the award by reference not only to the work to which the 
award applied, but also to the work of comparable occupations covered by other awards, industrial 
instruments or common law contracts. It concluded that the new principle would permit gender 
undervaluDWLRQDSSOLFDWLRQVWREHDGYDQFHGDQGFRQVLGHUHGVHSDUDWHIURPWKHH[LVWLQJµVSHFLDO
FDVHSULQFLSOH¶DQGVHSDUDWHWRRIURPWKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUWKHUHWREHDFKDQJHLQZRUNYDOXHDV
HPSKDVLVHGLQWKHµZRUNYDOXHSULQFLSOH¶$GGLWLRQDOO\WKH)XOO%HQFKHPSKasised that section 10 of 
the Industrial Relations Act UHTXLUHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQWRPDNHDZDUGVWKDWIL[HGµIDLUDQG
UHDVRQDEOH¶FRQGLWLRQVRIHPSOR\PHQW± enabling the Commission to rectify any demonstrated 
undervaluation (at [101]±[131]). 
The Full Bench considered economic outcomes, but found that (at [137]}: 
Claims that there may be negative employment effects cannot ... provide a proper basis for refusal of pay 
equity adjustments where it has been established that men and women are not being equally 
remunerated for work of equal or comparable value. 
It also noted that (at [142]}: 
[A]ll of the expert witnesses seemed unanimous that if genuine cases of such inequity were corrected by 
the Commission the effects on the labour market would be positive. 
The principle determined by the Full Bench did provide for the pursuit of claims of gender-based 
undervaluation. In this respect the Full Bench followed the recommendation of the Inquiry that 
undervaluation and not discrimination was the key determinant. In framing the Equal Remuneration 
3ULQFLSOHWKH)XOO%HQFKUHMHFWHGWKHVXEPLVVLRQRIWKH(PSOR\HUV¶)HGHUDWLRQWKDWWKHSULQFLSOH
should be confined to claims of discrimination, stating (at [7}}: 
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Claims of undervaluation may be based on identification of discriminatory matters. However, if it can be 
demonstrated that particular work is undervalued an appropriate adjustment to the applicable award rate 
should follow, without the necessity of establishing also that the undervaluation flowed from a particular 
act of discrimination. 
In contrast to the recommendations of the Inquiry, the principle provided little further guidance as to 
what might be appropriate areas for consideration in an equal remuneration claim. The Full Bench 
noted that the principle permitted that appropriate comparisons can be drawn but were not required 
for a finding of undervaluation (at [8]). The decision affirmed work value as the means of assessing 
the proper valuation of the work but noted that the Commission was to be guided by both internal 
and external award relativities (at [145]}: 
An assessment of the value of any work to which an award applies is not conducted in a vacuum but in a 
particular context, dealt with in the work value principle itself in para 6(c), namely in the context of other 
work to which the award applies and the work of any related classifications in other awards. 
7KH(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ3ULQFLSOHZDVLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VZDJHIL[LQJSULQFLSOHV
and has remained a part of those principles. The principles, as most recently stated in the State 
Wage Case 2010 (No 2) (2011) 206 IR 218, are as follows: 
12. Equal Remuneration and Other Conditions 
12.1 Claims may be made in accordance with the requirements of this Principle for an alteration in wage 
rates or other conditions of employment on the basis that the work, skill and responsibility required, or 
the conditions under which the work is performed, have been undervalued on a gender basis. 
12.2 The assessment of the work, skill and responsibility required under this Principle is to be 
approached on a gender neutral basis and in the absence of assumptions based on gender. 
12.3 Where the under-valuation is sought to be demonstrated by reference to any comparator awards or 
classifications, the assessment is not to have regard to factors incorporated in the rates of such other 
awards which do not reflect the value of work, such as labour market attraction or retention rates or 
productivity factors. 
12.4 The application of any formula, which is inconsistent with proper consideration of the value of the 
work performed, is inappropriate to the implementation of this Principle. 
12.5 The assessment of wage rates and other conditions of employment under this Principle is to have 
regard to the history of the award concerned. 
12.6 Any change in wage relativities which may result from any adjustments under this Principle, not only 
within the award in question but also against external classifications to which the award structure is 
related, must occur in such a way as to ensure there is no likelihood of wage leapfrogging arising out of 
changes in relative positions. 
12.7 In applying this Principle, the Commission will ensure that any alternative to wage relativities is 
based upon the work, skill and responsibility required, including the conditions under which the work is 
performed. 
12.8 Where the requirements of this principle have been satisfied, an assessment shall be made as to 
how the undervaluation should be addressed in money terms or by other changes in conditions of 
employment, such as reclassification of the work, establishment of new career paths or changes in 
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incremental scales. Such assessments will reflect the wages and conditions of employment previously 
fixed for the work and the nature and extent of the undervaluation established. 
12.9 Any changes made to the award as a result of this assessment may be phased in and any increase 
LQZDJHVPD\EHDEVRUEHGLQLQGLYLGXDOHPSOR\HHV¶RYHUDZDUGSD\PHQWV 
12.10 Care should be taken to ensure that work, skill and responsibility which have been taken into 
account in any previous work value adjustments or structural efficiency exercises are not again 
considered under this Principle, except to the extent of any undervaluation established. 
12.11 Where undervaluation is established only in respect of some persons covered by a particular 
classification, the undervaluation may be addressed by the creation of a new classification and not by 
increasing the rates for the classification as a whole. 
7KHH[SUHVVLRQµthe conditions under which the work is performed¶KDVWKHVDPHPHDQLQJDVLQ
Principle 8.2, Work Value Considerations. 
12.13 The Commission will guard against contrived classification and overclassification of jobs. It will 
also consider: 
(a) the state of the economy of New South Wales and the likely effect of its decision on the economy; 
(b) the likely effect of its decision on the industry and/or the employers affected by the decision; and 
(c) the likely effect of its decision on employment. 
12.14 Claims under this Principle will be processed before a Full Bench of the Commission, unless 
otherwise allocated by the President. 
12.15 Equal remuneration shall not be achieved by reducing any current wage rates or other conditions 
of employment. 
12.16 In arbitrating an application made under this Principle, the Commission is required to determine 
whether or not future State Wage Case general increases will apply to the award. 
B.2.3. Applying the Equal Remuneration Principle ± the Crown Librarians case 
The newly determined Equal Remuneration Principle has only been tested in a limited number of 
cases ± not least because, as noted in section 3.1, New South Wales industrial laws have been 
precluded from applying to constitutional corporations since March 2006, and to all other private 
sector employers since July 2009. The Principle has, however, been cited in various proceedings 
where applicants lodged their application under different provisions of the legislation or with 
recourse to a different wage fixing principle. These proceedings illustrate the potential for the 
Principle to shape tribunal practice in a wider variety of proceedings than those that explicitly 
concern equal remuneration.52 
                                                     
52 See eg Health and Community Psychologists (State) Award (2001) 109 IR 458; Re Teachers (Non-Government Pre 
Schools) State Award 2001 (2001) 120 IR 3; Re Public Hospitals (State) Award (2002) 115 IR 183; Re Local Government 
(State) Award 2001 (2004) 132 IR 357; &URZQ(PSOR\HHV¶7HDFKHUVLQ6FKRROVDQG7$)(DQG5HODWHG(PSOR\HHV
Salaries and Conditions Award (2000) 102 IR 202; Crown Employees (Teachers in Schools and TAFE and Related 
Employees) Salaries and Conditions Award (2002) 116 IR 361; Health Employees Pharmacists (State) Award (2003) 132 
IR 244; Re Crown Employees (Police Officers ± 2009 Award) (2012) 220 IR 1. 
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Crown Librarians, Library Officers and Archivists Award Proceedings ± Applications under the 
Equal Remuneration Principle (2002) 111 IR 48 was the first matter heard under the New South 
Wales Equal Remuneration Principle. While undervaluation was not contested by the parties, the 
Commission considered a range of evidence, including a case study that had been presented to 
Justice Glynn as part of the Inquiry into Pay Equity, which compared the work of librarians and 
geologists. The case study included points/factor job evaluation of the two occupations as part of 
evidence about the value of the work. The inquiry also undertook inspections of relevant 
workplaces, heard evidence from witnesses and received extensive documentary evidence. The 
Full Bench accepted that the work of librarians had been undervalued on a gender basis, the main 
indicia being (at [28]±[29]): 
x WKHILQGLQJVRIWKHFDVHVWXG\WRJHWKHUZLWK-XVWLFH*O\QQ¶VILQGLQJVLQWKH3D\(TXLW\,QTXLU\ 
x the consensus amongst the parties that the work was undervalued; 
x the fact that the occupation of librarian in the public sector was female dominated; 
x that librarians were found to be persons engaged in a profession ± they exercised skills based 
on theoretical knowledge, were required to have tertiary qualifications, were eligible for 
membership of independent, professional associations, were subject to standards of 
competence and were required to follow ethical codes of conduct ± yet they received lower 
pay rates than other professional groups in the New South Wales public service that exhibited 
similar characteristics; and  
x the absence of any concluded work value inquiry (while this was not of itself evidence of 
undervaluation, the absence of an independent assessment of the work served to strengthen 
the inference that the work had been undervalued). 
The work of archivists was not considered in the Pay Equity Inquiry. Nevertheless, the Full Bench 
found that archivists were also engaged in a profession and shared a number of similarities with 
librarians. The close nexus which had existed between librarians and archivists, including in 
relation to alignment of rates of pay, and the absence of any concluded work value inquiry, 
suggested that the work of archivists had also been undervalued (at [32]±[33]). Library technicians 
were likewise found to be undervalued by comparison with other para-professional groups in the 
public service. The occupation was female dominated, and at no stage had their work been the 
subject of a work value inquiry, despite significant change in the 1980s with the onset of automated 
systems (at [32]±[34]).The Full Bench concluded that the evidence established a career industry 
where qualifications, knowledge and responsibilities increased as the individual gained experience 
in performing the various functions at the various levels.  
Given that the issue of whether the work was undervalued was not contested between the parties, 
the Full Bench was not required to provide further guidance than that available in the decision that 
determined the Equal Remuneration Principle as to what was required to establish gender-related 
undervaluation. It was accepted that it was appropriate to compare the work of librarians with other 
public sector-based professions and it was relevant that librarians were paid less than other 
professions where work value had been assessed by the Commission in setting rates. Relevant 
IDFWRUVLQWKHFRPSDULVRQZHUHWKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUDEDFKHORU¶VGHJUHHRUHTXLYDOHQWIRUHQWU\DQG
career progression based on experience and merit-based appointment for promotion. The case 
involved direct inspections by the Commission at several worksites. 
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In these circumstances, to remedy the identified undervaluation the Commission decided to 
increase wage rates and adopt incremental scales for library staff ± an approach similar to that 
which had been adopted for public sector psychologists (Re Health and Community Employees 
Psychologists (State) Award (2001) 109 IR 458 at [60-61]). The Commission ordered the creation 
of a new interim award and requested the parties to confer on the terms of a new award to replace 
the interim award ± in particular, addressing issues such as the form and content of classification 
descriptors. Wage increases of up to 25 per cent (and on average 16 per cent) resulted and the 
new award formalised the professional status of librarians and library technicians (at [148]±[155]). 
B.2.4 The Child Care case 
In 2006, a Full Bench of the New South Wales Commission considered the first contested matter 
KHDUGXQGHUWKH6WDWH¶V(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ3ULQFLSOH5H0LVFHOODQHRXV:RUNHUV¶.LQGHUJDUWHQV
and Child Care Centres etc (State) Award (2006) 150 IR 290). 
The Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (LHMU) sought a new award with appropriate 
career paths and increased remuneration to address claimed historical inequities, undervaluation 
and work value change. The award was sought to cover primary contact staff, other than teachers, 
employed at pre-school, long day care and out of school hour childcare centres, as well as non-
contact staff, such as cooks and cleaners. In support of its claims for undervaluation, the union 
SUHVHQWHGHYLGHQFHRQWKHIHPDOHGRPLQDWLRQRIWKHLQGXVWU\LWVµFKDULWDEOHDQGSKLODQWKURSLF
RULJLQV¶WKHKLVWRU\RIHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDZDUGUDWHVE\FRQVHQWDQGWKHDEVHQFHRIDZRUNYDOXH
examination; and the changing nature of the work and quality of the service which had resulted 
from changed regulatory arrangements. The union also argued that the skills involved in childcare 
ZHUHQRWµLQQDWH¶EXWµOHDUQHGVNLOOVZKLFKGLGQRWFRPHQDWXUDOO\WRHLWKHUVH[¶DQGFODLPHGWKDW
µVRIWVNLOOV¶ including interpersonal and communication skills and teamwork had been undervalued 
in setting rates in the industry (at [2]±[3], [16]±[23], [101]±[107]). 
Employers First (on behalf of the childcare industry employers) argued that even if there had been 
an historical undervaluation of the rates of pay under the award as a result of the charitable origins 
of the industry, appropriate rates of pay had been established when the award had been aligned 
with that of other awards, in particular the metal industry award, as part of the minimum rates 
adjustment process in1991, and by union and employer review and consent variation in 1997. The 
employers also argued that substantial decreases in wages were warranted for some staff 
employed in pre-schools and that any wage increase would result in increased childcare fees which 
would affect the viability of childcare centres and would be a cost worn directly by the public (at 
[24]±[31]). 
The Commission conducted inspections and heard an extensive range of evidence relating to the 
LQGXVWU\LWVUHJXODWLRQIXQGLQJSURILWDELOLW\DQGDIIRUGDELOLW\WKHKLVWRU\RIWKHLQGXVWU\¶VDZDUG
regulation, the nature of the workforce, the skills and responsibilities required of the work and 
changes that had impacted on childcare work over time. The evidence included that of expert 
witnesses as well as the report of the Pay Equity Inquiry. Amongst other things, Justice Glynn had 
suggested in her report that the minimum rates adjustment process had not been correctly applied 
and subsequent consent award adjustments had failed to properly value the qualifications of 
childcare workers. She had noted that pay rates for such workers were below those of unskilled 
occupations such as shop assistants and car park attendants and had suggested that increased 
regulation had resulted in childcare work evolving in a similar way to the work of teachers (at [139]). 
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7KH&RPPLVVLRQVWDWHGWKDWWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRULWVFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHSDUWLHV¶FRPSHWLQJFDVHV
was the requirement imposed by section 10 of the Industrial Relations Act that the Commission 
PDNHDZDUGVVHWWLQJµIDLUDQGUHDVRQDEOHFRQGLWLRQVRIHPSOR\PHQW¶,WIRXQGWKDWLQFDVHVZKHUH
significant alterations were sought to existing consent arrangements, the onus fell on the applicant 
to demonstrate that the award no longer provided fair and reasonable conditions of employment (at 
[160]±>@&RQVLGHULQJDOOWKHHYLGHQFHWKH&RPPLVVLRQFRQFOXGHGWKDWµWKHHYLGHQFH
overwhelmingly showed that the rates of pay for childcare workers to whom the award applies, are 
WRRORZ¶DW>@ 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQUHMHFWHGHPSOR\HUV¶VXEPLVVLRQVWKDWVRPHUDWHVXQGHUWKHDZDUGVKRXOGEH
reduced, and found that both undervaluation and work value change supported the case for 
improved remuneration (at [169]: 
We are satisfied that no evidentiary basis for any reduction in the rates of any of those employed in 
preschools was made out ... we are well satisfied that as far as both qualified and unqualified child care 
workers are concerned, a case of both undervaluation and work value change was made out in the 
evidence. 
The Commission overviewed the changes in work requirements that it considered sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of the Work Value Principle. The changes affected childcare workers and 
co-ordinators and arose, in particular, from significant and ongoing changes in the regulatory 
environment (at [184]±[197]).The Commission then outlined the basis for its acceptance of the case 
for undervaluation of childcare workers, co-ordinators and authorised supervisors, stating that (at 
[200]): 
The evidence showed that the vast preponderance of views expressed over some years as the result of 
various investigations, surveys and considerations conducted by Federal and State government bodies 
and forums, as well as in academic research, was that the work of child care workers is undervalued. 
Even some employer witnesses in these proceedings accepted those views, albeit only in relation to 
qualified staff. Child care workers are generally perceived to have low pay and low status, with the result 
that few males are employed in the industry. One result is that there are difficulties in the attraction and 
retention of such staff, more in some areas than others, notwithstanding that the cost of the service 
provided by these centres is underwritten by Federal and State government financial support, as well as 
fees paid by parents. 
The Commission found that the award parties, through agreements which they had made and the 
Commission had ratified, had failed to ensure that the award rates properly reflected the value of 
the work, and that this situation had been compounded by the inability of childcare workers to 
negotiate on an over-award basis. The Commission noted that, generally speaking, it may be 
GLIILFXOWWRGHWHFWJHQGHUEDVHGXQGHUYDOXDWLRQ+RZHYHULWIRXQGWKDWLQWKHFKLOGFDUHZRUNHUV¶
case, there was no evidence to suggest that the conclusions reached by Justice Glynn in the Pay 
(TXLW\,QTXLU\KDGEHHQHUURQHRXVDQGWKHUHZDVµQRRWKHUH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHREYLRXV
undervaluation of childcare workers¶at [210]±[211]). 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQIRXQGWKDWWKHUHZHUHµVHULRXVGLIILFXOWLHV¶LQGUDZLQJFRPSDULVRQVEHWZHHQWKH
work of childcare workers and those employed in male dominated industries, but agreed with 
Justice Glynn that comparisons could usefully be made between teachers and childcare workers. 
The Commission found that childcare work had evolved in a way similar to the work of teachers 
and noted that childcare experience was recognised in teaching awards as a factor to be 
considered in classification matters. However, the Commission noted that there were differences in 
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the quality of the work and the similarities were less significant for non-qualified staff (at [214]±
[217]). 
In fixing fair and reasonable rates as required under section 10, the Commission also took into 
account the difference in the hours worked by childcare workers in pre-schools as opposed to long 
day care centres (at [231]±>@)XUWKHULQEDODQFLQJµZLGHO\KHOGFRQFHUQV¶IRUWKH
undervaluation of pay rates and employer concerns for employment and the viability of the industry, 
the Commission decided to phase in the award increases over a two year period (at [341]±[348]). 
The Full Bench noted also that rectifying undervaluation may require reassessing relativities with 
minimum rates in key benchmark awards such as the Metal Industry Award. In doing so the Full 
%HQFKDVVHVVHGWKDWLWZDVQRWOLPLWHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V0LQLPXP5DWHV$GMXVWPHQW3ULQFLSOH
7KH)XOO%HQFKQRWHGWKDWWRGRVRZRXOGLQWURGXFHµDQDUWLILFLDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQLQWRDQDVVHVVPHQW
RIWKHSURSHUUDWHVIRUFKLOGFDUHZRUNHUV¶DQGWRGRVRµZRXld elevate the Minimum Rates 
Adjustment principle to an overriding principle, imposing a limitation upon the proper assessment of 
WKHYDOXHRIZRUNHYHQZKHQLWKDVFKDQJHGRUZKHQLWKDVEHHQXQGHUYDOXHG¶at [242]). 
Some of the significant features of the decision were that the applicant was not required to make a 
comparison with a male dominated industry, although teaching was ultimately accepted as an 
appropriate comparator. The Full Bench also asserted that there was no requirement to assign a 
precise weighting to gender based undervaluation, It was simply a question of taking into account 
the evidence concerning whether the work was properly valued. Equally significant, arguments that 
DUHPHG\IRUFKLOGFDUHZRUNHUVZDVQRWLQWKHµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶ZHUe able to be rejected because the 
Commission accepted that the work they performed was of importance to the community and to 
government, as evidenced by the regulation and funding of the industry (Smith & Lyons 2007: 60±
1).  
B.3 Pay equity in Queensland 
B.3.1 The Queensland Pay Equity Inquiry 
In September 2000, the Queensland Minister for Employment, Training and Industrial Relations 
directed the QIRC to conduct an inquiry into pay equity in Queensland. The Inquiry was conducted 
by Commissioner Glenys FisKHUUHSRUWLQJLQ0DUFK7KH,QTXLU\¶VWHUPVRIUHIHUHQFH
specifically required it to assess the application of the findings of the investigations in New South 
Wales to the Queensland jurisdiction. It was obliged to consider, amongst other things, the extent 
of pay inequity in Queensland and the adequacy of the (then) Queensland legislation for achieving 
pay equity, and to develop a draft pay equity principle that might be adopted in Queensland.  
The Inquiry chose to conduct a case study on the work of dental assistants, with a twofold 
objective: to create an opportunity to analyse, assess and work value in a gender neutral way by 
unpacking the skills of a female-dominated occupation; and to provide interested parties with the 
opportunity to comment on the elements of a draft pay equity principle (Fisher 2001: 103). This 
procedural framework assisted in refining the principle ultimately recommended by the 
Commissioner in her final report, while the Inquiry found that its investigation of the work of dental 
assistants was assisted by an analytical framework that comprised the identification of the so-
FDOOHGµVRIWHUVNLOOV¶DVVRFLDWHGZLWKIHPLQLVHGZRUNWKHKLVWRU\RIZDJHGHWHUPLQDWLRQDQGZRUN
value assessment; the level of union activity; and forms of employment within the sector. 
The Queensland Inquiry accepted that a complex range of factors contributed to cause pay 
inequity, such as the concentration of women in low-paid work and precarious employment. It also 
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found that the profile of undervaluation indicators developed by the New South Wales Pay Equity 
Inquiry was relevant to Queensland. The final report recommended both legislative amendments 
and the introduction of a new principle to be effected through the industrial system. The report 
adopted the position of Justice Glynn in recommending that the most effective means of reform 
would be by way of labour law rather through the claims lodged under anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
The Queensland parliament passed legislative amendments to the Industrial Relations Act 1999 
(Qld) in line with a recommendation of the Inquiry, to the effect that the QIRC must ensure that all 
awards and agreements provide equal remuneration for men and women workers. The legislative 
changes also addressed the meaning to be DIIRUGHGWRµUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶GHILQLQJLWLQ6FKHGXOHDV
µWKHZDJHRUVDODU\SD\DEOHWRDQHPSOR\HH¶WRJHWKHUZLWKµDPRXQWVSD\DEOHRURWKHUEHQHILWV
PDGHDYDLODEOHWRDQHPSOR\HHXQGHUDFRQWUDFWRIVHUYLFH¶+HQFHWKHWHUPLVQRWIRUWKLVSXUSRVH
confined to minimum award rates.  
Section 60 of the Industrial Relations Act now provides that the QIRC may make any order it 
considers appropriate to ensure that employees covered by the order receive equal remuneration 
for work of equal or comparable value. The discretion to make such orders is not constrained by 
the existence or otherwise of an industrial instrument covering the affected employees. The 
Commission may be precluded from making an order if an alternative remedy has been pursued 
under the same or another Act (s 66).  
Besides the power to make specific orders, section 126(e) stipulates that the QIRC must ensure 
that each award provides for equal remuneration for men and women employees for work of equal 
or comparable value. In addition, it must refuse to approve any certified agreement unless satisfied 
that the agreement provides for equal remuneration of this kind (sections 156(1)(l),(m), 193(b), 
6HFWLRQGDOVRSURYLGHVWKDWµHQVXULQJHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQ
employees for wRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶LVWREHUHJDUGHGDVDSULQFLSDOREMHFWRIWKH$FW 
B.3.2 The 2002 Equal Remuneration Principle 
An Equal Remuneration Principle was introduced in April 2002 following hearings before a Full 
Bench of the QIRC, which arrived at the terms of the principle by consent. The Full Bench adopted, 
with only minor amendment, the draft principle recommended by the report of the 2001 Inquiry. The 
QIRC declared the principle by issuing a statement of policy (Equal Remuneration Principle (2002) 
114 IR 305). A grants program was also created to provide funding assistance to organisations 
involved in pay equity cases under the Principle. 
The terms of the principle oblige the QIRC to assess the value of work performed under any award, 
or in workplace agreements in female dominated industries, having regard to traditional work value 
factors such as the nature of work, skill and responsibility and the conditions under which the work 
LVSHUIRUPHGSDUD$VVHVVPHQWRIZRUNPXVWEHµWUDQVSDUHQW objective, non-discriminatory and 
IUHHRIDVVXPSWLRQVEDVHGRQJHQGHU¶SDUD7KHprinciple does not require a change in work 
value to be established (para 4). 
In assessing the value of work, the QIRC is to have regard to the history of any award, including 
whether there have been any work value assessments in the past and whether remuneration has 
been affected by the gender of the workers (para 6). The principle specifically identifies the 
features of an occupation or industry that might have contributed to undervaluation: 
x ZKHWKHUWKHZRUNKDVEHHQFKDUDFWHULVHGDVµIHPDOH¶ 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
164 
x whether the skills of female workers have been undervalued; 
x whether there has been undervaluation due to women being over-represented in lower-paid areas 
of an industry or occupation (occupational segregation or segmentation); 
x whether features of the industry or occupation (for example, occupational segregation, over-
representation of women in part-time or casual work, low rates of unionisation and a lack of ability 
for workers to bargain with their employer) have influenced the value of the work; and 
x whether sufficient weight has been placed on the typical work, skills and responsibilities exercised 
by women, working conditions and other relevant work features. 
The principle specifically states that it is not necessary to establish that female workers have been 
discriminated against to establish undervaluation of work (para 7). Nor does it require comparisons 
of any particular industry or occupation with any other (para 8), although it allows comparisons to 
be used for guidance in ascertaining appropriate remuneration (para 9). If the assessment shows 
that the work performed by female workers has been undervalued, the QIRC is obliged to take 
steps to ensure equal remuneration is provided to both female and male workers through means 
such as reclassification of the work, establishment of new career paths, changes to incremental 
scales, wage increases, new allowances and reassessment of definitions and descriptions of work 
to properly reflect their value (para. 10). It must do so without reducing existing wages or other 
conditions (para 14) and there must be no wage leapfrogging as a result of changes in relativities 
(para 11). Provision is included for phasing in any decisions under the principle (para 15). 
)RXUVXEVWDQWLYHDSSOLFDWLRQVKDYHEHHQEURXJKWXQGHU4XHHQVODQG¶V(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ
Principle since its inception. Each is discussed below. 
B.3.3 The Dental Assistants case 
In 2003, the LHMU brought a case on behalf of private sector dental assistants (DAs) employed 
XQGHUWKH'HQWDO$VVLVWDQWV¶3ULYDWH3UDFWLFH$ZDUG± State: see Liquor Hospitality and 
Miscellaneous Union (Queensland Branch) v Australian Dental Association (Qld Branch) (2005) 
180 QGIG 187. 
The QIRC considered a range of evidence, including a survey of the working conditions of DAs, 
work inspections, a case study of the work of dental assistants published in the report of the 
Queensland Pay Equity Inquiry, analysis of the award history, classification structure and 
qualifications, and information about the remuneration of comparable groups, both within 
Queensland and interstate. This evidence revealed a female dominated occupation, with low levels 
of unionisation, predominantly employed in small workplaces, with a high level of casual 
engagement ± despite employees remaining in the occupation for long periods. There was an 
absence of certified workplace agreements, but some evidence that certain dental assistants 
received informal over-award payments. Consent arrangements characterised changes to the 
award and the QIRC found that no work value case had been conducted in the past for DAs in 
either the public or private sector (at [48], [51], [63], [162]).  
It also found that DAs had been disadvantaged by the incomplete or inappropriate application of 
wage adjustment processes, such as the structural efficiency, award restructuring and minimum 
rates adjustment processes. The case for undervaluation was also supported by consideration of 
evidence relating to training and qualLILFDWLRQVLQDGHTXDWHUHFRJQLWLRQRIµVRIWVNLOOV¶UHVSRQVLELOLW\
(including delegated responsibility for infection control), and the conditions under which the work 
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was performed. After considering all the evidence, the QIRC accepted that undervaluation of work 
had occurred and that the work of DAs who possessed Certificate III qualifications were equal to 
those of tradespersons (at [63], [84], [128]±[153], [155]). 
The QIRC then considered how it should redress the undervaluation and, in particular, whether and 
to what extent wage rates from certified agreements that applied to predominantly male 
RFFXSDWLRQVVKRXOGEHLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKH'$V¶DZDUG,WQRWHGUHOHYDQWSURYLVLRQVRIWKH
Industrial Relations Act, including section 129, which provides that the Commission may include in 
an award provisions that are based on a certified agreement if such inclusions are consistent with 
principles established by the Full Bench and not contrary to the public interest. In considering the 
public interest, the QIRC stated that (at [181]): 
In our view the public interest is to ensure that the Award provides for equal remuneration by having 
regard to a number of factors including ensuring that relativities are properly set within and between 
awards; whether despite relativities being properly set, unequal remuneration still occurs either in respect 
of wage rates or more generally; and by consideration of rates paid to comparable occupations under 
awards and enterprise bargaining. 
The QIRC concluded that (at [183]): 
The evidence is overwhelming that DAs do not benefit from enterprise bargaining. It is this lack of access 
to, or participation in, enterprise bargaining that we consider the single biggest contributing factor to pay 
inequity for DAs. 
The QIRC found that lack of access to enterprise bargaining resulted from the small, non-
corporate, non-unionised workplaces in which DAs were found and the overwhelmingly female 
composition of the occupation. In deciding whether to take into account certified agreement rates, 
the WULEXQDODOVRWRRNLQWRDFFRXQW-XVWLFH*O\QQ¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIREMHFWLRQVWRWKHXVHRI
enterprise bargaining rates in the New South Wales Pay Equity Inquiry (at [185]±[187], [192]). It 
noted that Justice Glynn considered that enterprise agreements were appropriate for consideration 
in a pay equity context because they were: 
x subject to regulation and are institutionally based and therefore represent a more reliable and 
stable reference point than discretionary payments; 
x formalised and more likely to be transparent than over-award payments and more likely to 
demonstrate different classifications and definitions; and 
x subject to regulation by the QIRC so that the equal remuneration principle would be directly 
applicable to both awards and agreements. 
The QIR&FRQFOXGHGDW>@WKDWLWDJUHHGZLWK-XVWLFH*O\QQ¶VUHDVRQLQJDQGIRXQGWKDWSD\
equity would not be achieved by merely setting appropriate relativities for DAs by reference to 
comparable classifications in the Engineering Award, without any adjustment to compensate for 
rates in certified agreements. It also noted that section 266 of the Industrial Relations Act indicated 
WKDWµZKHUHSD\LQHTXLW\LVIRXQGLWPXVWEHUHFWLILHG¶DQGWKDWLWVUHFWLILFDWLRQZLOOJHQHUDOO\UHTXLUHD
µXQLTXHUHVSRQVH¶DW[193]). 
To redress the undervaluation, the QIRC applied a two-part increase to the basic pay rates as 
VSHFLILHGLQWKHDZDUG7KHILUVWUHIOHFWHGWKHWULEXQDO¶VYLHZWKDWWKHZRUNRI'$VEHDOLJQHGZLWK
the tradesperson rate in the Metal Industry Award. The second element reflected its concerns that 
wage increases of this magnitude ($63.60 per week or about 11 per cent) would not remedy pay 
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inequity for DAs due to their lack of access to, or participation in, enterprise bargaining. To this end 
it determined an Equal Remuneration Component, set at 1.25% of the base rate per annum. A 
small part of this Component was said to compensate for disabilities in the way in which work was 
performed, such as dealing with human waste, exposure to chemicals and noise. The QIRC 
attempted to limit the opportunities for flow-on claims by observing that a claim for equal 
remuneration would be determined with regard to its own circumstances and if inequity was 
HVWDEOLVKHGµLWVUHFWLILFDWLRQZLOOUHTXLUHDXQLTXHUHVSRQVH¶(at [192]±[197]). 
The case also resulted in a number of award amendments. The classification structure was altered 
to recognise the natural career path of DAs and the role of practice managers. Relativities were 
aligned with the Engineering Award ± State (the traditional benchmark for award wages in 
Queensland). Other improvements to conditions included a new right for regular and systematic 
casual employees to become permanent after six months, requirements for employer contributions 
to professional development costs, a first aid allowance and a requirement that ordinary hours only 
be worked on five consecutive days out of seven. 
In their analysis of the Dental Assistants case, Whitehouse and Rooney (2007: 88) argue that 
because equal remuneration was identified in the principal objects of the Industrial Relations Act 
(section 3) as an outcome to be pursued by the QIRC, pay equity became a priority in itself and 
FRQVWLWXWLYHRIWKHµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶UDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\VRPHWKLQJWREHEDODQFHGDJDLQVWRWKHU
considerations. They also suggest that (2007: 99): 
... the case provides an illustration of one of the most effective strategies to address gender pay inequity 
XQGHUWKHSUHYDLOLQJV\VWHPRIµHQWHUSULVHEDUJDLQLQJ¶± that is, to recognise the gendered distribution of 
premiums won through enterprise agreements and make appropriate corrections to awards covering 
female-dominated occupational groups with limited access to bargaining. As such it reflects a number of 
strengths of the Queensland system that bolster its ERP [Equal Remuneration Principle], such as the 
prioritisation of pay equity in the Act and the enhanced capacity to interpret public interest in more than 
simplistic economic terms. 
On the other hand, Whitehouse and Rooney note that in spite of the gains that the private sector 
DAs made, the case still left them well below the actual earnings of many male-dominated trades 
occupations and also below the rates for public sector DAs. They also argued that further rounds of 
bargaining in the public sector would likely increase the gap before the phasing in of the private 
VHFWRU'$V¶LQFUHDVHVZHUHFRPSOHWHG7KLVOHGWKHPWRUDLVHTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYH
way to construct comparisons for undervaluation cases and whether opportunities under the Equal 
Remuneration Principle were fully exploited in this case (Whitehouse & Rooney 2007: 99). This 
analysis has recently been extended to cover the period since the commencement of the Fair Work 
Act with the more recent work including child care workers who were also the gained wage 
increases through proceedings under the Queensland ERP (see section B.3.4). The analysis 
highlights the benefits of industrial awards for the carriage of pay equity claims but also highlights 
the vulnerability of pay equity gains to erosion and fragmentation (Connelly et al 2012: 127). 
B.3.4 7KH&KLOGUHQ¶V6HUYLFHV:RUNHUVFDVH 
A further attempt to apply the Equal Remuneration Principle arose in December 2003. It involved 
an application by the LHMU to vary the Queensland Child Care Industry Award ± State 2003: see 
Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (Queensland Branch) v  Queensland  Union  of  Employers  
(2006)  181  QGIG  568  (interim  decision);  Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union, Queensland 
Branch, Union of Employees v Children's Services Employers Association (2006) 182 QGIG 318 
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(final decision). The grounds were similar to that filed in New South Wales (see section B.2.4) and 
included that the occupation of childcare fits the profile that indicates undervaluation. The union 
noted that childcare work is characterised as female and carried out in small workplaces. The wage 
rates in the award reflected the lack of effective work-value outcomes and that childcare 
qualifications were inadequately recognised because childcare was a new industry with new 
RFFXSDWLRQVLQYROYLQJµVRIW¶± traditionally female ± skills which had not been properly valued.  
A range of factors prolonged the proceedings and the QIRC did not hand down an interim decision 
until March 24, 2006 and a final decision on 27 June 2006. This time span was not only a result of 
the contentious nature of the claims. The proceedings were required to move past challenges to 
each member of the constituted member of the Full Bench, as well as changes to the Full Bench 
caused by changes in administrative responsibilities within the Commission.  
The QIRC found the work performed by childcare workers had been historically undervalued based 
on the gender of those workers. It held that the conditions under which the work was performed 
had not been adequately taken into account in the past when the value of the work was assessed. 
It reviewed the award history and found that when the award had first been made, the work was 
FKDUDFWHULVHGDVµIHPDOH¶WKHZDJHUDWHVZHUHVHWE\UHference to other female wage rates and the 
skills necessary to perform the work were not identified. Subsequent adjustments had not remedied 
this position (at 357). 
The Commission concluded that childcare work involved high level duties or care, including high 
physical and mental demands. Many of the skills of childcare workers, such as communication, 
multi-tasking, teamwork and developing and implementing programs, had never been properly 
valued. Limited attention had also been given to work conditions, for example, lifting children, 
dealing with human waste and work intensity, and other relevant features of the work such as 
attending meetings out of normal hours, limited access to breaks and unpaid and self-funded 
training requirements. Following on from the Dental Assistants case, the QIRC established that a 
Certificate III gained for a predominantly female occupation had the same value as a Certificate III 
gained for a predominantly male occupation. Possession of such a certificate was to attract 
payment of the 100 per cent rate (C10) in the Engineering Award. The Commission said that the 
critical issue was not the length of time the qualification takes to achieve, but the equivalence of 
accountability and responsibility required for each level of qualification. However, the Commission 
also noted that other factors, such as the conditions under which the work was performed, or 
additional work requirements, could be relevant to the assignment of an occupation to the 
classification structure. 
The wage increases granted by the QIRC were similar to the award wage increases granted by the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission in federal work value proceedings (Re Child Care 
Industry (Australian Capital Territory) Award 1998 (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 
PR954938,13 January 2005)), though below the wage increases granted by its New South Wales 
counterpart (see section B.2.4). The Queensland tribunal offered three reasons for this departure. 
The first was that two year trained teaching rates, relied upon in New South Wales, was not an 
extant classification in Queensland teaching awards. On this point the Queensland tribunal did not 
address a broader point made in proceedings in New South Wales, that the appropriate nexus was 
relativity with teaching work, rather than work in the metal industry. The second was that the LHMU 
claim did not address the absence of over-award payments received by childcare employees; in 
the eyes of the tribunal there was no evidentiary basis to grant an Equal Remuneration Component 
as was the case in the dental assistants proceedings. The third reason rested on the weight given 
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to the Commission to competing considerations. It held that achieving pay equity needed to be 
EDODQFHGDJDLQVWWKHLQWHUHVWRIHQVXULQJFKLOGUHQ¶V services are affordable and accessible to 
SDUHQWV&RQVHTXHQWO\WKH&RPPLVVLRQUHMHFWHGWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VZDJHFODLPDVEHLQJµH[FHVVLYH¶
IRULWZRXOGµSXWDWULVNWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶DW±62). Increased pay rates were 
awarded and phased in over a period of two and a half years. For employees holding the 
appropriate academic or vocational qualifications, the pay increases ranged from 14 per cent to 29 
per cent. Some improvements to conditions were also awarded and the Award was renamed the 
&KLOGUHQ¶V6HUYLFHV$ZDUG± State 2006 to better describe the range of services provided to 
children and their parents by childcare workers. 
B.3.5 The Social and Community Services workers case 
The Queensland Services Union applied for a new award covering community services and crisis 
assistance workers in April 2008: see Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v 
Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ltd (2009) 191 QGIG 19. The first stage of the 
application resulted in the creation of the Queensland Community Services and Crisis Assistance 
Award ± State 2008, by consent, in September 2008. The new award incorporated the wages and 
classifications of the federal Social and Community Services (Queensland) Award 2001, and the 
Crisis Assistance Supported Housing (Queensland) Award 1999. 
The second stage of the application sought increased pay rates for workers covered by the new 
award, to correct historical undervaluation, as well as a 1.25 per cent Equal Remuneration 
Component to maintain ongoing wage parity because of a lack of enterprise bargaining in the 
sector. As in the previous applications under the Equal Remuneration Principle, evidence focused 
on the features of the industry, indicators of undervaluation, the award history, consideration of 
work value and comparisons with other occupations and industries. 
In its decision the QIRC drew specific guidance from the terms of the Queensland Equal 
Remuneration Principle, including the marker points of undervaluation provided in that principle. 
Relevant material considered in the proceedings included an agreed statement of facts between 
the parties and focused on: 
x female domination of the industry; 
x the middle class, charitable origins of the community services sector;  
x FXOWXUDOGHYDOXDWLRQRIµFDUHZRUN¶DVµZRPHQ¶VZRUN¶DQGDVVRFLDWHGXQGHUYDOXDWLRQRIµVRIW
VNLOOV¶VXFKDVDFWLYHOLVWHQLQJSUREOHPVROYLQJDQGQHJRWLDWLQJ 
x the lack of any work value exercise to review rates, except for an adjustment to the four year 
graduate entry rate; 
x industry features such as small workplaces and low levels of unionisation; 
x the fact that award rates and descriptors had predominantly set by consent; 
x the failure to define career paths in the previous award; 
x the prevalence of part-time positions, largely driven by funding; 
x industrial issues resulting in barriers to bargaining and a general lack of over-award payments; 
and 
x reliance on, and the nature of, government funding models. 
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Commissioner Fisher, who heard the matter, assessed that factors that contributed to the 
undervaluation of the work included the female characterisation of that work. Specifically, the 
nature of the work in the community sectors sector was considered to be an extension of work 
undertaken by women in the domestic sphere, including the caring and nurturing of dependants. 
This characterisation had impeded industrial recognition of the work and there had been an 
absence of work value investigations in the award. In consequence, the prevailing classification 
structure and wage rates failed to recognise post-school qualifications held by employees in the 
sector. Funding of the sector was consistent with award rather than bargained rates of pay. In 
considering the contribution of gender to undervaluation, Commissioner Fisher concluded that 
WKHVHIDFWRUVKDGDµJHQGHURUJHQGHUDVVRFLDWHGFDXVH:KHQFRQVLGHUHGDVDZKROHDSDWWHUQ
HPHUJHVWKDWJHQGHULVDWWKHFRUHRISUHVHQWZRUNYDOXHRIWKHFRPPXQLW\VHUYLFHVVHFWRU¶DW 
Commissioner Fisher concluded that the existing relativities understated the nature of the work, 
skill and responsibilities at particular levels of the award, and then proceeded to consider the work, 
skill and responsibility and the conditions under which the work was performed to assess its 
appropriate value. In considering the rates to be applied in the new award, the Commissioner was 
guided by the rates in a number of different industrial instruments in local government and the 
Queensland Public Service. A key feature of these proceedings was that this spectrum of rates 
included bargained outcomes, including the State Government Departments Certified Agreement 
2006. The Commissioner found that this Agreement provided a useful point of comparison, 
because a criterion for its certification was that the rates provided equal remuneration for men and 
women employees for work of equal or comparable value. The Commissioner agreed that it was 
appropriate to use certified agreement rates as a guide to ascertaining appropriate rates, on the 
basis that this was consistent with an overriding public interest objective of ensuring that 
employees in the community services sector were remunerated commensurate with their work 
value (at 46±9).  
An Equal Remuneration Component of 1 per cent was awarded in recognition that the relevant 
employees had experienced a low level of access to the higher wage rates that were available by 
way of enterprise bargaining. The tribunal placed some limitations on this aspect of the decision, 
PDNLQJLWDSSOLFDEOHRQO\XQWLO7KH&RPPLVVLRQHU¶VUHDVRQing was that although the evidence 
clearly established the low incidence of enterprise bargaining and over-award payments in the 
sector, there was encouragement elsewhere in the legislation for parties to engage in enterprise 
bargaining. The limitation to the Component would allow funding bodies to consider the broader 
public sector model of paying enterprise bargaining rates. In addition, if it became evident that 
enterprise bargaining was becoming a common feature of the industry, an application could be 
made for the earlier removal of the Equal Remuneration Component. 
B.3.6 The Disability Support Workers case 
$XVWUDOLDQ:RUNHUV¶8QLRQRI(PSOR\HHV4XHHQVODQGY4XHHQVODQG&RPPXQLW\6HUYLFHV
Employers Association Inc (2009) 192 QGIG 46 is the most recent case in the Queensland 
MXULVGLFWLRQ,WFRQFHUQHGDQDSSOLFDWLRQE\WKH$XVWUDOLDQ:RUNHUV¶8QLRQWRLQFUHDVHWKHUDWHVRI
pay in the Disability Support Workers Award ± State 2003, applicable to disability support workers 
in the community (non-government) sector. The union and the respondent Queensland Community 
6HUYLFHV(PSOR\HUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQWHQGHUHGDQDJUHHGVWDWHPHQWRIIDFWVGHPRQVWUDWLQJFRQVHQVXV
that the work of employees covered by the Disability Support Workers Award had been historically 
undervalued for similar reasons to community services workers, and consistent with the indicators 
of undervaluation identified in the New South Wales Pay Equity Inquiry. 
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Factors identified as contributing to undervaluation in the agreed statement of facts included: 
x female domination of the industry; 
x WKHLQGXVWU\¶VFRQQHFWLRQZLWKYROXQWDULVPDQGXQSDLGZRUN 
x the significance of part-time and casual employment; 
x government funding models; 
x low levels of unionisation; 
x impediments to bargaining (for example arising from low levels of unionisation, the large 
number of small organisations, the lack of dedicated human resource services, funding 
arrangements and cultural factors); 
x µFDUHZRUN¶DQGWKHµVRIWVNLOOV¶LQYROYHGLQVXFKZRUNVXFKDVHPRWLRQDOLQWHOOLJHQFHDQG
communication skills) having been undervalued; and 
x inadequate recognition of changes to the nature of the work resulting from de-
institutionalisation of the sector and changing work expectations and requirements. 
The agreed statement of facts also indicated that undervaluation had raised public interest 
concerns, including difficulty in attracting and retaining suitable staff, and a high level of staff 
turnover. In its decision of September 2009, the QIRC agreed, and awarded pay increases to 
employees at every level. In deciding new pay rates, the QIRC gave consideration to two relevant 
comparators: the newly created Queensland Community Services and Crisis Assistance Award ± 
State 2008, and the State Government Departments Certified Agreement 2006. It noted that much 
of the work performed in the community sector was very similar to that performed by Queensland 
Government services. The increase was phased in over five adjustments. 
B.3.7 Pay Equity: Time to Act 
A second inquiry into pay equity was undertaken by the QIRC in 2007. The terms of reference 
LQFOXGHGHYDOXDWLQJWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKHRXWFRPHVRIWKH4,5&¶V±01 inquiry in advancing 
pay equity and examining the impact of the 2005 federal legislative amendments on pay equity in 
Queensland. As noted at section 3.1, a key component of the federal legislation was that it 
H[FOXGHGWKHRSHUDWLRQRIµDODZSURYLGLQJIRUDFRXUWRUWULEXQDOFRQVWLWXWHGE\DODZRIWKH6WDWHRU
Territory to make an order in relation to equal remuneration for work of equal valXH¶IRUHPSOR\HHV
who fell within the federal jurisdiction. In this respect the Inquiry observed the impact of the federal 
legislative amendments on the cases involving dental assistants and childcare workers.  
In September 2007, the QIRC delivered the inquiry report, Pay Equity: Time to Act (Fisher2007). 
The report found that the Equal Remuneration Principle provided a useful analytical framework for 
the consideration of pay equity. In the context of the Dental Assistants and &KLOGUHQ¶V6HUYLFHV
cases, it discussed the usefulness of the principle in redressing the traditional undervaluation of the 
work performed in these predominantly female occupations. The report also emphasised that the 
principle had been valuable in educating the tribunal and industrial parties about pay equity. A 
funding program available in Queensland to support cases conducted under the principle was 
found to be important in addressing concerns about the resource-intensive nature of conducting 
cases (Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney-General 2010). 
The Inquiry noted, however, that the widened scope of federal industrial law had curtailed the 
capacity of State industrial jurisdictions to provide an industrial response to the issue of pay equity. 
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Given this finding the Inquiry canvassed the policy and legislative action that the Queensland 
government could take to exercise an impact on gender pay equity for employees of constitutional 
corporations. The Inquiry recommended that new legislation be passed which would require all 
employers in Queensland with fifteen or more employees to submit pay equity plans. The Inquiry 
tailored its recommendation in this regard to what was identified as the most viable aspects of the 
pay equity model used in Quebec, Canada (Fisher 2007: 99±111). This proposal was not, however, 
taken up by the government. 
B.4 The position in the other States 
The following sections detail the recent treatment of gender pay equity in Victoria, Western 
Australia, South Australia and Tasmania. 
B.4.1  Victoria 
A Victorian Pay Equity Inquiry, announced in March 2004, confronted a different set of 
circumstances from that of other State inquiries. In 1996 the Victorian Parliament had referred its 
industrial powers to the Commonwealth, by way of the Commonwealth Powers (Industrial 
Relations) Act 1996 (Vic). This brought all Victorian employees within the coverage of what was 
then the WR Act. It also meant left the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (as it then was) 
as the only body with power to prescribe pay and conditions for workers in Victoria ± including by 
making equal remuneration orders under the provisions outlined in section A.5 (URCOT 2005: 16, 
67).  
In June 2004 a tripartite Working Party chaired by Commissioner Whelan of the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission was established to oversee the Inquiry, which reported to the 
Victorian Government in March 2005. Among a series of recommendations the Working Party 
recommended that the Victorian Government should advocate a review of the equal remuneration 
provisions in the WR Act to identify provisions which required clarification or amendment and to 
advance a more effective legislative model for equal remuneration for Victorian workers. The 
initiatives proposed by the Working Party included a newly established Pay Equity Unit to 
commission a series of case studies designed to identify the determinants of gender pay inequity in 
Victoria. In identifying industry and occupational areas for investigation the Working Party 
recommended that regard should EHKDGWRWKH1HZ6RXWK:DOHV3D\(TXLW\,QTXLU\¶V
observations concerning the contributing factors to undervaluation. The Working Party also 
recommended that the Pay Equity Unit develop a model for workplace gender pay audits. Mindful 
of the international evidence concerning voluntary pay equity audits, the Working Party 
recommended that the government should assess how effective voluntary pay equity audits had 
been and examine whether a system of proactive and mandatory gender pay audits for Victorian 
workplaces is required (Victorian Pay Equity Working Party 2005: 11±25).  
Advice to the parties concerning gender pay equity audits formed the focus of State government 
initiatives in the wake of the Inquiry. Although the Pay Equity Unit was not established, financial 
assistance in the form of research and administrative support was provided to industrial parties in 
the finance sector to conduct a pay equity audit. The results of this audit were published to provide 
details of methodologies and the strategies relied on by the parties (Industrial Relations Victoria 
2007).  
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B.4.2 Western Australia 
A Western Australian Pay Equity Inquiry was announced in April 2004, with its final report tabled in 
November 2004. Unlike the pay equity inquiries in other States, the Inquiry was not conducted 
through the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission, but through academic 
researchers at the University of Western Australia (Todd & Eveline 2004). The report contained 
recommendations which focused on three areas; regulation, voluntary strategies, and training. The 
report noted that women in Western Australia were, on average, paid less than men in Western 
Australia and less than women elsewhere in Australia (Todd & Eveline 2004: 18). The report noted 
that multiple factors contributed to the pay gap, hence the remedies identified by the Inquiry 
extended beyond the industrial relations system. 
The recommendations identified the need for amendments to the Industrial Relations Act 1979 
(WA) to establish equal remuneration provisions to be applied in assessing undervaluation on a 
gender basis. The recommendations provided that the provisions have effect in relation to the 
making of awards and orders and the registration of industrial agreements, in addition to other 
applications brought by the parties or by the Western Australian Commission on its own motion 
(Todd & Eveline 2004: 55). The recommendations also asserted the need for legislative provisions 
which made it clear that equal remuneration provisions were not restricted by the operation of wage 
fixing principles and which would negate any assumption that previous applications of the wage 
fixing principles had been free of assumptions based on gender (Todd & Eveline 2004: 61). The 
report recommended the establishment of a fund to assist organisations making or responding to 
cases taken under the new equal remuneration provisions (Todd & Eveline 2004: 8, 33). The 
recommendations also making workplace gender pay audits mandatory in the public sector and 
voluntary in the private sector (Todd & Eveline 2004: 49±53).  
Following consideration of the report, in February 2006 the Western Australian government 
established a Pay Equity Unit in the Labour Relations Division of what was then the Department of 
Consumer and Employment Protection. The unit was charged with the responsibility for 
implementing selected recommendations of the 2004 review, including the development of 
resources to raise awareness of gender pay equity and to assist its identification. These resources 
were to include advice on how to conduct gender pay equity audits, and post-audit plans, the latter 
being directed to initiatives to remedy any gender pay inequities identified by the audit (Western 
Australia Department of Consumer and Employment Protection 2006). However, no legislative 
changes were ever made. 
As the Industrial Relations Act 1979 VWDQGVVHFWLRQDFPDNHVLWDµSULQFLSDOREMHFW¶RIWKHVWDWXWH
WRµSURPRWHHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQIRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶6HFWLRQ$YLL
also requLUHVWKH,QGXVWULDO5HODWLRQV&RPPLVVLRQWRWDNHLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQµWKHQHHGWRSURYLGH
HTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQIRUZRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶ZKHQPDNLQJ6WDWH
wage orders or adjusting awards. The Commission has in recent years noted evidence that 
Western Australia has a higher gender gap in earnings than other States, but expressed doubt 
about is capacity to remedy that situation. For example, in 2012 State Wage Order Pursuant to 
Section 50A of the Act [2012] WAIRC 00346 at [54] it observed that: 
The gender pay gap is calculated by reference to all industries in WA, however we do not set a minimum 
wage which applies across all industries in WA. The State Wage order can apply only to the small 
minority of the private sector workforce in WA. The lack of any measurable reduction in the gender pay 
gap in WA following the $29.00 per week increase to the minimum wage we ordered in 2008 leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that the gender pay gap in WA is unlikely to be reduced by any order which 
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can issue from these proceedings: the overriding effect of the FW Act makes it likely that the coverage of 
the State Wage order is insignificant for this purpose. There is nothing to suggest that the gender pay 
gap for the small minority of employees in WA who are covered by the State industrial relations system is 
significantly different from the gender pay gap for the majority of employees in WA who are covered by 
the national industrial relations system. 
The Commission DOVRQRWHGDW>@WKDWWKHHYLGHQFHEHIRUHLWVXJJHVWHGWKDWµJHQGHUSD\UDWLRV
GLIIHUVLJQLILFDQWO\E\LQGXVWU\RULQGXVWU\VHFWRU¶EXWZHUHORZHULQVRPHRIWKHORZSDLGVHFWRUV
most likely to be affected by the adjustment of minimum wage rates. On the other hand, it 
H[SUHVVHGFRQILGHQFHDW>@WKDWµDQLQFUHDVHWRWKHPLQLPXPZDJHKDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWRDVVLVWLQ
SURYLGLQJHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQIRUZRUNRIHTXDORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶,QLWV
most recent wage ruling, 2013 State Wage Order Pursuant to Section 50A of the Act [2013] 
WAIRC 00347 at [51], it reiterated that view. 
B.4.3 South Australia 
Section 3(1)(n) of the Fair Work Act 1994 6$PDNHVLWDQREMHFWRIWKH$FWWRµHQVXUHHTXDO
remuneration for men and women doing work of equaORUFRPSDUDEOHYDOXH¶$OWKRXJKWKHUHLVQR
SURYLVLRQIRUWKHPDNLQJRIHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQRUGHUVVHFWLRQSURYLGHVWKDWDQ\µUDWHRI
UHPXQHUDWLRQ¶IL[HGE\DFRQWUDFWRIHPSOR\PHQWDQDZDUGRUDQHQWHUSULVHDJUHHPHQWPXVWEH
µFRQVLVWHQWZLWK¶WKH,/2¶V(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQZKLFKLVUHSURGXFHGLQ6FKHGXOHRI
the Act. Section 90A also provides that in making an award regulating remuneration, the Industrial 
5HODWLRQV&RPPLVVLRQPXVWµWDNHDOOUHDVRQDEOHVWHSVWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHSULQFLSOHRf equal 
remuneration for men and women doing work of equal or comparable value is applied (insofar as 
PD\EHUHOHYDQW¶ 
Although wage-fixing principles adopted by the Commission in the past have made mention of 
equal remuneration (see eg State Wage Case, July 2005 [2005] SAIRComm 29), the Commission 
µVFXUUHQWUROHOHDYHVOLWWOHVFRSHIRUWKHDGRSWLRQRIVXFKSULQFLSOHV7KLVLVSDUWO\EHFDXVHWKHUH
are a few award-reliant employees left within its jurisdiction, but also because the only mention now 
of wage-fixing principles in the 1994 Act involves the Commission choosing or being asked to 
adopt principles formulated by the federal tribunal: see s 100; and see eg 2013 State Wage Case 
and Minimum Standard for Remuneration [2013] SAIRComm 13. 
B.4.4 Tasmania 
Guided by the developments in New South Wales, the Tasmanian government established a 
Women in Paid Work Taskforce in December 1999. The Taskforce was governed by terms of 
reference that went beyond gender pay equity, but appointed Commissioner Patricia Leary to 
examine the application of labour law developments in New South Wales to Tasmania. The 
Taskforce duly adopted a key finding from the New South Wales Pay Equity Inquiry ± that the 
existing industrial system, modified to allow the identification and rectification of undervaluation, 
would provide the most effective means of rectifying gender pay inequity. The Taskforce 
recommended that the Tasmanian Industrial Commission issue an equal remuneration principle to 
provide a mechanism for working women to find an adequate remedy for the undervaluation of their 
work (Tasmania Department of Premier and Cabinet 2000: 47±8).  
Submissions on a new equal remuneration principle were made to the review of wage fixing 
principles that commenced as a result of the State Wage Case 1999 (Tasmanian Industrial 
Commission, 6 July 2000). In July 2000 the Tasmanian Industrial Commission subsequently 
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LQFOXGHGDQHTXDOUHPXQHUDWLRQSULQFLSOHLQWKH6WDWH¶VQHZZDJHIL[LQJSULQFLSOHV The principle, 
while not restricted by the operation of other wage fixing principles, only applied to applications for 
the making or varying of an award and provided an extremely limited scope for the investigation of 
overaward payments. The principle focused on the proper valuation of the work and provided for 
the consideration by the Commission of whether the past valuation of the work had been affected 
by the gender of the workers. Prior assessments of the value of the work undertaken by the 
Tasmanian Industrial Commission were not to be assumed to have been unaffected by gender 
bias. Work value principles were to be used in determining appropriate rates; taking into account 
the nature of the work, skill, responsibility and qualifications required and the conditions under 
which the work is performed.  
No cases have been brought under the Tasmanian principle. In the State Wage Case 2009 
(Tasmanian Industrial Commission, T13471 of 2009, 27 July 2009) the Commission agreed to 
DEROLVKPRVWRILWVZDJHIL[LQJSULQFLSOHVRQWKHEDVLVWKDWWKH\µQRORQJHUhave a relevant purpose 
DQGVKRXOGEHUHWLUHG¶DW>@1HYHUWKHOHVVLWHOHFWHGWRUHWDLQDSD\HTXLW\SULQFLSOHDVIROORZV
(at [96]±[100]): 
In this Principle 'pay equity' means equal remuneration for men and women doing work of equal value. 
Applications may be made for making or varying an award in order to implement pay equity. Such 
applications will be dealt with according to this principle. 
Pay equity applications will require an assessment of the value of work performed in the industry or 
occupation the subject of the application, irrespective of the gender of the relevant worker. The 
requirement is to ascertain the value of the work rather than whether there have been changes in the 
value of the work. The Commission may take into account the nature of the work, the skill, responsibility 
and qualifications required by the work and the conditions under which the work is performed. 
A prior assessment by the Commission (or its predecessors) of the value of the work the subject of the 
application, and/or the prior setting of rates for such work, does not mean that it shall be presumed that 
the rates of pay applying to the work are unaffected by the gender of the relevant employees. The history 
of the establishment of rates in the award the subject of the application will be a consideration. The 
Commission shall broadly assess whether the past valuation of the work has been affected by the 
gender of the workers. 
In approaching its task, the Commission will have regard to the public interest requirements of Section 
36 of the Act. 
Although adopted by the Industrial Commission as a principle for dealing with awards, the issue of 
pay equity is not explicitly addressed in the Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas) itself. 
B.5 Timeline of State equal remuneration regulation 
This review has highlighted key phases in the development of State equal remuneration regulation, 
with a particular focus on developments in New South Wales and (more recently) Queensland. 
Table B.1 draws together particularly significant cases and inquiries and places them in a timeline 
of State equal remuneration regulation. 
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Table B.1: Significant cases and inquiries in State equal remuneration regulation, 1929±2009 
Year and development Cases/inquiries 
1929 - Industrial Commission of NSW 
determined that the delineation of 
separate basic wages for women and 
men did not apply to the setting of skill 
margins 
Re Hairdressers etc, Females (State) Award (1929) 28 AR (NSW) 39 
1957 ± observation by the Industrial 
Commission of NSW that the principle 
of equal skill margins for men and 
women did not apply in practice  
Re Paint and Varnish Makers etc (State) Award (1957) 56 AR (NSW) 87 
1958 - Female Rates (Amendment) Act 
1958 (NSW),introduced in response to 
ILO Equal Remuneration Convention to 
provide equal pay between the sexes 
in specified circumstances 
Re Clerks (State) Award and Other Awards (1959) 58 AR 470 
1973 ± introduction of the equal pay for 
work of equal value principle in NSW 
State Equal Pay Case (1973) 73 AR 425 
1998 ± NSW Pay Equity Inquiry Glynn, L. (1998), The pay equity inquiry, NSW Government Printer, Sydney 
2000 ± NSW Equal Remuneration 
Principle 
Re Equal Remuneration Principle (2000) 97 IR 177 
Crown Librarians, Library Officers and Archivists Award Proceedings ± 
Applications under the Equal Remuneration Principle (2002) 111 IR 48 
5H0LVFHOODQHRXV:RUNHUV¶.LQGHUJDUWHQVDQG&KLOG&DUH&HQWUHVHWF6WDWH
Award (2006) 150 IR 290 
2001 ± Queensland Pay Equity Inquiry Fisher, G. (2001), Worth valuing: report of the pay equity inquiry, Queensland 
Industrial Relations Commission, Brisbane 
2002 ± Queensland Equal 
Remuneration Principle 
Equal Remuneration Principle (2002) 114 IR 305 
Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (Queensland Branch) v Australian 
Dental Association (Qld Branch) (2005) 180 QGIG 187. 
Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (Queensland Branch) v Queensland 
Union of Employers (2006) 181 QGIG 568 (interim decision in Queensland child 
care case) 
Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union, Queensland Branch, Union of 
Employees v Children's Services Employers Association (2006) 182 QGIG 318 
(final decision in Queensland child care case)  
Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Queensland Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Ltd (2009) 191 QGIG 19 
$XVWUDOLDQ:RUNHUV¶8QLRQRI(PSOR\HHV4XHHQVODQGY4XHHQVODQG&RPPXQLW\
Services Employers Association Inc (2009) 192 QGIG 46 
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Appendix C: Equal remuneration in other jurisdictions 
C.1 European Union 
C.1.1 Legislation  
C.1.1.1 Article 119 TEEC 
Equal pay for equal work has been one of the most basic principles of the European Union (EU) 
since its foundation. Article 119 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
(TEEC), which was signed in Rome in 1957, provided that: 
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the 
principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. 
Article 119 was the only provision in the TEEC aimed at combating gender discrimination. It did not 
IROORZWKHZRUGLQJXVHGLQWKH,/2¶V(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQVHH section 2.2) and the 
background to the provision was purely economic. Some member states, in particular France, 
wanted to eliminate distortions in competition between undertakings established in different 
states.53 Article 119 should have been implemented before 1 January 1962, but as member states 
were unable or unwilling to do so, it was not transposed into national law (Burri & Prechal 2010: 2). 
The implementation of the principle of equal pay became one of the priorities of the social 
programme agreed upon in 1974 and the EU states eventually decided to adopt a new directive on 
equal pay.54 1975 saw the issue of Council Directive 75/117/EEC, which broadened the principle of 
equal pay for men and women as outlined in Article 119 of the TEEC. Article 1 of the Directive 
GHILQHGLWWRPHDQµIRUWKHVDPHZRUNRUIRUZRUNWRZKLFKHTXDOYDOXHLVDWWULEuted, the elimination 
RIDOOGLVFULPLQDWLRQRQJURXQGVRIVH[ZLWKUHJDUGWRDOODVSHFWVDQGFRQGLWLRQVRIUHPXQHUDWLRQ¶ 
The move away from equal pay being regarded in purely economic terms was given further 
impetus in 1976 by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).55 The Court ruled that Article 119 had a 
social as well as an economic aim, and consequently must be interpreted to contribute to social 
progress and the improvement of living and working conditions: Defrenne v Société Anonyme 
Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena [1976] ECR 455 (Defrenne) at [10]±[12]. Later, the ECJ 
ruled that the economic aim is secondary to the social aim and held that the principle of equal pay 
is an expression of a fundamental human right: Deutsche Telekom AG v Schröder [2000] ECR I-
743 at [57]. 
Since 1975, several cases have been brought before the ECJ in which the Court has decided that 
individuals may rely on Article 119 of the TEEC before the national courts of member states in 
                                                     
53 France had adopted provisions on equal pay for men and women much earlier and it feared that cheap female labour in 
other member states would put French undertakings and the economy at a disadvantage (Burri & Prechal 2010: 2). 
54 European Commission, Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme, OJ 1974, C 13/1. 
55 Following the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the European Court for Justice was renamed 
WKHµ&RXUWRI-XVWLFHIRUWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶ 
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order to receive equal pay for equal work or work of equal value, without discrimination on the 
basis of gender.56 
Between 1999 and 2009, Article 119 of the TEEC was amended and renumbered,57 eventually 
becoming Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which was 
signed in Lisbon in 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009.  
C.1.1.2 Article 157 TFEU: interpretation and case law 
Article 157 of the TFEU is one of the most important pieces of EU legislation that provides for equal 
pay between male and female workers. It provides: 
1. Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for 
equal work or work of equal value is applied.  
2. )RUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLV$UWLFOHµSD\¶PHDQVWKHRUGLQDU\EDVLFRUPLQLPXPZDJHRUVDODU\DQGDQ\
other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly or indirectly, in 
respect of his employment, from his employer.  
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means:  
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis of the same unit of 
measurement; 
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job. 
The ECJ in Defrenne [1976] ECR 455 held that Article 157 is directly effective in both vertical 
(private person versus public authority) and horizontal (private person versus private person) 
relations.58 The courts of member states are therefore obliged to recognize and enforce the 
provisions of Article 157 when interpreting their own domestic equal pay legislation (Foubert et al 
2010: 1). 
Several of the terms used in Article 157 have been addressed by the ECJ. For example, the 
FRQFHSWRIDµZRUNHU¶KDVDEURDGPHDQLQJDQGLWFDQQRWEHLQWHUSUHWHGPRUHUHVWULFWLYHO\LQ
national law (Burri & Prechal 2010: 5). According to the ECJ, a worker is a person who, for a 
certain period of time, performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for 
which he or she receives remuneration (Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121 
at [17]). The concept of a worker does not include independent service providers who are not 
subordinates of the person receiving the services. But once a person can be considered as a 
µZRUNHU¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRI$UWLFOHWKHQDWXUHRIWKHLUOHJDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHHPSOR\HULV
not relevant to the application of that Article. For example, even when a person is considered as 
being self-employed under national law, Article 157 must nevertheless be applied: Allonby v 
Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services [2004] ECR I-873 at [65]±[71]. 
                                                     
56 See eg Case 14/83 von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891 (Von Colson); Case 109/88 Handels-og 
Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss [1989] ECR 03199 
(Danfoss); Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-05357 (Francovich); 
Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and R v Secretary of State 
for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd [1996] ECR I-01029 (Brasserie du Pêcheur). 
57 It was amended and renamed Article 141 of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. 
58 In Defrenne, the principle of equal pay for equal work was successfully invoked to defend Gabrielle Defrenne, who was 
an air hostess working for the Belgian national airline. 
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$VIRUµSD\¶WKLVKDVEHHQWUHDWHGE\WKH(&-DVKDYLQJDYHU\EURDGGHILQLWLRQZKLFKLQFOXGHVQRW
only basic remuneration but also: 
x overtime payments (Voß v Land Berlin [2007] ECR 2000); 
x bonuses (Lewen v Lothar Denda [1999] ECR 7243); 
x travel expenses/ allowance (Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1982] ECR 359);  
x compensation for attending training courses and other self-education expenses 
(Arbeiterwohlfahrt der Stadt Berlin eV v Bötel [1992] ECR I-35890);  
x termination/redundancy payments (Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1990] ECR I-
2591; and 
x pensions (Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607. 
In Brunnhofer v Bank der Osterreichischen Postsparkasse AG [2001] ECR I-4961 (Brunnhofer), the 
ECJ provided guidance as WRWKHEURDGVFRSHRIWKHFRQFHSWRIµHTXDOSD\¶,WKHOGWKDWDW>@ 
Equal pay must be ensured not only on the basis of an overall assessment of all the consideration 
granted to employees, but also in the light of each aspect of pay taken in isolation. 
In determining the difference in pay received by a female worker and a male worker, the ECJ has 
stressed the need for genuine transparency, which may only be achieved if the principle of equal 
pay is observed in respect of each of the elements of remuneration granted to men and women. 
Comprehensive or global comparisons of all the considerations granted to men and women are not 
allowed: Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889 at ]33]±[34]. 
This implies that often a comparison should be made between the work performed and the salary 
received by male and female workers (Burri & Prechal 2010: 5).  
In Kenny v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2013] C-427/11 (Kenny) at [53], the ECJ 
further held that the application of the principle of equal pay must be interpreted as follows: 
[E]mployees perform the same work or work to which equal value can be attributed if, taking account of a 
number of factors such as the nature of the work, the training requirements and the working conditions, 
those persons can be considered to be in a comparable situation, which it is a matter for the national 
court to ascertain. 
In Worringham v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1981] ECR 767 at [21]WKH(&-VWDWHGWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIµVDPH
ZRUN¶LQ$UWLFOHRIWhe TEEC (now Article 157 of the TFEU) included work to which equal value 
could be attributed. Furthermore, the principle of equal pay applies not only to work of equal value, 
but also to work of higher value. In Murphy v An Bord Telecom Eireann [1988] ECR 673 at [10], the 
(&-DGRSWHGWKLVYLHZVWDWLQJWKDWRWKHUZLVHµWKHHPSOR\HUZRXOGHDVLO\EHDEOHWRFLUFXPYHQWWKH
principle [of equal pay] by assigning additional or more onerous duties to workers of a particular 
sex, who could then be paid a lower ZDJH¶ 
C.1.1.3 The Recast Directive 206/54/EC 
In 2006 a new directive was issued. The provisions of three different gender equality directives59 
were merged into Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
                                                     
59 The three Directives incorporated into the Recast Directive are: Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the 
approximation of the laws of the member states relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and 
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opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, 
ZKLFKLVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHµ5HFDVW'LUHFWLYH¶ 
The aim of the Recast Directive is to clarify and consolidate in a single text the main gender 
equality provisions regarding access to employment, vocational training, and working conditions, 
including pay and occupational social security schemes, as well as to ensure the implementation of 
the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (Article 1).  
The Recast Directive is comprehensive and is divided into four titles. Title I concerns general 
provisions and sets out the aim of the Directive, as well as definitions of different concepts such as 
direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and sexual harassment. Title II includes provisions 
on equal pay (Chapter 1), equal treatment in occupational and social security schemes (Chapter 2) 
and equal treatment with regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and 
working conditions (Chapter 3). Title III concerns remedies and penalties, the burden of proof, 
victimisation, the promotion of equal treatment through equality bodies, social dialogue and 
dialogue with NGOs. Finally, Title IV contains provisions on reporting, reviewing, implementation 
and entry into force.  
The Recast Directive was required to have been transposed into the domestic legislation of the EU 
member states by 15 August 2008 (Article 33) and has also been incorporated in the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) and therefore applies to Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway.60 
7KHUHDUHWZRVSHFLILF$UWLFOHVUHOHYDQWWRHTXDOSD\$UWLFOHSURKLELWVµGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶LQUHVSHFWRI
µHTXDOSD\¶DQGSURYLGHV 
For the same work or for work to which equal value is attributed, direct and indirect discrimination on 
grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration shall be eliminated. 
In particular, where a job classification system is used for determining pay, it shall be based on the same 
criteria for both men and women and so drawn up as to exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex. 
Article 14(1)(c) prohibits direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of sex in the public or private 
sectors, in relation to employment and working conditions, as well as pay, as provided for in Article 
141 of the TEEC (now Article 157 of the TFEU). 
C.1.2 Processes of achieving equal pay 
The Preamble to the Recast Directive recalls the principles that are set out in the number of earlier 
directives and also the principles settled in case law by the ECJ. In particular in relation to the 
principle of equal pay for equal work, specific reference is made in preamble paragraphs (8) to (14) 
which includes enjoining member states to continue to address the problem of continuing gender-
based wage differentials. 
                                                                                                                                                                
women; Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions; and 
Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women in occupational social security schemes. 
60 The EEA consists of the 27 EU Member States, as well as Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. The non-EU EEA members 
adopt almost all EU legislation related to the single market. 
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Titles II and III of the Recast Directive go to require all member states to ensure the enforcement of 
remedies and penalties, the promotion of equal treatment through equality bodies and social 
dialogue, as well as reporting and reviewing mechanisms on implementation of the Recast 
Directive. 
The equal pay provisions in the TFEU and the Recast Directives have significant influence on the 
EU member states, as well as the three other EEA members (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), 
in the way in which they legislate, interpret and promote equal pay in their respective countries. 
Due to the supremacy of EU law, member states must interpret their domestic laws in accordance 
with EU law. Further, these provisions prevail in the case of a conflict between domestic and EU 
law. The provisions have direct effect, which means that they can be relied upon in litigation before 
national courts and applied by such courts in any proceedings. 
C.1.2.1 Burden of proof 
An important influence on the member states is the burden of proof provision set out in Article 19(1) 
of the Recast Directive, which states that: 
Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their national judicial 
systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal 
treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from 
which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the 
respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. 
7KHUHLVQRGHILQLWLRQRIWKHSULQFLSOHRIµHTXDOWUHDWPHQW¶VHWRXWLQWKH5HFDVW'LUHFWLYH+RZHYHU
there is case law, which assists in the approach to be taken with regard to the burden of proof. 
In Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961 at [80], the ECJ held that: 
[I]t is for employees who consider themselves to be the victims of discrimination to prove that they are 
receiving lower pay than that paid by the employer to a colleague of the other sex and that they are in 
fact performing the same work or work of equal value, comparable to that performed by the chosen 
comparator; the employer may then not only dispute the fact that the conditions for the application of the 
principle of equal pay for men and women are met in the case but also put forward objective grounds, 
unrelated to any discrimination based on sex, to justify the difference in pay. 
Therefore in its practical application it is for the employee to adduce evidence that the pay she 
receives from her employer is less than that of her chosen comparator, and she does the same 
work or work of equal value, comparable to that performed by her comparator (Brunnhofer [2001] 
ECR I-4961 at [58]; Kenny [2013] C-427/11 at [19]). Such evidence would amount to a prima 
facie case of discrimination on the basis of sex. It would then be for the employer to prove that 
there was no breach of the principle of equal treatment in relation to pay (Brunnhofer [2001] ECR 
I-4961 at [60]). The employer by way of defence could either: 
x deny that the conditions for the application of the equal pay principle were met, for example by 
establishing that the activities actually performed by the two employees were not in fact 
comparable: or 
x justify the difference in pay by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination based on sex, 
by proving that there was a difference, unrelated to sex, to explain the payment of a higher 
monthly supplement to the chosen comparator (Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961 at [59]±[62]; 
Kenny [2013] C-427/11 at [20]).  
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C.1.2.2 Defences and objective justification  
The ECJ has also developed principles with regards defences to allegations of unequal pay, 
including the provision of objective justification.  
Importantly in Danfoss [1989] ECR 03199 the ECJ held that where an employer applies a system 
of pay which is lacking in transparency, it is open to a female worker to establish on a prima facie 
basis, in relation to a relatively large number of employees, that the average pay for women is less 
than that for men. If so, it is then for the employer to prove that its practice in the matter of wages is 
not discriminatory. While allowing that recourse to the criterion of length of service may involve less 
advantageous treatment of women than of men, the ECJ went on to hold that the employer does 
not have to provide special justification for such an approach (at [24]±[25]). By adopting that 
position, the ECJ acknowledged that rewarding accumulated experience which enables a worker to 
perform their duties better constitutes a legitimate objective of pay policy.  
In Cadman [2006] ECR I-9583 at [35]±[36], the ECJ further held that: 
As a general rule, recourse to the criterion of length of service is appropriate to attain that objective. 
Length of service goes hand in hand with experience, and experience generally enables the worker to 
perform his duties better. 
The employer is therefore free to reward length of service without having to establish the 
importance it has in the performance of specific tasks entrusted to the employee. 
It may be noted, however, that such an approach could potentially have adverse effects for women 
who have interrupted service and lack experience by reason of opportunities not available to them 
or alternatively as a consequence of childbearing. 
Another objective justification which is commonly relied upon by employers is training or 
professional qualifications. The ECJ has repeatedly held that, in order to determine whether 
employees perform the same work or work of equal value, it is necessary to ascertain whether, 
taking account of a number of factors such as the nature of the work, the training requirements and 
the working conditions, those persons can be considered to be in a comparable situation: 
Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse v Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse [1999] 
ECR I-2865 (Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse) at [17]; Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961 at [43]; Kenny 
[2013] C-427/11 at [27]). Consequently, where seemingly identical tasks are performed by different 
groups of persons who do not have the same training or professional qualifications for the practice 
of their profession, it is necessary to ascertain whether, taking into account the nature of the tasks 
that may be assigned to each group respectively, the training requirements for performance of 
those tasks and the working conditions under which they are performed, the different groups in fact 
do the same work within the meaning of Article 157 (Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse [1999] 
ECR I-2865 at [18]; Kenny [2013] C-427/11 at [28]).  
C.1.2.3 Remedies 
6DQFWLRQVZKLFKPD\FRPSULVHWKHSD\PHQWRIFRPSHQVDWLRQWRWKHYLFWLPPXVWEHµHIIHFWLYH
SURSRUWLRQDWHDQGGLVVXDVLYH¶Recast Directive, Article 25). Where there has been a breach of the 
principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value, member states are obliged to 
introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are necessary to ensure real and 
effective compensation or reparation (Article 18). The ECJ has further noted that national law may 
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not preclude the award of interest (Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area 
Health Authority [1993] ECR 1-04367). 
C.1.2.4 Promotion of equal pay 
In addition to these legislative approaches, closing the GPG through non-legislative measures is 
DOVRDFRUHREMHFWLYHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶Vµ6WUDWHJ\IRU
equality between women and men (2010±¶KLJKOLJKWVILYHDUHDVRIDFWLRQRQHRIZKLFKLV
specifically on equal pay. The strategy notes that there are many causes of this pay gap, in 
particular, segregation in education and in the labour market (European Commission 2010). In 
order to contribute towards eliminating unequal pay, pursuant to the Strategy the Commission will: 
x explore with social partners possible ways to improve the transparency of pay; 
x VXSSRUWHTXDOSD\LQLWLDWLYHVLQWKHZRUNSODFHVXFKDVHTXDOLW\ODEHOVµFKDUWHUV¶DQGDZDUGV 
x institute a European Equal Pay Day; and 
x seek to encourage women to enter non-WUDGLWLRQDOSURIHVVLRQVIRUH[DPSOHLQWKHµJUHHQ¶DQG
innovative sectors. 
,QDGGLWLRQWKHSXEOLFDWLRQµ3URJUHVVRQHTXDOLW\EHWZHHQZRPHQDQGPHQLQ± A Europe 
LQLWLDWLYH¶DVVHVVHVWKHVLWXDWLRQDVDWDQGFLWHVJRRGSUDFWLFHVIrom many of the 
member states (European Commission 2013b). Further, the European Commission published 
µ7DFNOLQJWKH*HQGHU3D\GDSLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶LQVXJJHVWLQJPDQ\VWUDWHJLHVDQG
again highlighting good practice in each of the member states (European Commission 2013a). 
Those good practices include annual reports made by member states on the gender gap; examples 
of plans and audits to enable employers to measure progress in implementing gender equality and 
gender pay; and in some cases mandatory legislative requirements for their provision. Further 
reference is made to the importance of introducing pay transparency and the report also provides 
examples of implementing equal pay tools. 
C.1.3 Summary and future directions for good practice in the EU 
National instruments to address the GPG are very diverse. Still, many national experts have 
concluded that their respective governments are not doing enough (Foubert et al 2010: 29). 
With this in mind, a resolution of the European Parliament made on 24 May 2012 called on the 
European Commission to review the Recast Directive 2006/54/EC and suggested a series of 
DPHQGPHQWV7KHPHPEHUVRIWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWQRWHGWKDWµ'HVSLWHWKHVLJQLILFDQWERG\RI
legislation in force for almost 40 years and the actions taken and resources spent on trying to 
reduce the gap ± progress is extremely slow and in some member states the gap has even 
ZLGHQHG¶ (European Parliament 2012).  
The Parliament then set out each of the elements which are needed to address the pay gap and 
called for a Europe-wide strategy to implement it with the support of the member states and the 
social partners. The strategies which the European Parliament called on the member states and 
the Commission to implement included taking action to: 
x foster closer coordination among member states for research, analysis and best-practice 
sharing; 
x oppose inequality in pay in all relevant EU policies and national programmes; 
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x revise the Council directive concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work, with the 
aim of closing the GPG; 
x encourage the social partners to create a more gender-equal wage structure; 
x provide for collective redress against violations of the equal pay principle by enabling 
individuals or representative bodies to bring a case for others; 
x continue with awareness-raising campaigns, including information on the burden of proof; 
x determine objectives, strategies and time limits for reducing the GPG and equalising equal pay 
for the same work and work of the same value; and 
x promote furtheUUHVHDUFKRQµIOH[LFXULW\¶VWUDWHJLHVLQRUGHUWRDVVHVVWKHLULPSDFWRQWKH*3*
and determine how these strategies can help tackle gender discrimination. 
In particular, the members of the European Parliament (2012: rec 4) have noted that: 
Article 20 of [WKH5HFDVW'LUHFWLYH@VKRXOGEHUHYLVHGVRDVWRHQKDQFHWKHERGLHV¶PDQGDWHE\L
supporting and advising victims of pay discrimination; (ii) providing independent surveys concerning the 
pay gap; (iii) publishing independent reports and making recommendations on any issue relating to pay 
discrimination; (iv) legal powers to initiate their own investigation; (v) legal powers to impose sanctions in 
cases of breaching the principle of equal pay for equal work and/or to bring wage discrimination cases to 
court. 
However, despite these calls from the European Parliament, the European Commission does not 
seem to have commenced drafting a directive to replace the Recast Directive. On 12 September 
2013, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the application of the principle of equal pay 
for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value.61 This resolution set out seven 
points aimed at closing the GPG. It reiterated that the Recast Directive, in its current form, is not 
sufficiently effective to tackle the GPG and achieve the objective of gender equality in employment 
and occupation. It also requested the European Commission to support member states in reducing 
the GPG by at least five percentage points annually with the aim of eliminating the GPG by 2020. 
C.2 Belgium 
C.2.1 Legislation and cases 
Belgium has a three tiered system of government, comprising a federal tier in addition to regional 
and language community tiers.62 As a result there is both federal legislation and regional and 
language-speaking community legislation. 
 At the federal level, the Gender Act of 10 May 2007 (Gender Act) abrogated and replaced the 
previous Equal Treatment Act of 7 May 1999. 7KH*HQGHU$FWLVµDLPHGDWFRPEDWLQJ
GLVFULPLQDWLRQEHWZHHQZRPHQDQGPHQ¶DQGSXUSRUWV to implement all EU gender directives 
                                                     
61 European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2013 on the application of the principle of equal pay for male and 
female workers for equal work or work of equal value (2013/2678(RSP). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0375&format=XML&language=EN 
(accessed 15 September 2013). 
62 There are three regions and three language speaking communities: the Flemish Region (which includes the Flemish-
speaking community); the Brussels Capital Region; the Walloon Region; the German±speaking community; and, the 
French±speaking community. 
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(although Directive 2006/54 is not mentioned) (Jacqmain 2010: ,WDOVRGHDOVZLWKµHTXDOSD\¶
DQGLQFOXGHVDZLGHGHILQLWLRQRISD\EXWLWGRHVQRWH[SOLFLWO\PHQWLRQµZRUNRIVDPHYDOXH¶DV
required by Article 157(1) of the TFEU. However, relevant Belgian case law reveals that the 
principle of application to work of same value is not disputed (Jacqmain 2010: 43). It applies to all 
work situations in the private sector, and in those sections of the public sector which fall within the 
federal jurisdiction (Jacqmain 2010: 43). Equal pay in the remainder of the public sector is 
regulated by various instruments, which the federal authorities had to adopt in order to implement 
EU non-discrimination law within their respective jurisdictions (Jacqmain 2010: 43). 63  
The Gender Act applies to working conditions, including pay (Articles 5, 6). It deals with certain 
aspects of access to employment (for example in the federal public services, or uniform conditions 
of access to the professions), but other aspects fall within the jurisdiction of the federal authorities 
(for instance in their own public services, or management of the labour market); and vocational 
training is almost entirely a Community matter (Jacqmain 2009: 12).  
The Gender Act adequately transposes the Recast Directive, except for the explicit reference to 
µZRUNRIWKHVDPHYDOXH¶$UWLFOH+RZHYHUDQHZ&ROOHFWLYH$JUHHPHQWVWUXFNLQ
includes explicit reference to work of the same value (Jacqmain 2009: 12). Equal pay is therefore 
guaranteed both by Collective Agreement No. 25 of the National Labour Council (only applicable to 
the private sector) and by the Gender Act (which includes the public sector, but with the restriction 
explained above). Taken together, both instruments cover all the aspects of the notion of pay within 
the scope of EU law (Prechal & Burri 2009:10). 
C.2.2 Process to attain equal pay 
In considering equal pay in Belgium, a significant feature is the high level of centralised collective 
bargaining and wage setting. This circumstance, together with policy and promotional approaches, 
help to explain the limited recourse to courts on equal remuneration. 
Collective bargaining in Belgium is highly structured. It takes place at three main levels: national, 
sectoral and company. Collective bargaining covers over 90 per cent of employees and the 
proportion of employees involved in unions is 50 per cent. The Law on Collective Agreements and 
Joint Committees of 5 December 1968 defines a strict hierarchy of legal sources and determines 
that a norm set at a lower level cannot, in principle, contradict norms set at a higher level (Keune 
2011: 1±2).64  
At the national level, two types of agreements are relevant. One is the inter-professional 
agreements concluded every two years between the 10 main trade unions and employer 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVFDOOHGWKHµJURXSRI¶ZKLFKFRYHUVWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU7KHVHDUHQRWIRUPDO
collective agreements but set a framework for bargaining at other levels, including a minimum 
wage. The other is the intersectoral collective agreement covering all sectors nationally, concluded 
in the National Labour Council, which comprises the most representative interoccupational 
HPSOR\HUVDQGZRUNHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQV7KH6WDWHDSSHDUV to play a major role at this national level. 
                                                     
63 Flemish Community and Region: decreet of 8 May 2002; German-speaking Community: Dekret of 17 May 2004; Region 
of Brussels Capital: ordonnance/ordonnantie of 4 September 2008; Walloon Region: décret of 6 November 2008, 
amended by the décret of 19 March 2009; and French-speaking Community: décret of 12 December 2008. 
64 See further European Trade Union Institute, http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-
Relations/Countries/Belgium/Collective-Bargaining (accessed 3 October 2013). 
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A 1996 law (Law of 26 July 1996 on Promotion of Employment and Preventative Safeguarding of 
Competitiveness) OLQNVSD\LQFUHDVHVWRWKHIRUHFDVWSD\WUHQGVLQ%HOJLXP¶VQHLJKERXUV*HUPDQ\
France and the NetheUODQGVLQRUGHUWRPDLQWDLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV7KHQDWLRQDOOHYHO
negotiations take place in the context of an official technical report that sets out this forecast and 
the government has the power to intervene if the two sides cannot agree on a figure within that 
limit. 
The second tier is industrial level collective bargaining covering specific industrial sectors.65 At the 
sectoral level, joint committees (or subcommittees or regional committees) with equal 
representation of employers and unions bargain on sectoral (or sub sectoral or regional sectoral) 
collective agreements within the framework of the interprofessional agreements. These 
agreements require consensus and can be made legally binding for all companies and employees 
in the sector by royal decree, upon the request of the relevant joint committee. They define job 
classifications for the sectors and determine wage increases that are implemented.  
The third tier is the company level negotiations. At the company level, collective agreements can 
be concluded between one or more representative trade unions and the employer. They then are 
legally binding and apply to all employees of the contracting employer. This level of negotiation 
only takes place within some companies, although the number of companies has increased in 
recent years and around a third have their own agreements (Keune 2011: 1). In the public sector 
WKHFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJUHVXOWVLQµSURWRFROV¶ZKLFKDOWKRXJKQRWOHJDOO\ELQGLQJKDYHDPRUDORU
political force. 
C.2.2.1 Enforcement 
The process to enforce equal pay in Belgium is through court proceedings. Pursuant to the Gender 
Act, any person claiming to be a victim of gender discrimination may bring an action in the Labour 
Courts. Furthermore, there is a gender equality body, the Institute for Equality of Women and Men, 
which is endowed with the power to commence proceedings. 
There has been limited case law, with only one reported recent case of pay discrimination. In this 
case the Labour Court of Appeal in Brussels found in favour of the claimant through simply relying 
RQWKH(&-¶VGHFLVLRQLQDanfoss [1989] ECR 03199. The claimant had no difficulty in 
demonstrating that she had been denied a pay increment which had been granted to male 
colleagues (Jacqmain 2010: 46).  
Article 33 of the Gender Act transposes Article 9 of the Recast Directive regarding the burden of 
proof, and obliges a claimant to present a prima facie case, after which the defendant must 
demonstrate that there is no discrimination. A prima facie case is established by producing 
µHOHPHQWDU\VWDWLVWLFDOPDWHULDOZKLFKUHYHDOVDQXQIDYRXUDEOHWUHDWPHQW¶$UWLFOH+RZHYHU
the common rules on proof in litigation (Belgian Judicial Code 1998, Articles 870±871) empower a 
court to order each party to produce any evidence on an element relevant to the case, including 
details of wages paid within a company (Jacqmain 2010: 46). 
                                                     
65 Industrial level negotiations are carried on by the unions and employers' federations meeting in joint committees. They 
cover the whole of the private sector with subcommittees for smaller industrial groupings. At the beginning of 2012 there 
were 101 joint committees and 70 subcommittees. The agreements reached are binding on all employers in the industries 
they cover.  
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Article 15 of the Employment Contracts Act of 3 July 1978 imposes a double limitation period: five 
years after the alleged discriminatory act and, in any case, one year after the effective termination 
of the contract. For tenured staff members in the public services, the limit is five years after the 
alleged discriminatory act. Those limits also apply to an employee challenging gender 
discrimination in pay. However, relying on the Protection of Remuneration Act of 12 April 1965, it 
may also be possible to claim compensation for discrimination evident during the whole period of 
employment, whatever the duration (Jacqmain 2010: 46). Article 23 of the Gender Act provides that 
the victim of discrimination in working conditions may apply either for fixed damages equal to six 
PRQWKV¶SD\RUIRUFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUWKHDFWXDOGDPDJHWKHH[WHQWRIZKLFKWKHYLFWLPPXVW
substantiate (Foubert et al 2010: 46). There is, however, no case law related to this provision 
(Jacqmain 2010: 46). The Gender Act also enables the Courts to issue injunctions to put an end to 
discriminatory conduct. 
C.2.2.2 Promotion 
Belgium has directed significant policy attention to the promotion of gender pay equity. In 2001, 
while Belgium held the Presidency of the European Union, the European Council approved a set of 
indicators designed to provide an accurate picture of the pay gap between women and men. Since 
2007 the BelgiaQJRYHUQPHQWKDVSXEOLVKHGWKHDQQXDOUHSRUWµ7KH*HQGHU:DJH*DSLQ%HOJLXP¶
produced by the Institute for Equality between Women and Men and the Federal Public 
Administration for Employment. The data is aligned with official European indicators (European 
Commission 2013: 18). 
Each new report builds on seven quantitative indicators in relation to the GPG. The indicators cover 
the following: 
x gender pay ratios for all employees;  
x part-time work;  
x age;  
x level of education;  
x segregation in the labour market;  
x personal features such as civil status, household composition or nationality; and  
x the factors contributing to inequality as defined by the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
technique (European Commission 2013: 13). 
These are linked to the Structure of Earnings Survey established in 2001. The report provides a 
UHOLDEOHJOREDOPHDVXUHPHQWWRRODFURVVGLIIHUHQWGDWDVHWVµ7KH*HQGHU3D\*DS¶UHSRUWKDV
become a reliable reference tool and the data is widely used in trade union campaigns (Belgium 
Institute for Equality of Men and Women 2010: 13±14). Furthermore, the Collective Agreement on 
Wage Equality Between Male and Female Workers (1975) has been amended since the 
publication of the Gender Pay Gap Report so that job functions are revised to exclude any gender 
bias. Further to this measure, the social partners drew up a new inter-professional agreement in 
2010. Under this agreement, the social partners must be able to guarantee the gender neutrality of 
classifications in all sectors in order to reduce the pay gap by 2016 (Belgium Institute for Equality of 
Men and Women 2010: 13±14). 
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In April 2012, Belgium adopted a new measure on reducing the GPG. Through annual audits, 
companies are obliged to outline differences in pay and labour costs between men and women. 
These annual audits are publicly available. Every two years companies with over 50 workers must 
undertake a comparative analysis of the wage structure of female and male employees. If this 
analysis shows that women earn less than men, the company is obliged to produce an action plan. 
,ISD\GLVFULPLQDWLRQLVVXVSHFWHGZRPHQFDQUHTXHVWDQDVVHVVPHQWWKURXJKWKHLUHPSOR\HU¶V
mediator, and where required the mediator is required to mediate an outcome with the employer 
(European Commission 2013: 18±19).  
Finally, Belgium was the first country in Europe to organise an Equal Pay Day in 2005 to draw 
attention to the issue of equal pay (European Commission 2013: 20). The campaign aims to raise 
WKHSXEOLF¶VDZDUHQHVVRQWKLVLVVXHWRPDNHµZDJHV¶DPRUHDFFHptable item for discussion and to 
encourage policy reform. According to the Belgium Institute for Equality of Men and Women (2010: 
72), the main results of the campaign have been: 
x an increased awareness of the GPG; 
x publication of the first Belgian official report on the GPG in 2007 and annual updates of the 
report; 
x an understanding that social partners will address the collective agreement on equal pay for 
men and women, the minimum wage, job classification systems, improved working conditions 
for part-time workers, and sectoral studies of the GPG; and 
x increased commitment among trade unions to reduce the GPG, including improvements in 
training, and increased campaigns to raise awareness about the effects of the gap. 
C.2.3 Conclusion 
The Gender Act is an ambitious attempt to construct a comprehensive equal pay system. This Act, 
in combination with promotional and policy activities and the centralised collective bargaining 
system, does provide a platform upon which to achieve equal remuneration across a broad 
employment spectrum. At the present time the GPG in Belgium, as discussed in Chapter 2, stands 
at 10.2 per cent which is significantly below the EU average of 16.2 per cent.  
C.3 Ireland 
C.3.1 Legislation and case law 
The prohibition of gender pay discrimination was initially addressed in the Anti-Discrimination (Pay) 
Act 1974. This Act has since been repealed and replaced by sections 18, 19 and 20 and 22 of the 
Employment Equality Acts 1998 (Employment Equality Acts). 
Within the Employment Equality Acts the provisions with greatest application to gender pay 
discrimination are sections 18±20. By way of introduction, section 18(1)(a) stipulates that for the 
µSXUSRVHVRIWKLV3DUW³$´DQG³%´UHSUHVHQWSHUVRQVRIRSSRVLWHVH[VRWKDWZKHUH³$´LVD
woman, ³%´LVDPDQDQGvice versa¶Section 19(1), which addresses remuneration, provides that 
µLWVKDOOEHDWHUPRIWKHFRQWUDFWXQGHUZKLFK$LVHPSOR\HGWKDW$VKDOODWDQ\WLPHEHHQWLWOHGWR
the same rate of remuneration for the work which A is employed to do as B who, at that or any 
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RWKHUUHOHYDQWWLPHLVHPSOR\HGWRGROLNHZRUNE\WKHVDPHRUDQDVVRFLDWHGHPSOR\HU¶66 This 
wording limits claims to comparisons between female and male employees in the same 
employment or associated employment. It does not permit comparisons with other employees 
GRLQJOLNHZRUNIRURWKHUHPSOR\HUV7KHZRUGLQJRIWKHVHFWLRQDOVROLPLWVFRPSDULVRQVWRµOLNH
ZRUN¶ZKLFKLVPRUHOLPLWHGWKDQWKHWLPHµZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶ 
There is however a qualification in section 19(ZKLFKSURYLGHVWKDWLI%¶VHPSOR\HULVDQ
µDVVRFLDWHGHPSOR\HU¶µOLNHZRUN¶UHTXLUHVµWKHVDPHRUUHDVRQDEO\FRPSDUDEOHWHUPVDQG
FRQGLWLRQVRIHPSOR\PHQW¶(YHQZLWKWKLVTXDOLILFDWLRQERWKH[SUHVVLRQVDUHPRUHOLPLWHGWKDQWKH
H[SUHVVLRQµZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶6HFWLRQFRQFHUQVLQGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQZKHUHDQ
apparently neutral provision puts persons of a particular gender at a particular disadvantage in 
respect of remuneration compared with other employees of their employer. Section 19(5) provides 
WKDWVXEMHFWWRVXEVHFWLRQµQRWKLQJLQWKLV3DUWVKDOOSUHYHQWDQHPSOR\HUIURPSD\LQJRQ
JURXQGVRWKHUWKDQWKHJHQGHUJURXQGGLIIHUHQWUDWHVRIUHPXQHUDWLRQWRGLIIHUHQWHPSOR\HHV¶67 
These provisions within the Employment Equality Acts have been the subject of a decision of the 
ECJ in Kenny [2013] C-427/11. The case concerned women who were predominantly employed 
DQGDVVLJQHGWRµFOHULFDOGXWLHV¶LQWKHSROLFHIRUFH7KHZRPHQFODLPHGLQGLUHFWJHQGHU
discrimination in their pay by comparison to male employees who were employed and assigned in 
µGHVLJQDWHGSRVWV¶LQWKHSROLFHIRUFH7KHFDVHZDVLQVWLWXWHGLQWKH(TXDOLW\7ULEXQDODQGWKH
unsuccessful women appealed to the Labour Court. Before the appeal was conducted, there was 
an agreement between the parties that the female police and the chosen male comparators were 
HQJDJHGLQµOLNHZRUN¶7KHNH\TXHVWLRQIRUWKH/DERXU&RXUWWRGHFLGHZDVZKHWKHUWKHUHZDV
µREMHFWLYHMXVWLILFDWLRQRIWKHprime facie FDVHRILQGLUHFWSD\GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ On the basis of that 
DVVXPSWLRQWKH/DERXU&RXUWUHTXLUHGWKH0LQLVWHUWRSURYHµREMHFWLYHMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶IRUWKH
GLIIHUHQFHVLQSD\7KH/DERXU&RXUWWKHQXSKHOGWKH0LQLVWHU¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHUHZDVµREMHFWLYH
MXVWLILFDWLRQ¶IRUWKHSD\GLIIHUHQWLDOThat decision was then the subject of appeal to the High Court, 
which in turn sought preliminary rulings from the ECJ concerning the burden of proof and also the 
FRQFHSWRIµVDPHZRUNRUZRUNIRUHTXDOYDOXH¶ 
Notwithstanding the apparently narrow wording of the Employment Equality Acts, which refer to 
µOLNHZRUN¶WKH(&-DSSHDUHGWRWUHDWWKH,ULVKOHJLVODWLRQDVUHTXLULQJHTXDOSD\IRUWKHµVDPHZRUN
RUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶DW>@>@,QUHDFKLQJLWVGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKH&RXUWGUHZDWWHQWLRQWRWKH
fact that the Labour Court had made a presumption of indirect gender discrimination in pay based 
only upon the difference in pay for the work done by the two groups, without ruling on whether the 
MREVLQTXHVWLRQZHUHµHTXLYDOHQW¶68 The Court made it clear that the principle of equal pay 
presupposes that the men and women to whom it applies are in identical or comparable situations, 
and that it must be ascertained whether the employees concerned performed the same work or 
work for which equal value may be atWULEXWHG7KH&RXUWVWDWHGWKDWµLWLVIRUWKH1DWLRQDO&RXUW
which alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts, to make the necessary determination 
whether, in the light of the actual nature of the activities carried out by those concerned, the 
workers in question perform the same work or worked which each will equal value can be 
                                                     
66 Section 20 implies such a term if there is no express term in a contract.  
67 This provision seeks to transpose Article 141 of the TEEC and the EC Directive 75/117 into Irish law and also adopts 
wording taken from the European Committees (Burden of Proof in Gender Discrimination Cases) Regulations 2001 S.I. 
No.337 of 2001. 
68 Contrary to the case of Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] ECR I-5535 at [11]. 
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DWWULEXWHG¶DW>@7KH&RXUWZHQWRQWRUHIHUWRDQXPEHURIIDFWRUVZKLFKZHUHUHOHYDQWWRWKDW
determination (at [27]±[29]). These included: the nature of the work; the training requirements; the 
working conditions; and requirements in respect of professional training and qualifications. The 
Court concluded that this assessment and determination needed to be done by the referring court. 
In answering the particular questions referred to it, the Court observed that in considering what 
µREMHFWLYHMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶ZDVUHTXLUHGE\WKHHPSOR\HULWZDVQRWDTXHVWLRQRIREMHFWLYHMXVWLILFDWLRQ
of the rate of remuneration, but rather it was one of justifying the difference in the remuneration. 
There were further observations made as to statistics and also the type of justifications which may 
be relied upon by an employer.  
The Labour Court of Ireland has also assessed the relative weight of historical and contemporary 
disadvantage. In HSE v Buckley [2010] AED/10/2 No. EDA 113 the Court reinforced the need for 
claimants to establish that a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex 
existed as at the time of the making of the complaint and was not reliant only on historical 
information. The Court clarified that while the historic origin of the salary scale may be an important 
factor in explaining the background of the particular case, nonetheless the disadvantage must be 
assessed at the time the complaint is submitted. 
C.3.2 Process of achieving equal pay 
A key institution established by the Employment Equality Acts is the Equality Authority. Complaints 
can be made directly to the Equality Tribunal. However, a claim on the basis of gender, which 
includes a claim for equal pay, can be dealt with by either the Circuit Court or the Labour Court 
without first claiming to the Equality Tribunal. The Tribunal can order arrears of pay up to a 
maximum of three years. The Equality Authority has an inhouse legal service that may, at its 
discretion, provide free legal assistance to those making complaints of discrimination. Assistance is 
only given in a small percentage of cases and claims for assistance are assessed against 
established criteria. 
The Authority is responsible for research and for the promotion of equality, but its responsibilities 
do not extend to monitoring and implementation. The Equality Authority has, for example, produced 
a plain English guide to the Employment Equality Acts (Equality Authority 2011b). It is also 
responsible, through various subcommittees, for the production of detailed guidance on 
employment equality issues for employers (Equality Authority 2011a). It also works with the 
European Social Fund and has produced two significant publications, the most recent being 
µ*HQGHU3D\5HYLHZV± $WHPSODWHIRUH[DPLQDWLRQRIJHQGHUSD\DQGRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶(TXDOLW\
Authority 2013). This document includes a number of different job evaluation methodologies, some 
RIZKLFKDUHµPDUNHW-EDVHG¶$QHDUOLHUSXEOLFDtion examines the gender wage gap in Ireland 
(Equality Authority 2009).  
Through some of its promotional work, the Authority advocates an approach that is more expansive 
than the legislation. In its Guidelines for Employment Equality Policies in Enterprises, for example, 
the Authority makes reference in its discussion of gender pay discrimination to work which is 
µVLPLODU¶RUµLQYROYHVZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶ZKHUHWKHOHJLVODWLRQLVFRQILQHGWRµOLNHZRUN¶7KH
Guidelines also identify external benchmarkinJXVLQJDµPDUNHWSODFH¶DVDZHDNQHVVµEHFDXVH
gender bias may already exist in certain sectors, there is a danger that external benchmarking may 
LQDGYHUWHQWO\SHUSHWXDWHJHQGHUGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶(TXDOLW\$XWKRULW\3: 6,11). 
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C.3.3 Summary  
In their current form, Irish regulatory provisions concerning gender pay discrimination have a 
UHVWULFWHGVFRSHJLYHQWKH\DUHFRQILQHGODUJHO\WRVLQJOHZRUNSODFHVRURUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGWRµOLNH
ZRUN¶7KHUHLVDOVRYHU\OLWWOHDVVLVWDQFHDYDLODEOHIRUFRPSODLQDQWVZKR wish to take their case to 
court. With the assistance of the European Social Fund, Ireland has followed the general direction 
provided by the EU and developed detailed assistance for employers to encourage objective 
remuneration review processes with a view to preventing possible future gender pay inequity. At 
present, however, there is no evidence of strategic approaches to monitor the process taken by 
employers or to require employers to collect relevant data concerning their earnings distribution.  
C.4 Finland 
C.4.1 Legislation  
6HFWLRQLQ&KDSWHURIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRI)LQODQGSURYLGHVWKDWµHTXDOLW\RIWKHVH[HVLV
promoted in societal activity and working life, especially in the determination of pay and the other 
WHUPVRIHPSOR\PHQWDVSURYLGHGLQPRUHGHWDLOE\DQ$FW¶. The constitutional reference is to the 
1986 Act on Equality between Women and Men. The Act on Equality has several provisions on 
discrimination. Section 7 defines discrimination in general, while section 8(1)(3) defines 
discrimination in employment, whicKRFFXUVZKHUHDQHPSOR\HUµDSSOLHVSD\RURWKHUWHUPVRI
employment so that an employee or employees are more disadvantaged on the basis of sex than 
RQHRUVHYHUDORWKHUHPSOR\HHVHPSOR\HGE\WKHVDPHHPSOR\HU¶VHHNousiainen 2010: 89). 
Under section 8(1)(3), an employer who applies pay or other terms of the employment contract, so 
that it results in one or several employees being in a less advantageous position than another 
employee or employees working for the same employer, violates the prohibition on pay 
discrimination. Thus, in relation to gender pay discrimination, the focus of the discrimination is on 
µSD\¶DQGLVEDVHGRQFRPSDUDWLYHGLVDGYDQWDJHEHWZHHQHPSOR\HHVRIGLIIHUHQWVH[HV 
$VDFRQFHSWµSD\¶LVQRWGHILQHGLQOHJLVODWLRQ7KHDEVHQFHRI a definition has been an issue in 
Finland in relation to performance based results and bonuses. In 2013, the CEACR referred to 
report by one of the major Finnish unions which noted that while only 11 per cent of their total 
membership received a performance bonus in 2010, 27 per cent of their male membership were in 
UHFHLSWRIVXFKDERQXV7KH&($&5IXUWKHUQRWHGWKDWWKH)LQQLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶V(PSOR\PHQWDQG
Equality Committee expressed the view that the Act on Equality should define remuneration to 
include various additional forms of payment. The CEACR endorsed this view (ILO 2013: 464).  
There is no system in Finland for setting a single national minimum wage, but section 7 of the 
Employment Contract Act 2001 has a general application to collective agreements. Pay rates set 
out in legally binding industry level collective agreements fix the minimum rates for each industry. A 
term of an employment contract that is in conflict with an equivalent term in the applicable industry 
collective agreement is void.  
C.4.2 Process to attain equal pay 
As with other EU countries, the collective bargaining system is highly relevant to the attainment of 
equal pay. In Finland collective bargaining has historically been highly centralised, with a national 
agreement which sets the framework for pay increases and collective bargaining at the industry 
and company levels. In 2007, however, the private sector employers association EK refused to 
negotiate a new national agreement. It was not until October 2011 that a national framework 
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agreement was again signed, signalling a return to more centralised bargaining. This framework 
agreement sets guidelines for industry level negotiators to follow. Unlike the earlier framework 
which covered all workers, the 2011 framework agreement only applies to industries with existing 
collective agreements. The agreement was for 25 months and is therefore to be renegotiated in 
2013. It is estimated that more than 90 per cent of all employees are covered by collective 
agreements. The generally applicable collective agreements are listed within the electronic Finnish 
law reference system (Finlex) (Nousiainen 2010: 89).69 
Industry level negotiations set rates and basic conditions for each industry and are mostly binding 
on all employers in that industry, ZKHWKHUWKH\DUHPHPEHUVRIWKHHPSOR\HUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQRUQRW
An independent commission decides whether an agreement should be generally binding, based on 
whether it covers more than half the employees in the industry. Disputes on this issue can also be 
taken to the Labour Court (Nousiainen 2010: 89). Below the industry level there are company 
negotiations which have become increasingly important. In particular, employers have pressed for 
greater flexibility. In the 2010 round of settlements, some individual companies successfully sought 
wage adjustments reflecting their own financial circumstances which were different than that 
provided in the industry framework industry agreements.  
There is also a collective agreement for government employees. In 2010±2012, the Government 
reported to the ILO that it was agreed that a 0.2 per cent equal pay allowance would be added to 
the pay rates in a specific target sector, to improve pay equality. For example in 2010, the target 
was sectors predominantly occupied by women and requiring highly educated workers.70  
The gender pay differentials in Finland are above the average in the OECD countries, and have 
remained so to the present time. The present gap is 18.2 per cent, when the EU average is 16.2 
per cent. The GPG haVEHHQGLVFXVVHGLQ)LQODQG¶VUHSRUWVRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWV
LQVWUXPHQWVVXFKDVWKH,/2(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQDQGWKH81¶V&('$:DQGLQ
reports to the UN Human Rights Council. The national report to the UN Human Rights Council in 
2008 admitted that women faced continuous discrimination in working life and that pay differentials 
continued to place women in an unequal position. The pay differentials were seen to be mainly due 
to gender-based segregation in the labour market (Nousiainen 2010: 88). 
On average, Finnish women have a higher level of education than Finnish men. Nevertheless, 
ZRPHQ¶VZRUNLVLQWHUPVRISD\XQGHUUDWHG7KHODERXUPDUNHWLVDOVRKLJKO\VHJUHJDWHG)LQQLVK
women and men work in different sectors doing different occupations and even within the same 
sector they may have different jobs or tasks (Belgium Institute for Equality of Men and Women 
2010: 20). Only 15 per cent of wage earners work in occupational areas where men and women 
are represented in roughly equal numbeUV$OWKRXJKZRPHQ¶VFDUHHUVWHQGWREHQHDUO\DVORQJDV
of those of men, women take more career breaks that often last longer. Studies indicate that 
SDUHQWDOOHDYHKDVDQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRQZRPHQ¶VHDUQLQJV%HOJLXP,QVWLWXWHIRU(TXDOLW\RI0HQ
and Women 2010: 20).  
It has been established, by a number of studies, that gender pay differentials in the Finnish labour 
market cannot be explained by characteristics such as differences in education or labour market 
                                                     
69 See further European Trade Union Institute, http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-
Relations/Countries/Finland/Collective-Bargaining (accessed 3 October 2013). 
70 See http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3056843 (accessed 3 
October 2013). 
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experience. The social partners agree that gender segregation of the labour market is a major 
cause of pay differentials, but there is disagreement about whether pay differentials are 
discriminatory (Nousiainen 2010: 88). 
C.4.2.1 Enforcement 
Claims under the Act on Equality are brought to the ordinary courts. The Equality Ombudsman has 
the competence to assist a party in a case involving compensation when the case is of general 
interest; however, commentators suggest that in practice this does not happen (Prechal & Burri 
2009: 45). The Labour Court decides all cases involving collective agreements, but individual 
claimants have no direct access to the Labour Court as only social partners can commence 
proceedings in this Court. Finnish labour law gives prominence to the social partners as the 
partners are represented on the Labour Court and the Equality Board. Additionally as parties they 
may seek to bring cases before these bodies. In contrast, NGOs representing equality or gender 
interests have no access to these bodies, and nor do they have a part in representing or assisting 
victims of discrimination (Nousiainen 2010: 93).  
Remedies for victims of pay discrimination are complicated. There is no access to mediation or 
another less burdensome procedure than the ordinary courts. The Ombudsman for Equality and 
the Equality Board, the bodies that supervise the implementation of the Act on Equality, mainly act 
in a consultative and supervisory capacity; they lack the jurisdiction to prohibit the continuation of a 
discriminatory practice. 
The burden of proof in pay discrimination cases in Finland is divided between the alleged victim 
and the defendant, so that the victim must substantiate on a prima facie basis an allegation of pay 
discrimination. The onus then shifts to the defendant to show that there has been no violation. In 
order to ascertain whether the employer applies less advantageous pay conditions, the employee 
alleging pay discrimination must be able to ascertain the terms applied to the comparator.  
Pursuant to section 10(3) of the Act on Equality, the employer is required to give the employee 
LQIRUPDWLRQµRQWKHJURXQGVRISD\DQGRWKHUQHFHVVDU\LQIRUPDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKHHPSOR\HH¶WKDW
show whether the prohibition against pay discrimination has been violated. However, under section 
10(4), the employee is not entitled to require information on the pay of other employees. A union or 
other representative of the employees may receive information on another employee, but only with 
the consent of that other employee. If the comparator refuses to allow the use of the details of their 
pay, the person alleging pay discrimination or the representative of the employees would need to 
seek the relevant information through the Equality Ombudsman, which may demand the relevant 
information under section 17(3) of the Act on Equality. Thus, in practice, assessing remedy pay 
discrimination can be protracted due to difficulties in accessing relevant comparator information 
(Nousiainen 2010: 93). The number of pay discrimination cases in Finnish courts is low. According 
to a recent study, pay discrimination cases numbered 0 in 2005, 1 in 2006, 6 in 2007, and 0 in 
2008 in courts of first instance (Nousiainen 2010: 93). 
Compensation for victims of pay discrimination depends in each case on the nature of the violation. 
CompenVDWLRQFDQEHUHGXFHGRUZDLYHGGXHWRWKHRIIHQGHU¶VILQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQRURWKHU
circumstances of the case (Nousiainen 2010: 93). Furthermore, employers offer many types of 
justifications for gender pay differentials, such as education, personal performance, experience and 
personal qualifications. Personal performance is a valid justification only if substantiated by an 
assessment (Nousiainen 2010: 93). 
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C.4.2.2 Promotion 
The Act on Equality also contains several provisions on positive action. Section 6 contains a 
positive obligation for all employers to promote gender equality and equality planning. Pursuant to 
section 6(2)(3), the employer has an obligation to promote equality between women and men as 
regards terms of employment, especially concerning pay. The duty is further specified to include a 
duty to encourage both men and women to apply for jobs, that men and women have equal 
opportunities for promotion, that men and women have equal employment conditions (especially as 
to pay) and that attention is paid to reconciling work and family life (especially concerning working 
hours).  
Section 6a of the Act on Equality contains a positive duty for employers with 30 or more employees 
to prepare an equality plan, together with representatives of the employees. The plan is required to 
map gender equality at the workplace, identifying the different earnings positions of women and 
men, and the measures needed to achieve equality and equal pay. The plan must be reviewed 
annually, or if so agreed between the employHUDQGWKHHPSOR\HHV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRQFHHYHU\
three years (Nousiainen 2009: 32).  
The lack of progress in obtaining any real changes to the GPG, has led to the development of a 
WULSDUWLWHµ(TXDO3D\3URJUDPIRU±¶7KHJRYHUQPHQWKDVDOVRLQLWLated a number of 
VWXGLHVLQRUGHUDVVHVVDQGILQGVROXWLRQVWRWKHSUREOHP7KHUHVHDUFKSURMHFWµ(TXDOSD\HTXDOLW\
DQGQHZSD\V\VWHPV¶6$78DQDO\VHGWKHLPSDFWRIQHZSD\V\VWHPVRQZRPHQ¶VDQGPHQ¶V
pay in the private and public sectors. The Labour Institute for Economic Research undertook the 
project in cooperation with the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) and Statistics 
Finland. It completed its work at the end of 2010. The government in its report to the ILO, indicated 
that the inWURGXFWLRQRIDQHZIRUPVRISD\DQGUHZDUGFLWHGDVµQHZSD\¶LQWKHUHSRUWFRPSULVLQJ
job assessment, performance assessment and result-based pay, provided only limited 
opportunities for reducing the GPG. The new systems of pay and reward had narrowed the GPG 
among employees who earn the highest wages or who work in the highest positions, however no 
similar narrowing had yet appeared among the employees who earn low wages or work in lower 
level positions. Furthermore, the impact of these new systems of pay and reward was more 
prominent within the public and municipal sectors than in the private sector.71 
In relation to equality plans, a survey conducted by the government in 2008±2009 indicated that 
FRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHVWDWXWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWVUHTXLUHGµFRQVLGHUDEOHLPSURYHPHQW¶7KHVXUYH\
revealed that only 17 per cent of the workplaces had conducted comparisons of wages of men and 
women across the boundaries set by the collective agreements (ILO 2013: 464). The government 
has reported to the ILO that a tripartite working group has been appointed to examine the 
functionality and development needs of pay surveys and that this working group completed its work 
in June 2012. The working group proposed updating the training on equality plans and pay 
surveys. The government also reported that Parliament had placed an emphasis on securing 
HPSOR\HHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶ULJKWWRDFFHVVWRLQIRUPDWLRQLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKSD\UHYLHZV,/2
464). 
The Equal Pay Programme for 2006-2015 aims to reduce the gender gap to 15 per cent by 2015 
DQGWRLPSOHPHQWWKHSULQFLSOHRIµHTXDOSD\IRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶7KHSURJUDPPHLQFOXGHV
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October 2013). 
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DFWLRQVRQGHVHJUHJDWLRQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISD\V\VWHPVPHDVXUHVWRVXSSRUWZRPHQ¶VFDUHHUV
and calls for the social partners to establish agreements to reduce the pay gap (European 
Commission 2013:19). The nine goals of the Equal Pay Programme include (Belgium Institute for 
Equality of Men and Women 2010: 21):  
x developing pay statistics so that they are sector- and gender-specific by 2010;  
x increasing the use of paternity leave; 
x reducing the GPG to 15 per cent by 2015; 
x improving the quantity and quality of gender equality plans and pay surveys; 
x developing pay schemes; 
x alleviating gender-based segregation in the labour market; 
x enhancing the prRVSHFWVIRUZRPHQ¶VFDUHHUDGYDQFHPHQW 
x reducing unjustified fixed-term employment contracts; and 
x incorporating equality and equal pay in the corporate social responsibility programmes of 
companies and organisations. 
In relation to this Program, it would appear that the goal of reducing the GPG to 15 per cent by 
2015 is unlikely to be achieved, bearing in mind the present gap. It has also been observed by a 
major union that there is little likelihood of meeting another objective ± to increase the number of 
SHRSOHHPSOR\HGLQµJHQGHU-HTXDOMRESRVLWLRQV¶ZKHUHWKHVKDUHRIERWKZRPHQDQGPHQLV
between 40 and 59 per cent) to one fifth of the workforce (Belgium Institute for Equality of Men and 
Women 2010: 64). 
C.4.3 Conclusion 
There are many measures required to attain the goals set out in the Equal Pay Program. An 
important step is attention to the definition of remuneration in the Act on Equality. Additional claims 
for equal pay are thwarted by the difficulties in accessing earnings data and information about 
comparator positions, particularly if the jobs to be compared are under different collective 
agreements. Increased access to information is therefore vital. Furthermore, the remedy system for 
gender pay discrimination under Finnish law could be less complicated and allow more room for 
associations and other stakeholders to assist complainants. 
In relation to the pay plan mapping which is required of employers pursuant to the Act, there needs 
to be a more efficient monitoring of pay plans. The resources of the Equality Ombudsman, which 
monitors the provision under section 19(3) of the Act on Equality, are quite limited and should be 
increased (Nousiainen 2009: 93). This is also echoed by a major union which indicated that due to 
insufficient resources, efficient and systematic law enforcement was hampered.72  
Although there is a centralised system for collective bargaining which could facilitate a broad-based 
approach to equal remuneration, there are insufficient mechanisms in place to facilitate this 
objective. There has not been the same attention to gender-neutral job or classification analysis, or 
                                                     
72 See http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3056843 (accessed 3 
October 2013). 
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the same commitment to the development of pay equity plans, as evident in other jurisdictions. An 
additional requirement would be sufficient support for the effective monitoring of pay equity plans. 
C.5 The Netherlands 
C.5.1 Legislation and cases 
Unequal pay on the ground of gender was government policy in the Netherlands between 1945 and 
1965. During this period, women were remunerated at the same rate as youths and were seen to 
QRWUHTXLUHDµIXOOZDJH¶WKDWLVDEUHDGZLQQHUZDJH7KLVSROLF\UHVWHGRQWKHORJLFWKDWZRPHQ
unlike men, were not required to support a family. If women were unmarried and had no 
dependants, their income needs extended only to their own cost of living and thus a full wage was 
not required (Holtmaat 2010: 183). Until the mid-1960s, government decrees regarding the 
minimum wage explicitly established that women and youths were allowed to earn a certain 
percentage of the wages of adult men for the same work, mostly fixed at 60±70 per cent.  
,QWKH(TXDO3D\$FWZDVSDVVHGZKLFKZDVDLPHGDWFRPSO\LQJZLWKWKH1HWKHUODQGV¶
obligations to transpose European Council Directive 75/117/EEC concerning the application of the 
principle of equal pay for men and women. 
The principle of equal treatment was first introduced into the Constitution in 1983 (Dierx & 
Rodrigues 2003). According to Article 1 of the Constitution, all persons in the Netherlands should 
be treated equally in equal circumstances, and distinctions on grounds of religion, belief, political 
opinion, race, sex, or any other grounds, are prohibited. However, the principle of equal treatment 
and non-discrimination only applies to the relationship between the state and the individual. Article 
1 of the Constitution is not directly applicable in lawsuits between private individuals. Pursuant to 
Article 94 of the Constitution, however, the judiciary must interpret national law in accordance with 
binding international law. ThLVµKRUL]RQWDOHIIHFW¶FRYHUVGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWXQHTXDOWUHDWPHQWEDVHG
on religion or belief, political orientation, race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, and marital 
status. 
Equal pay is governed in the Netherlands by three pieces of legislation: 
x Book 7 of the Civil Code; 
x General Equal Treatment Act (GETA); and 
x Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Employment Act (ETA).  
7KH*RYHUQPHQW¶VYLHZLVWKDWWUDQVSRVLWLRQRI'LUHFWLYH(&WKH5HFDVW'LUHFWLYHLVQRW
necessary, as these pieces of legislation already cover the provisions of the Recast Directive in 
substantive law (Holtmaat 2009: 74). Book 7 of the Dutch Civil Code prohibits employers from 
discriminating between men and women in hiring and promotion practices. It also prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of working hours. This is relevant to women given the 
disproportionate representation of women, relative to men, in part-time work. The norm of equality 
of pay between men and women is laid down in article 646 of Book 7, which staWHVWKDWµWKH
HPSOR\HULVQRWDOORZHGWRGLIIHUHQWLDWHEHWZHHQPHQDQGZRPHQDVUHJDUGV«ZRUNLQJ
FRQGLWLRQV¶µ3D\¶LVGHILQHGDVRQHRIWKHDSSOLFDEOHZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQV 
The GETA contains general rules to provide protection against discrimination on broad grounds, 
one of which is sex. Section 1 prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination and specifically 
VWDWHVWKDWµGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQRQWKHJURXQGVRIVH[LQFOXGHVGLVFULPLQDWLRQRQWKHJURXQGVRI
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SUHJQDQF\FKLOGELUWKDQGPDWHUQLW\¶ The prohibition of sex discrimination does not apply when the 
protection of women is concerned, specifically in pregnancy and maternity cases, and when the 
aim of the measure is to place women in a privileged position in order to eliminate or reduce 
existing inequalities and the discrimination is reasonably proportional to the intended effect (section 
2(2)). 
The equal pay principle is further defined in Division 2 of the ETA; sections 7 to 12 specifically 
FRQFHUQµ(TXDOSD\IRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶7KH(7$FRQWDLQs special rules on the definition of 
pay, on jobs comparison and evaluation (including in cases of part-time work), and on non-
monetary forms of pay. The main provision is section 7, which provides: 
(1) For the purposes of article 646, Book 7 of the Civil Code, the basis for comparing the terms and 
conditions of employment referred to in that article shall be, as far as pay is concerned, the pay 
normally received by a worker of the other sex for work of equal value or, in the absence of such 
work, for work of approximately equal value, in the undertaking where the worker on whose behalf 
the comparison is made is employed. 
(2) Pay as referred to in subsection 1 means the remuneration payable by the employer to the 
employee for the work performed by the latter. 
The concept of pay, as defined in the ETA and applied by the Dutch courts, is in line with the wide 
interpretation given by the ECJ (Sjerps 2007: 68).73 It includes occupational pensions as well as a 
ZLGHUDQJHRIµEHQHILWV¶WKDWIORZIURPWKHHPSOR\PHQWUHODtionship. For example, section 9(2) sets 
RXWWKDWIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIVHFWLRQµQRQ-cash salary components shall be taken into account as 
SD\DWWKHPDUNHWYDOXHWKDWFDQEHDVVLJQHGWRWKHP¶6HFWLRQRIWKH(7$SURYLGHVWKDWZRUN
shall be assessed in DFFRUGDQFHZLWKDµUHOLDEOHV\VWHPRIMREHYDOXDWLRQDGKHULQJDVIDUDV
SRVVLEOHWRWKHV\VWHPFXVWRPDU\DWWKHXQGHUWDNLQJZKHUHWKHHPSOR\HHFRQFHUQHGZRUNV¶
However, in the absence of such a system, the work shall be fairly assessed in the light of the 
available information. Furthermore, section 9 of the ETA establishes that the pay received by the 
HPSOR\HHFRQFHUQHGVKDOOEHµGHHPHGWREHHTXDOWRWKHSD\WKDWDZRUNHURIWKHRWKHUVH[
normally receives for work of equal value if it is calculated on WKHEDVLVRIHTXLYDOHQWFULWHULD¶7KH
ETA provides also for certain specific exceptions to the rule of equal treatment with regard to 
employment. An important exception concerns preferential treatment (affirmative action) on 
grounds of gender. Preferential treatment of women is permitted, provided that the aim is to 
eliminate or reduce de facto inequalities and the regulations are proportionate to that aim (section 
2(3)).  
C.5.2 Process to attain equal pay 
C.5.2.1 Enforcement 
The GETA provides for the establishment of an Equal Treatment Commission (ETC). Its task is to 
hear complaints (from individuals and organisations) and give non-binding opinions about 
discrimination, to give advice to organisations which want to revise their policies, and through 
monitoring to advise the Government with respect to the implementation and potential review of the 
                                                     
73 See also ECJ rulings in Kalanke C-450/93, [1995], ECR I-3051; Marshall C-409/95, [1997] ECR I-6363; Badeck, C-
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legislation (Prechal & Burri 2009: 125). It is vested with powers to investigate, mediate, and 
adjudicate allegations of discrimination (GETA, section 11). 
Proceedings before the ETC are free; legal assistance is neither required nor necessary, because 
the ETC itself plays an active role in the investigation of complaints. Furthermore, failure to co-
operate with an ETC investigation constitutes a criminal offence (GETA, section 19). Consistent 
with section 12 of the GETA, the ETC may, upon request, conduct an investigation to determine 
whether discrimination as referred to in the GETA, ETA or section 646 of Book 7 of the Civil Code 
has taken or is taking place, and may publish its findings. The ETC may also conduct an 
investigation on its own initiative to determine whether such discrimination is systematically taking 
place and publish its findings.  
Under section 12(2), a request for an investigation may be submitted by a very broad range of 
stakeholders: 
x a person who believes that they have suffered discrimination;  
x a natural or legal person or competent authority wishing to know whether they are guilty of 
discrimination;  
x a person responsible for deciding on disputes concerning discrimination;  
x a works council, which believes that discrimination as referred to in the GETA, ETA or article 
646 of Book 7 of the Civil Code is taking place in the company for which it was appointed, or a 
representative advisory organ similar to that works council, which believes that discrimination 
is taking place in the organ for which it was appointed; or 
x a legal person with full legal powers which, in accordance with its constitution or statutes, 
represents the interests of those whose protection is the objective of the GETA, ETA or article 
646 of Book 7 of the Civil Code. 
2QFHVXFKDUHTXHVWLQZULWLQJKDVEHHQVXEPLWWHGWKH(7&PXVWµLQVWLWXWHDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQDQG
shall forward its findings, in writing and with reasons, to the petitioner, the person said to be guilty 
RIGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGLIUHOHYDQWWKHYLFWLPRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶*(7$, section 13). Furthermore, the 
ETC may also make recommendations when forwarding its findings to a person said to be guilty of 
discrimination. 
Through the course of an investigation of alleged discrimination, the parties are invited to make 
submissions in writing. The ETC has the right to direct the employer to release sufficient pay 
information, so as to enable an employee to bring an equal pay claim. The ETC may also direct the 
employer to disclose all necessary pay information as soon as an employee has brought a claim 
(Foubert et al 2010: 14). When the ETC considers that it has collected sufficient information, 
hearings are conducted. If necessary, the ETC can direct parties to be present and give oral 
evidence at the hearing. Witnesses can also be invited or summoned to attend the hearing, both by 
the parties and the ETC. Commentators suggest that the ETC places great value on hearings, 
since they provide an opportunity for discussion, in addition to an explanation of the scope and 
relevance of anti-discrimination law (Dierx & Rodrigues 2003). After the hearing, the ETC 
discusses the case in a closed meeting and delivers its decision within 8 weeks.  
The ETC will refuse to institute an investigation if: 
x WKHUHTXHVWUHIHUUHGWRLQVHFWLRQLVµPDQLIHVWO\XQIRXQGHG¶ 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
198 
x WKHLQWHUHVWRIWKHSHWLWLRQHURUWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHEHKDYLRXUFRQFHUQHGLVµPDQLIHVWO\
iQVXIILFLHQW¶or 
x the period of time which has elapsed since the discrimination referred to in section 12 took 
SODFHLVVXFKWKDWDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQFDQµQRORQJHUUHDVRQDEO\EHFRQGXFWHG¶ 
The GETA does not oblige applicants to approach the ETC before filing a lawsuit with the Dutch 
courts, nor do proceedings before the ETC prevent court action. According to the GETA and the 
ETA, discriminatory dismissals and victimisation dismissals can be ruled to be void. The employee 
can ask the court to invalidate the termination of the contract, whereby an employee can claim 
wages and seek reinstatement. Alternatively, the employee can claim pecuniary damages before 
the courts under the system of sanctions in general administrative law, contract law and/or tort law 
(Prechal & Burri 2009: 124). Furthermore, pursuant to section 15 of the GETA, the ETC itself may 
bring legal action before the courts with a view to obtaining a ruling that conduct contrary to the 
GETA, ETA or article 646 of Book 7 of the Civil Code is unlawful, requesting that such conduct be 
prohibited or eliciting an order that the consequences of such conduct be rectified.  
The GETA and ETA also make reference to additional sanctions. Sanctions under these laws are 
imposed by the ETC, not by the courts. Under Article 13(2) of the GETA, the ETC may make 
recommendations to the party found to have made an unlawful distinction. Article 13(3) permits the 
(7&WRIRUZDUGLWVILQGLQJVLQDQµ$GYLFHWRWKH0LQLVWHUVFRQFHUQHG¶DQGWRRUJDQLVDWLRQVRI
employers, employees, professionals, public servants and relevant consultative bodies. Under 
Article 15(1), the ETC may bring legal action with a view to obtaining a court ruling that conduct 
contrary to the relevant equal treatment legislation is unlawful, requesting that such conduct be 
prohibited or eliciting an order that the consequences of such conduct be rectified.  
The GETA does not contain provisions concerning the burden of proof, but the ETC applies the 
burden in line with the Recast Directive, which places the evidentiary burden on the respondent to 
prove that the alleged discrimination did not take place. For example, if the plaintiff alleges that her 
gender is the reason why she has been remunerated at a rate lower than that paid for equal work 
or work of equal value, and she can prove that her credentials and experience were sufficient to 
meet the requirements of the job, the defendant has to provide evidence establishing that there 
have been other relevant reasons that justified the lower rate of remuneration. If the employer 
cannot clarify its decisions in an adequate manner, a violation of the law will be established. The 
right to bring a matter before the ETC, or to take legal action before the courts to claim pay under 
the GETA, lapses two years after the date on which payment should have been made (GETA, 
section 11). 
C.5.2.2 Promotion 
In 2000, the national representatives of the social partners, the government and the ETC 
LQWURGXFHGDSD\HTXLW\DFWLRQSODQ$µ-SRLQWSD\HTXLW\FKHFNOLVW¶ZDVGHYHORSHGWRKHOSWKH
social partners and human resource development managers identify potential discrimination in pay 
systems (van Hoogstraten & Van Embden 2002). The content of the checklist was informed by the 
discrimination cases handled by the ETC and are considered appropriate for analysing pay 
discrimination (Dierx et al 2004). The checklist includes the following ten questions:  
1. Does the pay system discriminate between employees on the basis of working hours or type of 
contract? 
2. Are the criteria used to rank employees in the pay scale non-sexist?  
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3. In practice, does the pay system guarantee equal pay for men and women?  
4. Are pay increases for equal jobs equal?  
5. Are men and women equally eligible for social benefits?  
6. Are men and women equally eligible for retirement benefits?  
7. Are men and women equally eligible for incidental supplements, allowances or bonuses?  
8. Are pay systems that incorporate an element of variable remuneration offered to all employees, 
regardless of sex?  
9. 'RDOOHPSOR\HHVUHJDUGOHVVRIVH[EHQHILWIURPWKHVDPHHOHPHQWVRIDµFDIHWHULD¶74 scheme, 
when the latter is in place? 
10. Do mergers, fusions and the like give rise to lasting pay discrimination? 
Although fairly exhaustive in the analysis of both the content and structure of pay systems, 
&KLFKD¶VREVHUYDWLRQLVWKDWµWKLVOLVWQRQHWKHOHVVIDLOVWRDGGUHVVPRUHVSHFLILFDVSects that lead to 
SD\HTXLW\PRVWQRWDEO\LWIDLOVWRHVWLPDWHGLVFULPLQDWRU\SD\GLIIHUHQWLDOV¶&KLFKD 
7KH1HWKHUODQGVDOVRKDVµ(TXDO3D\4XLFN6FDQ¶DVRIWZDUHSURJUDPGHYHORSHGE\WKH(7&,W
analyses company pay data to determine if an investigation into its remuneration system is 
required. It was applied by the Labour Inspectorate in an investigation of several sectors in 2005. A 
simplified version was also developed in 2008 for the use of individual employers (Foubert et al 
2010: 17). 
AQRWKHUSURPRWLRQDOSUDFWLFHXVHGLQWKH1HWKHUODQGVLVWKHµ:DJH,QGLFDWRU¶/RRQZLM]HUZKLFKLV
an internet tool developed by the University of Amsterdam. Individual men and women can use this 
indicator to compare their salaries to higher, lower or equivalent others in the same field, the same 
job level and with the same education and years of experience (Holtmaat 2010: 188).  
C.5.3 Conclusion 
The enforcement and promotional practices of the Netherlands are extensive, with the ETC 
supported by checklists, software programs and web-based tools to scrutinise pay and evaluation 
for compliance with the equal pay principle. Yet the GPG stands at 17.9 per cent and is reportedly 
widening (Foubert et al 2010: 2). 
A contributory factor may be that the checklists, software programs and web-based tools are 
voluntary requirements. There is no mandatory requirement for employers to implement them. 
There does not appear to be a systematic process, as evident in the Canadian provinces (see 
section C.9), for equity plans or annual audits. Additionally it would appear that information is only 
provided by employers following the commencement of an action before the ETC (Holtmaat 2010: 
189). 
Even if someone has indications that they are paid less than a colleague for the same work, it will 
be difficult to establish this to the required standard. Many factors, unknown to the claimant, may 
justify the difference in pay (for instance, the number of years of experience or some extra training 
                                                     
74 ,QDµFDIHWHULD¶VFKHPHHPSOR\HHVFDQFKRRVHIURPDQHVWDEOLVKHGOLVWRIVRFLDOEHQHILWVEDVHGRQWKHLUQHHds. 
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or education of the colleague). Also, workers fear that the relationship with their colleague or 
employer may become troubled as a result of such a claim. Individual employees also may also 
find it difficult to assess whether their concern about the pay they receive is a case of indirect 
discrimination, given the complexities involved in this standard. 
Nonetheless, the continued development of the promotional tools appear well directed to good 
practice by employers and also helpful for employees to make enquires as to whether to initiate an 
equal pay claim. The wide range of stakeholders who can request and initiate an equal pay 
investigation by the ETC, can also have broad impact, if effectively utilised. 
C.6 Norway 
C.6.1 Legislation  
The right to equal pay is established by section 5 of the Gender Equality Act 2005 (GEA). The 
European Economic Area (EEA) Committee made Directive 2006/54/EC (the Recast Directive) part 
of the EEA Agreement by its decision of 14 March 2008. The Norwegian Ministry of Children and 
Equality conducted an evaluation and concluded that Norwegian legislation was already in line with 
WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKH5HFDVW'LUHFWLYHDQGDGHTXDWHO\LQFRUSRUDWHGWKH'LUHFWLYH¶VHTXDOSD\
requirements (Burri & Prechal 2009: 77).  
The GEA promotes gender equality and prohibits gender discrimination. When the GEA was 
RULJLQDOO\SDVVHGLQVHFWLRQSURYLGHGWKDWµZRPHQDQGPHQVKDOOKDYHHTXDOSD\IRUWKH
VDPHZRUNRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶7KHUHZDVDFRQFHUQWKDWWKHWHUPµZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶ZDV
given too narrow a meaning and the value of work could not be compared meaningfully across 
trades and professions (Holst 2012: 2±3). Section 5 of the GEA was subsequently amended in 
,WQRZSURYLGHVWKDWµZRPHQDQGPHQLQWKH same enterprise shall have equal pay for the 
VDPHZRUNRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶DQGWKDWWKLVµVKDOODSSO\UHJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHUVXFKZRUNLV
connected with different trades or professions or whether the pay is regulated by different collective 
wage agreemHQWV¶,QDGGLWLRQVHFWLRQVWDWHVWKDWZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXHLVWREHGHWHUPLQHGµDIWHU
an overall assessment in which importance is attached to the expertise that is necessary to perform 
the work and other relevant factors, such as effort, responsibility DQGZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQV¶7KH
definition is an inclusive one and allows other factors to be taken into account, such as market 
conditions.  
3D\LVGHILQHGDVµRUGLQDU\UHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNDVZHOODVDOORWKHUVXSSOHPHQWVRUDGYDQWDJHV
or other benefits pURYLGHGE\WKHHPSOR\HU¶7KHULJKWWRHTXDOSD\LVOLPLWHGE\VHFWLRQWRWKH
same enterprise, which means that the equal pay requirement cannot be based on comparisons 
between employees in different enterprises, even if the enterprises are operated and owned by the 
same physical or legal entity (Equal Pay Commission 2008: 6). 
6HFWLRQRIWKH*($FRQFHUQVWKHEXUGHQRISURRI,WLVDGLVWLQFWSURYLVLRQSURYLGLQJWKDWµLIWKHUH
are circumstances that give reason to believe that there has been direct or indirect differential 
WUHDWPHQW«VXFKGLIIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWVKDOOEHDVVXPHGWRKDYHWDNHQSODFHXQOHVVWKHSHUVRQ
responsible proves on the balance of probabilities that such differential treatment nonetheless did 
QRWWDNHSODFH¶75 Broadly interpreted, this provision requires an employer to prove, on the balance 
                                                     
75 Section 3 of the Act defines direct and indirect differential treatment. In relation to indirect differential treatment, as it is a 
generalised statute it lacks clarity as to how it should be applied in relation to equal pay. For example the legislation states 
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of probabilities, that differential treatment did not take place. A prime facie case is required, 
however, before the burden shifts to the employer (Equal Pay Commission 2008: 6). 
C.6.2 Overview of the process for achieving equal pay 
C.6.2.1 Enforcement  
The enforcement of the GEA, including equal pay, is primarily through the Gender Equality and 
Anti-Discrimination Ombudsman (Ombud) and the Gender Equality and Anti-Discrimination 
Tribunal (Tribunal). Both are independent bodies.  
A complaint concerning unequal pay can be made directly to the Ombud. The Ombud investigates 
the complaint by requesting information and documentation from the employer. Following 
investigations, the Ombud may make a recommendation or statement. If the Ombud concludes that 
there has been a breach of the law, the party responsible is obliged to rectify their conduct in 
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKH2PEXG¶VVWDWHPHQW7KHVWDWHPHQWLVQRWOHJDOO\ELQGLQJEXWLQPRVWFDVHV
employers wLOOIROORZWKH2PEXG¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ 
If one of the parties disputes a recommendation, then an appeal to the Tribunal may be made by 
either party or referred by the Ombud directly. The Tribunal may only hear the case after the 
Ombud has made a recommendation. The Tribunal will then decide whether or not the GEA has 
been violated and can decide that the discriminating actions must come to an end (Fourbet 2010: 
195). The Tribunal does not have the power to award damages or compensation, or impose 
sanctions, a situation which has been the subject of criticism (Equal Pay Commission 2008; 
Equality Commission 2011; Equality and Anti-discrimination Ombudsman 2011:16). The rulings of 
the Tribunal are administratively binding, but may be overruled by a court on appeal. Where a party 
does not pay compensation voluntarily, the victim can only obtain a remedy through the courts 
(Foubert et al 2010: 195).  
If a complaint is made against municipal or state institutions, the powers of the Tribunal are limited 
to making recommendations. Also, the Tribunal may not hand down rulings that affect collective 
wage agreements (Equal Pay Commission 2008: 7). The Tribunal has the right to give an opinion 
on such cases, but its opinion is not legally binding. Therefore the competence of the Tribunal in 
determining disputes, which may involve collective wage agreements, is limited. The time period 
between the initiation of a complaint and a decision by the Ombud may vary, but it is not 
uncommon for this period to be up to 12 months. A complaint for the Tribunal may add another 6 to 
PRQWKVWRWKLVSURFHVV,IWKH7ULEXQDO¶VGHFLVLRQLVGLVSXWHGDQGSUHVHQWHGWRFRXUWDIXUWKHU
to 12 months may elapse before a judgment is provided (Foubert et al 2010: 196).  
An order for compensation for a breach of the GEA can only be made by a court. Section 17 of the 
*($SURYLGHVWKDWDQHPSOR\HHPD\µGHPDQGFRPSHQVDWLRQDQGUHGUHVVUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHIDXOWRI
WKHHPSOR\HU¶&RPSHQVDWLRQLVIL[HGDWWKHDPRXQWWKDWLVUHDVRQDEOHKDYLQJUHJDUGWRWhe 
financial loss, the situation of the employer and the employee or job seeker, and all other 
circumstances. The courts will grant compensation from the date of the claim and in general the 
limitation period for claims is three years (Norwegian Limitation Act 1979, sections 3, 9). 
                                                                                                                                                                
WKDWLQGLUHFWGLIIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWLVSHUPLWWHGµLIWKHDFWLRQKDVDQREMHFWLYHSXUSRVHWKDWLVLQGHSHQGHQWRIJHQGHUDQGWhe 
PHDQVWKDWLVFKRVHQLVVXLWDEOHQHFHVVDU\DQGQRWGLVSURSRUWLRQDOLQWHUYHQWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRWKHVDLGSXUSRVH¶ 
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7KH/DERXU&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQLQWKHDUHDRIHTXDOSD\SULPDULO\FRQFHUQVFROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQWV
An employee organisation may file a complaint before the Labour Court regarding the 
interpretation, existence and validity of a collective agreement. Whilst a collective wage agreement 
may not be entered into if it contravenes the GEA, only the Labour Court is competent rule on this 
and only the parties to a collective wage agreement can bring this type of action. If a provision of a 
collective agreement is found to be in violation of the GEA, it will be declared null and void by the 
Labour Court so that the compensation to be paid is retrospectively dated back to the moment that 
the invalid provision was put into force.  
A review of appeal cases relating to equal pay indicates that the Ombud receives many cases 
relating to discrimination in employment, but that relatively few are dealt with by the Tribunal and 
even fewer appeals are upheld. Appeals made to the Tribunal are very rarely upheld in cases 
where the basis of the appeal is that the Ombud took insufficient account of the work value across 
occupational and collective wage agreement borders. An additional factor that explains the limited 
number of successful appeal cases is that the Ombud is permitted to give consideration to market 
value as a justification for differentiated pay. Further, appeals can only be initiated by an individual 
and individual employees face significant barriers in obtaining information about their colleagXHV¶
pay. Very few equal pay cases have been dealt with by the ordinary courts. During the period 
1999±2005, 95 cases concerning wages were handled by the Ombudsman (Foubert et al 2010: 
196), while the Tribunal dealt with only 17 cases concerning equal pay between 2002 and 2008 
(Equal Pay Commission 2008: 7). 
C.6.2.2 Promotion 
The GEA also addresses promotion of gender equality. Section 1a establishes that an employer 
has a positive obligation to promote gender equality. As such, employers in the public and private 
sectors must make active, targeted and systematic efforts to promote gender equality in their 
enterprises. In their annual reports or annual budgets they must give an account of the actual state 
of affairs as regards gender equality and the measures that are planned in order to promote gender 
equality and to prevent differential treatment in contravention of the GEA. The monitoring and 
supervision of these mandatory requirements lies with the Ombud.  
In 2006, the Norwegian Cabinet appointed an Equal Pay Commission to provide an overview of the 
GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQZRPHQ¶VDQGPHQ¶VSD\DQGFRQVLGHUPHDVXUHVWRUHGXFHSD\GLIIHUHQFHV,W
was established as a committee of experts, comprising researchers from different disciplines 
together with a reference group of employers and employees organisations. In 2008 the 
Commission produced its first report on gender and pay (Equal Pay Commission 2008). The 
&RPPLVVLRQDOVRXQGHUWRRNDQDVVHVVPHQWLQDQGRIWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKH2PEXG¶V
equal pay monitoring. The Commission, apart from commenting on some uncertainty as to the 
enterprises who were subject to the requirement to produce an annual report, noted deficiencies in 
relation to monitoring of the reporting requirements of private enterprises. The conclusion was that 
the administrative structure for implementing an equality policy by the Ombud was too weak to 
realise the equality policy ambitions (Equal Pay Commission 2008: 13).  
In its 2008 report, the Commission made seven specific recommendations to promote equal 
remuneration for women and men (Equal Pay Commission 2008: 15±16). The first concerned 
strengthening the enforcement of the duty to promote gender equality under the GEA. The second 
was to implement pay increases for selected female-dominated occupations in the public sector. 
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The third was that social partners involved in private sector collective bargaining allocate funds to 
areas of low pay and feminised work. 
These three recommendations were set against the stagnant nature of Norwa\¶VGPG which has 
remained around 15 per cent since the mid-1980s. Although Norwegian women take part in 
working life to almost the same extent as men, they work shorter hours and they do not work in the 
same occupations, industries or sectors as men. Nor do they have an equal position in the job 
hierarchy. Commentators suggest that Norway has one of the most gender-segregated labour 
markets in the industrialised world (Equal Pay Commission 2008: 2). The labour market is divided 
by gender along horizontal and vertical lines. Horizontal segregation of the labour market indicates 
that women and men are concentrated in different occupations, industries and sectors. The gender 
differences largely correspond to the division between the public and private sectors. Women 
account for approximately 70 per cent of employees in the public sector, while there are more men 
in the private sector (63 per cent). The salaries within the private sector are higher than the salaries 
within the public sector and the pay gap between women and men is higher within the private 
sector, than within the public sector (Malmberg-Heimonen 2011: 2). Vertical segregation indicates 
that women and men are segregated in terms of their position in the job hierarchy, even within the 
same occupation or profession. Only one in three managers in Norway is a woman (Malmberg-
Heimonen 2011: 2). 
An additional matter of debate in Norway concerns the use of job evaluation as the basis of 
successful claims for wage adjustments. The Commission observed that practice in Norway did not 
match that evident internationally. While there were only limited impediments to using job 
evaluation to measure the value of work on the principle of job requirements, problems and 
conflicts occurred at the next phase, where this measurement was linked to a claim for pay 
adjustments and new pay relationships between occupational groups. Additionally job evaluation 
within enterprises has little effect on the pay gap because the greatest pay differences in Norway 
are due to the gender-segregated labour market, where men and women are divided between 
different industries, sectors and workplaces. A compounding factor is the limitation of equal pay 
OHJLVODWLRQWKHVFRSHRIWKHHTXDOSD\SURYLVLRQVLVOLPLWHGWRWKHµVDPHHQWHUSULVH¶Equal Pay 
Commission 2008: 13±14). The Ombud has also observed that work assessment tools to facilitate 
comparison of the work of men and women across sectors and across occupations were 
underutilised. The Ombud observed that these tools could be an important means of preventing 
SD\EHLQJGHWHUPLQHGRQWKHEDVLVRIVWHUHRW\SLFDOLGHDVDERXWWKHYDOXHRIZRPHQ¶VZRUN
particularly in local and central government sectors which are highly feminised (Equality and Anti-
discrimination Ombudsman 2012: 8).  
In 2011WKH,/2¶V&($&5 requested the Norwegian Government to provide information on any 
measures it had taken to overcome the obstacles relating to job evaluation. In particular it 
requested the government to provide information on measures taken in cooperation with the social 
partners to address pay differences between men and women beyond the enterprise level, 
examining in particular the remuneration levels in female-dominated and male-dominated 
occupations where the work is of equal value (ILO 2011: 484). 
C.6.3 Summary  
Norway has a number of impediments to improving the GPG. Legislation is limited to gender pay 
discrimination within an enterprise, there is no requirement for an employer to disclose information 
about the pay of other employees within an enterprise and no effective remedies which can apply 
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across occupational and collective wage agreement borders. The enforcement provisions of the 
GEA are limited also, as complainants are unable to obtain compensation, other than by pursuing 
remedies through an ordinary court. More broadly, the GEA provides limited clarity as to how equal 
pay for work of equal value is to be applied in practice. The objective of equal pay is hampered also 
by ineffective equality promotion and there is deficient monitoring of the mandatory requirements of 
gender equality reporting required of enterprises and public authorities. 
C.7 Sweden 
C.7.1 Legislation and case law 
Legislation to promote equal rights for women and men in the workplace, including provisions on 
equal pay, was first adopted in Sweden in 1979 and has been updated several times over the 
years, most notably with the Equal Opportunities Act of 1991 and the Discrimination Act of 2009. 
The Discrimination Act combined seven Swedish anti-discrimination laws, including the Equal 
Opportunities Act, into one Act and established the Equality Ombudsman to supervise compliance 
with the Discrimination Act.76 
7KHSXUSRVHRIWKH'LVFULPLQDWLRQ$FWLVWRµFRPEDWGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGLQRWKHUZD\VSURPRWHHTXDO
rights and opportunities regardless of sex, transgender identity or expression, ethnicity, religion or 
RWKHUEHOLHIGLVDELOLW\VH[XDORULHQWDWLRQRUDJH¶VHFWLRQ&KDSWHURIWKH'LVFULPLQDWLRQ$FW
FRYHUVµZRUNLQJOLIH¶DQGLVRUJDQLVHGLQWRWKHIROORZLQJFDWHJRULHV 
x cooperation between employer and employees; 
x goal-orientated work; 
x working conditions; 
x recruitment; 
x matters of pay; and  
x gender equality plan. 
Employers and employees are to cooperate on active measures to bring about equal rights and 
opportunities in working life, regardless of sex, ethnicity, religion or other belief, and in particular to 
combat discrimination in working life on such grounds. Section 2 of Chapter 3 sets out that 
employers and employees are to endeavour to equalise and prevent differences in pay and other 
terms of employment between women and men who perform work which is to be regarded as 
equal or of equal value. They are also to promote equal pay growth opportunities for women and 
men. Work is to be regarded as of equal value with other work if, on an overall assessment of the 
requirements and nature of the work, it can be deemed to be equal in value to the other work. The 
assessment of the requirements of the work is to take into account criteria such as knowledge and 
                                                     
76 These are the Equal Opportunities Act (Swedish Code of Statutes 1991: 433); the Act on Measures against 
Discrimination in Working Life on Grounds of Ethnic Origin, Religion or Other Religious Faith (Swedish Code of Statutes 
1999: 130); the Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life on Grounds of Disability Act (Swedish Code of Statutes 1999: 
132); the Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life on Grounds of Sexual Orientation Act (Swedish Code of Statutes 
1999: 133); the Equal Treatment of Students at Universities Act (Swedish Code of Statutes 2001: 1286); the Prohibition of 
Discrimination Act (Swedish Code of Statutes 2003: 307); and the Act Prohibiting Discriminatory and Other Degrading 
Treatment of Children and School Students (Swedish Code of Statutes 2006: 67). 
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skills, responsibility and effort. In assessing the nature of the work, particular account is to be taken 
of working conditions. 
The Discrimination Act contains further rules monitoring equal pay practices. In order to detect, 
remedy and prevent unjustified differences in pay and other conditions of employment, section 10 
of Chapter 3 provides that each employer must undertake a pay survey and analyse every three 
years: 
x provisions and practices regarding pay and other terms of employment that are used at the 
HPSOR\HU¶VHVWDEOLVKPHnt; 
x pay differences between women and men performing work regarded as equal or of equal 
value; 
x whether pay differences between women and men performing the same work are based on 
gender or on other factors; and 
x groups of employees performing work generally dominated by women, comparing that to work 
being performed of equal value but not dominated by women. 
According to section 11, employers with 25 or more employees are required to draw up an action 
plan for equal pay every three years that: 
x provides employHHV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVZLWKZKLFKWKH\KDYHDFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQW
information to cooperate in the survey, analysis, and drawing up of the plan (taking into 
consideration confidentiality); 
x details pay adjustments and measures necessary to be taken by the employer; 
x includes a cost estimate and implementation schedule; and 
x provides an account of how planned measures have been implemented. 
Such an action plan must report the results of the employer obligations to survey and analyse pay 
practices, from DJHQGHUSHUVSHFWLYHDQGLQGLFDWHµWKHSD\DGMXVWPHQWVDQGRWKHUPHDVXUHVWKDW
need to be taken to bring about equal pay for work that is to be regarded as equal or of equal 
YDOXH¶7KHSODQPXVWLQFOXGHDFRVWHVWLPDWHDQGDWLPHSODQQRWH[FHHGLQJWKUHe years, and, 
subsequently, report on the implementation and results. Furthermore, there is a right for employee 
organisations bound by a collective agreement to obtain the information needed for the 
organisations to be able to cooperate in the survey, analysis and drawing up of an action plan for 
equal pay. If related to an individual employee, such information is confidential (section 12). 
C.7.2 Process of achieving equal pay 
C.7.2.1 Enforcement 
The enforcement of the equal pay principle in Sweden is an individual and complaint-based 
structure (Numhauser-Henning 2010: 239). The equal pay provisions in the Discrimination Act are 
enforced by the Equality Ombudsman. An individual employee (or various employees) must be 
identified as potentially discriminated against, which requires a relevant comparator of the opposite 
sex. Such a comparator must be found at the same employer, otherwise there is no comparable 
situation (Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College [2004] ECR I-873). 
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Complaints about unequal pay DUHLQYHVWLJDWHGE\WKH2PEXGVPDQ¶VFDVHRIILFHUV$QLQGLYLGXDO
complainant can turn to their trade union or to the Equality Ombudsman for assistance. If the 
investigation shows discrimination or unfair treatment with regards to pay, the Ombudsman will first 
try to negotiate a voluntary agreement or settlement between the employer and the employee. 
Should the employee and employer fail to reach a settlement, the Ombudsman can take the matter 
to the Labour Court, where the trade union has a right to represent a member. 
Should a case of pay discrimination be proven, there is a right to both punitive and economic 
damages. The time limits for presenting a pay discrimination claim are regulated in section 4 of 
Chapter 6 of the Discrimination Act. These rules are quite complex, regulating time limits for 
negotiations and legal proceedings in the case of an individual claimant being represented by a 
trade union and complementary rules when this is not the case. A request for negotiations for 
damages must be made within four months of discovering the discriminatory act and within a 
maximum of two years of the act itself. However, pay (which by its nature is recurrent) is a 
µFRQWLQXRXVO\¶FRPPLWWHGDFWRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQ$QDFWLRQPXVWWKHQEHEURXJKWWRFRXUWZLWKLQthree 
months of finalising the negotiations. If the trade union does not call for negotiations or bring the 
claim to court, there is an additional time limit of one month for the employee or Equality 
Ombudsman to do so.  
The Equality Ombudsman has a general duty to monitor compliance with the Discrimination Act. 
Furthermore, there is an obligation on any natural or legal person to provide any information 
required by the Equality Ombudsman. Should such a person not fulfil the obligations concerning 
active measures under Chapter 3, that person may be ordered to fulfil them subject to a financial 
SHQDOW\ZKLFKLVLVVXHGE\DVSHFLDOµ%RDUGDJDLQVW'LVFULPLQDWLRQ¶RQDSSOLFDWLRQIURPWKH(TXDOLW\
Ombudsman. A trade union may also approach the Board regarding a lack of compliance of the 
DFWLYHPHDVXUHV7KH2PEXGVPDQLQYHVWLJDWHVFRPSODLQWVEDVHGRQWKHODZ¶VSURKLELWLRQRI
discrimination and harassment, and can represent victims in court free of charge.  
C.7.2.2 Promotion 
Other than the provisions set out in the Discrimination Act, Sweden has also developed other 
PHWKRGVWRSURPRWHHTXDOSD\2QHH[DPSOHLVWKHµ6WHSVWR3D\(TXLW\PHWKRG¶ZKLFK was 
developed by the Equality Ombudsman to facilitate pay equity (Harriman & Holm 2001; Katz & 
Baitsch 1996; Hastings $FFRUGLQJWR2HO]HWDOLWµLVDTXLFNDQGHDV\PHWKRGIRU
GHWHUPLQLQJWKHGHPDQGVDQGGHJUHHRIGLIILFXOW\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKSDUWLFXODUMREV«>DQG@FDQ
DVFHUWDLQZKHWKHUGLIIHUHQWLDOVLQPHQ¶VDQGZRPHQ¶VZDJHVDUHGXHWRVH[GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶7KH
method can be used for different purposes, such as determining work of equal value in connection 
with wage surveys required under the law, ranking and comparing different jobs, and determining 
whether a job evaluation is required (Oelz et al 2013: 42). The Office of the Equality Ombudsman 
has also published a brochure on pay surveys, explaining the difference between equal work and 
work of equal value, and setting out the steps to be taken for pay surveys and analysis (Oelz et al 
2013: 74; Equality Ombudsman 2009). In response to data that sectors with the lowest minimum 
wage were also the most highly feminised, the social partners agreed to increase the minimum 
wage through collective bargaining (Oelz et al 2013: 62; ILO 2011). 
For InternatLRQDO:RPHQ¶V'D\WKH6ZHGLVK:RPHQ¶V/REE\LQLWLDWHGDQH[WHQVLYH
campaign to raise awareness on the current GPG. The campaign involved a large number of 
XQLRQVSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVDQGZRPHQ¶VULJKWVRUJDQLVDWLRQV7KHPHVVDJHµ$IWHUZRPHQZRUk 
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for free ± HYHU\GD\,WLVWLPHIRUSD\DOOGD\¶ZDVFLUFXODWHGWKURXJKRXWDZLGHUDQJHRI,QWHUQHW
and social media outlets.77 
C.7.3 Conclusion 
7KH'LVFULPLQDWLRQ$FW¶VSURYLVLRQVRQDFWLYHPHDVXUHVLQSDUWLFXODUWKRVHFRQFHUQLQJWKH
mandatory requirement for employers to draw up action plans and report on measures needed or 
taken to achieve equal remuneration pay, are an example of good practice. This, taken together 
ZLWKWKH(TXDOLW\2PEXGVPDQ¶VSRZHUVSURFHVVHVRILQYHVWLJDWLRQDQGDELOLW\WRDVVLVt 
complainants before the Labour Court (if required), also amounts to good practice. However, 
between 2000 and 2012, the GPG in Sweden continued to rise and is now above 15 per cent. 
Contributory factors may include the legislative limitation that provides that comparators be drawn 
from the same employer. A further contributing factor may be issues as to the effectiveness of the 
supervisory powers of the Equality Ombudsman in relation to systematic monitoring and 
assessment. 
C.8 United Kingdom 
C.8.1 Legislation 
The Equality Act 2010 (UK) gives women and men the right to equal pay for equal work. Section 65 
SURYLGHVWKDWZRUNLVµHTXDO¶LILWLVµOLNHZRUN¶µZRUNUDWHGDVHTXLYDOHQW¶RUµZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶
These terms are further expanded upon in the Equality Act 2010 Code of Practice, published by the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). Under section 14 of the Equality Act, this Code 
was approved by the Secretary of State and laid before Parliament. The Code does not itself 
impose legal obligations, but it explains the legal obligations under the Act and also states that 
when considering an equal pay claim, tribunals and courts are obliged to take into account any part 
of the Code that appears relevant to the proceedings. The Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 
1983 provide for a woman to seek equal pay with an unnamed male comparator. It is important to 
QRWHWKDWWKH(TXDOLW\$FWGRHVQRWJLYHZRPHQWKHULJKWWRµIDLU¶SD\LQVWHDGLWJLYHVWKHPRUH
limited right to have equal pay when all other circumstances are the same or similar. 
Paragraph 34 of the Code of Practice further explains particular terms. It indicates that the Equality 
Act postulates a claimant of a particular gender and a comparator of the opposite gender. It can 
apply both to male aQGIHPDOHµ/LNHZRUN¶UHIHUVWRWKHVDPHRUEURDGO\VLPLODUZRUNSURYLGHGWKDW
ZKHUHWKHUHDUHDQ\GLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHZRUNWKHVHDUHQRWRISUDFWLFDOLPSRUWDQFHµ:RUNUHODWHGDV
HTXLYDOHQW¶UHIHUVWRGLIIHUHQWZRUNZKLFKLVUDWHGXQGHUWKHVDPHMREHYDOuation scheme as being 
µZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶µ:RUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶UHIHUVWRGLIIHUHQWZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXHLQWHUPVRIIDFWRUV
such as effort, skill and decision-PDNLQJ$FRPSDUDWRULVDOVRUHTXLUHGWREHLQWKHµVDPH
HPSOR\PHQW¶DVWKHFODLPDQW6HFWLRQ 79 of the Equality Act amplifies the meaning of this phrase. It 
is also noted that European Union law allows a woman to compare herself to a man who is not in 
WKHVDPHHPSOR\PHQWZKHUHWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQSD\LVDWWULEXWDEOHWRµDVLQJOHVRXUFH¶ZKLFKKDVthe 
SRZHUWRUHFWLI\WKHGLIIHUHQFH,IWKHRXWFRPHLVGLIIHUHQWIURPWKHµVDPHHPSOR\PHQW¶WHVWXQGHU
English domestic law, European Union law may be applied to produce a remedy. For example in 
Levez v TH Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd (No 2) [1999] IRLR 764 the EAT ruled that the two-year 
limit on back pay in section 2(5) of what was then the Equal Pay Act 1970 contravened Article 119 
                                                     
77 Available at http://sverigeskvinnolobby.se/ (accessed 21 September 2013). 
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(now Article 141) of the EC Treaty and was thus unenforceable. Successful equal pay 
complainants can claim back pay for up to six years from the date proceedings were commenced. 
As a matter of practice, a woman and her comparator whose pay can be equalised by a single 
source are likely to be in the same employment: see Lawrence v Regent Office Care Ltd [2003] 
ICR 1092. It is notHGLQWKH&RGHWKDWWKHVHOHFWHGFRPSDUDWRUFRXOGEHHLWKHUDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRID
JURXSRIZRUNHUV¶RUEHWKHRQO\SHUVRQGRLQJDSDUWLFXODUW\SHRIMRESDUD,WLVDOVRQRWHGWKDW
it may be prudent for a woman to select more than one comparator and that multiple comparators 
may be necessary for a term-by-WHUPFRPSDULVRQRIDZRPDQ¶VFRQWUDFW,WLVIXUWKHUQRWHGWKDWLID
woman claims gender pay on the basis of direct sex discrimination in relation to her contractual 
pay, but there is no actual comparator doing equal work so that a sex equality clause cannot 
operate, she can claim sex discrimination based on a hypothetical comparator (para 61). 
C.8.2 Overview of the process for achieving equal pay 
There are three processes which can be used to obtain equal pay. The two major approaches are 
through the EHRC and the Employment Tribunal. The approaches taken by each body are very 
different.  
The EHRC has powers to carry out enquiries, for example into the extent and causes of pay gaps 
in particular sectors, and also to conduct investigations of an employer it suspects of having 
unlawfully discriminatory pay practices. The EHRC uses its powers of investigation and enquiry to 
strategically promote equality and human rights, and to tackle entrenched discrimination and pay 
inequality. An example of the use of its powers is the Financial Services Enquiry (Code of Practice 
paras 3±6). 
The approach taken under Part II of the Equality Act encourages employers to carry out regular 
equal pay audits and the Commission recommends this approach. It is not mandatory. However in 
order to promote equal pay in the private sector, section 77 prevents the enforcement of so called 
µSD\VHFUHF\¶FODXVHVLQHPSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFWVDQGDOVRHPSRZHUVUHJXODWLRQVWREHPDGH
requiring employers to disclose information about GPGs. Where a pay system lacks transparency 
the employer must be able to prove there is no discrimination behind the pay differential (Code of 
Practice paras 102, 162).78 The Commission provides a model for carrying out an equal pay audit 
with a five-VWHSHTXDOSD\DXGLWSURFHVVZKLFKLVGHWDLOHGLQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V(TXDO3D\
Resources and Audit Toolkit.79 
The second major approach to obtaining equal pay is the complaints system or grievance 
procedure before the Employment Tribunal. An important adjunct to this complaint mechanism is 
the assistance provided by the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). ACAS is a 
body set up pursuant to section 247 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992. ACAS has published a Code of Practice on disciplinary and grievance procedures, which 
provides guidance for employees and employers when dealing with complaints about pay. If 
Employment Tribunal proceedings are commenced and there has been an unreasonable failure by 
either party to adhere to the ACAS Code, this could affect any compensation awarded (Trade 
                                                     
78 See also Handels og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening [1989] IRLR 532; [1991] 
ICR 74; Barton v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd [2003] ICR 1205. 
79 Available at http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/advice-and-guidance/tools-equal-pay/ (accessed 15 September 2013). 
See Code of Practice paras 164±185.  
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Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 section 207A). ACAS provides a booklet on 
Job evaluation: consideration and risks (ACAS 2011) and may also assist parties in relation to any 
grievance claim. 
When an equal pay claim is filed with the Employment Tribunal, it will assess the evidence about 
the work done by the complainant and comparator. It will also look at: the application and validity of 
any job evaluation study if the claim is for equivalent work; the value placed on the work if the claim 
is for work of equal value; the pay and other contract terms of the complainant and comparator and 
how they are determined; and the reasons for the difference in pay if the employer raises a 
µPDWHULDOIDFWRU¶GHIHQFHXQGHUVHFWLRQRIWKH(TXDOLW\$FW 
An important aspect of the Tribunal process is that where a question arises as to whether a 
SHUVRQ¶VZRUNLVRIHTXDOYDOXHWRDQRWKHU¶VWKH7ULEXQDOPD\EHIRUHGHWHUPLQLQJWKHTXHVWLRQ
require a member of the panel of independent experts to prepare a report on the question (Equality 
Act 2010 section 131(2)). A panel of experts is then designated by the ACAS. There are special 
Tribunal procedures for work of equal value claims, as contained in the Employment Tribunals 
(Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 and Schedule 3 of the Employment 
Tribunals (Equal Value) Rules of Procedure. Schedule 3 sets out the process which applies to 
proceedings involving an equal value claim based on either the Tribunal itself deciding equal value, 
or alternatively requiring an independent expert to prepare a report.  
There is a tight schedule starting from the time of the claim to the time of the hearing, which, in the 
absence of there being an appointment of an independent expert, is 27 weeks. In the case of the 
appointment of an independent expert, the period is 37 weeks. The process includes a claim; a 
response; a stage one and stage two equal value hearing; the appointment of an independent 
expert (something which may happen at any time during the proceedings), resulting in a report 
based on either on facts agreed between the parties, or determined by the tribunal; and, then, a 
hearing commencing before the Tribunal. There are very detailed provisions regarding the 
requirements of an independent expert contained within Schedule 3. 
A third potential remedy for achieving equal pay is by instituting proceedings in a civil court, 
although the court may still elect to refer the matter to the Employment Tribunal by reason of its 
special expertise. 
In July 2012, a report was undertaken on behalf of the Government Equalities Office on equal pay 
cases and pay audits, looking at claims for equal pay and of sex discrimination related to pay that 
were made during the previous eight years (Incomes Data Services 2012). The aim of the research 
was to provide a context for proposed legislation which would require employers who lost an equal 
pay case, or a sex discrimination case related to pay, to conduct a pay audit ordered by the 
Tribunal. A summary of relevant cases was attached and positive findings were made in support of 
such proposed legislation, with the proviso that the Tribunal should not be able to order an audit 
where the employer can show it would not be productive. This approach would extend potential 
remedies to workers more broadly and not simply rely on individual case law. 
C.8.3 Summary 
It can be seen that the United Kingdom is moving towards self-assessment models which, although 
not a mandatory requirement, are recommended and promoted by the EHRC. The EHRC is 
increasingly seeking to influence better pay equity in the private sector and its ability to conduct 
enquiries may assist in approaching pay equity in a broader based manner. There is also an effort 
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to streamline equal pay cases before the Tribunal and to use independent experts appointed by the 
Tribunal to enhance that process. There is much online support for methodologies for undertaking 
equal pay evaluation through ACAS, which provides information, advice and training, and stresses 
the importance of transparency to obtain better outcomes. 
C.9 Canada 
Canada has a federal system of government, with both federal and provincial legislation. Like 
Australia, it has a combination of human rights legislation which prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of gender, as well as labour laws which deal with the issue of gender pay equity. Although 
the legislative provisions between Canada and Australia are very different, there are lessons to be 
learned, both positive and negative, from the Canadian experience. This section will provide an 
overview of the federal legislation and practice, and a brief overview of some of the provinces, with 
a particular focus on two examples of good practice in Québec and Ontario. 
C.9.1 Federal legislation and case law  
A clear overview and appraisal of the federal legislation is conveniently set out in the final report of 
the Canadian Pay Equity Task Force (2004). Although the federal model in Canada is undergoing 
some development (ILO 2013: 436), the analysis contained in the Task Force report appears still to 
be relevant.  
Pay equity is dealt with in section 11 of the Canadian Human Rights Act 1985 (CHRA), together 
with the supporting Equal Wages Guidelines 1986, issued pursuant to section 11 of the CHRA. In 
addition, the Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985 also provides for equal pay for work of equal value. 
Section 11(1) of the CHRA states that it is a discriminatory practice for an employer to establish or 
maintain differences in wages between male and female employees employed in the same 
establishment who are performing work of equal value. The section applies to all employers, but it 
LVOLPLWHGWRHPSOR\HHVHPSOR\HGLQWKHVDPHµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶DVGLVFXVVHGEHORZ6HFWLRQRI
the CHRA sets out the criteria to be applied in assessing the value of work. It specifically refers to it 
being a composite of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions. These four criterion are 
IXUWKHUDPSOLILHGLQWKH*XLGHOLQHV6HFWLRQUHIHUVWRWKHµUHDVRQDEOHIDFWRUV¶ZKLFKDUH
considered to be a legitimate basis for differences. Finally, section 11(7) of the CHRA outlines the 
components which are to be included as wages, which is comprehensive and extends beyond 
salaries. 
The Guidelines elaborate on these legislative provisions. They expand the four elements of the 
criteria and there is recognition of the differing features of work done by men and by women. For 
example, section 5 of the Guidelines requires that intellectual as well as physical effort be taken 
into account, while section 8 indicates that both physical and psychological features of working 
conditions must be considered. Section 9 of the Guidelines provides that when an employer relies 
on a system in assessing the value of work, then that system shall be used in the investigation of 
any complaint alleging a difference in wages, provided it fulfils certain criteria. These criteria are 
that there is no sexual bias, that the system is capable of measuring the relative value of work in all 
jobs in the establishment, and that it assesses that value according to the four criteria.  
In 2009 a Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act (PSECA) was adopted, but not all of the 
provisions have yet come into effect and regulations require enactment (ILO 2013: 436). PSECA 
requires workplace parties to bargain as part of the regular collective bargaining process, imposing 
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DFFRXQWDELOLW\RQERWKZRUNHUVDQGHPSOR\HUVWRSXWµHTXLWDEOHFRPSHQVDWLRQ¶LQWRZRUNSODFHV
Distinctions are drawn between accountability and complaint mechanisms, depending on whether 
employees are or are not represented by unions. Both represented and unrepresented workers 
may send a complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC), as described below, 
but in addition, unionised employees may complain to the Public Service Labour Relations Board 
where they have access to other dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration and 
conciliation. 
C.9.2 Processes for achieving equal pay 
The CHRC is an independent agency reporting to Parliament and has a general statutory 
responsibility of pursuing and promoting the goals set out in the CHRA. Its mandate has a number 
of components. In contrast to legislation in other Canadian jurisdictions, the CHRA does not 
provide for a separate administrative system dedicated to the pursuit of pay equity. Instead, the 
process for ensuring compliance with the pay equity provisions in section 11 of the CHRA is the 
same as that used to enforce the rest of the CHRA (Canadian Pay Equity Task Force 2004: ch 3). 
In relation to pay equity, either individuals or groups may file complaints with the CHRC under 
section 11 of the CHRA. Sections 11 to 15 of the Guidelines describe the processing and 
determination of claims. Section 11(1) of the Guidelines provides that the gender composition of an 
occupational group is a relevant consideration in determining the complaint of a member of that 
JURXS6HFWLRQRIWKH*XLGHOLQHVVHWVRXWDVOLGLQJVFDOHZKLFKGHILQHVµJHQGHUSUHGRPLQDQFH¶
depending on the size of the employer. 70 per cent is required of an occupational group in which 
the employer has less than 100 members; 60 per cent is between 100 and 500 members; and 55 
per cent if more than 500 members. 
The CHRC has established a dedicated Pay Equity Branch, which examines complaints and 
assists the parties in attempting to attain pay equity. In addition to having this advocacy role, the 
CHRC decides whether the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal should adjudicate a complaint, and it 
may also pursue the issue as a party in those proceedings. The issue of the independence of the 
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal as a consequence of the advocacy role of the CHRC was one of 
the issues addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bell Canada v Canadian Telephone 
(PSOR\HHV¶$VVRFLDWLRQ [2003] SCC 36, which concluded that the functions of the CHRC did not 
constitute an infringement of the independence of the Tribunal.  
The CHRC has issued a number of publications related to pay equity including a Guide to Pay 
Equity and Job Evaluation, as well as other materials directed specifically at employees and 
employers.80 
In relation to the Canada Labour Code, section 182 links the workplace inspection system to the 
pay equity provisions of section 11 of the CHRA, and permits Human Resources Development 
Canada to monitor compliance with section 11 of the CHRA, as it is also required to monitor the 
other provisions of the Labour Code.  
Pursuant to the Labour Code, an Equal Pay Program was established. Over the years the Program 
has included educational and promotional activities as well as facilitating development of five 
                                                     
80 Available at http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca. 
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sectoral initiatives (Canadian Pay Equity Task Force 2004: ch 3).81 An audit program has also been 
implemented to more systematically monitor progress of employers in achieving pay equity. The 
emphasis has been on assisting employers to understand their nature of their obligation in relation 
WRSD\HTXLW\7KHSURJUDPLQFOXGHVRQVLWHLQVSHFWLRQV,QWKHHYHQWRIHPSOR\HUµUHFDOFLWUDQFH¶D
case may be referred to the CHRC or a complaint may be filed. 
Numerous criticisms have been made of the combination of the CHRA, the Guidelines and the 
complaint process, as well as PSECA. The complaint based approach has been criticised because 
of its limited effectiveness in achieving the stated objective. The Task Force recommended that 
new and more comprehensive federal pay equity legislation be framed with clear standards and 
criteria. There is concern about the general and open-ended language of the Guidelines, including 
WKHODFNRIDQDXWKRULWDWLYHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHWHUPµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶&DQDGLDQ3D\(TXLW\7DVN)RUFH
2004: ch 3). Because of their generality and lack of clarity, the Guidelines have been dependent 
upon successive interpretations of Tribunals and this has led to an adversarial climate. Cases are 
complicated and take many years and expert witnesses have given testimony for weeks or even 
months: see eg Attorney General of Canada v Public Service Alliance of Canada (1999) 180 DLR 
(4th) 95. 
The Public Service Alliance of Canada has been highly critical of the PESCA and the Public 
Service Labour Relations Board complaint mechanism.82 7KH,/2¶V&($&5KDVDOVREHHQFULWLFDO
of PESCA in respect of the provisions for equitable compensation of female dominated job groups 
RUµMREFODVVHV¶7KH&($&5QRWHGWKDWµMREFODVVHV¶LV defined in section 2 of the PESCA to mean 
µWZRRUPRUHSRVLWLRQVLQWKHVDPHMREJURXSWKDWKDYHVLPLODUGXWLHVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVUHTXLUH
VLPLODUTXDOLILFDWLRQV«DQGDUHZLWKLQWKHVDPHUDQJHRIVDODU\UDWHV¶7KHSRLQWPDGHE\WKH
CEACR is that the ,/2¶V(TXDO5HPXQHUDWLRQ&RQYHQWLRQSURYLGHVIRUFRPSDULVRQVWREHPDGHQRW
RQO\EHWZHHQMREVWKDWKDYHµVLPLODU¶GXWLHVEXWDOVREHWZHHQMREVWKDWDUHHQWLUHO\GLIIHUHQWLQ
nature (ILO 2013: 436). The CEACR also noted recommendations made by the Canadian Pay 
Equity Task Force and by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Status of Women in a 
-XQHUHSRUW)XUWKHUFULWLFLVPVPDGHE\WKRVHERGLHVLQFOXGHGWKDWWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIµPDUNHW
IRUFHV¶DVDVWDQGDUGE\ZKLFKWRDVVHVVWKHYDOXHRIwork can be inherently gender-biased and 
may not adequately ensure non-discriminatory assessment. There has also been concern over the 
KLJKWKUHVKROGIRUILQGLQJDµIHPDOHGRPLQDWHGJURXS¶,/2 
The limitations of the federal system are particularly revealed in the recent case of Public Service 
Alliance of Canada v Canada Post Corporation [2011] 3 SCR 572. The case concerned the 
interpretation of the CHRA as well as the Guidelines. A union filed a pay equity claim on behalf of a 
predominantly female clerical and regulatory occupational group of employees within the Canada 
Post Corporation under the CHRA. The CHRC referred the complaint to the Canada Human Rights 
Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal hearing went for more than 400 days and its decision was 
then the subject of an appeal to the Federal Court. The Federal Court set aside the Tribunal 
decision and later a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the Court 
decision, with Justice Evans dissenting: Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canada Post 
Corporation [2011] 2 FCR 221. That dissenting opinion was subsequently upheld in its entirety by 
                                                     
81 The sectors included those covered by the Canadian Trucking Alliance, the Air Transport Association and the Canadian 
Association of Broadcasters.  
82 See eg http://psacunion.ca/pay-equity-new-law-compromises-equal-pay-women-federal-public-sector (accessed 4 
October 2013). 
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the Supreme Court of Canada, which thereby reinstated the decision of the Tribunal. Agreement as 
to the implementation of the Tribunal judgment was finally reached with Canada Post in June 2013 
± some thirty years after the complaint was originally filed with the CHRC.83 
There were three primary issues raised on the appeal before the Federal Court and later before the 
Supreme Court. The first was whether, in a pay equity claim by a predominantly female 
occupational group, the Tribunal could select a predominantly male comparator group that included 
a significant number of relatively well paid women. The second was the standard of proof. The third 
concerned the findings that must be made after the jobs of members of the complainant and 
comparator groups have been evaluated, before their wages can be compared in order to 
determine if they are being paid differently for performing work of equal value.  
In relation to these three issues, as a starting point, Justice Evans endorsed the conclusion of the 
Tribunal that on the balance of probabilities the members of the predominantly female occupational 
group were paid less than members of a comparator group for work of equal value. Justice Evans 
pertinently observed that ([2011] 2 FCR 221 at [165], [208]): 
The resolution of pay Equity claims involves a mix of Art, science, human rights and labour relations. It 
can be difficult to fit multi-disciplinary enquiries of this nature within a legal framework: social scientists 
and management consultants do not always express themselves on the same terms as lawyers, on 
questions of evidence and proof, for example. 
«(VWDEOLVKLQJWKHYDOXHRUPRUHDFFXUDWHO\SHUKDSVWKHUHODWLYHYDOXHRIZRUNLVQRWDSXUHO\VFLHQWLILF
exercise, admitting of a uniquely correct answer. It calls for the exercise of judgement; not all evaluators 
would necessarily adopt the same methodology for assessing work, or place the same value on given 
jobs. Those assessing the value of work must be afforded a margin of appreciation in applying the 
appropriate methodology to the job data. 
The evidence as to value before the Tribunal was proffered by the complainant only.84 The 
Tribunal, and Justice Evans on appeal, considered whether the evaluators had adopted a proper 
process in applying the methodology to the data. 
Justice Evans, when considering the Guidelines, noted that they specifically contemplated the 
presence of women within a male-dominated comparator group, but not vice versa. The fact that 
some women at Canada Post were relatively well paid did not necessarily preclude the existence of 
systemic gender discrimination elsewhere in the Corporation. He observed that ([2011] 2 FCR 221 
at [190]): 
Systemic gender discrimination means that work performed by women tends to be undervalued, not that 
this is necessarily the case in every situation. The fact that [a particular level] has become gender ± 
QHXWUDOVRWKDWPDLOVRUWLQJKDVORVWLWVFKDUDFWHUDVµZRPHQ¶VZRUN¶DQGLVSHUIRUPHGZLWKLQD
predominantly male occupational group, may well explain why women in the [a particular level] are 
relatively well paid. 
                                                     
83 See http://psacunion.ca/canada-post-pay-equity-timeline-thirty-years-fighting-pay-equity (accessed 4 October 2013). 
84 Justice Evans noted that a tribunal would normally have before it job evaluations submitted on behalf of the parties as a 
result of a joint union-management study. However in this case the job evaluations were submitted on behalf of the 
complainants only, prepared by what was described as µthe Professional Team¶[2011] 2 FCR 221 at [198]). 
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With regard to the standard of proof when finding that members of the complainant and comparator 
groups were performing work of equal value, he concluded that the balance of probabilities was 
appropriate and added (at [198]): 
Because it may be impractical to collect the necessary data for all the jobs performed by members of the 
groups, it is sufficient to evaluate the work performed by representative samples of the groups. 
Finally, Justice Evans indicated that this case revealed that there was much to learn from the 
experience of provincial pay equity regimes within Canada, which did not seem to have been 
plagued with the same problems of protracted litigation as this federal scheme. Reference was also 
made to the recommendations of the Task Force report (Canadian Pay Equity Task Force 2004). 
C.9.3 Provincial approaches  
Unlike Australia, many of the Canadian provinces have specific statutes which give detailed 
attention to the need for, and the means to address, pay equity. The wording of the legislation does 
not necessarily use the language of the ILO Convention. For example, equal pay for the same or 
similar work is a requirement of employment standards legislation in Ontario, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Yukon, Newfoundland and the Northern Territories (Ontario Pay Equity 
Commission 2011); whereas equal remuneration for work of equal value is legally required in 
legislation in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, but is limited to the public sector and has not been 
extended to the private sector (ILO 2013: 437; Ontario Pay Equity Commission 2011).  
Four of the provinces are referred to below, but the focus is predominantly on the legislation and 
practice in the provinces of Ontario and Québec. These appear to have the most developed 
systems, applicable to both the public and private employment sectors. 
C.9.3.1 New Brunswick 
The New Brunswick Pay Equity Act 2009 entered into force in 2010 and applies to the public sector 
only. A Pay Equity Bureau provides information, assists in the implementation and maintenance of 
pay equity, monitors employer progress, and generally oversees the pay equity process. The 
obligation is on the employer to implement and maintain pay equity. The Pay Equity Bureau is not 
complaint driven. When workplace parties cannot agree on a pay equity process, an arbitrator may 
EHDSSRLQWHG2QWDULR3D\(TXLW\&RPPLVVLRQ1HZ%UXQVZLFNKDVDOVRODXQFKHGDµ:RPHQ
OHDGLQJ:RPHQ¶SLORWSURJUDPGHVLJQHGWRGHYHORSIHPDOHOHDGHUVDQGWKHUHLVDOVRDµ)LYH-Year 
WaJH$FWLRQ3ODQ¶,/2 
C.9.3.2 Nova Scotia  
This province has a similar legislative and process approach as New Brunswick, with some further 
embellishments (Ontario Pay Equity Commission 2011). A pay equity plan is negotiated between 
the workplace parties. Once the pay equity process begins, the parties are required to agree on a 
gender-neutral job evaluation process and the definition of male and female dominated job classes. 
Pay equity is considered to have been achieved in a female dominated job class where the pay 
rate for the female dominated classes is equal to the pay rate of the male dominated class, which is 
performing work of equal value. There are other specific provisions under the Pay Equity Act for 
circumstances where, for example, the employer has two or more male dominated classes; or if 
there is no male dominated class that is performing work of equal value. In addition to this, a Pay 
Equity Commission is able to receive and investigate complaints and is authorised to make 
determinations (Ontario Pay Equity Commission 2011). 
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C.9.3.3 Québec  
The Pay Equity Act of 1996 requires equal remuneration for work of equal value and applies to 
both public and private sector employers with more than 10 employees. If there are more than 100 
employees there is a requirement for the employer to develop a pay equity plan. This operates on 
WKHEDVLVRIPHPEHUVRIDµMREFODVV¶DQGFRYHUVPHPEHUVZKRKDYHµVLPLODUGXWLHVUHTXLUHG
TXDOLILFDWLRQVDQGWKHVDPHVDODU\VFDOH¶,IDMREFODVVLVSHUFHQt male or female, it may be 
considered a male or female dominant job class for pay equity purposes. However there are other 
criteria for determining gender predominance and they include: 
x LIWKHZRUNLVµFRPPRQO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKPHQRUZRPHQRZLQJWRJHQGHU-EDVHGVWHUHRW\SLQJ¶ 
x the difference between the representation of women in the class and women in the labour 
market generally is considered significant; or 
x the historical pattern of incumbency is predominantly one or other gender. 
Value is determined by comparing jobs primarily held by women and those primarily held by men, 
to determine the value of these classes of jobs in a gender-neutral way. This is done by reference 
to four factors: qualifications, responsibilities, physical and mental effort, and working conditions. 
An employer with between 50 and 99 employees may choose to set up a pay equity committee to 
determine value and wages. If there are less than 50 employees, a process is still required and one 
method which may be chosen is the creation of a pay equity plan. 
The Pay Equity Act requires the establishment of sector-based pay equity committees to provide 
advice and help with the development of pay equity plans. Annual reporting is required of all legally 
registered employers with six or more employees, including a requirement to test for pay equity 
compliance. There is also an audit process which is the responsibility of the employer to be 
conducted every five years. 
In addition to this mandatory pay equity process, there is a complaints mechanism through the 
Commission of Pay Equity (CES). The CES is composed of a Chair and two Commissioners, who 
may mediate, conciliate or arbitrate a dispute. Importantly the CES has authority to initiate an 
investigation on its own motion without receiving a complaint. It may also utilise selected experts to 
conduct investigations. 
There are financial penalties and fines for non-compliance. Where wage compensation is allowed, 
the maximum period for the calculation of adjustment can be up to five years prior to the date when 
a complaint was filed.  
C.9.3.4 Ontario 
The Pay Equity Act, RSO 1990 GHILQHVSD\HTXLW\DVµHTXDOSD\IRUZRUNRIHTXDOYDOXH¶7KHUHDUH
also other statutes which may offer remedies in respect of pay equity, including the Employment 
Standards Act 2000 and the Ontario Human Rights Code.  
7KH3D\(TXLW\$FWLVVSHFLILFDOO\DLPHGDWUHGUHVVLQJµV\VWHPLFJHQGHUGLVFULPLQDWLRQLQ
FRPSHQVDWLRQIRUZRUNSHUIRUPHGE\HPSOR\HHVLQIHPDOHMREFODVVHV¶VHFWLRQ3D\HTXLW\
under the Act requLUHVWKDWDOOHPSOR\HHVERWKPHQDQGZRPHQLQXQGHUYDOXHGµIHPDOHMRE
FODVVHV¶VKRXOGUHFHLYHSD\HTXLW\ZDJHDGMXVWPHQWV7KHZDJHVRIHPSOR\HHVLQIHPDOHMRE
classes are required to be adjusted so that they are at least equal to the wages of employees in 
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male job classes found to be comparable in value. Value is determined on the four factors of skill, 
effort, responsibility and working conditions (section 5). 
The Act prescribes that in deciding whether a job class is a female job class or a male job class, 
regard shall be had to three particular criteria, namely current incumbency, historical incumbency 
DQGµJHQGHUVWHUHRW\SH¶RIWKHILHOGRIZRUNVHFWLRQ3D\HTXLW\LVDFKLHYHGE\RQHRI
three forms of comparison of female job classes: a job-to-job method; a proportional value method 
of comparison; or a proxy method in the case of an employer in the public sector (section 5.1(1)). 
The requirement for the job comparison process to be gender neutral was discussed in some detail 
in Ontario NurVHV¶$VVRFLDWLRQY5HJLRQDO0XQLFLSDOLW\RI+DOGLPDQG±Norfolk [1992] CanLII 4705 
(ON PEHT). Four components in the job comparison process were identified: (1) accurate 
collection of job class information;85 (2) the mechanism or tool to determine the value of job 
classes;86 (3) the application of the mechanism or tool to determine the value of the work; and (4) 
the comparison of job classes.87 In addition, the case discussed five tests for determining whether 
the tool or mechanism used to value the work was applied in a gender neutral way.88 
The job-to-job PHWKRGFRPSDULVRQLQYROYHVDVNLQJZKHWKHUµWKHMREUDWHIRUWKHIHPDOHMREFODVV
that is the subject of the comparison is at least equal to the job rate for a male job class in the 
same establishment where the work performed in the two job classes is of equal or comparable 
YDOXH¶Pay Equity Act 1990VHFWLRQ7KH$FWVHWVRXWDVHTXHQFHRIµLGHP¶DSSURDFKHV
(section 6(1), 6(5)), depending on what comparators can be found within the establishment.89 It 
commences with identification of a male job class of equal or comparable value and thereafter 
there is a sequence which includes the situations where more than one male comparator is found, 
or if no male job class is found of equal or comparable value. If after applying the sequence there 
are female job classes that do not have a male comparator, the employer is required to use the 
proportional value method to achieve pay equity.  
The proportional value method indirectly compares female and male job classes by comparing the 
IHPDOHMREFODVVZLWKDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶PDOHMREFODVVRUDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶JURXSRIPDOHMRE
                                                     
85 Job class information was further broken down by the tribunal into (1) the range of work performed in the establishment; 
(2) whether the system makes work, particularly women's work, visible in the workplace; (3) the information to accurately 
capture the skill, effort, responsibility and conditions for both female job classes and male job classes to be used as a 
comparator; and (4) whether the information has been collected accurately and consistently.  
86 The Ontario Pay Equity Commission (2012: 45) notes that there are several types of approach to value job classes. 
These include a simple ranking method, or classifications or grade descriptions that include the four required factors. A 
more detailed and common approach is the µpoint factor method¶ which involves assigning points to sub factors and 
adding them to provide a score for the job class. The Pay Equity Office has developed materials and online resources in 
order to enable employers to use the µpoint factor method¶. 
87 A helpful note by the Ontario Pay Equity Commission (2012: 46) expands upon the job evaluation tool and the need for it 
to be gender bias free and in particular not developed with only men's jobs in mind. Further it is noted that the focus of the 
act is not on an evaluation of individual job classes, but instead on comparisons to be made between female job classes 
and male job classes.  
88 The tests were: (1) Is the valuing tool applied consistently without regard to the gender of the job class?; (2) If a 
committee is used to evaluate job classes, is the committee balancing the interests of the parties with duties and 
obligations under the Act? (3) Is such a committee sufficiently knowledgeable to allow the parties to meet their 
obligations? (4) Is the decision-making done in a manner free of gender bias? (5) Does the mechanism identify systemic 
wage discrimination?  
89 Comparisons also vary depending on whether unionisation is present within the job class. The distinction between 
unionised and non-unionised settings is a strong feature of the Act and in particular in relation to pay equity plans (Ontario 
Pay Equity Commission 2012). 
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classes (section 21.3(1)). Pay equity is achieved when the relationship between the value of the 
work performed in terms of compensation received is the same for both female and male job 
classes. This method is applied in establishments where male job classes are not available in large 
enough numbers, or else their job values are such that they cannot be used for direct comparisons.  
RegardiQJWKHSURSRUWLRQDOYDOXHPHWKRGDQGZKDWLVµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶WKH7ULEXQDOLQHudson v 
Hamilton Police Association [2010] Can LII 61163 (ON PEHT) indicated that in the absence of a 
definition, the plain English meaning suggests that that it is not necessary to include every male job 
class in the proportional value analysis. Instead representative male job classes are those which 
will best reflect the value/compensation ratio at which male job classes in the group are 
compensated. The tribunal also referred to not including a class, which is paid at an anomalous 
rate because for example skills are in short supply. 
The proxy method of comparison allows organisations in the broader public sector, which have 
mostly female job classes, to obtain and apply pay equity information from another public sector 
organisation. The definition of the method is set out in section 21.12, which although formally 
repealed in 1996 is still taken to operate by reason of an Ontario Court ruling. The provision only 
applies, however, to employers that had employees as at July 1993 (Ontario Pay Equity 
Commission 2012: 5, 86). 
7KHSUR[\PHWKRGDOORZVHOLJLEOHSXEOLFVHFWRURUJDQLVDWLRQVFDOOHGµVHHNLQJHPSOR\HUV¶WRJRWR
another public sector employer and borrow job and pay equity adjusted job rate information about 
VLPLODUIHPDOHMREFODVVHVIURPWKHµSUR[\HPSOR\HU¶7KHSUR[\HPSOR\HUPXVWDOUHDG\KDYH
identified pay equity wages, using either job-to-job proportional value comparison in relation to the 
female job classes. The seeking employer compares its female job classes to the proxy female job 
classes using a proportional value method and determines pay equity adjustments to enable its 
organisation to also achieve pay equity (Ontario Pay Equity Commission 2012: 86±92). Proxy 
employers are identified in a schedule to the Pay Equity Act, covering nine broad categories drawn 
from the care sector.  
In addition to stating the four components for job comparison, section 8 oI2QWDULR¶V3D\(TXLW\$FW 
expressly states that the Act does not apply to prevent differences in µFRPSHQVDWLRQ¶EHWZHHQD
female job class and a male job class if the employer is able to show that the difference is the 
result of five named exceptions. In summary they are: 
1. a formal seniority system that does not discriminate on the basis of gender;  
2. a temporary employee training or development assignment that is equally available to male 
and female employees and that leads to career advancement for those involved in the 
program; 
3. a merit compensation plan that is based on formal performance ratings that does not 
discriminate on the basis of gender; 
4. WKHSHUVRQDOSUDFWLFHNQRZQDVµUHG-FLUFOLQJ¶ZKHUHEDVHGRQJHQGHUQHXWUDOUH-evaluation 
process the value of a position has been downgraded. This exception has a detailed 
description 
5. a skills shortage that is causing a temporary inflation in remuneration because the 
employer is encountering difficulties in recruiting employees with the record skills for 
positions in the job class. 
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Section 8(2) of the Pay Equity Act also states that the Act does not prevent differences in 
remuneration between female job classes and male job classes, if the employer can show that this 
is a result of differences in bargaining strength. A further exception is if an employer designates a 
position as being µcasual¶, but there are restrictions on the use of that term. A Guide to the Act 
prepared by the Ontario Pay Equity Commission (2012) makes the important point that it is the 
HPSOR\HU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRVKRZWKDWWKHZDJHGLIIHUHQFHLVDUHVXOWRIa circumstance or pay 
practice described in the Act and that the exceptions will be narrowly defined: see BICC Phillips Inc 
v Group of Employees [1997] CanLII 1223; Stevenson Memorial Hospital v Ontario Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 360 [2000 CanLII] 22419. 
In relation to the exception of differences in bargaining strength, this is further amplified in the 
Guide and two cases are noted. First, the defence of bargaining strength cannot be raised to 
explain wage differences until the employer has achieved pay equity for all employees in the 
establishment (see York Region Board of Education v <RUN5HJLRQ:RPHQ7HDFKHUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQ 
[1995] CanLII 7202). Second, the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal has interpreted bargaining strength 
to mean the ability of a bargaining unit to exercise power on behalf of all of its members. It refers to 
differences between different bargaining units, as opposed to differences within the same unit.  
The promotion, implementation and enforcement of the Pay Equity Act is achieved through the Pay 
Equity Commission, which is in turn composed of two separate and distinct bodies: the Pay Equity 
Office and the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal. The Pay Equity Office is responsible for enforcing 
the Act and it investigates, attempts to settle, and resolves pay equity complaints and objections to 
pay equity plans by order or notice of decision. The Office also provides programs and services to 
help people understand and comply with the Pay Equity Act. A highly useful publication is the 
Guide to Interpreting Ontario's Pay Equity Act issued by the Office in May 2012 (Ontario Pay Equity 
Commission 2012). The Guide gives an overview of the minimum requirements of the Pay Equity 
Act with guiding principles for interpreting the Act derived from the provisions of the Act, Tribunal 
GHFLVLRQVDQGWKH2IILFH¶VSUDFWLFDOH[SHULHQFH90 It is designed primarily to help employers 
understand their obligations. It does not replace the legal authority of the Act, and nor does it bind 
any tribunal.  
The Guide describes the pay equity process in Ontario as either a self-managed process or a 
negotiated process in unionised work places, and remedies are not reliant on a complaint being 
made. The main purpose of the Act is the focus on gender neutrality, requiring employers to 
compare work in a gender neutral way so that the work done in female dominated job classes is 
made as visible as the work done in male dominated job classes and is compensated accordingly. 
The onus is placed on every employer, and pay equity is achieved when every job class in an 
establishment has been compared to a job class or job classes under one of the comparison 
methods described in the Act. Part II of the Act sets out specific requirements for private sector 
employers of 10 or more employees and also public sector employers. There are staged 
                                                     
90 The practical illustrations in the Guide are invaluable. Taking one simple illustration, the Guide expands upon the 
meaning of µgender stereotypes¶ referred to in the definition of job classes in section 1(5) of the Pay Equity Act. It 
describes what it is, how it is practically addressed and provides a case reference. The Guide indicates that in applying 
the criterion of gender stereotype, employers sometimes rely on statistical data, reports or information such as the gender 
breakdown of occupational classifications derived from Statistics Canada, graduation rates by gender in professional 
programmes all fields of study, or occupational data by gender from professional associations. The Guide indicates that 
statistical data is not necessarily the entire answer and it is important to look at the actual job characteristics and duties of 
the job class and whether those characteristics and duties are associated with or can be found in a typical female job or 
male job. A supporting case to which reference is made is Association of Professional Student Services Personnel v 
Toronto Catholic District School Board [2006] CanLII 61262 (ON PEHT). 
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mandatory implementation dates depending on the number of employees, which include pay equity 
plans to be drawn up and established.  
In 2011, the Pay Equity Office launched the Wage Gap Program, designed to examine current 
compensation data and assess the likelihood of gender wage gaps for non-unionised employees in 
private sector workplaces of Ontario. The Wage Gap Program enables the Office to more 
accurately direct its efforts to support workplaces that appear to have pay equity gaps. Initially, the 
Office piloted the Program by obtaining compensation data from employers with over 500 
employees. Workplaces with 250±499 employees are now being canvassed and the next bracket 
to be targeted are workplaces with 100±249 employees. 
The Tribunal is responsible for adjudicating disputes that arise under the Act and has exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine all questions of fact or law that arise in any matter before it. The decisions 
of the Tribunal are final and conclusive for all purposes. 
Part IV of the Act sets out the processes for making complaints and resolving disputes. There are 
no time limits on a complaint and it can be made for any period during which the Act has been in 
effect. A complaint may be made by an employer, a current or former employee, a group of 
employees or any bargaining agent representing employees. There are special provisions in 
relation to a negotiated pay equity plan on the bases upon which challenge can be made (Ontario 
Pay Equity Commission 2012: 94±5) 
C.9.4 Overall summary 
There are significant difficulties with the Canadian federal system, particularly by contrast to the 
more focused and proactive models which have been implemented in Québec and Ontario. These 
provincial models place the emphasis on the obligation of employers to implement and to achieve 
pay equity within their establishments by use of specified mandatory pay equity evaluation models. 
There is specific pay equity legislation, which does not simply form part of more generalised labour 
law or human rights law. This legislation sets out the mandatory obligations of employers to 
achieve pay equity through the development of pay equity plans, or by negotiation and the setting 
up of pay equity committees. Monitoring and auditing are part of the process. Complaint 
mechanisms are then focused on whether the evaluation process used within an establishment has 
appropriately evaluated and applied gender equity within the establishment. There are systematic 
monitoring and auditing processes conducted by a dedicated government department. Those same 
departments are also producing supportive material, mainly for employers in order to achieve 
gender pay equity. This material contains detailed information to assist employers, and of course 
employees, to undertake job evaluations which, are not gender biased. The complaint mechanism 
is regarded as a last resort where a compromise cannot be reached between employers and 
employees.  
C.10 New Zealand  
C.10.1  Legislation and case law 
Labour relations history in New Zealand has been somewhat volatile over the last 30 years. It has 
moved from having a centralised arbitration and wage fixing system to a far more decentralised 
model which began in about 1987 and hastened with the passage of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991. The process of decentralisation removed compulsory arbitration and it also moved away 
from national occupational awards towards industry and collective bargaining. Legislation was 
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sometimes short lived.91 Brief overviews and comments about of this history can be found in 
various publications (Hall 2007; Hyman 2004; Hyman 1994).  
This section takes up the history from the time of the Commission of Enquiry into Equal Pay 
published in New Zealand in 1971.92 The following year, in 1972 the Equal Pay Act was passed. 
The Equal Pay Act, as amended, remains the most relevant piece of legislation and is the most 
important in respect of equal remuneration. Other relevant legislation includes the Human Rights 
Act 1993 and the Employment Relations Act 2000.  
7KH(TXDO3D\$FWGHILQHVµHTXDOSD\¶WRPHDQDµUDWHRIUHPXQHUDWLRQIRUZRUNLQZKLFKWKHUHLVQR
element of differentiation between male employees and female employees based on the sex of the 
HPSOR\HHV¶µ5HPXQHUDWLRQ¶LVDOVRGHILQHGDVPHDQLQJWKHVDODU\RUZDJHVDFWXDOO\DQGOHJDOO\
payable and includes overtime bonuses, special payments and allowances, whether paid in money 
or not. Section 2A of the Act, insertHGLQDQGODWHUDPHQGHGLQLVKHDGHGµXQODZIXO
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶7KLVVHFWLRQSURYLGHVWKDWLWLVXQODZIXOWRUHIXVHRURPLWWRRIIHURUDIIRUGDQ\
SHUVRQµWKHVDPHRUVXEVWDQWLDOO\VLPLODUTXDOLILFDWLRQVHPSOR\HGLQWKHVDPHRUVXEVWDQWLDOO\
simLODUFLUFXPVWDQFHVRQZRUNRIWKDWGHVFULSWLRQE\UHDVRQRIWKHVH[RIWKDWSHUVRQ¶ 
The ILO has been commenting for a number of years on the fact that this provision, as well as 
similar provisions contained in the Human Rights Act, limits the requirement for equal remuneration 
LQDPDQQHUWKDWLVPRUHUHVWULFWLYHWKDQWKHFRQFHSWRIµHTXDOYDOXH¶EHFDXVHRIWKHXVHRIWKH
ZRUGVµVDPHRUVXEVWDQWLDOO\VLPLODU¶ 
Section 3 of the Equal Pay Act provides the criteria to be applied in determining whether there 
exists an element of differentiation, based on the sex of the employees, in the rates of 
remuneration of male and female employees for any work or class of work payable under any 
LQVWUXPHQW7KHSURYLVLRQGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQZRUNZKLFKLVQRWµH[FOXVLYely or predominantly 
SHUIRUPHGE\IHPDOHHPSOR\HHV¶DQGWKDWZKLFKLV 
A unique aspect is the role of the Employment Court, which is established pursuant to section 9 of 
WKH(TXDO3D\$FW7KLVSURYLGHVWKDWµWKHFRXUWVKDOOKDYHSRZHUIURPWLPHWRWLPHRf its own 
motion or on the application of any organisation of the employers or employees, to state, for the 
guidance of parties in negotiations, the general principles to be observed for the implementation of 
equal pay in accordance with the provisions of VHFWLRQVWR¶ 
A recently decided case of the Employment Court is Service and Food Workers Union NGA Ringa 
Tota Inc v Terranova Homes and Care Ltd [2013] NZEmpC 157 ARC 63/12. The case was a 
joinder of two proceedings. The first was an application under the Equal Pay Act by the relevant 
HPSOR\HHV¶XQLRQDQGWKHVHFRQGDQLQGLYLGXDOFODLPE\DQHPSOR\HHQDPHG.ULVWLQH%DUWOHWW
against the same defendant. The proceedings were referred to the Employment Court by the 
Employment Relations Authority. The case was a hearing of a preliminary point regarding the 
power of the Court to state principles pursuant to section 9 of the Equal Pay Act. Eight questions 
were postulated by the parties, all of which concerned the scope of the requirement for equal pay 
for the female employees for work exclusively or predominantly performed by them, and then how 
                                                     
91 For example the Employment Equity Act 1990 and the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
92 History of Pay and Employment Equity in New Zealand, available at 
http://www.dol.govt.nz/services/PayAndEmploymentEquity (Accessed 1 September 2013). 
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compliance with this requirement was to be assessed. It involved consideration of the scope of 
sections 3 and 9 of the Act.  
The factual background is that the defendant operated rest homes in the residential aged care 
VHFWRU7KHUHZHUHSUHGRPLQDQWO\IHPDOHZRUNHUVDWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VDJHGFDUHFHQWUHZLWK
female and four male caregivers. They were all paid at the same rate, which was around $13.75 to 
$15 per hour, the minimum wage being $13.75 per hour. The essence of the claim was that the 
female caregivers were being paid a lower rate of pay than they would be if the provision of aged 
care were not so substantially female dominated. While the claim was brought on behalf of a 
limited number of plaintiffs, it was noted that there were potentially broad implications not only 
within the residential aged care sector, but also more generally. A number of organisations sought 
to intervene.  
The Court decided that section 3(1)(b) of the Act requires that equal pay for women for work 
predominantly or exclusively performed by women is to be determined by reference to what men 
would be paid to do the same work, abstracting from skills, responsibility, conditions and degree of 
effort, as well as from any systematic undervaluation of the work derived from the current, historical 
or structural gender discrimination. The Court also determined that when considering this issue it 
should have regard to what is paid to males in other industries, if enquiries of other employees of 
the same employer or of other employers in the same or similar enterprise or industry or sector 
would be an inappropriate comparator group.  
This latter conclusion gives some scope for a broader range of comparators, but at the same time 
there is a limitation on the comparators by reason of the fact that the legislation is limited to work of 
µWKHVDPHRUVXEVWDQWLDOO\VLPLODUVNLOOV¶LQVWHDGRIZRUNRIµHTXDOYDOXH¶ 
7KHSODLQWLIIV¶VXEPLVVLRQZDVWKDWPDOHJDUGHQHUVDWWKHVDPHHVWDEOLVKPHQWFRXOGEHXVHGDV
part of the consideration as a comparator. To this the Court responded (at [20]): 
We do not need to, and cannot at this preliminary stage, decide which comparator is appropriate in the 
circumstances of this case. However, we note two things. First, it is unclear to us how a gardener can be said to 
have the same or substantially similar skills, responsibility and service as the plaintiff female employees of the 
defendant. In any event, and somewhat ironically, it appears that gardeners (who tend to be male) are generally 
remunerated at a higher rate (around $16.56 per hour) than the plaintiff employees in this proceeding (around 
$13.75±$15 per hour). 
This observation of the Court appears to illustrate gender stereotyping of jobs and how this impacts 
XSRQZRPHQ¶VHPSOR\PHQWEXWDWWKHVDPHWLPHGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKHVFRSHRIWKH
legislation because of the wording. 
C.10.2  Process for achieving equal pay 
Section 2A(2) of the Equal Pay Act 1972 SURYLGHVIRUµXQODZIXOGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶7KLVLVOLQNHGWR
section 145 of the Human Rights Act 1993, which prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination 
on the grounds of sex. An employee has an entitlement to make a complaint in respect of an 
allegation of discrimination either under the Human Rights Act or the Equal Pay Act. The employee 
must choose one of those entitlements, but not both. 
A complaint may be made to the Employment Relations Authority for unlawful discrimination with 
respect to pay. The Authority has an unusually extensive jurisdiction under the Equal Pay Act 1972. 
This includes in section 12 the right to determine the classification of any work, any rate of 
remuneration that would represent equal pay, the minimum percentage for the adjustment, and any 
interim increase. It may also determine any question arising under sections 4 to 7 of the Equal Pay 
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$FWDQGµDQ\TXHVWLRQRIODZLQFOXGLQJWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHEqual Pay Act 1972, in relation to 
DQ\LQVWUXPHQWDULVLQJRXWRIWKLV$FW¶WKDWLVUHIHUUHGWRLWE\DQ\SDUW\RUE\DQDSSURSULDWH
authority or an inspector. It has additional powers under section 240 of the Employment Relations 
Act. 
The other alternative is to make a complaint under the Human Rights Act. In 2001, the Human 
Rights Act established the role of an Equal Employment Opportunities Commissioner and extended 
grounds for discrimination in relation to the public sector and with a revised complaints resolution 
process. In 2003 a Tripartite Pay and Employment Equity Task Force was established and its 
report outlined a five-year action plan on pay and employment equity, referred to as the Pay and 
Employment Equity Plan of Action. This was rolled out in the public service, public health and 
public education sectors. At the end of the five years in 2008, it was discontinued along with the 
relevant unit within the Department of Labour. Thereafter it appears that the responsibility for 
further research and policy work on gender pay and employment equity has been undertaken 
WKURXJKWKH0LQLVWU\RI:RPHQ¶V$IIDLUV,/2D 
The Department of Labour through the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has 
developed a Gender-inclusive Job Evaluation Standard which is available on the Department of 
Labour website.93 This website includes other support materials which include a four step Pay and 
Employment Equity Review Process, a Spotlight Skills Recognition Tool and general support for 
employers to DSSO\DµYROXQWDU\VWDQGDUG¶7KHUDWLRQDOHIRUUHTXLULQJDVWDQGDUGLVDOVRVHWRXW,W
makes reference to the Human Rights Act, the Employment Relations Act, the State Sector Act and 
the Crown Entities Act and includes requirements for public sector emplR\HUVWREHµJRRG
HPSOR\HUV¶DQGPHHWHTXDOHPSOR\PHQWRSSRUWXQLW\UHTXLUHPHQWV7KHEDFNJURXQGDQGYDOXHRI
self-assessment skills tools for employers, so as to mainstream gender equity (including in the 
private sector), is discussed in a recent publication (Hampson & Smith 2009: 195±211). 
C.10.3  Summary 
In New Zealand, there is increasing proactive encouragement through the Department of Labour 
and the Ministry of Women to promote self-assessment models in the private sector, which are not 
mandatory. The resort made to the courts appears limited. There are very comprehensive 
assessment tools, which are available for employers, the process is voluntary and there does not 
appear to be any systematic formal follow-up or monitoring, which contrasts with the position in 
Canada. Complaints can be made either by unions or individuals but they are limited to an 
establishment. It was, however, noted in the recent Service and Food Workers Union case that the 
decision could have broader effect and hence the right to intervene was given to non-parties. 
C.11 United States 
C.11.1  Federal legislation  
The Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963 and forms part of the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938. 
Since 1979, it has been administered and enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC). Section 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act prohibits sex based wage discrimination 
by an employer in an establishment from paying wages to employees at a rate less than the rate it 
SD\VWRHPSOR\HHVRIWKHRSSRVLWHVH[µIRUHTXDOZRUNRQMREVWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIZKLFKUHTXLUHV
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HTXDOVNLOOHIIRUWDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGZKLFKDUHSHUIRUPHGXQGHUVLPLODUZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQV¶
There are, however, four named exceptions: 1) a seniority system; 2) a merit system; 3) a system 
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; and 4) a differential based on any 
factor other than sex. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964. Section 703 of this Act prohibits employers with 
at least 15 workers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex in relation to the 
compensation, terms and conditions of employment, which includes payment of wages and 
benefits.94 Section 703(k)(1)(A) refers to the burden of proof in unlawful employment practices 
EDVHGRQµGLVSDUDWHLPSDFW¶7KLVVHFWLRQLVFRQIXVLQJO\ZRUGHGWKHFRQVHTXHQFHLVWKDWWKH
plaintiff has the burden of persuading the fact-finder that the employment practice used by the 
employer adversely affects the employment opportunities of a Title VII protected class (which 
includes sex). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the court must dismiss the action under Rule 
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co (1971) 401 US 424 the Supreme Court explained what is meant by the 
FRQFHSWRIWKHµGLVSDUDWHLPSDFW¶DQGVHWRXWDWKUHH-step model of proof that the plaintiff and 
GHIHQGDQWPXVWXVHLQSUHVHQWLQJWKHLUFDVHV7KH&RXUWVWDWHGWKDW7LWOH9,,µSURVFULEHVQRW only 
RYHUWGLVFULPLQDWLRQEXWDOVRSUDFWLFHVWKDWDUHIDLULQIRUPEXWGLVFULPLQDWRU\LQRSHUDWLRQ¶,QWKH
three-step model the plaintiff must first prove that a specific employment practice adversely affects 
the employment opportunities of Title VII protected classes. If the plaintiff can establish a disparate 
LPSDFWWKHHPSOR\HUPXVWGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKHFKDOOHQJHGSUDFWLFHLVMXVWLILHGE\µEXVLQHVV
QHFHVVLW\¶RUWKDWWKHSUDFWLFHLVµPDQLIHVWO\UHODWHG¶WRMREGXWLHV,IWKHHPSOR\HUGRHVQRWPHHWWKe 
burden of production and persuasion in proving business necessity, the plaintiff prevails. However, 
if the employer does meet these burdens, the third step requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
alternative practices exist that would meet the business needs of the employer which would not 
have a discriminatory effect. 
In 1981, in County of Washington v Gunther (1981) 452 US 161 the Supreme Court ruled that Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act was not limited by the equal work standard set out in the Act and could be 
HVWDEOLVKHGHYHQZKHQPHQDQGZRPHQZHUHLQGLIIHUHQWMREVDQGDUHQRWSHUIRUPLQJµHTXDOZRUN¶
The Court recognized the broad remedial scope of Title VII and considered that it extended beyond 
the narrow confines of the Equal Pay Act. Commentators suggest that this interpretation has 
RSHQHGDGRRUIRUSD\HTXLW\IRUGLIIHUHQWMREV)LJDUW	.DKQ)XUWKHUPRUHWKH&RXUW¶V
expansion of Title VII to allow for sex-based wage discrimination claims beyond the scope of the 
Equal Pay Act's lLPLWHGµHTXDOZRUN¶UHTXLUHPHQWKDVVXEVWDQWLDOO\HQKDQFHGWKHSRWHQWLDO
availability of relief for victims of employment discrimination. Employees who present direct 
evidence of their employer's intentional discrimination, but who are unable to show that a member 
of the opposite sex is receiving higher wages for performing substantially identical work, may now 
seek relief. Thus, women in traditionally female jobs and unique positions, as well as those 
deliberately segregated into lower paying jobs, will be afforded the opportunity to prove sex-based 
wage discrimination under Title VII (Saltoun 1983).  
The wording of section 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act also does not conform to the wording of ILO 
&RQYHQWLRQ,WLVOLPLWHGE\EHLQJFRQILQHGWRµHTXDOZRUN¶ZKLFKUHTXLUHVµHTXDOVNLOOHIIRUW
DQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶%HIRUHDQHPSOR\HULVUHTXLUHGWRSURIIHUDQDIILUPDWLYHGHIHQFHEDVHGRQWKH
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four exceptions, a plaintiff must make a prima facie case showing wage discrimination. The plaintiff, 
usually female, must then identify a comparable (male) employee who makes more money for 
SHUIRUPLQJµVXEVWDQWLDOO\HTXDO¶ZRUNZKLFKUHTXLUHVHTXDOVNLOOHIIRUWDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\XQGHU
VLPLODUZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQV7KHWHUPµVXEVWDQWLDOO\HTXDO¶ZDVFRLQHGE\WKH8QLWHG States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Shultz v Wheaton Glass Co (1970) 421 F 2d 259, which involved 
IHPDOHµVHOHFWRU-SDFNHUV¶ZKRZHUHSDLGOHVVWKDQWKHPDOHµVHOHFWRU-packer-VWDFNHUV¶7KH&RXUW
decided that the Equal Pay Act only required joEVWREHµVXEVWDQWLDOO\HTXDO¶QRWLGHQWLFDO(YHQ
with this broadened interpretation, however, there is still only a narrow base for a comparator. If a 
plaintiff fails to make such a prima facie case, then the employer need not offer any defence at all 
(Miranda v BB Cash Grocery Store Inc (1992) 957 F 2d 1518 at 1526) 
Furthermore, if a plaintiff successfully makes out a prima facie case, an employer may justify a 
wage disparity even where there is substantially equal work being done. The fourth of the defences 
listed in the Equal Pay Act has been especially problematic, in spite of the precedent provided by 
the 1974 Supreme Court decision in Corning Glass Works v Brennan (1974) 417 US 188. In that 
case, Corning Glass Works created a nightshift inspector position at a time when New York and 
Pennsylvania prohibited female employees from working at night. The employer argued that male 
employees would not perform inspection work unless they received more money than the daytime 
female inspectors. In other words, WKHSD\GLIIHUHQWLDOZDVQRWEDVHGRQVH[EXWRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
need to accommodate the male nightshift workers. The Court rejected this reasoning, recognising 
WKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQWRSD\WKHZRPHQOHVVIRUWKHVDPHZRUNWKDWWKHPHQSHUIRUPHGµWRRN 
DGYDQWDJH¶RIWKHPDUNHWDQGDVDFRQVHTXHQFHZDVSURKLELWHGE\WKH(TXDO3D\$FW7KH&RXUW
UHMHFWHGWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWµPDUNHWIRUFHV¶FDQFRQVWLWXWHDµIDFWRURWKHUWKDQVH[¶DVVH[LV
precisely the factor upon which those forces were based.  
Despite this unequivocal ruling, employers have continued to argue, and courts have continued to 
DFFHSWDµPDUNHWIRUFHV¶WKHRU\WRMXVWLI\SD\GLIIHUHQWLDOV Moreover, some courts have applied a 
µIDFWRURWKHUWKDQVH[¶LQDZD\WKDWLVXQUHODWHGWRWKHTXDOLILFDWions, skills or experience needed to 
perform the job, which undermines the principles of the Equal Pay Act. For example, in a 2008 
FDVHD1HZ<RUN)HGHUDO'LVWULFW&RXUWGLVPLVVHGWKHSODLQWLII¶V(TXDO3D\$FWFODLPKROGLQJWKDW
µVDODU\PDWFKLQJ¶95 is perPLWWHGXQGHUWKH(TXDO3D\$FWEHFDXVHµLWDOORZVDQHPSOR\HUWRUHZDUG
SULRUH[SHULHQFHDQGWROXUHWDOHQWHGSHRSOHIURPRWKHUVHWWLQJV¶Sparrock v NYP Holdings, Inc 
(2008) No. 06 Civ. 1776, 2008 WL 744733 at [16]). The Court came to this conclusion despite the 
fact that the men and women had similar experience and qualifications for the position.  
Following some recent high profile cases in the Supreme Court, an enquiry was conducted in 2009 
by the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate. The purpose of the enquiry was to 
H[DPLQHWKHLPSDFWRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQLedbetter v Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co 
Inc (2007) 127 S Ct 2162. In that case, Ms Ledbetter worked as a manager at a tyre company and 
for almost two decades was paid less than her 15 male colleagues. She sued under the Equal Pay 
Act and a jury ruled in her favour. There was an appeal to the Supreme Court, which did not find 
that she had failed to prove her case, rather it barred her claims because it found that she had not 
sued quickly enough. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964, an employee has 180 days after 
DGLVFULPLQDWRU\DFWWRILOHDFODLP3ULRUWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQDPDMRULW\RIWKH)HGHUDO
&LUFXLW&RXUWVUHFRJQLVHGWKHµSD\FKHFNDFFUXDOUXOH¶LQHPSOR\PHQWGLVFULPLQDWLRQFDVHVZKLFK
                                                     
95 That is, for example, raising a salary to match or exceed a salary that a person was previously earning or may be 
available in the market place. 
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refers to the recognition by courts that each new discriminatory payment amounted to a separate 
discriminatory act. This meant that employees were able to claim as long as they could show they 
had been paid on a discriminatory basis within the 180 day limitation period. The Supreme Court 
overturned the previous court decisions on this point. This was in spite of the fact that Ms Ledbetter 
was unaware of the date the pay discrimination began and the employer prevented her from 
gathering information that would have been necessary to file a complaint within the limitation 
period. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bade Ginsburg was the sole dissenting judge on the case. 
,QUHVSRQVHWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ&RQJUHVVLQWURGXFHGWKHµ/LOO\/HGEHWWHU)DLU3D\
$FW¶ZKLFKVSHFLILFDOO\DGGUHVVHGWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ3UHVLGHQW2EDPDVLJQHGWKH%LOOLQWRODZLQ
January 2009. Subsequently, a further Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives called 
WKHµ3D\FKHFN)DLUQHVV$FW¶ZKLFKDPRQJVWRWKHUWKLQJVZRXOGKDYHUHTXLUHGHPSOR\HUVWRVKRZ
that pay disparity is truly related to job performance and requirements and not to gender. It also 
sought to strengthen remedies for pay discrimination. After having passed in the House in January 
2009 with bipartisan majority, the Bill was defeated in the Senate in November 2010. It was 
reintroduced again on 12 April 2011 but in 2012 was again voted for in the House and defeated on 
a procedural vote in the Senate. The Bill was reintroduced in January 2013 in both chambers of the 
new Congress, but as at October 2013 it has still not been passed. 
Another high-profile case was that of Wal-Mart Stores Inc v Dukes (2011)131 S Ct 2541, which 
involved a claim made by one and a half million plaintiffs who were current and former female 
employees of Wal-Mart. They alleged that the discretion exercised by their local supervisors over 
pay and promotion discriminated against them in violation of Title VII of the Equal Pay Act. The 
District Court and the Court of Appeal had previously approved the certification of the class action. 
This was then the subject of an appeal and the Supreme Court dismissed the claim on the basis 
that it should not have been certified as a class action. Although the Wal-Mart delegation of 
discretion over pay and promotions was a uniform policy throughout the stores, the very nature of 
discretion was such that managers could exercise it in various ways. Hence the case would be 
dependent on individual circumstances and remedies, which were unique to each employee.  
C.11.2  Overview of the process of achieving equal pay 
There are many legal challenges in the United States for women seeking to bring claims involving 
discrimination on the basis of pay gaps. The process for alleging equal pay discrimination depends 
on whether a person is employed within the public or private sectors.  
In the private sector, there are two possible approaches. A person can file a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC, or alternatively take a job discrimination lawsuit directly to the courts. 
If the charge is filed with the EEOC, there is a progressive process of resolution, commencing with 
mediation and then an investigation. If an EEOC investigation finds no violation, then a Notice of 
Right to Sue gives permission to the person to file a suit in the courts. If a violation is found, then 
an attempt is made to reach a voluntary settlement through the EEOC. If that is not achieved a 
case will be referred to the EEOC legal team or the Department of Justice, who decide whether or 
not they will file a lawsuit on behalf of the complainant. Not all claims receive such assistance. If 
there is a decision not to file a lawsuit, then again a Notice of Right to Sue is issued and the 
complainant may proceed without EEOC assistance.  
Any court claim must be filed within two years from the day the discrimination took place. There are 
advantages of pursuing a claim at least initially through the EEOC, as the case may be taken up 
and resolved through that process. EEOC statistics reveal that some 1082 charges were filed with 
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the EEOC in the 2012 financial year. While 59.1 per cent were assessed as having no reasonable 
cause, the combination of successful settlements and conciliations resulted in $9.9 million of 
benefits for claimants (US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2012).  
Federal government employees must contact an EEOC Counsellor within 45 days from the date of 
the alleged discrimination. Once contact has been made, the next step is either counselling or an 
alternative dispute resolution process such as mediation. If the dispute is not settled by mediation, 
the complaint can go through an investigation process and ultimately to a hearing before an EEOC 
administration judge, which can then be the subject of appeal or challenge in a Federal District 
Court. 
In relation to programs for assistance for employers to address the problem of equal pay 
discrimination, little overt assistance is given online through the EEOC. The situation appears 
dramatically different from the programs and toolkits available in Canada (see section C.9). In a 
speech commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Equal Pay Act, President Obama referred to 
WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRID1DWLRQDO(TXDO3D\7DVN)RUFHµWRKHOSFUDFNGRZQRQYLRODtions of equal 
SD\ODZV¶DQGWRGRVRWKURXJKHGXFDWLRQDQGRXWUHDFK$UHFHQWSXEOLFDWLRQE\WKH1DWLRQDO(TXDO
3D\7DVN)RUFHSXEOLVKHGLQ-XQHDQGWLWOHGµ<HDUVDIWHUWKH(TXDO3D\$FW¶1DWLRQDO3D\
Equity Task Force 2013) provides a comprehensive background and information about the equal 
pay gap, as well as promotional material as to the work of the Task Force. Included in this is a 
UHIHUHQFHWRFROODERUDWLRQZLWKRWKHUDJHQFLHVVXFKDVWKH:RPHQ¶V%XUHDXZKLFKKDVLQVWLWXWHG
µ$Q(PSOR\HU¶V*XLGHWR(TXDO3D\¶+RZHYHUWKH7DVN)RUFHDSSHDUVWREHDZRUNLQSURJUHVV 
C.11.3  State approaches 
Given the context of this project, this section will give simply a thumbnail sketch of the approaches 
taken by States of the United States in relation to equal pay. The literature and information on the 
topic is vast, but not necessarily up to date.  
Legislation varies considerably across the 50 States. The National Conference of State Legislation 
provides a chart of references to legislation and citations for States as at May 2013, but only limited 
detail is given as to the content of the provisions. The chart indicates that there is no legislation on 
equal pay in Alabama, Mississippi, Utah, Vermont or Wisconsin.96  
In broad terms, the legislation in many States uses the same or similar wording as that set out in 
VHFWLRQGRIWKH(TXDO3D\$FW7KH\UHIHUWRµHTXDOZRUN¶UHTXLULQJµHTXDOVNLOOHIIRUWDQG
UHVSRQVLELOLW\«XQGHUVLPLODUZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQV¶&DOLIRUQLD&DO/DERU&RGH Rhode 
Island, Gen Laws 1956 28-6-18; Minnesota, MSA 181.67; New York, Labor Law 194). Sometimes 
WKHOHJLVODWLRQUHIHUVWRµHTXDOZRUNRUZRUNRQWKHVDPHRSHUDWLRQV¶5KRGH,VODQG*HQ/DZV
1956 28-6-18). The legislation is limited to individual employers and frequently only to the public 
sector employers. In Washington State (Washington, RCWA 49.12. 175), the legislation prohibits 
ZDJHGLVFULPLQDWLRQµDVEHWZHHQVH[HVRUZKRVKDOOSD\DQ\IHPDOHDOHVVZDJHEHLWWLPHRU
piece work, or salary, than is being paid to males similarly employed, or in any employment 
IRUPHUO\SHUIRUPHGE\PDOHV¶ 
Another common formulation used in State legislation relates to the exceptions that allow for the 
variation of wages between the sexes by reason of seniority, a merit which measures earnings by 
                                                     
96 Available at http://www.ncsl.org/ (accessed 17 September 2013).  
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TXDQWLW\RUTXDOLW\RISURGXFWLRQRUDFDWFKDOOµGLIIHUHQWLDOEDVHGRQDQ\RWKHUIDFWRURWKHUWKDQVH[¶
(Minnesota, MSA 181.67; New York, Labor Law 194; California, Cal Labor Code 1197.5). The 
broadest formulation of exceptions is set out in the legislation of Rhode Island (Rhode Island, Gen 
Laws 1956 28-6-18), which permits differences based on seniority, experience, training, skill, or 
ability; duties and services performed, either regularly or occasionally; the shift or time of day 
worked; or availability for other operations or any other reasonable differentiation except difference 
in sex. 
Examples of States which provide for comparable work or comparable worth appear limited, but 
include Alaska (Alaska, RCW 18.20.270) and MonWDQD)RUH[DPSOH0RQWDQD¶VHTXDOSD\
legislation provides (Montana, MCA 2-18-208): 
Comparable worth. The department of administration shall, in its continuous efforts to enhance the 
current classification plan and pay schedules, work toward the goal of establishing a standard of equal 
pay for comparable worth. This standard for the classification plan shall be reached by: 
1) eliminating, in the classification of positions, the use of judgments and factors that contain 
inherent biases based on sex; and 
2) comparing, in the classification of positions, the factors for determining job worth across 
occupational groups whenever those groups are dominated by males or females. 
As can be seen from this formulation, comparable worth is a goal to be achieved by the 
department. 
:KHQGLVFXVVLQJDQGDQDO\VLQJµFRPSDUDEOHZRUWK¶RUµSD\HTXLW\¶FDUHQHHGVWREHWDNHQDVWR
KRZWKRVHWZRWHUPVDUHUHIHUUHGWRLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHµ&RPSDUDEOHZRUWK¶KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDV
deriving essentially from a basic notion, which is that jobs of the same worth should receive the 
same pay (Killingsworth 1990: 1). For example, Killingsworth (1990: 176) states that: 
7KHWHUPµFRPSDUDEOHZRUWK¶LVVKRUWKDQGIRUWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWDQHPSOR\HUVKRXOGDZDUGµHTXDOSD\
IRUMREVRIµFRPSDUDEOHZRUWK¶DQGIRUWKHFRUROODU\SURSRVLWLRQWKDWRQHFRQWHVWIRUGLVFULPLQDWLRQE\DQ
employer by investigating whether differences in pay for jobs of comparable worth exist and are related 
to the sex composition of the incumbents in those jobs.  
Killingsworth (1990: 176, 184±185) also notes that so far as he is aware, no comparable worth 
proponent has ever suggested comparing the worth in pay of jobs at different employers (for 
example, determining whether the worth of the job at one employer is equal to the worth of the job 
at another employer) 
6RPHFRPPHQWDWRUVDSSHDUWRUHJDUGµSD\HTXLW\¶DVV\QRQ\PRXVZLWKQRQ-discrimination in pay 
DQGµFRPSDUDEOHZRUWK¶DVDPHDQVWRWKDWHQG.LOOLQJVZRUWK+RZHYHULQWKHVWKH
WHUPµSD\HTXLW\¶JUDGXDOO\VXSHUVHGHGWKHRULJLQDOWHUPµFRPSDUDEOHZRUWK¶DQGSD\HTXLW\
advocates now appear to regard the two terms as equivalent and interchangeable (Killingsworth 
2002: 185). 
The magnitude of debate on comparable worth in courts, Congress, government agencies, the 
media, public forums and scholarly journals in the United States has been considerable 
(Killingsworth 1990: 6). Some illustration of this can be found in the many references included the 
following selected publications: Killingsworth 1990: 1±10; Libeson 1995; England 1992; 
Killingsworth 2002; Levine 2003. However, as Killingsworth (1990: 7) notes, much of the public 
debate has often been preoccupied with essential ideological and normative issues rather than 
Equal remuneration under the Fair Work Act 2009 
228 
looking at means to redress the economic effects of discrimination or labour market segregation of 
women. 
Although few States refer to the concept of comparable worth in their legislation, the National 
Committee on Pay Equity has identified 14 States as having made comparable worth and pay 
equity adjustmHQWVRIVRPHNLQGµLQVHOHFWHGRFFXSDWLRQVDVDUHVXOWRIVRPHW\SHRIVWXG\RU
QHJRWLDWHGSURFHVV¶.LOOLQJVZRUWK7KHVH6WDWHVDUH&DOLIRUQLD&RQQHFWLFXW)ORULGD
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, and Vermont. The National Committee on Pay Equity has also reported that 
an additional six States are deemed to have fully implemented pay equity, by assessing a broad 
range of jobs and making substantial pay adjustments accordingly (Killingsworth 2002: 178). Those 
States are Iowa, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.  
In relation to a combination of the legislative regimes and the practices of the 20 States identified 
as having implemented comparable worth in their civil services since 1989, the Institute for 
:RPHQ¶V3ROLF\5HVHDUFKFRQFOXGHWKDWDOOLQFUHDVHGWKHLUIHPDOHWRPDOHZDJHUDWLRV
Furthermore, statistical analysis undertaken in three of the States found that comparable worth was 
implemented without substantial negative ramifications, such as increased unemployment. The 
costs to States that have implemented comparable worth in their civil service range from 1 per cent 
WRSHUFHQWRIWKH6WDWH¶VSD\UROOZLWKWKHDYHUDJHDWSHUFHQW%oushey 2000: 29±35). 
Killingsworth (2002: 179), however, questions the claims about the extent to which States have 
adopted or implemented pay equity, citing authors who question whether adjustments have been 
motivated by pay equity. Instead it is suggested that the only States that appeared to have 
undertaken major pay equity initiatives that have been successful are Iowa, Minnesota, New York, 
Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin (Killingsworth 2002: 178). 
What is apparent is that these successes have essentially been negotiated rather than as a 
consequence of court determination. At the federal level, the court decisions have been 
disappointing (Killingsworth 2002: 177) and the only real headway has been made in State and 
local governments (Levine 2003). 
The National Committee on Pay Equity (undated) details pay adjustments which have been 
QHJRWLDWHGIROORZLQJSD\HTXLW\VWXGLHVXQGHUWDNHQLQDQXPEHURI6WDWHV7KHVHLQFOXGHDµSD\
HTXDOLVDWLRQ¶FRQWUDFWLQDWWKH6RXWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLD*DVFRPSDQ\LQ/RV$Qgeles; and, 
following a lawsuit by the Illinois Nurses Association and the American Nurses Association, a pay 
equity settlement using a pay equity evaluation study commissioned in 1983 by the Illinois 
Commission on the Status of Women. 
There is considerable debate in the United States about whether comparable worth evaluations 
produce a significantly different result than would result from taking an alternative process of 
tackling discrimination (Killingsworth 2002: 184). Some also question the lack of analysis regarding 
the potential economic impact of comparable worth (Sorenson 1994; Levine 2003: 21±24), while 
others question the complexity of comparative job evaluation tools, as well as the questionable 
value to women if comparative worth policies are implemented (Levine 2003: 21±24). Differing 
views are boldly expressed. Killingsworth (1990: 283), an economist, ultimately expressed his view 
WKDWµDGRSWLQJFRPSDUDEOHZRUWKDVDVROXWLRQWRSUREOHPVRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQLVDNLQWRDGRSWLQJ
prohibition as a solXWLRQWRWKHQDWLRQ¶VSUREOHPZLWKDOFRKRODEXVH¶2QWKHRWKHUKDQGSURSRQHQWV
of comparable worth such as England observe, that whether one advocates for comparable worth 
GHSHQGVWRDODUJHH[WHQWRQWKDWSHUVRQ¶VYLHZVDVWRZKHWKHUWKHUHLVVH[GLVFULmination implicit in 
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the economy or, as many economists argue, the big gaps in wages between men and women can 
be almost entirely explained by human capital requirements and varying amenities of different jobs 
(England 1999: 748). England (1999: 752) observes that job evaluation, if used properly, provides 
a tool for correcting discrimination while still allowing for markets to determine what characteristics 
of jobs have weight in setting pay. It is also suggested that some economists reject the very notion 
of comparable worth, relying on the premise that economic doctrines of supply and demand can 
define and conceptualise all factors that affect wages (England & Norris1985: 630). There are 
many views in between and they are reflecting on legislation and practices which differ vastly from 
the centralised, award-based industrial relations structure which exists in Australia. 
It is interesting to reflect at this point on the gender gap statistics in relation to the 50 States. 
Census Bureau data from 2012 conveniently published on the American Association of University 
Women (AAUW) website.97 The data uses the State median annual earnings for males and 
females and calculates the earnings ratio for full-time, year-round workers, aged 16 and older, by 
gender. The daWDUHYHDOVWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶KDVDQRYHUDOOHDUQLQJVUDWLRRISHUFHQWZKLFK
means that women earn 77 per cent of the earnings of men (giving a GPG of 23 per cent). The 50 
States have earnings ratios which vary with the lowest earnings ratio in Wyoming at 64 per cent 
(GPG 36 per cent) with the highest earnings ratio in Maryland, Nevada and Vermont of 85 per cent 
(GPG 15 per cent).  
In relation to the 20 States that have implemented some pay equity in the public sector, all but 
Michigan are in the top 34 States for the highest earnings ratios, between 85 per cent and 77 per 
cent (that is, GPGs of 15 per cent to 23 per cent). On the other hand, the States which have no 
legislation and no comparable worth policies tend to have much higher GPGs. 
Needless to say this is simply a broad-brush reflection and takes no account of the many variables, 
including the differing legal systems, practices, industrial sectors and general labour market 
situations in each of the States. 
C.11.4  Summary 
The United States has not yet legislated at a federal level to require employers to collect and 
provide data related to equal pay, so that a lack of transparency remains an issue. Furthermore, 
there does not appear to be a range of toolkits or assessment processes to aid employers in 
achieving equal pay. The Government does not have the proactive approach presently taking place 
in New Zealand and parts of Canada, although the rhetoric expresses a possible future plan on 
these matters. There are also legal limitations with respect to the scope of the complaints 
mechanism and difficulties with the remedies that can be sought through the court system. These 
appear to be areas of potential future progress under the National Equal Pay Task Force. 
Regulation at State level is marked by divergent approaches, narrow legislative bases and limited 
application of comparative worth, which is predominantly confined to the public sector. Hence there 
is little there of direct relevance to Australian circumstances. However, some value may be found 
for applicants in the strategies and approaches adopted by US unions using comparable worth 
studies to underpin their negotiations.  
 
                                                     
97 http://www.aauw.org/resource/state-by-state-pay-gap-data-table/ (accessed 3 October 2013). 
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